UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA CRUZ
3 2106 01502 0990

OXFORD INDIA

INDIRECT RULE IN INDIA

Residents and the Residency System 1764-1858

MICHAEL H. FISHER



SHOUT
SHARE
IT

INDIRECT RULE IN INDIA

Residents and the Residency System 1764 – 1858

INDIRECT RULE IN INDIA

Residents and the Residency System 1764 – 1858

MICHAEL H. FISHER

DELHI
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
CALCUTTA CHENNAI MUMBAI

Univ. Library, UC Santa Cruz 1999

Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
Oxford New York
Athens Auckland Bangkok Calcutta
Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi
Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City
Mumbai Nairobi Paris Singapore
Taipei Tokyo Toronto
and associates in
Berlin Ibadan

© *Oxford University Press 1991*
Oxford India Paperbacks 1998

ISBN 0 19 564419 0

Printed in India at Rekha Printers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi 110020
and published by Manzar Khan, Oxford University Press
YMCA Library Building, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi 110001

TO PAULA
My best critic and greatest support

30
224
F37
1998

Contents

Tables, Charts, and Maps xi
Preface xiii

PART I: THE RESIDENCY SYSTEM

1. *Introduction: Residents and Indirect Rule in Context*

Indirect and Direct Rule: The Issues 1
Indirect Rule: An Ideal Type 4
The Effects of Indirect Rule on the Principals 7
Imperial Patterns Among Nations 18
The Variety of Indirect Rule in British Practice 22
Common Patterns across Empires 24
Japanese Variations in Indirect Rule 27
The Scope of this Book 29

2. *The Origins and Growth of the Residency System in India (1764-1857)*

Introduction 43
From Commercial Agent to Diplomatic Representative 45
Analysis of the Patterns of Growth of the Residents System 52
Changing Functions of the Residency 60
Conclusion 66

3. *The Composition of the Political Line*

The Man on the Spot: The Residents of the Political Line 70
Overview of the Scale of the Political line 71
Civilian Officials and Military Officers in the Political Line 77
Presidencies and the Residencies 85
Recruitment into the Residencies 88

Training in the Political Line 89
Promotion in the Political Line 95
Funding the Residencies 101
The Members of the Political Line 112

PART II: THE THREE PHASES OF THE RESIDENCY SYSTEM

4. *The Origins and Mixed Growth of the Residencies: Phase One 1764-97*

Overview of the First Phase of the Residencies 123
The Historical Context in Brief 124
Residents, Knowledge, and Information 128
Conflict within the Company over the Role of the Resident 133
The Resident and the Succession of Rulers 139
The Resident and the Ruler's Jurisdiction 144
The Residents and the Internal Affairs of the States 147
Conclusion 155

5. *Expansion and Indirect Rule: Phase Two (1798-1840)*

Overview of the Second Phase of the Residencies 163
Historical Context in Brief 165
The Resident's Network of Knowledge and Information 170
The Resident in Indian Court Ritual 178
The Resident and the Ruler 186
The Residents and Subsidiary Forces in the State 193
The Resident and the Ruler's Jurisdiction 199
The Resident and Indirect Rule 208
Conclusion 227

6. *Consolidation of the Residency System of Indirect Rule: Phase Three (1841-1857)*

Introduction 242
Historical Context in Brief 244
The Company's Policies on Intervention 246
The Resident in Indian Court Ritual 250
Jurisdiction of Residents 254

The Resident and the Ruler's Succession 255
The Resident and Annexation 260
Scale of Direct and Indirect Rule in India 262
Conclusion 264

PART III: SOUTH ASIANS IN THE RESIDENCY SYSTEM

7. *The Indian Rulers and their Relations with the Residents 1764-1857*

The Indian Rulers: An Overview 269
Residents and Wakils 272
The Rulers' Alternatives to the Resident 277
Ruler's Efforts to Block or Terminate a Residency 282
Rulers' Employment of Company Officials 284
Rulers' Uses of the Residency 285
Rulers Use of Company Divisions 287
The Indian Rulers and Indirect Rule 289
Rulers Reject Resident's Intervention 290
Rulers Avoid Residents 292
Rulers Isolate the Resident 293
Rulers Discredit Residents 295
Rulers Incorporate Residents into Court Life 302
Rulers Defer to Residents 303
The Resident as Symbol of Status for Rulers 305
Conclusion 307

8. *Indians in the Service of Empire: Uncovenanted Servants in the Residencies, 1764-1857*

The Subordinate Staff in the Residency Establishment 316
The Identities of Munshis in the Persian Department 319
The Duties of the Munshi in the Persian Department 324
Munshis and Bureaucratization of the Residency Systerr 331
Introduction of Bureaucratic Characteristics 339
The English Office of the Residency 349
The Intelligence or Newswriter's Office 352
Treasury 357
The Local Language Departments 360
Residency Doctors 362
The Role of Indian Officials in the Residencies 363

PART IV: STUDIES OF INDIRECT RULE IN INDIA AND BEYOND

9. *Case Studies in Indirect Rule: Awadh, Hyderabad, Mysore, and Nepal*

Introduction 375
The Case of Awadh 376
The Case of Hyderabad 386
The Case of Mysore: Direct or Indirect Rule 402
The Case of Nepal 414
Conclusion 422

10. *Indirect Rule, Pre- and Post-1858, The Model for the Rest of the Empire*

The Residency System: 1764-1858 432
The Political Line: 1764-1858 437
Indian Subordinate Officials in the Residency Offices 438
The Residency System in India: 1858-1947 440
Indirect Rule in India: The Sovereignty of the Indian Rulers 441
The Indian Political Line: 1858-1947 454
Indian Covenanted Members of the Political Service 457
Indirect Rule in India: The Model for Empire 458
The Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and South Pacific Littoral 461
Continental Africa 468

Select Bibliography 484
Index 499

Tables, Charts, and Maps

Tables

1. Ratio of European Officials to Estimated Local Population Direct and Indirect Rule, Africa and India 8
2. Average Length of Service as Resident or Political Agent 84
3. Distribution of Political Offices (Residents and Political Agents) By Presidency and Establishment (by percentage) 87
4. Stipends Paid to Rulers or Former Rulers by the Company Annually in Rupees (1827-28) 192
5. Treaties Providing for Subsidiary Forces with Amount of Subsidy in Rupees (1832) 196
6. Area and Population under Indirect Rule, 1841 vs 1857 263
7. Indians in the Residency Establishment: Percentages by Community and Office 318

Charts

1. Number of States in which a Resident or Political Agent was Posted 53
2. Number of Offices Held Annually in the Political Line (Weighted) 73
3. Average Number of Annual Political Officials per State (Weighted) 74
4. Number of Offices Held Annually in the Political Line, Civil and Military (Weighted) 75
5. Percentage of Residents and Political Agents by Number of Years 102

Maps

1. India in 1797 126
2. India in 1840 168
3. India in 1857 247

Preface

This book focuses on the role of the Resident in British imperialism, in India (especially 1764-1858) and elsewhere in the Empire. Instead of concentrating on official British policy statements alone, this book analyses the underlying patterns and effects of British indirect rule on the Indian Rulers and states, and on how the British and Indian administrators themselves functioned.

The British in India combined two patterns of imperial control: direct and indirect. Under the former, British officials brought Indian territory under their immediate administration. Under the latter, the British recognized the sovereignty—variously defined at different times—of numerous indigenous Rulers, subject to higher British authority. British political advisors, entitled 'Residents,' at the courts of these Rulers provided the means for indirect rule.

As the system of indirect rule evolved from the 1760s onward, Residents tried to induce Indian Rulers and officials to conform to British expectations and to implement British policy. Residents both helped formulate British policy and, more significantly, endeavoured to enforce it through Indian Rulers. Often isolated from their fellow Europeans, these Residents played a particularly crucial role in the establishment and expansion of British rule over India.

Indigenous Rulers and their officials faced new conditions with the arrival and expansion of British power. While some Rulers lost their thrones, hundreds of others managed (by policy or fortune) to preserve some measure of authority throughout the period of British conquest and consolidation. As ambiguously sovereign Rulers over states which ranged in size from a few square miles to regions the size of European nations and over populations from a few thousand to over ten million, these Indian Rulers gradually worked out their relations with the British. The Ministers in these states also had to adapt to indirect

rule. They now had Residents as well as Rulers to accommodate. The actions of Indian Rulers and their officials determined to a considerable degree the shape of the British Empire.

For the Indian service elite, the British presence presented a vast range of new demands and opportunities. Some members of families with traditions of administration found their training and resources less valued and rewarded than before. Others adjusted themselves to these new circumstances and maintained their positions or rose in service to the new regime. Those courtiers and officials who threw their lot with the British form a particularly intriguing group. By studying Indians who worked in the Residencies, we can examine indirect rule from the inside, from the perspective of those who implemented it, both serving and guiding the British Resident.

This study examines the entire Residency system and in particular three groups within it: the British Residents, the Indian Rulers, and the Indian assistants to the Residents. We focus on the Residencies as they developed from the 1760s (when the British first formalized their political intervention in Indian affairs) up until 1858 (when Queen Victoria decreed the system of indirect rule to be the permanent foundation of the British Empire). Bracketing this detailed study of the Residency system in India between those years are examinations of indirect rule in larger contexts: generally within history, in India (1858-1947), and in Empires elsewhere in Asia and in Africa.

The breadth of this study, covering as it does most regions of India over a century of time, reflects the extensive instruction I have received over the years from other scholars. I am grateful to my language teachers, C.M. Naim, M.A.R. Barker, and John Woods, for having helped me gain access to vital Urdu and Persian language sources; these sources provided me with the perspectives of Rulers and also Indian officials serving both them and the British. Having followed a line of inquiry which he inspired, I would like to thank Bernard S. Cohn for having set a model for inquiry. I have tested my interpretations and formulations over the years against a range of scholars, I am indebted to many including Paula Richman, Thomas Metcalf, Frank Conlon, and others too numerous to mention. Paula Richman carefully read through the entire manuscript and gave me some of my

toughest, and most constructive criticism. To her this book is dedicated. The early field work for this project was funded by American Institute for Indian Studies Junior Research Fellowship; later work was funded by a Senior Research Fellowship from this same institution. The University of Pennsylvania extended me every courtesy, appointing me a Visiting Scholar for the summer of 1988. Significant support was also given by the Social Science Research Council, the Fulbright-Hays Program, the American Philosophical Society, and Western Washington University. I thank all of these organizations but they are in no way liable for the statements or conclusions of this work. I carried out my field work in the National Archives of India, the British Museum Library and Commonwealth Relations Library, the Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and Tamilnad State Archives, and the Lucknow University and Universities of Washington and Pennsylvania Libraries among other public and private bodies. I am beholden to the directors and staffs of these institutions for their uniformly kind assistance.

MICHAEL H. FISHER

Oberlin College and
Western Washington University

1. Introduction: Residents and Indirect Rule in Context

> **There are no British police in the [Indian] States, and there are but few military cantonments. We have therefore on the spot no British force to command respect and obedience to Imperial policy. British supervision is represented by a single political officer, whose moral influence is the slender thread that ties the State to the suzerain British power.**
>
> **—Sir William Lee-Warner (1899)**

Indirect and Direct Rule: The Issues

European control over parts of the non-Western world followed two broad patterns: direct or indirect rule. Under direct rule, a European nation simply seized American, Asian, or African territory and asserted sovereignty and European administration over it, virtually excluding indigenous political systems except at the local level. Spanish and Portuguese rule over the Americas quickly moved toward this direct pattern. Often, however, European nations incorporated indigenous political institutions into their imperial administrations to a substantial degree. I examine the most expansive of the European empires, the British, focusing on its most vital and populous colony, India, where indirect rule developed earliest and to its greatest extent.

The perceived success of the Residency system of India later inspired officials in London, and in the field elsewhere in Asia and in Africa, with the idea that imperial expansion need not, and indeed should not, draw heavily on the limited resources of the home nation. Advocates of British expansion, and opponents of greater British involvement as well, began to support the application of an Indian model Residency system in a variety of environments. Some applications of this system came in areas where indigenous political institutions — comparable to parts of India — existed. Other times, local conditions differed fundamentally

from those of India. Further, local practice often departed significantly from the image of a Residency system as intended by imperial officials and London politicians. Eventually, a variety of terms such as 'indirect rule,' 'native administration,' 'protectorate,' and 'trusteeship' came into use to describe practices of control by European powers, often bearing slight resemblance to the original Residency system of India.

Nevertheless, well into the twentieth century the idealized image of a Residency system continued persuasive to British policy-makers, especially as nationalism emerged primarily in areas of direct rule. In 1910, the British Government of India made futile efforts to counter Indian nationalism by restoring 'full ruling powers' to hitherto nominal Indian princes.[1] Still, as the father of indirect rule in Nigeria, Lord Frederick Lugard, regretfully conceded in 1922, a reversion to more extensive use of indirect rule was no longer possible in the twentieth century.

> It is, of course, now too late to adopt to any large extent the alternative of gradually transforming the greater part of British India into native states governed by their own hereditary dynasties...and extending to them the principles which have so successfully guided our relations with the native states in India itself, and in Malaya in the past.[2]

Thus for the officials and politicians of the British Empire, indirect rule on the model of India's princely states remained a goal (albeit an increasingly unrealizable goal) toward which to strive almost until the end of the Empire itself.

While the British (until 1858 through the English East India Company) stood as the most extensive practitioners of indirect rule in history, they were by no means the only nation to exercise — or seek to exercise — indirect control over other peoples through indigenous political structures. At various times the Chinese, Egyptian, and Roman Empires held comparable degrees of control over significant numbers of client states on their peripheries. Alexander of Macedon, Napoleon, and Hitler all used indigenous political institutions in some degree. Further, empires were not the only entities to exert indirect rule over

nominally sovereign (client) states; corporate bodies of merchants often initiated the practice. In India, the French East India Company (founded 1664) experimented with the earliest forms of indirect rule. In Southeast Asia, the Dutch East India Company (founded 1602) first asserted a form of indirect rule. In Africa, the early practitioners of indirect rule included several commercial corporations. Thus, both states and companies of merchants used forms of indirect control.

In the broadest sense, indirect control — or at least determining influence over other states — remains the goal of many governments and trans-national corporations today. Often this control or influence is exercised through the medium of its embassy or local corporate headquarters. The role of the Soviet ambassador with respect to the government of Afghanistan since 1979 — and more generally with regard to the government of almost every Warsaw Pact nation after World War II — carried with it aspects of indirect control. His ambassadorial 'advice' was ignored only at great risk to its recipients. Likewise, the position of the United States ambassador in Vietnam from the 1960s to 1975 can be compared to that of some British Residents in India.

In current debate about external influences on developing states by corporate bodies — governments or corporations — which seek to control them, the term indirect rule has given way to others. Nkrumah defines neo-colonialism in phrases easily applicable to indirect rule:

> The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.
>
> The methods and form of this direction can take various shapes. For example, in an extreme case the troops of the imperial power may garrison the territory of the neo-colonial state and control the Government of it. More often, however, neo-colonialist control is exercised through economic or monetary means.

> ...For those who practice it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress.[3]

Many strategies and tactics developed in India from the 1760s, both by Residents and by local Rulers, are strikingly similar to those found in 'neo-colonial' situations today. While drawing attention to such significant parallels where appropriate, this book retains as its main thrust the study of the development and application of indirect rule by the British in India.

Indirect Rule: An Ideal Type

One of the central arguments running through this book is that the similarities in the patterns of indirect rule appear from analysis of local practice of this form of imperialism in the context of official policy by the imperial governments, rather than either practice or policy alone. 'Indirect rule' as an explicit term was not current before the twentieth century, even in India, where the practice developed. There, officials used a variety of labels for the practice of indirect rule including British 'Paramountcy' or 'Suzerainty' or 'Native Administration' over 'Princely,' 'Protected,' 'Native States'. Much more consistently, however, other imperial administrations — following the British pattern established in India — have commonly used the title 'Resident' to designate their agent of indirect rule. This continuity suggests that the pattern of indirect rule developed by the British in India served as the model in these later colonial governments.[4]

During the twentieth century, European and non-European writers about imperialism have tried to make 'indirect rule' a precise technical term. Yet they have tried to apply indirect rule to a broad variety of practices, drawn from a vast geographical and chronological range. As a result, debate has raged over whether particular historical examples fit one or another definition of indirect rule.[5]

Trying to induce a definition from imperial practice, some writers have fitted an extremely narrow definition on the term;

others have applied it so freely that it becomes only a vague concept. Following the former course, a body of scholars concerned with colonial Nigeria worked to create their own precise definition of 'Indirect Rule.' They sought to define it so that certain regions of northern Nigeria are included in this definition during particular historical periods, while during different periods those regions — and southern Nigeria as well — are excluded. At a conference at the University of Ife, they tried to settle the question by defining the seven criteria necessary for full 'Indirect Rule,' as distinct from a variety of practices of 'indirect rule'.[6] They argued that Indirect Rule requires that: (1) there is the continuity of the pre-colonial dynasty as 'native authority'; (2) the pre-colonial territorial jurisdiction is maintained; (3) the 'native authority' both collects taxes and controls the budget; (4) these native authorities continue to apply and enforce the traditional legal system (although it may be purged of 'abuses'); (5) the native authorities appoint their subordinate officials; (6) European political officers advise the native authorities and control matters which transcend the local jurisdiction of individual native authorities; and (7) the native authorities serve as legislative bodies. This definition brings out many of the key elements in some instances of Indirect Rule. It has, however, two limitations. First, as with any list of criteria, few if any actual historical cases meet all criteria perfectly. Examples problematic to this definition are readily available. In some instances, virtually all parties — European and indigenous — agreed that Indirect Rule prevailed, and yet one or more of the above mentioned criteria fails to apply. Second, imperial practice changed over time so that, in a single example, the appearance of specific criteria might continually be called into question. When defined so narrowly, the term indirect rule may prove useful in describing imperial practice in these specific instances, but has only limited application elsewhere.

In contrast, writers as distinct as Hailey and Afigbo have defined indirect rule broadly as any use of local officials by European administrators. Employing such a loose definition, these writers each proceed to reject the term in the analysis of imperial practice. They maintain that all imperial administra-

tions practiced indirect rule — as they define it — to one degree or another. Therefore, they hold it misleading to associate it with either one European power or any consistent imperial practice.[7]

Even imperial administrators in the field disagreed about whether they were currently practicing indirect rule or not. Successive Governors of Buganda, for instance, alternately denied and asserted that their administration conformed to indirect rule.[8] Lugard trumpeted his administration in northern Nigeria as a model of indirect rule while later scholars have argued that his practices came closer to direct rule.[9]

In order to use the term indirect rule effectively, we must distinguish methodologically between local practice and official policy. Indirect rule describes a range of practices from among the variety of shifting forms of imperial administration carried out on the soil of Asia or Africa. At the level of local practice, we must systematically analyse the complex variety of relationships that developed over time between the European power and the local polity. At the same time, indirect rule existed in the minds of bureaucrats and the halls of government as an administrative policy for European rule. As such, it said much about the European perspective on the political and moral relationship between peoples and polities. For many, the term implies that European imperialists regarded non-Whites as so fundamentally different from Whites as to be controllable only by their own 'natural' leaders and political institutions. This level leads us into debates about abstract principles of political theory.

Much of the heated argument surrounding indirect rule stems from a confusion of these two levels, or from an extension of the issues of one into the arena of the other. Developing the concept of 'indirect rule' as an ideal type, however, one can discuss either practice or policy with relative clarity.

As defined here, indirect rule is the exercise of determinative and exclusive political control by one corporate body over a nominally sovereign state, a control recognized by both sides. To be indirect rule, the control must in fact be exercised: exerted on a regular basis by the imperial power or its agent. Control must also be determining: recognized as effective from the perspectives of

both the imposing power and the local Ruler subject to it. Only one corporate body at a time may hold indirect rule over a particular local state; all others must be excluded. Despite this control, the imposing power recognized at least to some degree the sovereignty of the local state. Although imperial powers often exercised indirect rule from adjacent directly ruled territory, this was by no means necessary, as examples later in the book will demonstrate.

European officials who proved able to implement their policies effectively in indigenous states approached indirect rule more closely than officials who were frustrated in their efforts by a canny or unresponsive local Ruler. Thus, practice in a single Asian or African state might move toward or away from the ideal type over time or in different ways than its contemporary neighbour. At the same time, politicians and bureaucrats in the metropolis or colonial capital might debate the sovereignty of the local Ruler or pronounce policies of indirect rule quite removed from these local practices. Through this book, we will see the variety of indirect rule in Asia and Africa and the frequent conflicts and incongruities between local practice and official policy. By so doing we will explore the diversity and, more significantly, the overarching and unifying patterns of indirect rule.

The Effects of Indirect Rule on the Principals

Using this ideal type, I can set out how indirect rule affected and would be regarded by the five major groups of people involved: the European administrators in the field, the European politicians at home, the indigenous Rulers, indigenous officials who served the European administration, and the indigenous population at large. The effects of indirect rule varied with each, as did the perspective each would hold on it. Nevertheless, indirect rule had some marked advantages of both practice and policy over direct rule for each of these groups.

European Administrators

For the European imperial administrators, indirect rule held a

number of apparent benefits. Foremost among them, indirect rule implied reduced cost to the colonial administration, in terms of both civil and military budgets and manpower. The number of Europeans drawing salaries, pensions, and benefits (all usually of considerable scale in any imperial budget) were far less in indirect than in direct rule. The actual administration lay in the hands of indigenous officials, whose official salaries came from the local Ruler's treasury, not the imperial exchequer. Indeed in some instances the local Ruler paid the salaries and expenses of the indirectly ruling European officials as well.

Table 1
Ratio of European Officials to Estimated Local Population
Direct and Indirect Rule, Africa and India

Colony or Local State	*Type of Rule*	*European Officials*[a]	*Estimated Population*	*Year*	*Ratio (nearest 100)*
British Kenya	Direct	164	3,100,000	(1930s)	1: 18,900
French West Africa	Direct	526	14,500,000	(1921)	1: 27,600
Belgian Congo	Mixed	316	11,000,000	(1936)	1: 34,800
British Nigeria and Cameroons	Mixed	386	20,000,000	(1930s)	1: 51,800
India (all)	Mixed	c.950	253,900,000	(1881)	1: 267,300
Awadh	Direct	38	11,220,000	(1872)	1: 295,300
Princely India	Indirect	107[b]	94,000,000	(1947)	1: 878,500
Hyderabad	Indirect	2[c]	10,666,000	(1872)	1:5,333,000
Awadh	Indirect	2[c]	11,000,000	(1856)	1:5,500,000

[a] For Africa, these figures include only officers in the Administrative Department and exclude those in Judicial, Military, Police, Health, Transportation, and all other Departments who would increase the total many fold. For India, these figures likewise include Europeans only in the convenanted civil service and exclude the Military and other branches of the British Government in India. African figures are from Lord Hailey, *An African Survey*, p. 226, supplemented by Lewis H. Gann and Peter Duignon, *Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960*, vol. 2, *The History and Politics of Colonialism*, 1914-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p.329.

[b] This figure is the total for Europeans serving in the Indian Political Service. Creagh Coen, p.4.

[c] This figure represents the Resident and his Assistant. On some occasions, the Resident was the only covenanted official present in a Residency. On other occasions, the Resident might have additional covenanted officials attached to his Residency.

Table 1 compares the number of European officials employed in administration for selected African and Indian examples of direct and indirect rule. While these ratios are based on estimates of the local population and are for different years, they indicate indirect rule's relative efficiency in terms of European officials used. The sample colonies or local states appear in order of ratio of local people controlled by a single European official. The lowest ratio appears in the directly ruled African colony of British Kenya. Like any colony with substantial numbers of European colonists, Kenya did not suit the indirect rule model. Next, French West Africa illustrates the French proclivity for bringing their 'civilizing' culture to the Africans through direct rule. The Belgian Congo and British Nigeria and Cameroons represent European colonies in Africa with mixed direct and indirect rule; Nigeria, for example, approached indirect rule in the north and direct rule in the south. These mixed administrations show relatively higher ratios of indigenous people per European official.

All of the Indian examples show a dramatically higher ratio of local populations to Europeans than do the African ones. This feature may in part explain India's positive image in the corridors of power in London during the late nineteenth century. Those who make comparisons between India and Africa must consider that India averaged a far greater density of population than Africa. Comparisons within India avoids some of this difficulty.

For India as a whole, combining both directly and indirectly ruled territories, and estimating the number of British officials in the Indian Civil Service, we find more than a quarter of a million Indians per official. As with the African examples, factoring in the military and other branches of the imperial government would considerably reduce this proportion. A more useful and telling comparison might be Awadh, under indirect and direct rule. Prior to 1856, only a single British Resident with, often, a single British assistant indirectly controlled the state of Awadh. After annexation into British direct rule in that year, some 38 covenanted British officials held positions in the district and provincial administration of Awadh. Since the population in 1872 had arguably recovered to the pre-annexation level (following the

decline caused by annexation and the 1857 fighting), we can see most clearly here the increase in British administrative manpower due to the imposition of direct rule. Since Awadh presented more of a military threat to the British after annexation than before, indirect rule did not hold any hidden costs in military manpower that might offset its significantly higher ratio of local population per European civil servant.

The separate issue of the commercial benefits to the European state of direct or indirect policy often proved of less moment to the imperial administrator than his official budget. Since European administrators proved able to extract significant sums from indirectly ruled states — for their governments or for themselves — financial benefits did not require direct rule. Further, European firms managed substantial commercial undertakings in indirectly as well as directly controlled areas. Thus, while a number of imperial administrations had their origins in commercial enterprises, in most instances officials later distanced themselves from European merchants ('box-wallas') and their concerns.

European administrators found the reduced friction between them and the indigenous Ruler and society a particularly attractive feature of indirect rule. For the European administration, this reduced friction possessed a number of advantages in terms of cost, particularly in regard to the need for a supporting military and police establishment. Letting indigenous authority structures carry on much of the administration shielded Europeans from the potential hostility of the local population.

Evidence from India convinced the British Government of the relative benefits of stable indirect rule. Leading up to 1857, the British deposed a number of Indian Rulers and replaced them with direct British rule. In the hostilities of 1857, these deposed Rulers formed much of the leadership of the anti-British forces. Further, the Indian Nationalist movement that culminated in Independence in 1947, like the 'Mutiny' of 1857, had its base in areas of direct British rule and not in the areas under indirect rule. By preserving traditional political institutions (at least in some degree) indirect rule helped the imperial administration stunt the development of nationalism. The new political organizations that

led the movements for independence, in most instances, sprang not from hereditary or traditional ruling classes. Rather, the established nationalist movements generally emerged out of the Westernized middle classes created by the social and economic changes brought on by direct European rule. European imperialists came to believe that indirect rule tended not to generate such nationalist movements while direct rule did.

Further, indirect rule tended toward certain kinds of instrumental effectiveness for the imperial administration. Indigenous officials had a more extensive knowledge of local conditions and languages than did Europeans. Balancing this, local Rulers and officials did not, naturally, always have a complete commitment to using their knowledge selflessly on behalf of the European administration.

Indirect rule obviously preserved more elements of the traditional authority structure than did direct rule. Unquestionably, the very fact of imperial rule fundamentally distorted the indigenous political institutions and therefore 'preserved' an altogether different institution. Nevertheless, the attraction of indirect rule depended on the degree to which the European power wished to 'reform' the indigenous society.

Finally, the social factors of indirect rule proved personally attractive, especially for upwardly mobile Europeans in the imperial administrative service. The sense of racial superiority held by many Europeans elevated them to the highest rungs of society within the local state. Whatever their class might have been at home, European officials usually mixed more comfortably with 'oriental despots' and hereditary nobility than with non-White hoi polloi. Indirect rule maintained the European's distance from the Asian or African masses.

European Politicians

For European politicians at home, indirect rule tended to have more positive and fewer adverse political implications than did direct rule. Indirect rule permitted more rapid expansion with fewer out-of-pocket costs and less recruiting at home, thus saving the imperial government from drawing too heavily on its home

constituents. For instance, when seeking to create an empire rapidly and cheaply, Bismarck envisioned indirect patterns for German rule in Africa, as we shall see below. Nations which recognized the legitimacy of indigenous political institutions, as the British tended to do, found indirect rule easier to defend in the European community on ethical grounds as well. Indirect rule permitted *de facto* control without the political costs of controversy over extensions of *de jure* authority.

Assessing the precise, overall economic benefits to the European society of direct or indirect rule raises the problematics of balancing official revenues and expenditures against official and private trade and transfers of capital. Despite great debate, no consensus has been reached as to the precise economic effects of imperialism as a whole, let alone assessments of direct versus indirect rule. Nevertheless, a general pattern can be discerned between the intrinsic value of an Asian or African region and the type of administration it received. European settlers concentrated in those regions which they perceived as having the greatest value. These 'white settler colonies' tended strongly to have direct European administration. Thus, the regions left under indirect rule tended to be those perceived by Europeans as holding the least promise for agricultural, mineral, or industrial development. This, however, says nothing about the totality of economic costs or benefits of indirect rule to the metropolitan state.

While the pressures exerted by commercial interests in the home nation on European politicians should not be underestimated, these interests made no uniform demand for either direct or indirect rule. Commerce under direct rule had to conform to regulations set by Europeans, under indirect rule by indigenous Rulers (albeit with European advice). Each required a different set of commercial practices, but both proved amenable to profit.

Indigenous Rulers

For indigenous Rulers, indirect rule had one obvious attractive feature in contrast with direct rule: under indirect rule the Ruler retained the throne, direct rule meant deposition and/or exile. The process of European penetration of the indigenous state often

proved so gradual as to allow the Ruler to retain some measure of dignity and sense of position. While the Ruler's role was necessarily redefined by the presence of an imperial power and its agent, the Resident, only a few local Rulers chose to abdicate on principle. Rather, most local Rulers sought to cling to as much of their traditional role as grudging collaboration with the indirectly ruling Europeans would permit. In a number of cases, Rulers adopted relatively successful strategies for staving off European efforts at control or redirecting them to the Ruler's advantage, at least temporarily. Thus, while perhaps accompanied by occasional shocks and painful confrontations, the extension of European indirect rule over a local state, with the active or passive collaboration of its Ruler, usually proved preferable to the latter than direct annexation.

One of the most fundamental problems in indirect rule is the issue of the sovereignty of the local Ruler. Necessarily, the existence of indirect rule demands that the theory of sovereignty be modified from its usual absolute form. The concept of limited sovereignty remained troublesome for scholars of international law throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. European politicians and bureaucrats tried to reconcile their desire to perpetuate the sovereignty of the indirectly ruled state with their need for the right to intervene whenever their policy demanded. Theoreticians created concepts such as 'paramountcy' and 'suzerainty' to explain the relationship between the imperial European sovereign and a sovereign (but subordinate) indigenous Ruler, stripped of many of the key attributes of sovereignty. Scholars of international law debated distinctions between domestic sovereignty — which the indirectly ruled states maintained in name — and sovereignty beyond their borders — which the European state adamantly refused to permit them. These policy conflicts resulted in great variation in the legal language of the treaties between European power and local state. Since treaties were concluded at different times, my analysis of treaties with numerous Indian states (see Chapter 10) reveals the inconsistent development of official British policy with respect to sovereignty.

Sovereignty proved a problem at the level of imperial practice as well. In a number of instances, European officials disregarded or overrode their earlier explicit guarantees of sovereign rights to specific indigenous states when the exigencies of the moment seemed to demand it. Imperial administrators argued that such legal niceties could not stand in the way of the obvious requirements of European control or their higher obligation to 'the people' of Asia or Africa. Thus, the men on the spot reformulated their recognition of the local Ruler's sovereign status according to the specific situation at hand. This does not mean that they always cynically rejected the validity of local sovereignty, only that they tended to redefine it in the context of the specific situation. My ideal type for indirect rule requires recognition of some type of sovereignty in the local Ruler at both these levels — imperial policy and local practice.

The Indigenous Service Elite

Within the indigenous society, some individuals in particular prospered under indirect rule. Courtiers in local states, who successfully served the Ruler or the Resident (or both simultaneously), often continued to build up their fortunes. Indeed, a judicious balancing of loyalties by these courtiers between the Ruler's court and the Resident's allowed them to combine wealth derived from the former with legal (extraterritorial) protection derived from the latter. In addition, the Residency itself provided employment and opportunity to classes of indigenous but European-oriented clerks, guards, attendants, and low-level civil servants, comparable to the classes of employees in a district official's establishment under direct rule. I will explore this class of Indian officials extensively in Chapter 8.

The Indigenous Society

For the indigenous population at large, indirect rule maintained some vestige of their links with the traditional political and social traditions. While looking to their Ruler, the local people often failed to perceive the full significance of the Resident standing behind the throne. Although the indigenous population might, in

many instances, have been better off to have observed the European presence more directly and responded to it, the more gradual transition into European control offered by indirect rule undoubtedly had fewer immediate adverse dislocations for the local culture and society. The disorienting effects of the European presence unquestionably changed aspects of the local economy and local society but these shocks were often buffered by the continuing presence of the traditional Ruler. Evidence suggests that, given the choice between living under direct or indirect rule, indigenous Rulers, courtiers, and people almost uniformly chose indirect rule. Migration — where it occurred at all — was apparently often from areas under direct European rule to neighbouring areas under indirect rule.

Indirect rule had markedly different effects on the local society than direct rule. Scholars of Africa and India made comparisons between the consequences of these two systems in relatively similar settings. For Africa, Asiwaju contrasts the effects of British indirect with those of French direct practice in virtually identical environments in Yorubaland. His analysis shows convincingly that significant differences resulted for the two neighbouring societies due to the distinct imperial practices. He concludes that 'the differences between French and British rule occurred first and foremost in the evolution of the indigenous chieftaincy institution.' The elimination of traditional chiefs in direct rule areas contrasts strongly with the enhanced position of traditionally selected Yoruba Rulers under the indirect rule system.[10] For India, Hurd makes an effort to test the differences in social and economic development between areas under indirect and direct British rule. His critics, Simmons and Satyanarayana, reject Hurd's conclusions on methodological grounds. Their own analysis, however, suggests that the directly ruled regions (British India) developed a higher concentration of 'modern' industrial and commercial enterprises than the indirectly ruled areas (Princely India).[11]

Much debate raged among European policy-makers and administrators about the relative benefits to the local population of indirect and direct rule. At the height of British expansion in

India, the British Parliament gathered a range of opinions by experts in administration as to the relative advantages of indirect rule. Some of these expert witnesses asserted that leaving local populations under unworthy traditional Rulers was not only cruel and inhuman, it was doomed to inevitable failure. They held that only enlightened European direct rule could improve the condition of the people. James Mill provided one such assessment of the costs to the local society of indirect rule, asserting that the British only used indirect rule to placate the British public and that it would be better to annex the Indian states, pension off their princes, and rule the states directly. [12]

Some British officials supported Mill's general position. John Crawfurd largely concurred that indirect rule was an unwise policy, the product of a 'mania' by the British. Instead, he suggested that the larger Indian states be allowed to break up into simple landholdings; Indian Rulers and administrators, he asserted, were morally incapable of managing anything larger than landholdings.[13]

In contrast, most Company officials supported the morality of indirect rule, if only as a desired but ephemeral state. Included among the latter was John Malcolm, who spoke with the authority of a distinguished career in Residencies.[14]

> I have frequently heard it stated that it is...good policy to increase the territories under our direct rule, and that...we can govern them better than their actual rulers. Some, indeed, argue that it is a moral duty to do so. While I deny the first position, I cannot understand that to...enlarge our Indian territories, on the latter ground, is in any degree different from a doctrine that would justify unlimited usurpation and conquest, on the vague speculation of improving the conditions of a native state, by a process that commenced by destroying its established institutions and government,...all native rank and authority [and] the inherent rights of chiefs and the cherished allegiance of their followers.... [T]ies and feelings which originally constituted the strongest links of social order and peace, being outraged and

> broken, are converted into elements of discontent and rebellion.

He concluded that Britain should support and use 'an aristocracy throughout the empire of India' continuing that it would be 'one of the greatest calamities, in a political point of view, that could arise to our empire, the whole of India being subject to our direct rule....' Other British officials with extensive experience exercising indirect rule in the Indian states concurred.[15]

These and other commentators recognized that the British presence in India might, if uncontrolled, lead inevitably to the decline and destruction of the Indian states, unwanted as that end might be. Malcolm asserted:

> But we must try to march slow time if we cannot halt, and to support, at least for a period, what is still left of native rank and power. Its dissolution, to be safe, must be gradual, and we must make, before that crisis comes, a change in some of our principles of administration...[16]

Related to this position, others believed that indirect rule was useful, but only as a temporary condition. The Resident's intervention, so necessary to the system, 'inevitably' led to the destruction of the Indian states. In the words of Henry Russell:

> By degrees our relations become more intimate, the habit of [Indian states] relying on foreign support gradually paralyses its own faculties, and in the end it loses the form as well as the substance of independence. If it is galled by its trammels, and makes an effort to shake them off as the Peshwa [the Maratha Ruler of Poona] did, it only precipitates its own destruction; if it submits, it declines, by degrees, from one stage of weakness to another, until, like the Nizam [of Hyderabad] and the Rajah of Mysore, it expires from exhaustion. The choice is between a violent and a lingering death.[17]

By limiting the degree of interference, however, the inevitable

day would be postponed. Aligning himself in this group was John Munro, who felt that only a Minister, supported by the Resident, could counteract the dangerous slide toward decay in a state so under British influence.[18] Charles Metcalfe disagreed, saying 'it is of all things most necessary to refrain from setting up a Minister who is to be supported by our power.'[19] Thus, while many favoured the policy of indirect rule, they disagreed over the means to implement or the duration of it. Still, indirect rule remained an essential principle of the British Empire until the mid-twentieth century.

The main alternative to indirect rule available to expanding European nations was direct rule. When territory was annexed by a European power and administered directly, the indigenous political structures held a much diminished role. No European empire could afford to dispense entirely with indigenous personnel or authority structures. All European administrations in Asia and Africa depended to a greater or lesser extent on the employment of native authorities, if only at the village level.[20] In reality, there were often great similarities between imperial practice even in areas officially following distinctly 'direct' versus 'indirect' policies. Some landholdings in India were larger in size, population, and wealth than some 'sovereign' princely states yet British district officers administered the former under direct rule and British Residents controlled the latter indirectly. Nevertheless, direct rule stands as an ideal type distinct from indirect rule.

Imperial Patterns among Nations

Three often conflicting factors determined the shape of imperial rule in particular instances. First, each imperial power developed national policies which it tended to try to apply throughout its empire. Second, the body of officials sent out by those powers followed their own inclinations, not always identical to those of the metropolis or consistent within these officials themselves. Third, the interactions between the indigenous Ruler, officials, and population on one hand and the imperial power and its administrators on the other led to extensive local variation in

practice. Nevertheless, despite a variety of forms of imperial rule within empires, broad national patterns emerged.

Particular European nations associated themselves with either direct or indirect rule on the basis of their national policies. The Spanish and Portuguese, for example, retained little respect for indigenous political authority. The 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, by which these two Catholic states formally divided up the non-Christian world, provides one illustration of this denial of the sovereignty of native American, Asian, and African polities. Further, their imperial administrators in the field largely shared and implemented these direct rule policies.

Most scholars agree that the French, after their 1789 Revolution, stood consistently for the principle of direct rule, the British for indirect rule. Discussing their respective African Empires, Crowder argues that 'the French saw the chiefs for the most part as a necessary evil' due to their 'French republican hostility' toward hereditary Rulers. In contrast, he attributes the British preference for indirect rule to their sympathy with 'African monarchs, their ritual, the complexity of their courts, genealogy, etc.,' since Britain was 'a country in which the trappings and person of monarchy survive alongside a parliamentary democracy.'[21] Mair concurs that the French in Africa uniformly sought direct links between imperial France and the indigenous population: 'The guiding principle in this is the unity of France with her possessions overseas.' The French expected the indigenous population to support France economically and militarily: 'the native will be necessarily and inevitably civilized by this process so that in helping France he also helps himself.'[22]

Departures from these national trends occurred in part because of the complexity of the policy making process, even within the home nation itself. For Britain in the early nineteenth century, for instance, the Parliament, Cabinet, Prime Minister, and Crown all took varied and inconsistent degrees of interest in India. The Regulating Board held particular charge over Indian administration. Surrounding these official bodies were various court and public pressure groups. The English East India Company itself consisted of shareholders grouped loosely into 'interests,' each

represented on the Court of Directors which directly set Company policy.[23]

Additionally, the Europeans who set out to conquer and rule the non-Western world were diverse in composition, having their own agendas and attitudes, not always shared by the home government. In India under English East India Company rule, various levels of authority contributed to the decision-making process. At the top of the East India Company's administration were the largely political appointees: the Governor-General and his Council, and the Governors of Madras and Bombay. All of these made policy decisions of a variety of magnitudes, isolated by an interval of up to six months travel time from London. Further, the career officials and officers in the service of the Company, often several weeks of travel away from the Governor-General, likewise each had decision-making power. Finally, local conditions and the policies and actions of indigenous Rulers and peoples of India had an effect on the British administration which should not be underestimated.

Nevertheless, in the field as well, national patterns can be identified. As Gifford points out, officials in the field recognized precedent: there was a tendency to retain 'a common standard...a rationale for maintaining the varying degrees of recognition already accorded to indigenous political systems in scattered territories.'[24] The English East India Company as a whole favoured indirect rule although this book will show that during particular periods elements seeking direct rule dominated. Even during these periods, however, the officials of the Company not only sympathized with local kings and chiefs, they almost universally recognized these local Rulers' legitimacy. The Company at least nominally respected the sovereignty of the Mughal Emperor — and demonstrated that respect through public ritual — until the mid-nineteenth century, nearly one hundred years after the Mughal Emperor had lost the military power to force it to do so. British officials of the Company might break treaties with local Rulers and deposed many of them. At the same time, they largely retained the underlying British assumption that legitimacy clung to these princes, even if that legitimacy was overridden by the

compelling circumstances of the day. Thus, the British most often tried to preserve the local Ruler under indirect rule; if they deposed an incumbent out of perceived expediency, they continued to accord him his titles, dignity, and what they considered an appropriate pension even in exile.

Prior to the 1789 Revolution, it was the French East India Company which first made extensive use of local Rulers in India. Dupleix — French Governor of Chandernagore, 1731–41 and then French Governor-General in India 1741–54, before his recall — innovated the manipulation of Indian regional Rulers for European purposes. The struggle between the French and English Companies in the mid-eighteenth century focussed on the successions of the Rulers of Hyderabad and the Carnatic; the rival Companies backed rival candidates for each office. After British naval superiority had cut French lines of supply, Robert Clive (among others) broke French influence over the Indian states. Adopting Dupleix's strategies, Clive led the British toward indirect control over the Indian states. Horace Walpole noticed this in 1764:

> Lord Clive has been suddenly nominated by the East India Company to the Empire of Bengal, where Dupleix has taught all our merchants to affect to be king-making Earls of Warwick, and where the chief things they have made are blunders and confusion. It is amazing that their usurpations have not taught the Indians union, discipline, and courage — we are governing nations to which it takes a year to send our orders.[25]

As Walpole recognized, the initial inspiration for British indirect rule in India may have come from the French. Following the French Revolution, however, the French almost uniformly advocated direct rule.

Official policy often differed so much from imperial practice in the field that some scholars deny that the former had any determining effect on the latter. For instance, Furnival argues on the basis of British direct rule in Burma (as well as Dutch practice in Indonesia), that 'the economic environment...rather than any national philosophy of empire' determined the form of imperial

rule.[26] Kanya-Forstner acknowledges national tendencies among officials in the field but adds that local conditions and the timing of decisions, at least in the Sudan, contributed to the marked differences between British and French policy.[27] Clearly national policies were often reversed by officials in the field or local circumstances. Thus, the British, despite their national policies eventually came to hold the largest extent of territory and population under direct European rule: the greater part of India, much of Southeast Asia, and substantial portions of Africa.

Nevertheless, the effects of these national tendencies and the precedents of their predecessors led many European colonial administrators to conform to their national tendencies. Gifford sees British officials in Africa as sharing a penchant for indirect rule due to

> . . . [an] aversion to social planning, a desire not to 'mix with the natives,' a preference for gradual accommodation and local leadership [and] the expectations [of indirect rule] of men nurtured on the exploits of British Residents in the Native States of India or in the former 'Advised' States of the new Malayan Federation.

He argues, even when policy was not explicitly based on imperial theory, indirect rule was subsequently used to rationalize decisions made on the basis of the responses of British officials to compelling local factors.[28] Throughout this book, we will see how the interrelationships among official policies, the various proclivities of European officials in the field, and local circumstances combined to produce direct and indirect rule in India.

The Variety of Indirect Rule in British Practice

As with any phenomenon of global scale, indirect rule encompasses a vast variety of practices, even within the British Empire alone. Working on a different model from the Nigerian Conference discussed above, Low has tried to present a comprehensive 'typology' of British indirect rule. Low uses as his criterion the degree of intensity of European intervention into the internal

affairs of the indigenous states.[29] At one end of this range, that of extremely limited interference, he places the Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf where the British generally confined their involvement exclusively to foreign relations, leaving internal administration in the hands of the traditional Ruler. In the mid-range, he identifies the Indian states — apparently looking only at the period after Victoria's proclamation of 1858, when interference in the states' internal affairs was, in theory, restricted to the correction of exceptional abuses. (In fact, as Copland demonstrates for western India, such internal interference took place during certain periods on a far more frequent basis than abstract policy would suggest.)[30] Further up the scale of internal intervention, Low locates Egypt under Cromer where there was *de facto* 'substantially more direct British control' over internal administration. In Uganda, by contrast, the British exercised a *de jure* protectorate but, in fact, refrained from regular internal intervention. Yet further up his scale, Low sets northern Nigeria under Lugard. Here only one body of rule existed, British Residents and traditional Rulers functioning within the same structure of political authority.[31] At the furthest extreme, so interventionist as to be direct rule in all but name, he identifies the cases of Malaya and Zanzibar.

While a useful heuristic, Low's frame of reference does not fully account for the wide degree of variation within many specific cases. The states of India (or Malaya) were not all subject to the same degree of intervention, for example. Further, over time, the same state might experience a broad range of types and degrees of intervention, from minimal to extreme, depending on regional and local circumstances and British policies and personalities on hand at the time. My survey of the states of India (and to a lesser extent Malaya and Africa) will demonstrate this variety.

In India alone this entire range of practice can be found, as forms of indirect rule were tested in the field and applied to particular states at different points in history. To illustrate, British policies in Mysore state in South India (explored in Chapter 9) went through a series of changes, not unique in their variety. After installing an infant Ruler in 1799, the British intervened

deeply in the state's administration until 1812, by means of a Chief Minister the British had selected and sustained in office. From 1812 to 1831, the British withdrew from virtually any involvement, leaving the Mysore Ruler to function with almost complete independence. For fifty years after 1831, however, British administrators ran Mysore under nearly direct rule, preserving the Ruler's authority only in name. Finally, from 1881 to 1947, Mysore returned to a situation of only limited British intervention. Thus, in one not unusual example, the British practiced a whole range of degrees of interference. Ranking a state in terms of degrees of intervention or reclassifying it repeatedly as under indirect rule, Indirect Rule, or direct rule would thus be less useful than tracing its approach to or distance from an ideal type with respect to policy and practice over time.

Common Patterns across Empires

Within the broad range of policy and practice of indirect rule, however, there are a few significant constants. The British — and other imperial states as well — regularly and explicitly drew upon the Indian model in creating and shaping the policy and practice of indirect rule elsewhere in Asia and in Africa. Further, in each British case — and interestingly in the Dutch, German, and even Japanese examples of indirect rule as well — the agent of indirect rule bore the same title: 'Resident,' developed in India. This use of the same title indicates that the policy-makers of all these nations shared a common conception of the role and position of this key office. Thus, by concentrating on the Indian model and on the office of Resident, I will be tracing a set of underlying themes that link them all.

Unlike the Spanish, Portuguese, and French who favoured direct rule, the Dutch, Germans and Belgians all relied (at least initially) on indirect rule through traditional, indigenous political authorities. The variety of their policies and practice bear comparison with that of the British and also with the ideal type of indirect rule. Using officials later called Residents, the Dutch developed their own form of indirect rule, particularly in Java.

During the first part of its existence, the Dutch East India Company, like its contemporary English East India Company, sought commercial, maritime-based profit and not costly involvement in political or administrative affairs inland. Perceiving the threat of disorder among the local states, however, the Dutch Company began to intervene during the last quarter of the seventeenth century. During the eighteenth century, again like the English Company, the Dutch established a system of European officials to supervise the indigenous regional Rulers. These local Rulers were forced to contract to supply raw materials and labour at stipulated rates, rates so low as to be virtually tribute in kind.[32]

The brief period of French and English control over Java at the beginning of the nineteenth century furthered an ongoing process of reduction in the authority of the local Rulers. From this period of English control as well, we find the application of the titles of Resident and Regent to the European advisor and the indigenous Ruler respectively. With the restoration of Dutch control, the office of Regent was reduced to village-level control, more of a headman than a Ruler. Thus, unlike the Indian example, the Dutch in Java never really established a stable system in which nominally sovereign states were controlled indirectly through European Residents.

During their relatively brief and comparatively late periods of colonialism, the Germans and Belgians tried rapidly to institute systems of imperial administration. Both drew heavily upon the experience of other European powers. Neither, however, established a single coherent system of indirect rule for any length of time. Bismarck, after having initially rejected an African empire, abruptly altered his policies and came to envision a German empire based on principles of indirect rule. His belief in the relative cost-effectiveness of indirect rule seems to have been its chief appeal. He intended German companies, rather than the German state, to administer these new outposts. In fact, since these companies proved unable to manage the venture alone, the German state ended up playing a far larger role than Bismarck initially intended. Further, the German constitutional and military styles proved highly destructive to the indigenous political institutions

he wished to harness. Nevertheless, in areas such as the northern Cameroons, where there was little economic appeal to induce a more substantial German presence, the Germans established a system of indirect rule very similar to that of neighbouring British-ruled northern Nigeria. German officials posted to districts to oversee the local chiefs bore the title *Residentur*.[33]

The Germans attempted a similar plan in Urundi and Ruanda. According to the Duke of Mecklenburg:

> The fundamental principle is the same with all Residents. It is desired to strengthen and enrich the sultan and persons in authority, and to increase thereby their interest in the continuance of German rule, so that the desire for revolt shall die away, as the consequences of a rebellion would be a dwindling of their revenues. At the same time, by steadily controlling and directing the sultan and using his powers, civilizing influences would be introduced. Thus, by degrees, and almost imperceptibly to the people and to the sultan himself, he eventually would be nothing less than the executive instrument of the Resident.[34]

In practice the German Residency system broke down soon after it was instituted. Prominent among the causes was the distortion of the local political institutions caused by the German presence. Although these brief German imperial experiments in Africa terminated during World War I, they demonstrate the pervasiveness of the concept of Resident and the persuasiveness of the model of indirect rule.

The Belgians in the Congo initially sought to use indigenous agents in order to extract resources as cheaply and simply as possible. Nevertheless, their imperial practices of economic exploitation and their reliance on *Evolue* (Europeanized Africans) who were appointed to the office of chief — a practice known in British colonies as the creation of 'warrant chiefs' — destroyed the traditional political system relatively quickly. The Belgians shifted their administration rapidly to a condition approaching direct rule. Instead of Rulers, the posts of soldier, domestic servant, Catholic priest, and clerk marked the highest limits for vir-

tually all Africans in both the Congo Free State (1885–1908) and later the Belgian Congo (1908–60).[35] Thus, both the Germans and the Belgians originally set policies seeking cheap rule through indigenous agents. In practice, however, neither power established a stable system of indirect rule.

Japanese Variations on Indirect Rule

Among Asian nations, the Japanese proved most successful in rapidly adopting European imperial practices. During the mid-nineteenth century, the United States and European powers subjected Japan to forms of imperialism, including extraterritoriality. Following the Meiji Restoration (1868), Japan transformed itself into an imperialist power. The collision between Japanese and Russian expansion in Northeast Asia became the prime cause of the Russo-Japanese war (1904–5). Like the British in India, the Japanese found significant benefits from the application of indirect, rather than direct, rule in Korea and, just before World War II, in Manchuria.

From early in 1904, the Japanese Empire extended and then deepened its military and diplomatic influence in Korea. By the end of that year, the Japanese had attached a Japanese advisor to each of the important ministries of the Korean Government. Following Japan's striking victories in the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese extended indirect rule over the Korean peninsula. A Japanese official attached to the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew up a treaty by which Korea accepted status as a 'protectorate' of Japan. Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909), one of the oligarchs then running Japan, went to Korea with the title of 'To-kan'. The Japanese at the time (and most scholars since) rendered this title in English as 'Resident-General'. clearly evoking the British precedent of Residents in India and Southeast Asia. Ito, however, functioned in a deeply interventionist manner, more in accord with the literal rendering of the Japanese term: 'Controlling Supervisor.'

The Korean Emperor sought, as had Indian Rulers a century before, to block Ito from assuming indirect control over the state

administration. When the Emperor's obstructions and objections proved too strenuous for the Japanese, they forced him to abdicate in favour of his son. This son proved more malleable in the To-kan's hands. Finally, as Japanese involvement in Northeast Asia extended beyond Korea into Manchuria and China, the Japanese Empire annexed Korea into direct rule in 1910.[36]

Japanese expansion in Manchuria approached the model of indirect rule even more closely. In Korea, the Japanese had inserted themselves into an existing state and took it over from the inside. In Manchuria, Japanese first sent in military and civilian agents who encouraged separatist Manchurian elements to revolt from Chinese rule. Under Japanese guidance, these Manchurian elements affected Manchuria's secession from China and the establishment of 'Manchukuo' in February, 1932. Within two months, the Japanese installed Pu-Yi, the deposed Chinese Emperor, as Chief Executive of the new state. The Japanese had been sheltering this last Chinese Emperor since the Chinese revolution and now used him to create a state they could rule indirectly.

Since Pu-Yi's imperial family were Manchus, who had conquered China in the mid-seventeenth century, his role as sovereign of the new Manchurian state proved convincing, albeit to the Japanese almost alone (since Manchukuo received virtually no international recognition). Japanese nationals joined each ministry within the Manchukuo Government, first as advisors and later as office-holders. In this, the Japanese differed from the British because, instead of one British official advising the Ruler and so indirectly ruling the state, the Japanese decided to commit some two hundred Japanese officials to the process of administering Manchukuo.

The Japanese creation of indirect rule in Manchukuo eventually failed to serve their particular purposes. The international community never fully accepted the Japanese argument for the legitimacy of that state. Eventually, the Japanese withdrew from the League of Nations over the issue of the Japanese role in Manchuria. A protocol between Manchukuo and Japan, dated 15 September, 1932, permitted Japan to station troops in Manchukuo

and effectively brought the latter's foreign policy fully under Japanese control.

In 1934, the Japanese elevated Pu-Yi in status to Emperor of Manchuria but this generated little additional international recognition for his sovereignty. During the war years, the Japanese continued their tight control over his administration through extensive use of Japanese personnel. The Soviet conquest of Manchuria in 1945 and the subsequent entry of Chinese forces ended this Japanese experiment with indirect rule.[37]

This brief survey of the general patterns of imperial administration in Asia and in Africa of the more important European powers and Japan provides a context for the main subject of this book: the system of indirect rule administered by British Residents in India, 1764–1858. Over this period, the British developed and experimented with indirect rule in a dynamic process. They occasionally exceeded the capacity of their Residency system to affect the results they sought. After 1858, the British tried to stabilize their system of indirect rule as a cornerstone of British policy on the subcontinent. The Indian Residency model provided the pattern upon which the British and other imperial powers formulated and implemented indirect rule elsewhere in Asia and in Africa.

The Scope of the Book

At the cutting edge of British expansion, at the intersection between the indigenous Rulers and the British, stood the Resident. This book uncovers the Indian origins and history of the system of Residents, which so centrally advanced the British cause. No less importantly, I seek also to describe and analyse the complex interactions between the Indian regional Rulers and these Residents. I also examine the people, both British and Indian, who comprised the system of indirect rule. After carefully tracing the creation and stabilization of the Residency system in India to 1858, I then turn to its later forms, both in India and in the rest of the British Empire, from the mid-nineteenth century onward.

The origins of the Residency system of India lay in the dramatic expansion of the East India Company's commercial enterprise

from the mid-eighteenth century. Commercial agents, posted to states in order to obtain merchandise, gradually took on increasingly political roles. Military victories brought the Company and its agents unforeseen opportunities for enrichment. As the Company in India itself grew more interested in wealth gained from warfare and taxation than from commerce alone, it posted Residents with explicitly political duties, beginning in 1764. They, as much as the growing Company armies, began to aggressively defend the Company's interests in the states of the relatively autonomous regional Governors and Rulers of the fragmenting Mughal Empire.

The Company — in a large measure through the efforts of its Residents — asserted its control over the entire subcontinent (as well as parts of Afghanistan and Burma) over the century from the battles of Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1764) to the 1857–8 conflict. The number and scope of its Residents increased dramatically during this period, in several phases of growth. Residents preceded each wave of expansion of the Company's power. Residents guided the surviving states into line with Company policy. By the 1840s, the Residency system had gained sufficient experience to begin to reflect a degree of mastery over the principles of indirect rule. At the same time, the Company's growing desire to consolidate its hold over India led to extensive annexation of particularly valuable or 'troublesome' states into direct rule. The anti-British hostility of the people and Rulers of these annexed states contributed substantially to the violent fighting of 1857. Following 1858, the British explicitly sought a stable system of indirect rule through its Residents.

As the role of the Residents grew increasingly complex over the century following the establishment of the first political Residencies in 1764, the body of individuals who held office as Resident became ever more sophisticated in the process of indirect rule. During the periods of greatest British expansion, the post of Resident attracted the most ambitious among the servants of the Company. These selected civilians and military officers understood that service in a Residency could prove the key to British success as well as their own.

In his romanticized justification of the British administration in India, Woodruff recounts the image held by later British officials in the Indian Civil Service about the Residents ('the political line') as they established indirect rule.

> In the surge forward of those years [1798–1857], every young man with a noble ambition tried to get employment in 'the political line.' There were no hard and fast departments yet, no rules confining a man to 'the line' he had been brought up in, but — apart from the outcasts of the commercial line — the three main 'lines', political, judicial and revenue, were emerging...there could be no question that the political was much the most attractive.[38]

Following 1858, however, much of the appeal of 'the political line' faded when routine replaced dynamism and glamour, as a result of the new British policy of stabilized relations with the Indian states.

By analyzing the patterns of recruitment of this body of European Residents and their staff members, we can begin to understand the Residency system from the inside. I have compiled an index of 615 individual Britons who held offices within the Residencies over the period 1764–1858. Using the words and career patterns of these individuals, I can trace their changing attitudes toward, skills in, and perceptions of British indirect rule over the indigenous states to which they were posted. By discussing the heavy reliance they placed on empirical rather than theoretical training for their subordinates and successors, we can begin to comprehend the strengths and weaknesses of the system with respect to its stated goals. Finally, by investigating the direction and coordination of the Residents across India, I can explain the contradictions between the official policy toward and the actual practice of indirect rule. Further, we can perceive how effective the entire system proved to be in advancing the Company's cause.

The large number of Indian employees who served in the Residencies proved vital for the establishment and practice of indirect rule. Indian experts in diplomacy, administrative assis-

tants, translators, and clerks shaped the Company's policies, and the effects of these policies, in a variety of subtle ways. Although more difficult to study than the more well-documented British they served, these Indian subordinates reveal fundamental aspects of the working of the Residency system. To this end, I have assembled career biographies on 523 of these Indian subordinates and have determined the patterns of recruitment, training, service, and general treatment within the Residencies. Further, I will present case studies of individuals from among them to illustrate more fully their backgrounds, career patterns, and role in the changing Residency system.

In order to make sense of the British conquest and rule over India, we must organize into identifiable patterns the shape of the interaction between the Residents and the indigenous Rulers, courts, and populations. The Residents, over time, built on the experience of their colleagues and predecessors in order to develop tactics and strategies for dealing with their charges. Likewise, the regional Rulers and courts also followed policies that enabled them to improve their role in the relationship with the Company and within their own states. Out of the interaction between these patterns of behaviour emerged the overall shape of the Residency system in India.

Following the traumatic events of 1857 (the Indian 'Mutiny' or 'War for Independence'), the relationship between the Residents and the indigenous Rulers underwent a fundamental change. One of the central causes of the 1857 conflict had been the Company's policy of annexation of regional states from indirect to direct rule. Another significant cause was British pressure for the 'reform' of Indian society, associated with direct British administration . After 1858, the British government resolved to make the remaining states bastions of loyalty to the British monarch through indirect rule. The British also withdrew somewhat from earlier efforts to reform Indian society, and therefore from the need for direct rule. By ensuring the loyalty of India's 'princes' and the continuity of its traditional institutions — primarily through the careful guidance of the Resident — the British Empire was intended to be eternal. Instead of dynamic

changes in the relationship between them and the princes, therefore, Residents were expected to guarantee stability for all time.

India's post-1858 system of indirect rule through Residents became the model for much of the rest of the Empire. Thus, for substantial parts of Southeast Asia and Africa, imperial officials in the field and politicians in London often explicitly drew upon the example and experience of India. Although the practice in each case varied considerably from that of India's princely states, the image of that system remained strong well into the twentieth century. Thus, for the British as well as for several other European nations, the Residency system developed and stabilized in India proved highly influential.

Despite the centrality of the Residency system in India, it has never before been studied as a coherent system. Some suggestive and valuable work has been done, however, on indirect rule in specific Indian states. Jeffrey has developed a useful model for the relations among the Ruler, the chief Minister, and the Resident of Travancore.[39] Reeves, writing about Residents in Awadh during the early nineteenth century, describes them as functioning 'like a co-manager installed in a business enterprise by one partner.'[40] My own work on Residents in Awadh suggests that much of the Company's influence arose through the building of a constituency out of the notables of the court, capital, and countryside.[41] This constituency, which often included the chief Minister and the members of the royal family of Awadh, depended on the Resident rather than the Ruler, allowing the former to isolate the latter and eventually displace him. Panikkar has argued that the Delhi Resident was primarily controlling diplomatic relations with the princely states of Rajasthan.[42] Regani, Yazdani, and Wood have examined some of the relationships existing among the Ruler of Hyderabad, the Resident, and the Company.[43] Bhattacharyya describes the careers of the Residents at Poona, 1786–1818.[44] Yapp discusses the role of Residents and political agents of Iran and Afghanistan in the north-west frontier defence strategies of British India.[45] Further, other scholars have discussed individual Residents or individual Residencies.[46] Each of these studies has advanced our understanding of particular parts of the system, but

the overall patterns can only be seen through an examination of the history of the entire structure of indirect rule in India from its inception.

Examinations of the overall system of indirect rule were, in fact, attempted during the nineteenth century by imperial administrators in the field. In an early effort to bring order out of the *ad hoc* system of Residency, Henry Prinsep, the Persian Secretary who supervised the Residents, in 1825 laid out a hierarchy of relationships.

> . . . there are three forms in which the administrative function is held by or for the native states now remaining in India. First, the independent, where the prince manages his own estate with his own agents; secondly, the ministerial, where the British Government, deeming the prince incompetent from minority, imbecility, confirmed vicious habit, or other cause of which itself only is the judge, appoints a native minister, who governs in his name; and thirdly, the residential, where the British political functionary in person, and by officers of his selection, manages the territory for the native prince.
>
> It must always be the wish of the Supreme government that the affairs of the native powers should be so conducted as to give not trouble; that is, that they should proceed smoothly in the first of the three forms above mentioned, without calling for interposition of any kind direct or indirect, permanent or temporary. It is only when this is found impossible, and when matters are so embroiled or mismanaged as to threaten the public peace, that its interposition becomes indispensable, and ends in giving one of the other two forms to the state. The last of the three, being the most violent remedy, is of course the most rare.... The last, however, being the nearest approximation to a direct assumption of the country, seems to afford the population a much better chance of a government on principles with a view to its interests, than the second which rests on the intervention of a native party at the court, and perhaps even more than the first.

> Sooner or later all may possibly come to this [third] stage; but he must be a shallow politician that would hasten the catastrophe, or attempt the introduction of such a system, until every effort to prop up the native rule, and govern by the agency of the families in existence, had absolutely failed — until the change was acknowledged, by other powers similarly circumstanced, to be indispensable, and was called for by the general voice of the people.[47]

In 1837, another analysis was published for the edification of Residents by John Sutherland.[48] Five decades later, the Political Department asked Sir Charles Tupper to summarize case law on the princely states.[49] While much of his work remained secret, parts were published and used to justify British intervention in the states. In 1894, Sir William Lee-Warner published his interpretation of the system of indirect rule which opposed Tupper's analysis.[50] Thus, each of these three developed fundamentally different principles in their effort to systematize the frequently anomalous set of relations and 'proportionate sovereignty' then extant between the states and the British Raj.

These imperial administrators were, however, deeply involved in justifying principles then under heated political discussion, and therefore lack the perspective of the historian. As a result, their writings provide as much evidence about their contemporary concerns as about the foundations of the system of indirect rule in India and the rest of the Empire. Thus, much more analysis of the Residency system is needed to understand how this substantial portion of the British Empire functioned.

Imperial administrators and scholars have tried to examine the Indian system of Residents for the period after 1937, when it was formalized as the Indian Political Service. Creagh Coen, himself a veteran of the Service, has acted as a spokesman for it, describing its personnel, functions, and goals.[51] A more objective analysis has been provided by Copland. He has demonstrated that the body of political officials at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth consisted of low quality men of poor morale: 'Prejudice against intellectual ability, emphasis on

physical prowess, financial parsimony, and a lack of basic training in administrative skills, combined to produce a service dominated by upright but slow thinking and extremely unimaginative [military] officers.'[52] Copland argues in part that the political line after 1858 proved so disappointing both to the Government of India and also to its members because its heritage of glory and prestige could not be sustained. Before 1858, during the period of the establishment of the Residency system in India, no more vital part of the Company's administration could be found. The early members of the political line brought vast states under the control of the British. Their successors after 1858 merely served to maintain the status quo.

My work, therefore, breaks new ground by undertaking a study of the Residency system of India as a whole. Drawing upon primary British and Indian sources, in English, Persian, and Urdu, I analyse the system from the perspectives of both the European indirect rulers and the indigenous Indians indirectly ruled. Keeping in mind the contexts both of other European empires and present-day forms of indirect economic and political influence by the major powers over smaller states, I will present a study of indirect rule.

This book has four parts. The first describes and analyses the system of indirect rule as a whole: its origins, patterns of growth, and the overall composition of the body of Residents. The second examines each of three phases of the Residencies: the origins and early, mixed growth (1764–97); the phase of greatest expansion (1798–1840); and the phase of consolidation (1841–57). The third analyses the indigenous groups of people within the system: the Indian Rulers and the members of the Indian service elite who staffed the Residencies. Part four investigates four case studies of indirect rule: in Awadh, Hyderabad, Mysore, and Nepal. I conclude with a survey of indirect rule in India for the period 1858–1947, elsewhere in the British Empire, and in other contexts. Thus, to learn about the growth and development of the Residency system is to gain a better knowledge of the establishment of the British Empire in India, the role of indigenous states and societies within that Empire, and the various and changing roles played by

British and Indian personnel over time, and the larger imperial process elsewhere in the world.

NOTES

1. See Viceroy's letter, 2 June 1910, in L/PS /10/173, File 876, India Office Library (hereinafter cited as IOL) details these efforts. The Raja of Benaras did receive 'full ruling powers,' but in other cases these efforts were not successful.

2. Frederick D. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1926), p.196.

3. Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (New York: International Publishers, 1966), pp. ix-xi.

4. E.g. Frederick D. Lugard, *Political Memorandum*, No.9 para 1 quoted in Prosser Gifford, 'Indirect Rule: Touchstone or Tombstone for Colonial Policy' in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, eds. *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 355, n.10.

5. E.g. Michael Crowder, *West Africa under Colonial Rule* (London: Hutchinson, 1968), pp. 166–9. See also the disagreement concerning whether Iboland came under direct or indirect rule in Lucy Mair, 'Indirect Rule in Iboland,' *West Africa*, 2335, 3 July 1962, p. 238 and A.E. Afigbo, 'The Warrent Chief System in Eastern Nigeria: Direct or Indirect Rule?', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, IV, 3 (1968), pp. 421–38.

6. Michael Crowder and Obaro Ikime, eds. *West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status under Colonial Rule and Independence*, (New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1970), Introduction.

7. A. E. Afigbo, 'The Establishment of Colonial Rule, 1900–1918,' in J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder, *The History of West Africa*, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 2:464. See also Lord Hailey, *A General Survey of the System of Native Administration*, Part IV of *Administration in the British African Territories* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1951).

8. Philip Mitchell denied that he practiced indirect rule in Buganda while his successor, Charles Dundas, asserted that the Buganda administration was the 'prototype' of indirect rule. D[onald] Anthony Low and R. Cranford Pratt, *Buganda and the British Overrule: 1900–1955, Two Studies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 163.

9. Lugard, *Dual Mandate*. John E. Flint, 'Frederick Lugard: The Making of an Autocrat (1858–1943)', in L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, eds. *African*

Proconsuls: European Governors in Africa (New York: The Free Press, 1978), pp. 290–312.

10. A. I. Asiwaju, *Western Yorubaland Under European Rule 1889–1945* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976), p. 258. See also his 'The Alaketu of Ketu and the Onimeko of Meko: The Changing Status of Two Yoruba Rulers under French and British Rule' in Crowder and Ikime, *West African Chiefs*, pp. 134–60.

11. John Hurd, 'The Economic Consequences of Indirect Rule in India, *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, vol. 12, no. 2 (April-June 1976):169–81. C.P. Simmons and B.R. Satyanarayana, 'The Economic Consequences of Indirect Rule in India: A Reappraisal,' *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, vol. 16, no. 2 (April-June 1979): 185–206.

12. James Mill was author of *The History of India* and then head of the office of examiner of Indian correspondence for the East India Company in London. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, *Sessionals 1831–32*, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix VI, Testimony of James Mill, 16 February 1832.

13. Crawfurd had served in Siam, Malaysia, and Ava. Ibid., John Crawfurd to T. Hyde Villiers, 24 February 1832, p. 780.

14. John Malcolm's career included service as: Assistant Resident Hyderabad (1798); Envoy to Persia (1799–1800, 1810; Resident with Sindhia (1804); Resident Mysore (1806–12) — largely in absentia; Agent of the Governor General in Central India (1819–1821); Governor of Bombay (1827–30). Ibid., Testimony of John Malcolm, 12 April 1832, and cited in letter of B.S. Jones to Charles Grant, 1 August 1832, p. 717.

15. Among those concurring that indirect rule was the better course and that the indigenous administrations of the Indian states should be strengthened was James Tod who had served on the Residency staff with Sindhia (1805–18), then Political Agent with the Rajput states (1818–22). Tod advised 're-modelling the alliances, lessening the causes of interference, by diminishing the tributes....' Ibid., Testimony of James Tod, 23 March 1832, p. 817.

16. Malcolm to Governor General, August 1819, cited in John Willliam Kaye, *The Life and Correspondence of Major General Sir John Malcolm*, 2 vols. (London:Smith, Elder, 1854), 2:324.

17. Russell had served on the Residency staff in Hyderabad (1800–7), on the Commission to study the claims against the Nawab of Carnatic (1807–9), as officiating Resident Poona (1809), and as Resident Hyderabad (1810–20). Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Sessionals 1831–32, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix VI, Testimony of Henry Russell, 21

February 1832, pp. 699, 851.

18. Among other important posts, Munro served as Resident Travancore (1811–1818). Ibid., Testimony of John Munro, 27 March 1832, p. 699.

19. Charles Metcalfe served in the Delhi Residency (1805–9, 1811), the Residency with Sindhia (1810–1811), and the Hyderabad Residency (1820–1825); he later held positions in India and as Governor of Jamaica and Governor General of Canada. Minute of Metcalfe 1815, cited in John WilliamKaye, *Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe* (London: Smith, Elder, 1855), 122–128.

20. See Afigbo, 'The Establishment of Colonial Rule, 1900–1918' and Hailey, *A General Survey of the System of Native Administration.*

21. Crowder and Ikime, *West African Chiefs*, pp. xii-xiii. See also Michael Crowder, 'Indirect Rule — French and British Style,' *Africa*, 34:3 (July1964), pp.197–205.

22. Lucy P. Mair, *Native Policy in Africa* (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1936), pp. 185–6. See also Crowder and Ikime, *West African Chiefs* and Michael Crowder, 'Indirect Ruler: French and British Style,' *pp. 197–205.*

23. Among the 'interests' which each sought influence and profit in the Company were the Parliamentary, Indian, Private Trade, Company and City and Shipping (later divided into 'Old' and 'New' Shipping) interests. For an extensive discussion of each of these see C.H. Philips, *The East India Company, 1784–1834* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1961). See also W. David McIntyre, *The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, 1865–1875: A Study in British Colonial Policy in West Africa, Malaya and the South Pacific in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli* (London: Macmillan, 1967), esp. pp. 15–17.

24. Gifford, 'Indirect Rule', p. 352.

25. Horace Walpole to Sir Horace Mann, 18 March1764, in *Horace Walpole's Correspondence with Sir Horace Mann, ed. W.S. Lewis et al. 48 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937–83), 22:211–12. See also H.H. Dodwell, Dupleix and Clive:The Beginning of Empire* Reprint, (Gorakpur: V. Prakashan, 1952).

26. J. S. Furnival, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of British Burma and Netherlands India* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1948), p. 277. See also Lord Hailey, *An African Survey*, revised ed., (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 130ff, 528ff.

27. A. S. Kanya-Forstner, 'Military Expansion in the Western Sudan — French and British Style' in Prosser Gifford and William Rogers Louis, eds., *France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule* (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 409–41.

28. Gifford, 'Indirect Rule,' pp. 353, 355.

29. D[onald] A[nthony] Low, *Lion Rampant: Essays in the Study of British Imperialism* (London: Frank Cass, 1973), pp. 8–14.

30. Ian Copland, *The British Raj and the Indian Princes: Paramountcy in Western India, 1857–1930* (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1982), pp. 137–39.

31. While Low places this case near the intensive British intervention extreme of his typology of indirect rule, this is the very area that the Nigerian Conference took as the model for its seven criteria for its definition of Indirect Rule. Low, *Lion Rampant*, pp. 8–14. Crowder and Ikime, *West African Chiefs*, Introduction.

32. Bernard H. M. Vlekke, *Nusantara: A History of Indonesia* (The Hague: W. Van Hoeue, 1959), p. 184. Clive Day, *The Dutch in Java* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 110–111 provides an example of such a contract from Northeast Java for 1773.

33. Governor Ebermaier, Colonial Archives Verwaltungssachen, 4c. Generalia. Verwaltung des Schutzgebietes Kamerun, Vol. II cited in Harry Rudin, *Germans in the Cameroons 1884–1914: A Case Study in Modern Imperialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), p. 186. Woodruff D. Smith, *The German Colonial Empire* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978).

34. In his *In the Heart of Africa* (1910), p. 46 quoted in William Roger Louis, *Ruanda-Urundi* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 145.

35. M. Crawford Young, 'Background to Independence,' in Martin A. Klein and G. Wesley Johnson, eds., *Perspectives on the African Past* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), pp. 576–90; Roger Anstey, *King Leopold's Legacy: The Congo under Belgian Rule, 1908–1960* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); Jean Stengers, 'The Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo before 1914' in C. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *Colonialism in Africa: 1870–1960*, 4 vols, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 261–92.

36. See F. Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960); Ki-Bak Lee, *A New History of Korea*, trans. and ed. W. Wagner with E. J. Shultz (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

37. See Westel W. Willoughby, *The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1935); K.K. Kawakami, *Manchoukuo, Child of Conflict* (New York: A.M.S. Press, 1933).

38. Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India*, vol. 1 *The Founders*. (Norwich: Jarrold and Sons, 1965), pp. 204–5.

39. Robin Jeffrey, 'The Politics of "Indirect Rule": Types of Relation-

ships among Rulers, Ministers and Residents in a "Native State",' *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 13, 3 (November 1975): 261–81.

40. Peter Reeves, ed. *Sleeman in Oudh: An Abridgement of W.H. Sleeman's A Journey through the Kingdom of Oude, 1849–1850* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 6–9.

41. Michael H. Fisher, 'British Expansion in North India: The Role of the Resident in Awadh,' *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 18, 1 (January-March 1980), 69–82. See Safi Ahmad's useful pamphlet, *British Residents at the Court of Avadh (1764–1856)* (Lucknow: Avadh History Research Centre, 1968) for the personalities of some of the Awadh Residents.

42. K.N. Panikkar, *British Diplomacy in North India: A Study of the Delhi Residency 1803–1857* (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1968).

43. Sarojini Regani, *Nizam-British Relations, 1724–1857* (Hyderabad: Booklovers Private Ltd., 1963). Zubaida Yazdani, *Hyderabad During the Residency of Henry Russell, 1811–1820: A Case Study in the Subsidiary Alliance System* (Oxford: The Author, 1976). Peter Wood, 'A Vassel State in the Shadow of Empire: William Palmer's Bank in Hyderabad, 1810–1824', Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1981. See also Omar Khalidi, *The British Residents at the Court of the Nizams of Haydarabad* (Wichita, Kansas: Haydarabad Historical Society, n.d.) for a list of the Hyderabad Residents.

44. Pranjal Kumar Bhattacharyya, *British Residents at Poona, 1786–1818* (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1984).

45. Malcolm Yapp, *Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran, and Afghanistan, 1758–1850* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

46. Examples include: R. D. Choksey, *A History of British Diplomacy at the Court of the Peshwas, 1786–1818* (Poona: R. D. Choksey, 1951), Mani Kamerkar, *British Paramountcy: British-Baroda Relations, 1818–1848* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1980), R. M. Mathur, *Rajput States and the East India Company* (Delhi: Sundeep, 1979), S. C. Mukhopadhyay, *British Residents at the Darbar of Bengal Nawabs of Murshidabad, 1757–1772* (Calcutta: Gian, 1988), and Vijay Kumar Vashishta, *Rajputana Agency, 1832–1858: A Study of British Relations with the States of Rajputana during the period with special emphasis on the role of Rajputana Agency* (Jaipur: Aalekh, 1978).

47. Henry T. Prinsep, *History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813–1823* (London: Kingsbury, Parbury and Allen, 1825), pp. 420–21. Other, unofficial surveys of the Indian states emerged at about the same time. Published anonymously was [John Clunes] *An Historical Sketch of the Princes of India,*

Stipendiary, Subsidiary, Protected, Tributary, and Feudatory: With a Sketch of the Origin and Progress of British Power in India by an Officer in the Service of the Honourable East India Company (Edinborough: Smith, Elder, 1833).

48. Sutherland served in Hyderabad (1817–1825 and 1827–1830, 1833?–1834), Delhi (1826–1827), Gwalior (1835–1838) and Rajasthan (1838–1848). [John] Sutherland, *Sketches of the the Relations Subsisting between the British Government in India and the Different Native States* (Calcutta: G.H. Huttmann, 1837).

49. Charles Lewis Tupper, *Our Indian Protectorate: An Introduction to the Study of the Relations between the British Government and Its Indian Feudatories* (London: Longmans, Green, 1893).

50. William Lee-Warner, *The Protected Princes of India* (London: Macmillan, 1894).

51. Terence Creagh Coen, *The Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect Rule* (London: Chatto, Windus, 1971).

52. Ian Copland, 'The Other Guardians: Ideology and Performance in the Indian Political Service,' in Robin Jeffrey, ed. *People, Princes and Paramount Power* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 275–305.

2. The Origins and Growth of the Residency System in India, 1764-1858

> **the King [the Mughal Governor of Orissa] very affably bended forward (in a manner of a curtsie or Respect) and withall leaned his Armes on two men's shoulders, and flipped off his Sandall from his foote to our [the East India Company's] Merchant [Richard Cartwright] to kisse, which he twice did refuse to doe, but at the last he was faine to doe it; then the King sate downe....**
>
> **—William Bruton (1632)**

Introduction

The system of political Residencies, later so vital to British rule over India, emerged gradually as the character of the British presence changed from almost exclusively commercial to primarily political. These changes brought with them new relationships between the British and the indigenous Rulers. As the British realized their new opportunities and needs, they began to transform their network of commercial representatives into a system of political agents. The Company sent a political agent, a 'Resident,' to reside on a fixed basis at each Indian court important to it at the time. In deploying these agents, the English East India Company officials followed models which combined their notions about European diplomacy with their impressions of Mughal official practice, all cobbled together under their conception of their needs at the time. In the late eighteenth century, as this system first developed, the British did not understand the full significance it would eventually acquire. Over time, the Residents and their superiors accumulated a body of empirical knowledge and theoretical pronouncements to guide them. Not until the mid-nineteenth century did the British finally commit themselves to the Residency system. Nevertheless, from the middle of the nineteenth century, the Residency system became one of the central pillars of the British Empire in India, as the means for

indirect control over some 550 substantial Indian states covering approximately two-fifths of the subcontinent.

Reflecting the unplanned origins and changing roles of the Residency system, its growth proved uneven. This unevenness reflected the ongoing debates taking place in both India and London, within the Company and without, over policy with respect to the level of British involvement in the Indian states. Over much of this period, the Company's Directors in London and its officials in India each tended to favour divergent interests. Conservative policies advocating the limitation on, or even the disengagement from, Company entanglement with Indian politics most often stemmed from London. These policies advocated the reduction of the number of Residents by withdrawing from political contact with Indian states, especially those states relatively distant from British interests. In contrast, East India Company officials in Calcutta, or in one of the other Presidency capitals, or in the field tended to advocate one of two types of more aggressive policies toward the Indian states. One such policy called for indirect rule in India. This policy saw the need for relations with increasing numbers of Indian states, and thus more Residencies. This policy increased the number and importance to the Company of the Residents. A second, even more aggressive policy, however, urged not only deeper involvement with Indian states but, further, annexation of them into direct rule as part of British India. This last policy had the consequence of decreasing the number of Residents and replacing them with British district officials.

Due to their distance from events in India, policy-makers in London often faced the choice between accepting the accomplished advances of their agents in India or forfeiting these gains because they were achieved in violation of official Company policy. Since the former usually proved the more immediately politic option, British expansion in India often resulted from a series of 'sub-imperialisms'[1] rather than any consistent policy of imperial expansion.

Conflicts in policy also occurred among and within the three Presidencies (Bengal, Madras, and Bombay) and between each of them and the Company Resident on the spot. Although the

Governor-General in Calcutta eventually assumed direct authority over virtually all of the Residencies, this came only after repeated confrontations with each of these other levels. Further, Residents in the Indian states occasionally went well beyond the intentions of their superiors. In such instances, the Company's Presidency Governments in Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay had the choice between repudiating the actions of subordinates or supporting them, and thus effectively shifting Company policy with regard to that state. The number and role of Residents posted to Indian states reflected these various conflicts among the inconsistent official policies of each level of colonial officialdom.

Without attempting to explicate the Company's political history I can nevertheless examine the growth and development of the Residency system. Despite the complex interactions among these several policy positions, we can see some larger patterns emerging. In order to analyze the nature and the patterns of growth in the Residency system over the period 1764-1858, the remainder of this chapter has three parts. First is a brief discussion of the origins, in Indian and European tradition, of what would become the Residency system. Second stands an examination of the changing scale of the system in terms of the number of Residents posted in each year to Indian courts. By quantifying and analyzing the total number of Residents on station in each year, I trace the overall, albeit uneven, development of the Residency system. Finally, this chapter presents a general discussion of the respective roles of the Resident and Ruler in an Indian court.

From Commercial Agent to Diplomatic Representative

As the English East India Company (1600-1858) sought to establish direct commercial links with India during the seventeenth century, it entered a world dominated politically by the Mughal Empire (1526-1858). In India, unlike some other areas of the non-Western world where Europeans arrived in force and so overwhelmed the local political structure as to need to take little heed of it, Europeans were at first very much the soliciting intruder.

Before the English arrived, the Portuguese had already managed to establish a presence at the Mughal court. In an effort to secure trading privileges for England, Queen Elizabeth I dispatched John Newberry and Ralph Fitch with a letter to the Mughal Emperor; Fitch's party reached the Mughal court in 1585. Soon after Elizabeth had granted a charter to the English East India Company in 1600, John Mildenhall and then William Hawkins sought an imperial Mughal *farman* (Persian, 'royal letter, order, decree') permitting the English to trade. Later, as distinct from commercial representatives of the Company like Hawkins, there was also a further royal ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe, sent (1615-19) by James I of England to the Mughal Emperor.[2]

The Mughal Empire gradually dissolved into its constituent regions during the course of the eighteenth century. Various internal tensions and weaknesses, as well as the growing European presence, all contributed to the dissolution of many of the bonds that held the Empire together. The English East India Company thereby found itself playing an increasingly political part in Indian affairs, particularly at the regional level. Armed with European weapons and military tactics, even relatively small numbers of Company troops regularly overcame the military forces available to some Mughal provincial governors or to many regional Rulers. Further, the continuing conflict between the English and the French East India Companies, fueled by the War of Austrian Succession (1740-8) and the Seven Years War (1756-63) in Europe as well as by commercial rivalry in India itself, dramatically escalated European political involvement in Indian affairs.

In this context, the initial commercial interests of the English East India Company — still predominant among the Court of Directors in London — gradually lost pride of place to political interests among many of its servants in India from the mid-eighteenth century onward. The Company's commercial agents stationed 'up-country' at courts such as that of the Nawab of Bengal in Murshidabad began to involve themselves in affairs of state on a more regular basis.[3] In so doing, they began to imitate Mughal diplomatic practice, albeit with an admixture of European-based presuppositions and their own impressions of

their particular situation.[4]

The Mughal Empire had its own diplomatic conventions and regulations to which the Company had to conform, at least in part. The Mughal Emperor on occasion dispatched an Envoy or Ambassador (often termed a *safir*, from Arabic for 'peace-maker') on a specific imperial mission to another sovereign. In contrast, some special Ambassadors (termed *ilchi*, a Turkish word for Ambassador or Plenipotentiary) resided on a more long-term basis at the Mughal Court.[5] At a lower level, a Mughal official was expected to send an personal agent, a *wakil* (from Arabic, 'one entrusted'), to represent him before the Emperor in the official's absence. Further, Mughal officials also posted wakils to each other — particularly to other regional courts — in order to look after their interests. Mughal officials normally recruited their wakils from the Islamicized service elite of scholars and administrators who traditionally served in such positions across India. Collectively, these wakils brought dignity to the court at which they attended. Each stood facing the Ruler in order of precedence, ranked on the basis of the status of his master and of himself personally. Each bore titles which had been bestowed upon him by his master, by the Ruler on whom he attended, or which derived from his family's or his personal attainments. This service elite preserved and purveyed much of the expert knowledge of the traditions of diplomacy and administration in the Mughal imperial and regional courts.

Each of India's many regional courts embodied a unique combination of political and diplomatic traditions. Some of these courts centred on traditional Rulers whose dynasty traced itself back to the Hindu gods as Rulers of that region. Others surrounded a Subadar or Governor appointed by the Mughal Emperor. Many courts were nested as subordinates of larger courts. Each of the hundreds of courts of all sizes, however, linked itself to both the people it ruled and also the powers superior to it. A Rajput court, for example, might reiterate or create bonds between the Ruler and the Rajput nobility of that region. Further, the court might stress the Ruler's descent, both biological and moral, from Rama (the divine Vishnu incarnate) born from a fire

sacrifice. The court might also allude to the Ruler's authority derived from his anointment with a royal *tika* (Hindi, here meaning the forehead mark bestowed by a superior on a Ruler at the latter's installation). Courts of governors or other officials appointed directly by the Mughal Emperor would receive each farman from him with rituals indicative of that official's bond and submission to the Emperor.

In Europe, the institution of permanent diplomatic missions had only developed during the early sixteenth century. Prior to that time, embassies had been exchanged between major European states but the cost and the frequent 'disputes about precedence and ceremonial . . . led to the appointment of agents or *Residents,* who were not entitled to the same ceremonial honours as ambassadors.'[6] The title 'Resident' continued in use in Europe until the end of the eighteenth century.

The officials of the Company finally decided to use the title 'Resident' for its agents only after extensive internal debate. In 1772, the Calcutta Council discussed the legal right — as well as the practicality — of the Company's appointment of an 'Ambassador.'[7] Three years later, the Calcutta Supreme Court sent down a detailed but inconclusive discussion on the distinct legal statuses of an 'Embassador,' an 'Elchey' (ilchi), and a 'Vakeel' (wakil) as well as on the legal rights of an Indian Ruler and the Company to dispatch or receive each of these three types of agent. The Chief Justice argued that since the Company's officials 'are authorized to make Treaties, War and Peace with the Country Powers in India,' they therefore had the right to dispatch and receive political agents.

> ...among powers capable of making real treaties and making war and peace it is absolutely necessary there should be intermediate agents...otherwise nations must live in Eternal war or in invidious Peace for if there were not persons Harbingers of peace...the horrors of war must continue.

He nevertheless refused to decide if the Company's political agents had 'the situation of Foreign Ministers at European Courts.'[8]

The Council also sought the opinion of an Indian expert on diplomatic practice. This Indian informant, however, confessed himself unable to reconcile European terminology with his understanding of Mughal practice: '...I understood Vakeel, but what is the meaning of Public Minister, I do not know, Vakeel is one thing and Elchei is another....'[9] Perhaps to obviate such confusion, the Company decided that its agents sent to reside at the courts of India's major regional governors and Rulers should appropriately hold none of these Persian diplomatic ranks but should rather be entitled 'Resident'. Persian texts of the day, generated largely in the Indian states, concur that the Company's agents did not fit into any pre-existing Mughal diplomatic category. These Persian language texts thus tend to refer to the Company's agents with the English term, 'Resident,' in transliteration, or with the personal name and titles of the British official concerned.

The title of 'Resident' apparently seemed particularly appropriate to the British in light of the Company's peculiar role with respect to both the British and the Mughal sovereigns. As a chartered company, it decided it could not appoint full ambassadors or deal with sovereigns on the basis of *de jure* equality. Further, the Company's position within the Mughal Empire would never be regularized in terms of the practice of international law of the day. From 1772, the Company formally acknowledged Mughal sovereignty (when it accepted Mughal appointment as Diwan, or revenue officer, of Bengal). At the same time, the Company also acknowledged the sovereignty of the British crown, although the Council of the Governor-General agreed that to make this public within India would unnecessarily excite the people against the Company.[10] In this ambiguous situation, appointing a 'Resident' instead of an 'Ambassador,' thus had advantages for the Company not only of lower cost but, further, of fewer questions of ceremonial and precedence.

The Company's role in India shifted from primarily commercial to predominantly political. As it did so, the Company's needs and the function of its representatives changed fundamentally as well. The year 1764 stands as a watershed in the history of the Company. In that year the Company both won the decisive vic-

tory at Buxar (Baksar) which opened the Gangetic heartland of the Mughal Empire to its armies and also appointed its first three 'political Residents' to the regional courts in which it had the most interest.

The first of these political Residents was at Murshidabad, the court of the Nawab of Bengal. From its base at Calcutta, the Company had already gained considerable control over the affairs of state in Bengal. Since the Nawab owed his tenure in office to the Company, it needed someone by his side to 'superintend the Transactions of [his] court, to keep an eye over the conduct of his Guardian [the Regent] and his Dewan, in the care of his education and the management of his household, to furnish the advances of his stipend according to the orders of the [Company's] President and Council.'[11] With this posting of a political Resident to Murshidabad having such extensive control over the Nawab's court, therefore, the system of indirect rule in India can be said to have begun, at least in Bengal. Indeed, by 1772, the Resident at Murshidabad had included in his duties the collectorship of the district (i.e. the direct administrator) and the head of the Cossimbazar factory (i.e. the chief commercial post in the area).[12]

Following 1764 as well, the Company sent a political Resident to the court of the Nawab of Awadh. By the mid-eighteenth century, the Nawab of Awadh had emerged as the Wazir (Chief Minister) of the Mughal Empire as well as its most militarily powerful official. His goal had been to control the Empire through his hold over the person of the Emperor. His territorial ambitions had ranged across north India to Bengal and therefore across the lands then controlled by the Company. The Company's crushing victory at Buxar in 1764 had been over Mughal imperial armies under his direction. Following his defeat at the hands of the Company, the Nawab of Awadh, while still extremely powerful in military and financial terms, turned from opposition to the English to cooperation with them. The Company Resident involved himself increasingly in the political affairs of Awadh from the time of this first appointment, although only toward the beginning of the nineteenth century did he gradually come to exercise indirect rule there.

At the same time, the Company posted a political Resident to the court of the Nizam of Hyderabad. The Nizam dominated central and south India, much as the Nawab of Awadh did the north. The Chief Minister of the Mughal Empire in the early part of the eighteenth century and a major rival of the Nawab of Awadh, the Nizam had abandoned the Mughal imperial court for rule over the *de facto* independent but nominally loyal southern provinces of the Empire. For the East India Company's interests in the south, based in Madras and Bombay, influence with the Nizam was therefore vital. As in Awadh, the Residency in Hyderabad gradually became a center of political power that eventually rivaled the court of the Nizam itself.

While the significance of the Nawab of Bengal to the Company declined over time, the other two of these early Residencies (Awadh and Hyderabad) proved among the most crucial in the expansion of the East India Company across the subcontinent. The pattern of relationship between the Ruler and the Resident in these two cases, however, differed in important ways. Each became a model for other Residents to learn from, demonstrating what both to emulate and to avoid. Their ends, however, differed. In Awadh, the Resident at Lucknow presided over the annexation of Awadh into the direct authority of the Company in 1856. In Hyderabad, the Resident returned sovereignty to the Nizam in 1947. Nevertheless, these two Residencies proved to be among the most significant in the entire system of indirect rule.

Over time, the number of Residents posted to local courts, and the scope of their activities, kept pace with the changing role of the Company. Over the period from 1764, the Company's *de facto* role shifted from that of a body of merchants to that of a regional political and military power. By the mid-nineteenth century, the Company was *primus inter pares* among India's Rulers although nominally still under the Mughal Emperor. Finally, in 1858, the British crown tried and exiled the Mughal Emperor, abolished the Company, and made itself sovereign in India, with all of India's princes under its suzerainty. During the period prior to 1858, the roles and the number of Residents necessarily grew significantly. After 1858, the Residents assumed the position of guardians of the

status quo over approximately 40 per cent of India.

Analysis of the Patterns of Growth of the Residency System

Patterns in the uneven growth of the Residency system become clear through quantitative analysis. In order to chart the number of Residents deployed over the period 1764-1857, I have drawn together vast numbers of individual references to individual Residencies and the careers of individual Residents. The Company's administration kept no systematic survey of its Residencies over this period, although it did publish annual lists of official appointments (including, *inter alia* appointments to Residencies), often out of date by the time they were issued. The Company's lack of a clear picture of even changes in the number of Residencies over time is symptomatic of the unplanned growth of its indirect rule in India as a whole. Three distinct periods of growth and decline in the absolute number of states to which a Company Resident or Political Agent was posted are clearly evident in Chart 1.

While this chart indicates relative change in the Residency system, it should not be read as a precise map of the expansion of the Company in India. Not all states were of equal size or population, although each containing a Resident or Political Agent counts as one unit on this chart. The appointment of a Resident to a state did not necessarily mean that that state came under British indirect rule. Further, as particular states were annexed, they shifted from the system of indirect rule into that of direct rule; as a result, they cease to appear on this chart. Should a Resident in a remote area die, it might be some time before he could be replaced, thus causing a temporary absence of that state from this chart. Further, reorganization of Residencies, as frequently occurred in Rajasthan for example, leads to minor fluctuations in the figures. I cannot, of course, discuss here the entire history of the Company in India, as would be necessary to fully explain each fluctuation. Nevertheless, this chart demonstrates the patterns of growth in the Residency system over the century up to 1858. I will then use the three rough periods evident here to organize the



Chart 1: The number of states in which a resident or political agent was posted.

chronology of our study of indirect rule in India.

Examining this chart, one can identify three broad trends in the growth and consolidation of the system of Residencies in India. The first of these begins with the appointment of the initial political Residents in 1764 and continues unevenly until 1797. Until 1797, the Company proved uncertain as to the use of indirect rule and, further, as to its role in India. At times, the Company tended to withdraw from involvement in the Indian states, as reflected in the uneven rise and decline in the number of states during this phase. From 1798, however, the forces for expansion largely overcame those opposed to involvement with the states. As a result, in the second phase, significant growth occurred; the number of Residents increased markedly. Following 1841, however, the Company sought to consolidate its hold over India so that the absolute number of Residencies ceased to grow, and indeed declined until 1857, when this chart stops. I will now turn to a brief analysis of each of these three phases in turn.

The First Phase, 1764-97

As we have seen, prior to 1764 the Company maintained no regular political Residents. Occasional diplomatic missions engaged in negotiation with particular regional Rulers. Only after 1764, however, did the Company's administration establish permanent political Residencies at the courts of some of its more important neighbours. Between 1767 and 1783, the number and influence of these Residents grew significantly, as did the role of the Company in India. This period of uncertain growth had at its heart the most dynamic portion of Warren Hastings' leadership in Calcutta (Governor, then Governor-General of Bengal, 1772-85).

During this initial period of expansion in the Residency system, the Company functioned much as a regional state, powerful but treated as a peer by many of the other regional powers. The Residents functioned more as diplomatic representatives than as agents exercising indirect rule. Many of the Residents were posted to the other regional powers by the Company because the local Ruler requested an agent through whom he could communicate to the Company. Thus by 1783, a number of Rulers, including

those in Delhi, Lucknow, Poona, Gohad, Berar, Tanjore, and Gwalior had asked the Company to dispatch or retain a political agent for their courts. On their part, many of the princes maintained their own wakils in Calcutta, Bombay or Madras to represent them.[13] As we shall see, the Company did not long tolerate such alternative channels of communication that detracted from its Residents.

From Chart 1 we can see that, following this initial modest growth, some decline in the number of states followed to 1797. This mild retrenchment was apparently brought on, at least in part, by the generally restrictive policies of the Company's Court of Directors and British Government in London. During this phase particularly, the Company came under increasing pressure from London to withdraw from its costly and dangerous involvement in Indian politics. Pitt's 1784 India Act embodied this policy, and apparently largely led to Warren Hastings' resignation. Its preamble stated:

> ...to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour and the policy of this nation...it shall not be lawful for the Governor-General and Council, without the express command of the Court of Directors or the Secret Committee, in any case...either to declare war or commence hostilities or entering into any treaty for making war, against any of the country Princes or States in India, or any treaty for guaranteeing the possessions of any Country, Princes or States...[14]

The Company's Court of Directors supported this policy of withdrawal from involvement with the Indian states in a large measure due to the financial cost of the Residencies.[15] The conservative policies of the Directors found support under Governors-General Macpherson (1785-6) and Cornwallis (1786-93, 1805). The latter assured the Directors: 'The expenses attending residencies and Deputations suggest the Propriety of discontinuing them whenever circumstances will admit...'[16]

Local policy decisions in India also contributed to this decline.

The Company's officials in the Presidencies often disagreed as to the benefits and costs of retaining Residents. On occasion, gaps occurred due to the lack of a regular system: Residents withdrew temporarily from their posts or retired before their successors arrived. During this phase as well, some Indian Rulers, like the Mughal Emperor, requested that the Company withdraw its agent as unnecessary or disadvantageous to that Ruler.[17] Since many of the Indian Rulers believed themselves to be the equal or superior of the Company, militarily and/or politically, they demanded control over its Resident at their court.[18]

The evidence from Chart 1, therefore, illustrates how conditions in India and policy from London combined to limit the Company's political role in India. In consequence of all these causes, the number of Residents sank from a peak of eleven states (1782), fluctuating around four (1786) or five (1789, 1790, 1796, and 1797). During this period of decline in the number of Residents, they played a reduced role as well. The Residents who remained served more as diplomatic agents than as the means for indirect control over the other regional states of India. The Company enjoyed the prestige of some military victories but not the paramountcy it would later establish. Chapter 4 will describe and analyze this first phase extensively.

The Second Phase, 1798-1840

The Company's closed frontier policy shifted in 1798 to an aggressive policy and thus began the dramatic expansion that characterized phase two. As seen clearly in Chart 1, from 1798 to 1840 the Company entered its major period of rapid expansion of influence over large parts of the subcontinent. This advance created not only larger numbers of Residents, it also changed their roles. The Company, by means of its Residents, gradually assumed a position of indirect control over most of the Indian states including the largest ones: Awadh, Hyderabad, and Mysore. Although this clearly resulted from more than the actions of a single man, the forward policies initiated by Governor-General Wellesley (1798-1805) certainly gave additional impetus to this expansion. As Wellesley's Chief Secretary instructed the Resident at Delhi,

looking back to the developments since 1798 and writing at the beginning of 1805:

> The various and important additions which have been made to the British territory in India during the last seven years [i.e. since 1798] have originated in the prosecution of just and necessary wars or, of positive right under established treaties. The augmentations of territory which have accomplished either the success of our arms or the improvements effected in our subsidiary alliances with various Native States, have been justified in point of policy as well as of right by their inseparable Connections with the foundations of our security, public faith, honour and independence in India...[These alliances are] the main spring of our interests, power, and glory in India.[19]

Panikkar argues that Wellesley's 1798 Treaty with Hyderabad is 'the bed-rock of Indian state policy and the foundation on which the Imperial edifice of Britain in India has been built.'[20]

During this period of expansion, the number of states to which a Resident or Political Agent was posted climbed in the wave-like pattern visible in Chart 1. Two factors contributed to the uneven quality of this rise. The first consisted of continuing conflict, which we have seen earlier, between the advances generated by Company officials in India and the checks on those advances exerted from London. Representing the interests of many officials in India, George Barlow (a career civil servant in India, 1778-1813) wrote in 1803 as Vice-President of the Calcutta Council, 'It is absolutely necessary that no Native State should be left to exist in India which is not upheld by the British power or the political conduct of which is not under its absolute control.'[21] In 1805, however, the Court of Directors recalled Wellesley and appointed Cornwallis as Governor-General to administer a policy of non-interference in the Indian states. After Cornwallis' death the same year, British officials in India regained their initiative for greater Company involvement and expansion; a series of sub-imperialisms resulted. This interaction between directives for restraint and drives for territorial extensions by the Company's

officials in the field thus contributed one factor in the sinuous increase described on Chart 1.

The second factor contributing to the uneven rise in the number of states with Residencies over the period through 1840 consisted of the form that British expansion took. The Company's first formal involvement with a state often began with the posting of a Resident to it. Should the Resident not be able to control that state himself, the military branch of the Company took over. The Company's armies tended to concentrate their efforts, thrusting themselves — and therefore the Company's control and influence — over one state at a time. Once conquered by the Company, a state was either annexed into direct British administration or left to the Resident to control indirectly, perhaps to be annexed by the Company later. This advance and consolidation thus proved a second factor which led to the wave-like rise in the number of states with Residencies on Chart 1. Chapter 5 takes up this second phase of growth in the Residency system.

The Third Phase, 1841-57

The final phase indicated on our Chart, that of consolidation, began around 1841. This year did not mark a radical shift in Company policy or practice. Rather, at this point the forces of consolidation overcame the forces of expansion; the peak of the growth of the Residency system had been passed and the pace of the Company's incorporation of the territories of Indian states into direct rule began to accelerate.

The facts of physical geography played a role in this transition to consolidation rather than expansion. By this time, the Company's armies had reached the physical boundaries of the subcontinent. Indicative that the Company had reached its geographical limits was the disastrous — for the Company — First Afghan War (1838-42). This war thus marked the furthest extent of the Company's hitherto virtually unchecked military expansion. The Company's failure to bring Afghanistan into its indirect control through a Resident revealed to British policy-makers some of the limits of indirect rule.

Since after 1841 the Company's extension of its influence over

new states in India effectively halted, the number of states on Chart 1 show no increase. As we shall see, the depth of the Company's involvement and interference within the Indian states did not necessarily decline, however. On the contrary, states including Awadh, Jhansi, Nagpur, and a number in the Punjab, were annexed and taken under direct Company control. Others, like those of Rajasthan, were brought together under a fewer number of Residencies. Still others, like those of Southeast Asia, were transferred from the Company's control to that of the Colonial Office. As a result, the number of states on Chart 1 registers a net decline from a peak of 47 (1840) to a low of 33 (1857, anomalously low because of the disruptive events of that year). Chapter 6 will examine this third phase.

The Residency System, 1858-1947

Chart 1's termination in 1857 coincides with the end of the period of British expansion over the Indian states. Following Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858 which guaranteed the rule of the loyal princes of India, British policy changed its course. The number of states, and their relations with the British, were stabilized. The 1857 fighting had been confined primarily to areas under direct British control. Key states including Hyderabad had been held out of the battle against the British by their Rulers and Residents. Even in the areas where the populace had risen against the British, Rulers or deposed Rulers had exerted authority, an authority which the British sought after 1858 to harness to their own purposes.[22] After 1858, the British annexed few of the remaining states. Indeed, British policy depended on the Indian Rulers as the 'natural leaders' who would hold the people of their states in loyalty to the British crown.

In addition, after 1858 British imperial administrators and officials held up the system of indirect rule in India as the model to be followed by much of the rest of the Empire. The images of India's Rulers, loyal to the core, and of Residents as their paternalistic guides, became a matter of faith within the Empire. Officials and politicians in the rest of the Empire used the success of the

Residency system in India to justify their own advances and establishment of indirect rule, just as they used the basic principles developed empirically by the members of the 'political line' in India. Chapter 11 will survey the Residency system from 1857 until Independence in 1947. Chapter 12 traces the principles of indirect rule developed in India as they spread throughout the British Empire, and indeed were borrowed by other colonial powers as well.

Much of the remainder of this book will use these three phases of the growth of the Residency system to 1857 as the organizing framework. We have seen that the three phases reflect the quantitative summation of a variety of factors including official British policy, the practice of Residents and other officials in the field, and local conditions in each state. The patterns of change in any one of these factors might differ significantly in terms of periodization from the three phases demonstrated on Chart 1. Nevertheless, as a heuristic, these three phases allow us to punctuate our discussion of the Residency system over nearly a century of sweeping change.

Having laid out these overall patterns above, I can now turn in the remainder of this chapter to a more concentrated examination of the role that Residents played. Each Resident's relationship to each Indian Ruler varied considerably but certain analytic patterns do emerge. The Company's expectations for the office of Resident also varied from state to state and over time. Nevertheless, here too, specific patterns are clear. Within the context of the origins and growth of the Residency system described above, I will turn to an examination of the role of the Resident. I will present a broad discussion of the general position of the Resident in an Indian court and then examine specific aspects of the Residency system in later chapters.

Changing Functions of the Residents

No one, Indian or British, apparently imagined in the early stages that the deployment of the first few political Residents would harbinger the extensive system of indirect rule over much of India

that would later develop. From the time of the initial appointment of political Residents in 1764 until the reconstruction of the Residency system following the bloody fighting of 1857, the Residencies reflected and, in a large measure, determined the shifting relationship between the East India Company and the various Indian Rulers. Over time, Residents came to perform many duties. Fundamental among these duties were control over communication between the court and the Company, influence over the internal and foreign policies of the Ruler, supervision of the state administration, and intervention on behalf of British policy or in the name of the people of the state.

The Resident, as the central yet slender thread that bound the Indian states to the British Government of India, had to deal with tensions of various types. On one side, each Resident had a personal career in the Company. A posting to a particular Residency formed only one step in his lifetime of military or civil service. A Resident thus at least in part measured success or failure at a Residency by the consequences for his own career, as well as by his effects on the local state. Since each Resident worked in relative isolation from the rest of the Company (often a week or more by runner from the secretariat), he often had to anticipate his superior's assessment of the situation and instructions. Not all British officials agreed on specific policies or even the fundamental issues of indirect rule. This meant that individual Residents occasionally carried out policies which they personally questioned. While the Resident's primary bonds were to the Company, he also developed links to the Indian court where he served.

Primary among the Resident's duties, particularly during the first phase, was to control political communication into and out of the Indian court. The Resident lived at a distinctive Indian court. He had to acquire the ability to function in an alien environment and language. Often the only British official in the state, the Resident had to depend on his Indian subordinates to guide him through the intricacies of local court politics and formalities. The Resident had to extract knowledge, by overt and covert means, that might be useful to his superiors. This knowledge then permitted the Company to develop policy with regard both to that

state and the larger political arena of India. Further, the Resident's job included progressively isolating this one state politically from the rest of India and the world. In so doing, he sought to make himself the sole diplomatic link among that court, the Company, and other Rulers. This official and enforced isolation of each state by the Company proved to be a major segment of the foundation of its system of indirect rule in India.

As the Company's diplomatic representative in the state's capital, the Resident had to learn about, and then to gain subtle yet effective influence over, the Ruler. Such influence permitted the Resident to bring the Ruler's diplomatic relations into accord with the interests of the Company. It also allowed the Resident to affect the Ruler's policies within his state. The Resident often had to use threats and other pressures to implement Company policy when it conflicted with local interests. Yet, the Resident had to adjust his stress to the situation; reining the Ruler in too severely or too obviously might have the effect of reducing that Ruler's authority, and thus his utility to the Company. The converse, abstention from sufficient authority, might lead to a combination of states against the Company or to disorder within the state, disorder that could spread to adjacent states or Company territory. Eventually, the Resident's influence extended to the arbitration of dynastic succession and even tenure on the throne. By establishing and maintaining the dependency of the ruling dynasty on the Company, the Resident harnessed the residual authority of the Ruler to the purposes of the British.

As the British official charged with guiding the internal affairs of the state into accord with Company policies, the Resident often supervised the local administration. The Resident had to ensure that the state's Ministers also served the Company's interests, even if only indirectly. On occasion this meant the Resident's intervention in the state administration. The Resident, in some circumstances, had to assume the direct administration of the state, often with insufficient knowledge about it and with little or no time for preparation.

As the Company-delegated embodiment of British civilization and morality, the Resident sought to ensure the welfare — as

defined by the Resident and the Company — of the people of the state. The Company saw this responsibility as validating the Resident's sometimes arbitrary and extra-legal exertion of power. In a few examples, this self-perceived obligation legitimized for Britain and the Company its annexation of the state into its directly ruled territories.

As 'the man on the spot', the Resident had the responsibility to implement British policy in the state where he held his post. British policies, however, shifted over time and varied with the circumstances of each Indian court. In consequence, each Resident had to learn or devise tactics and strategies that would enable him to implement the Company's policies of the day in his particular court. On occasion, the Governor-General instructed a Resident to achieve a specific goal. More generally, the Company expected the Resident to understand overall British policies and gave him only the most vague of briefs. Since a Resident usually held office at more than one court during his career, he needed to learn quickly the peculiarities of each, drawing upon and adapting his past experiences to suit the circumstance at hand. Indian Rulers and officials thus in large measure set the context for the Resident.

On their part, the regional Rulers and officials with whom the Residents dealt also developed tactics and strategies for achieving their own purposes. Likewise, Indian Rulers and courtiers sought to frustrate those policies of the Resident and Company which seemed threatening to them. While the British ultimately could use military force to overpower any direct opposition in a particular state, the shape of indirect rule derived as much from the actions of Indians as it did from those of Britons.

The Ruler and each of the factions in his court and administration had their own particular agendas, not often identical with that of the Resident. To them, the Resident represented an alien power. If left unchecked, this power could disrupt extant relationships and displace incumbent authority. If isolated from sources of knowledge or information, it could be held off, at least to some measure. If harnessed to their purposes, the Resident's power could prove valuable to particular elements within the court. Just

as the Company and individual Residents experimented with different methods to manipulate Indian Rulers and courtiers, so also did the latter try empirically to discover ways of using the British presence, or at least negating its most threatening features.

The relationship between the Resident and the local Ruler and court was never perfectly symmetrical. The imbalance became inexorable over the course of the second stage of growth of the system (1798-1840). The point of decisive British dominance naturally came at different times in each region of India. In the south, for example, the British did not reach undisputed military supremacy until the Fourth Mysore War (1799), in the west until the Third Maratha War (1817-19), in the Punjab until the Second Sikh War (1849). Thereafter, the Company held such military superiority in India as to overwhelm any of the Indian princes individually. This meant that no prince could completely reject the Resident's presence or influence; at best an Indian Ruler could modify or redirect the Company's impact. Nor, in the pre-1858 period, could the states sustain their own means of access to British information or power as an alternative and counterbalance to the Resident.

Looking out from the state, a Ruler and his courtiers found that the Resident's presence came to loom so large as to obscure not only the rest of the British presence but to some degree their neighbours as well. Some Rulers and officials made repeated — but ultimately futile — attempts to get around the Resident and deal directly with the Governor-General, the British monarch, or even elements within the British public, in India or in Britain. In each instance, the Company discovered and blocked these attempts, channelling all communications from the court through the Resident. Thus, perforce, the Rulers and courtiers had to accept a relationship to the Resident. The Company could decisively interfere in their affairs. A Ruler found it sometimes possible, but always difficult, to interfere significantly in the Company's affairs outside of the Ruler's own state.

The asymmetry of their relationship extended to their respective local tenures as well. Once a Ruler ascended the throne he remained there for the remainder of his or her life, barring rare,

untoward circumstances. A Resident served in a single state for only a few years on average before moving on to the next. A Ruler therefore in most cases would have to deal with a series of Residents during his or her reign. Each new Resident represented, in some measure, a fresh start for the Ruler. Personal difficulties which a Ruler had encountered with one Resident might not carry over to the next. On the other hand, methods which a Ruler had successfully used to manipulate one Resident might not work with the next. The Ruler's continuity of experience remained primarily confined to his or her own state, although the isolation imposed by the Company on a Ruler could not preclude his or her general knowledge about or social links to neighbouring courts.

Conversely, most Residents relied on personal and official experience drawn from careers dealing with several states — and usually with districts in directly ruled British India as well. As a consequence, the British perspective by and large encompassed the Indian states as a whole rather than a single state, as did the perspective of most Rulers. Thus each Resident held a broader range of experience than did any one Indian Ruler. Conversely, due to his relatively short tenure in a particular court, a Resident tended to apply in his current court the tactics he had found effective in previous postings. Since courts differed widely in composition, organization, and issues, such practice often led to misunderstanding on both sides. To learn about his current court, a Resident had to rely heavily on Indian guides and informants, both on his official staff and in the local court and administration.

The greatest instability in a relationship between an Indian Ruler and a Resident thus came at the time of a succession on either side. For a Ruler, the appointment of a new Resident to his or her court meant the entry of a whole new set of uncertainties, and possibilities. On the Company's part, a Resident often preferred to await the death of a Ruler before making fundamental changes in its relations with that state. This avoided conflicts with precedent for an incumbent Ruler. As we shall see, the Company occasionally decreed unilaterally that its treaties were personal to the incumbent Ruler and had to be renegotiated with a late Ruler's successor. Since contenders for a throne were almost

uniformly less securely in power than established incumbents, a royal succession thus proved a time of particular strength for the Company and weakness for the state. On occasion, the Resident supervised the education of potential heirs; some Residents even directed the regency council for minor or incompetent Rulers, thus ensuring Residency dominance.

The duties and assignments for individual Residents varied considerably over each of our three phases of growth from 1764 to 1858. Company policy changed significantly with respect to the Indian states as a whole and in terms of each individual state. The Company rarely provided its Residents even with explicit principles of guidance and only occasionally with specific instructions. Indeed, the Company often shifted its ground or acted in inconsistent ways in different parts of India during the same period. Nevertheless, by pulling together examples of policy statements and instructions from the Governor-General and more so by examining the strategies and tactics of Residents in several states, we can see patterns in their practice. Equally important, by analyzing the statements and actions of the Rulers, courtiers, and administrators in the various Indian states over this same period, I can discover the methods developed and employed by them in their relationship to the Resident at their court. I shall also trace how these patterns changed over time.

Conclusion

The East India Company shifted its character in India from primarily a commercial enterprise to increasingly a political entity from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century. As the Company gradually and inconsistently made this shift, the nature of its relations with the Indian states likewise altered. Reflecting these altered relations, the Company posted British Residents to those states and charged them with managing these relations.

To carry out their duties, Residents had to adopt practices and rituals drawn from the traditions of Mughal diplomacy. At the same time, the place of the Resident in the Indian court differed in fundamental ways from the place that had earlier been occupied

by Indian wakils As a result, the Residency system grew into a unique institution, outside of either European or Indian precedents.

Over time, the number and duties of Residents expanded considerably. Analyzing the growth of this system of Residents quantitatively, I have described three phases. From 1764 through 1797, the Residents began to develop some of the features later associated with indirect rule. Since many of the Indian Rulers maintained their own wakils in the Company's capital, some Residents lacked exclusive control over communications among the Indian states and with the Company. Until 1797, the number and scope of the Residents evinced the conservative policies of the Court of Directors against involvement with the Indian states. Following 1798, however, a forward policy generally prevailed in India. The Residents proved in large measure the agency by which much of the Company's expansion took place. Most of the features of indirect rule emerged during this second phase. By 1841, the Residency system — and the Company's extension of its influence over the Indian states — peaked. Following 1841, the Residents did not grow in numbers but they did deepen their control within many of the states. The trend during this third phase was toward direct or nearly direct rule. Following 1857, however, the British backed off from further annexation in the states and made stable indirect rule the prime goal of the Residencies. Thus, the Residency system changed quantitatively as well as qualitatively over the period from 1764 when it first began.

NOTES

1. This concept is discussed extensively in Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (London: Macmillan, 1961).

2. See Bernard S. Cohn, 'The British in the Mughal Court in the Seventeenth Century', manuscript, July 1977.

3. Warren Hasting himself served as a Resident with primarily commercial but some political functions at Murshidabad from 1757 to 1760. See George Robert Glieg, *Memoirs of the Life of the Right Hon. Warren*

Hastings, 3 vols. (London: Richard Bentley, 1841), 1:51-78.

4. See Bernard S. Cohn, 'The British in the Mughal Court in the Seventeenth Century,' manuscript, July 1977.

5. E.g. Jahangir, *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*, trans. Alexander Rogers, ed. Henry Beveridge (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1968).

6. Ernest Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, 4th ed., ed. Nevile Bland (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1961), p. 165.

7. Minutes of 29 August 1772, Foreign Secret Consultations (hereinafter cited as FSC), 29 August 1772.

8. Resolution of Supreme Court, 10 July 1775, FSC, 10 July 1775.

9. Translation of Affidavit of Ray Radachun, 4 July 1775, FSC 10 July 1775.

10. Minutes of 18 November 1814, Bengal Secret Consultations (hereinafter cited as BSC), 18 November 1814, No. 19.

11. Extract from Proceeding of Committee of Circuit, 20 August 1772, FSC, 29 August 1772; No. 3. A treaty specifying that '...an English gentleman shall reside with me, to transact all affairs between me and the Company...' had been signed earlier (10 July 1763). C[harles] U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, 5th ed. (Calcutta: Government of India, Central Publication Branch, 1929), 2:233-5.

12. Select Committee, secret letter to Court of Directors, 10 November 1772, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 6, ed. Bisheshwar Prasad (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1960), p. 448.

13. Letter from Shuja uddaula, BSC, 30 September 1772; Bombay Government to Lt. Col. Upton, 3 January 1777, Eur MS Addl. 28987, British Museum (hereinafter cited as BM); Arzee from Vakeel of Ranna of Gohad, BSC, 6 December 1779; Governor-General to David Anderson, 4 November 1781, BSC, 10 December 1781, Eur MS Addl. 13612, BM.

14. See *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 15, Foreign and Secret, 1782-6, eds. C.H. Philips and B.B. Misra (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1963). This act is also cited in K. M. Panikkar, *The Evolution of British Policy towards Indian States 1774-1858* (Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1929), p. 20.

15. Court of Directors to Governor-General, 11 April 1785, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 9, ed. B.A. Saltore (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1959), p. 178.

16. Governor-General to Court of Directors, 9 January 1789, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 16, ed. Syed Hasan Askari (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1976), p. 212.

17. Browne to Macpherson, 20 April 1785, BSC, 12 May 1785, No. 2;

also Panikkar, *Evolution of British Policy*, p. 4.

18. Lt. Col. Upton to Governor-General, 22 January 1777, BSC, 26 February 1777, Eur MS Addl. 28987, BM.

19. Secretary to Government to Resident Delhi, 13 January 1805, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 11, ed. Nirod Bhushan Roy (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1943), p. 123.

20. Panikkar, *Evolution of British Policy*, pp. 31-2.

21. Memorandum of 8 July 1803, quoted in Panikkar, *Evolution of British Policy*, p. 39.

22. Thomas Metcalf, *The Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857-1870* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

3. The Composition of the Political Line

> **Every real advantage to the people which can be expected from our rule can be secured through a Native ruler, with the aid of an English Political Agent of average ability, more surely, easily, and cheaply than by any form of direct administration with which I am acquainted.**
>
> **— Lord Canning**
> **Governor-General of India (1856-62)**

The Man on the Spot: The Residents of the Political Line

Only in the abstract did the system of indirect rule established in India consist of relations between the East India Company and the Indian states. In each specific instance, the immediate relationship was between individuals: British officials and local Rulers, each supported by their staffs. No policy about indirect rule, no matter how well formulated in London, Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay went into effect except through these people. An understanding of the system of indirect rule in India must therefore take cognizance of the individual Britons who made up the body of Residents and Political Agents appointed to the courts of the Rulers of India. Later chapters will take into account — individually and collectively — the Rulers and Indian officials in this relationship.

While Chapter 2 surveys the growth patterns of the Residencies as institutions, the patterns of growth and decline in the numbers of the officials holding office in these Residencies varied somewhat from those of the institutions as a whole. Such variations tell us a great deal about how the Residencies actually functioned. In addition, the backgrounds of these individuals changed over time. Career military officers often varied from civil servants in their preparation for, and attitude toward, performing the duties of Resident. Certainly, the Directors of the East India Company

expected such variations and tried — largely unsuccessfully — to exclude military officers from the political line. Further, the cadres of each of the three Presidencies regarded the members of the other two cadres as rivals for access to the prize appointments of the Residencies.

While the early Residencies followed inconsistent practices, responding ad hoc to local circumstances, gradually they developed more regular patterns based on policy, precedent, and custom. Such growing regularities are apparent in the recruitment, training, and promotion of Residents and their staffs as well as with respect to the funding of the Residencies, although even by 1857 the political line remained far from fully bureaucratized. By looking at the aggregate patterns of recruitment and service for the Britons who served in the Residencies, as well as at individual case studies, we can begin to understand the men who carried out indirect rule over the Indian states. Chapter 8 traces parallel shifts in the patterns of recruitment and service for the Indian members of the Residency establishment.

Overview of the Scale of the Residency System

Over time, the officials of the East India Company began to regard service in a Residency as a speciality, distinct from the commercial, administrative, judicial, or military posts found elsewhere in the Company. As the East India Company broadened its areas of involvement in India, especially after 1764, from primarily commercial to a range of activities, including political intercourse with the Indian Rulers, it frequently reorganized its internal administrative divisions to reflect these new functions. In 1789, for example, the Calcutta Secretariat undertook an effort to bring some order into the burgeoning Company by organizing its branches, including the creation of the 'Sixth Class' of offices which lumped together 'Residencies, Deputations, and Commissary ships...subdivided into two heads: Political, and Civil and Commercial.'[1] In later years, this separation out of political functions continued, although the Indian Political Service did not emerge as a formally separate service until 1937.

As some individuals in the Company's service tended to make service in a Residency their speciality, the concept of a 'political line' developed. I have examined this political line by grouping all the posts in the Residencies and Political Agencies together. Having done this, I can identify on an annual basis all those individuals who held posts in the political line within the Company's service. In order to quantify the dimensions of this political line, I have created Chart 2, which graphs the total number of Britons holding a political appointment (on a weighted annual basis).[2] In totalling these appointments, I do not wish to imply that all offices were of equal importance. This chart includes both Residents of major states and Residencies, like Murshidabad, that came to be regarded as sinecures by both the Company's Government and its incumbents.[3] Chart 2 further includes lower-level British members of the Residency staff (such as 'acting fourth assistant Resident', to take an extreme) who were often in training for later promotion. These figures therefore, as much as possible, indicate the total active strength of the 'political line' on a year by year basis.

I should note that throughout the period under study here, no Indian, that is non-European, held any appointment as Resident or Political Agent and therefore none appear on Chart 2. Many Indians did, however, serve as members of the staffs of Residencies and Political Agencies. The actions and advice of these 'native agents,' clerks, translators, and attendants proved vital to the functioning of the Residency system as we shall see.

Examining Chart 2, the same broad trends observed and discussed extensively for Chart 1 (Chapter 2) appear. While they are roughly parallel, the differences between the patterns on these two charts should be briefly explained. On both charts, the initial period of expansion is virtually identical, peaking in 1781. The period of retrenchment found on Chart 2 continues only until 1796 — although no significant increase begins until 1798, as in Chart 1. On Chart 2, as on the earlier chart, the rapid growth in the political line continues from 1798 until 1840, where it reaches a maximum of more than 116 annual offices held.[4] Thus, the patterns found in



Chart 2: Number of offices held annually in the political line (weighted).



Chart 3: Average number of annual political officials per state (weighted.)



Chart 4: Number of offices held annually in the political line, civil and military (weighted.)

the number of states and in the number of officials are essentially parallel until 1840.

From 1841 until 1857, Chart 2 shows a rapid decline in the number of officials, in contrast to the much more gradual decline in the number of states seen on Chart 1. By 1856 (prior to the disruptions of 1857), there were fewer than 51 officials (counted in full year equivalents). Since the states which remained in the system of indirect rule in 1856 do not appear to be any smaller on the average than those in 1840, a case can be made for the increased efficiency of the system.

Measuring the actual 'efficiency' of any administrative institution presents both conceptual and technical problems; problems that must be kept in mind for Chart 3 as well.[5] In order to gauge, even roughly, the 'efficiency' of the system of Residencies in India, we can advance the hypothesis that, all other factors being equal, the fewer the number of British officials needed per state, the more efficient the system from the Company's perspective. Since historians can never account for all other factors, the analysis of Chart 3 must be treated as tentative. Nevertheless, by calculating the average number of British officials actively employed per state, we can identify general patterns in the 'efficiency' of the system. The early period (to 1790) was marked by an uneven increase in the average number of British officials needed — or at least used — for each state, reaching a maximum of 4.4 officials per state. The middle period (1791-1840) was evidently a period of experimentation. The values for these years vary widely as the system expanded rapidly and different methods were tried and accepted, modified or rejected by the political line. For us, the most significant part of the chart is the final period (1841-57) which shows a relatively steady increase in the 'efficiency' — that is a steady drop in the number of officials per state. In contrast to the earlier peak of 4.4 officials per state, the system apparently stabilized and then grew ever more 'efficient'. By the end of this period less than 1.5 officials were used, on the average, per state.

Our hypothesis that the system of Residencies grew more efficient following 1841 finds support in the increasing systematization of their functions during these years. The routinization of

indirect rule during the decade prior to 1857 left officials holding office in the political line little opportunity to distinguish themselves. They began to complain about the lack of scope for action and attention they encountered as compared to their predecessors.

Further, the system evidently fulfilled its primary role, that of keeping the Indian states obedient to the Company. During the fighting of 1857, Indian states remained largely out of the struggle against the British. In contrast, the most heated opposition to the Company arose in areas recently annexed by the Company into its direct rule, such as Awadh, Nagpur, and Jhansi. Indeed, much of the hostility toward the British in these regions can be traced directly to the dislocations inherent in these annexations. Had these states continued under indirect rule, it is possible that they would have remained quiet as did most of the remaining states. The policy-makers of the British Empire after 1858 drew this conclusion and therefore relied upon the loyalty of the areas under indirect rule as its cornerstone. The conclusions drawn from Chart 3 about the developing efficiency of the Residencies thus are supported by less quantitative measures.

The Civilian Officials and Military Officers in the Political Line

In order to understand how these Residents and Political Agents functioned, we should examine the background of the individual Britons who composed the 'political line'. One of the most fundamental divisions can be highlighted by identifying these officials as members of either the civil or military service.

Looking first at the civil service, we can see the same broad trends discovered in Charts 1 and 2. The initial period of expansion occurred between 1764 and 1781. Chart 4 highlights the fact that this initial expansion involved primarily the appointment of civil officials to the political line. As compared with the Company's military service, the civil side developed earlier and held pride of place during this period. The period of retrenchment, 1782-97, likewise was reflected mainly in a decline in the number of civil officials with political posts.

The rapid expansion of the Company's influence in India (1798-1840), however, placed severe demands on the number and quality of civil officials available for the political line. While Chart 4 shows a rapid rise in this number, the relatively small number of civil officials in India (and the competing demands on them to administer the vast territories annexed into direct Company control) meant that military officers overcame them as the majority in the political line. The final decline (1841-57) in the number of civil officials in the political line fluctuates but does not decline as rapidly as that of the military.

For the civil official (unlike his military colleague), service as Political Agent or even Resident in a small Indian state need not differ significantly from service in British India. Often a district collector would have to deal with large landholders or petty Rajas on the scale of some of the smaller princely states. Service in one of the major states, such as Hyderabad, certainly called for a different order of training and skills from those of a district collector used to dealing with landholders. Even with larger states, however, a Resident or Political Agent might find himself administering the state revenue system directly during a period of regency or attachment, as in Mysore during much of the early nineteenth century.[6]

A military officer's decision to enter the political line often proved a major career choice, since service in the political line differed significantly from regimental duty. For the individual military officer, the political line offered many opportunities for distinction and advancement, particularly in the periods of greatest expansion. Certainly, during times of relative peace, adventurous spirits would find political employment far more enticing than garrison duty. Thus, at points of military quiescence, the number of officers seeking political duty apparently increased while at the hint of battle, a number of officers sought temporary release from Residency service in order to gain glory on the battlefield. In some cases, these military-political officers provided political guidance as part of the staff of the Company's Commanding Officer in the field.

Financially, as well, military officers found life in a Residency more comfortable that in a cantonment. The addition of allowances due a political appointee to standard military pay, plus batta (*bhatta*, an extra allowance paid to officers while posted away from base) could make the line attractive to military officers, especially compared to their standard regimental pay, or even to the salary of a civil official of the same seniority. The acting Resident at Nagpur, the civilian Richard Jenkins, complained in 1807 that his assistant, Lieutenant Robert Close (three years his junior in seniority of service), received in total from military pay and allowances more than 20 per cent above his own civilian salary.[7]

The patterns of rapid rise and fall in the number of military officers in the political line shown on Chart 4 result from a number of factors. Relative to the number of officials in the civil service, there were significantly more military officers available in India. While only an average of 37 writers (the entry level appointment in the civil service) were sent annually to India between 1802-33, there were an average of 258 cadets per annum.[8] Thus, the supply of civil servants was far less than the supply of military officers. When the need arose after 1798 for a significant increase in the number of Residents, Political Agents, and their subordinates, military officers were available in larger numbers to fill those posts. Many cadets entered the political line and spent only a minimal amount of time serving with their regiments during their entire careers. Military officers appointed to command the Residency escort or to serve as Residency interpreters — only marginally part of the political service — occasionally gained the attention of superiors at the Residency or in the upper administration and entered the political line in that way.[9] We have seen from Chart 4 that the military provided the bulk of the political line during the period of greatest demand. At the peak, in 1840, there were approximately 80 annual offices in the political line held by military officers.

In addition to their availability, military officers were appointed by the Company to the political line because they were usually relatively cheaper. Their military pay was normally less than that of civil servants of the same seniority, although extra

allowances could raise that amount.[10] Further, an officer's salary came out of the budget of the military establishment and he was normally not replaced on the rolls of his home regiment, which just went short-handed. Denuding the Indian army of its officers proved one cause of the rapid collapse of the army in 1857.

The decline in the number of military in the political line between 1804 and 1812 correlates with a series of specific directives from London that the military not be so employed. Indeed, were it not for the explicit and repeated orders of the Court of Directors in London, far more officers would apparently have been appointed in the political and other administrative lines of the Company's service. In 1808, for example, 'The Court [of Directors] observed that altho' they had not absolutely prohibited the nomination of Military Officers to be public Residents they nevertheless should have great satisfaction in seeing those Situations occupied by Civilians.'[11] In another case, in 1810, the Directors again made their preferences known (although in this instance, as in others, they bowed less than graciously to the recommendations of the officials on the spot in India):

> ... we retain entire, our predilection in favour of allotting all offices in the Political and Revenue Departments of our affairs to our civil servants; admitting at the same time that it may be necessary in some extraordinary cases to deviate from this principle.... But we were not prepared to expect that a gentlemen of [Lieutenant James Rivett] Carnac's description would be thought the fittest successor [as Resident Baroda] and nothing less than the strong and solemn declarations made by you [the Governor of Bombay] and Lt. Colonel Walker [the outgoing Resident] respectively...would have induced us to consent even to make a trial of that Gentleman....[12]

The tone of the Directors' letter reflects their prejudice against military officers in Residencies rather than against Carnac personally. Carnac proved well-trained and qualified to serve in Baroda. He had been Assistant (1802-8) and then Acting Resident (1808-11). After the Directors reluctantly confirmed his appoint-

ment, Carnac went on to remain as Resident Baroda for nearly nine years (1811-19), later himself serving as a member of the Court of Directors (from 1827), Governor of Bombay (1838-41) and as a Member of Parliament (from 1837).

Such directives from the Court of Directors barring the military from service in the political line seem to have softened between 1812 and 1840, the period of most rapid growth in the Residencies, and therefore a time when the military component was most in demand for the political line. From 1841, when a decline in the number of Residencies set in, the Directors renewed their expressions of prejudice against military officers. One of their complaints against Governor-General Ellenborough (1842-44), and apparently an important factor in his recall by the Court, was his predilection for the use of military officers in civil employment.[13]

Particularly under Governor-General Ellenborough, distinguished military service (even if unrelated to a Residency) could bring the reward of an appointment to a political post. In order to honour General Nott for his victories in Afghanistan, Ellenborough upgraded the office of Resident at Lucknow to the status of 'Envoy' and bestowed it upon the General. The General was 60 years old at the time and had never held any political office during his previous 42 years in India. He accepted the title as 'Envoy to the King' of Awadh (1842-43) apparently without the expectation that he perform any but ceremonial duties.[14]

Nott was not the only distinguished soldier so rewarded. At the same time, Ellenborough appointed Lt. Colonel Archibald Richmond — who likewise had no prior experience in the political line — as his Agent in the Northwest Frontier, as a reward for his army service commanding the rear guard in the same Afghan campaign. Ellenborough regarded Richmond 'as the best soldier we have, quite steady and sensible' but even the Governor-General had serious doubts about the Colonel's diplomatic and linguistic skills.[15] In 1843, this Governor-General appointed Richmond to succeed Nott in Lucknow, although the post reverted — in name — to a mere Residency. Thus, distinguished military service, even service irrelevant to the Residencies, could lead to high rewards in the political line.

The costs to the effectiveness of the Residencies from such compensatory appointments cannot be fully known today, but neither Nott nor Richmond accomplished much of note in Lucknow. One military officer appointed by Governor-General Ellenborough, but later dismissed by the next Governor-General, Hardinge (1844-1848), from political office, wrote that under Ellenborough: 'Deserving soldiers were given appointments hitherto reserved for the *proteges* of the Court [of Directors], and the whole interest of the Court and the Civil Service turned against [Ellenborough]' out of envy.[16]

In addition to Ellenborough, a few others in the Company's upper echelons also opposed the prevailing policies against the employment of military officers. John Hobhouse of the India Board, while admitting the general prejudice 'that, on no occasion, a military man should be employed' in the political line, tried to redefine the terms. He argued that while a Resident should, in fact, be 'a *civil* officer', either a military man or a civilian could fill the post. In a letter of 1850 to the Governor of Bombay, he argued on behalf of a military candidate for a political appointment in Sind, '[Lt. Colonel Peter] Melville would have been as much a civilian in regard to his province as any gentleman in a black coat.'[17] This argument proved vain in the case of Melville and in general.

Governor-General Dalhousie's views were much more typical of the Company's policies; with reference to a case in 1851, his

> ...opinion [was] that none but a Civilian could adequately discharge the very unusually arduous and difficult duties [of a Political Agent, which were]...beyond the grasp of any man who has not, in addition to capacity, professional experience and practice in these branches of civil government.[18]

Civil servants often expressed the same sentiments, particularly when a military officer obtained a coveted political appointment.[19]

On their part, military officers — especially those not in political employment and after 1840 — expressed great contempt for that entire civilian establishment. One officer suggested with

respect to a difficult siege, making *'a political*...lead the storming party! Then he might be the *first political* that ever covered himself with glory — That is, *if he got in*!!!' [emphasis his].[20]

Those officers who committed themselves to the political line complained that such service diminished their chances for promotion. After being passed over for promotion in military rank due to his absence from his regiment because of political service, one officer wrote in 1855:

> ...the very elite of the Army...the Munros,the Malcolms, the Octerlonys, the Pottingers, the Cubbons, the Cullens, the Outrams, the Lawrences, cum multis aliis of the Indian Armies, are the men now debarred from promotion, or removed from high appointment just as they used to hold them, just as their services have become most of value to the Government, in order to perform simple garrison duty, now apparently the criterion established for the qualification of a Colonel, and therefore of a General Officer.[21]

Citing the earlier examples of successful officers in the political line, this officer bemoans the current state of prejudice in the army against those officers choosing political service. Thus, in contrast to the civil service official who might perform similar tasks within or without the political line, for a military officer to choose the political line was for him to move significantly out of the normal track for his service.

This suggestion that civilians moved more easily into and out of the political line finds support from the fact that civilians averaged less time in the political line than military officers. Of those individuals who ever held the office of Resident, civilians averaged only 4.40 years per man, while military officers averaged 5.45 years per person. In the generally lower level post of Political Agent, the figures are even more significant, 3.89 years for a civilian and 6.56 years for an officer. The clear conclusion is that civilians were less committed to the political line than military officers, although in the more prestigious posts civilians held on to office longer than they did in the lower ranking ones.

John Malcolm, one of the most successful of the military Residents, confirms the above pattern. Admitting the primacy of the civilian service, he argues that those military officers with an aptitude for the political line should be allowed to devote their careers to it without detriment to their prospects:

> I do not mean...to affirm that the civil service is not higher than the military, or to represent the latter as having officers [with] any pretensions whatever to political or civil stations, but when long employment and acknowledged competence in these branches of the service bring a military man prominently forward, there should be no bar to his promotion.[22]

Table 2
Average Length of Service as Resident or Political Agent

	Number of Years Service				
	≤5	5<x≤10	10<x≤15	15<	Total
Civilian n (per cent)					
Resident	80 (74)	17 (16)	7 (6)	4 (4)	108 (100)
Political Agent	90 (79)	18 (16)	5 (4)	1 (1)	114 (100)
Military n(per cednt)					
Resident	56 (58)	25 (26)	8 (8)	8 (8)	97 (100)
Political Agent	45 (48)	23 (25)	19 (20)	6 (6)	93 (99)

Table 2 adds further evidence to this suggestion. By identifying the average length of service of Residents and Political Agents in these offices, we can see that military officers tended to stay in these posts longer than civilians. An overwhelming majority (74 and 79 per cent) of civilians holding the offices of Resident or Political Agent held one of these posts for a total of less than five years. Roughly half of the military officers held these posts for more than five years. Of those holding them for more than fifteen years, there were more than double the number of military compared to civilians.

Overall, military officers made up a majority of the Residents and Political Agents who served in the political line during the period under study. The military made up 52.7 per cent of the total annual offices of Resident. In the normally less prestigious

post of Political Agent, they made up 57.9 per cent. Thus, much of the political line during the period of its greatest expansion was made up of the military, although as conditions stabilized, the proportion of military declined.

Presidencies and the Residencies

Each of the three Presidencies had a military and a civilian cadre. In the early years of the Residencies, the establishments of each Presidency remained administratively separate. Residencies under the control of the Bengal, Bombay, or Madras Presidency were reserved for members of those cadre respectively. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the Governor-General and the Madras and Bengal Presidencies fought over control over the Residencies until the Governor-General largely triumphed at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This conflict can be seen here in terms of the personnel who staffed the Residencies.

During the time of conflict among the Presidencies over appointments to the Residencies, the individuals concerned often felt like pawns, moved about or sacrificed to inter-Presidency conflicts. Charles Warre Malet of the Bombay civilian establishment had his proposed appointment as Resident from Bombay to the court at Poona cancelled in 1783 by the Governor-General and then reinstated in 1784, but under the authority of Calcutta. In the midst of this frustrating contretemps, Malet wrote a private letter to a friend in England: 'It gives me much Concern to have been made the Punchinello of this political puppet shew...to have been the principal personage in so ludicrous a Farce.'[23] Indeed, the Governor-General made Malet take the long and personally costly journey from Bombay to Calcutta before taking up his post in Poona. Indeed, in order to hold the Residency, Malet was first struck off from the Bombay establishment and added to that of Bengal. Since at this time, possession of seniority in a particular establishment was an extremely valuable commodity, bestowing commercial rights, Malet protested the loss of his position in the Bombay establishment.[24] As the Governor-General attained control over the Residencies, such transfers of

personnel from one establishment to another proved unnecessary. Malet was returned to the Bombay cadre (apparently with no loss of seniority) and eventually rose to the position of Acting Governor of Bombay (1796).

Gradually, the conditions changed and each of the cadres contributed men to the India-wide system of Residencies. Nevertheless the distinct Presidency identities continued to be taken into consideration as rivalry and proprietary jealousy among the cadres persisted. Each of the Presidencies tended to look after the interests of its own cadre. When the Governor-General appointed John Bax, a Bombay civilian to what would be the culminating position in his career, Resident at Indore (1834-40), the Governor of Bombay wrote, '...it is highly gratifying to this Government to have one of its Servants selected for this important Political appointment by the Governor-General...'[25] In 1845, Major George Broadfoot, of the Madras military establishment, received the coveted appointment of Political Agent of the Governor-General in the Northwest Frontier. Broadfoot requested that Lieutenant Joseph D. Cunningham, also of the Madras military establishment, be appointed as his assistant. The Foreign Secretary to the Government explained, '...I dare say it can be managed. The only objection is his being a *Madras* officer as well as yourself, brought up to our frontier.'[26] In the end, they did manage his appointment.

The issue of proprietary rights of the Bengal versus Bombay cadre continued to arise to the end of our period. In one instance from 1850, the Governor of Bombay, on contemplating an appointment under his patronage, admitted that the Bombay service contained only inferior men. At the same time he felt compelled to appoint a Bombay man rather than incur 'a slur on the whole of the Bombay Service' by asking for a man from the Bengal establishment.[27] Thus, the distinct identities of the three Presidencies continued, although all provided political officers to Residencies across India. As a result of such rivalries (among other factors), merit was never the sole criteria for an appointment to the political line.

I have quantified the distribution of offices in the political line by cadre within each Presidency, using weighted annual offices as the unit. In doing so, I have combined the infantry, cavalry, artillery, and other military cadres (although each comprised a separate establishment) together into the rubric of 'military.' The results, shown in Table 3, illustrate the place of each establishment, both for the Residencies and for the Political Agencies.

Table 3
Distribution of Political Offices
by Presidency and Establishment (by percentage)

	Bengal	Bombay	Madras
		Residents	
Civilian	25	16	6
Military	17	9	26
Total	42	26	32
		Political Agents	
Civilian	25	10	6
Military	33	14	10
Total	58	24	17

Table 3 shows that the Bengal Presidency dominated the political line, for both Residencies and Political Agencies. Looking first at the Residencies, however, the Madras military actually formed a plurality among the establishments in providing Residents. Many of the more ambitious of the Madras military cadets found that the political line offered far more scope than a relatively constricted career in the regiments of the Madras army, especially after 1799 when the last military threat to South India, the Mysore Sultan, was defeated. The second largest group among the Residents consisted of Bengal civilians, followed by Bengal military.

In the normally less prominent office of Political Agent, the Bengal services, both military and civilian, supplied by far the largest number of officials. This would reflect the larger scale of the Bengal establishment and the control by the Governor-General in Calcutta over appointment to most of these Agencies. Through Table 3, therefore, we are able to see the sources of the personnel who staffed the political line.

Recruitment into the Residencies

Not all of the Company's officials wished to hold office in a Residency or Political Agency; conversely, not all those officials who desired such a post received them. Throughout the period under study here, recruitment into the political line depended on the personal inclination of the individual, combined with seniority rights and some measure of influence at the higher levels of the Company. Appointment to the Company's service in India in the first place, as a civilian writer or military cadet, depended on the patronage of the Company's directors until 1855. Even after appointment to the Indian Civil Service had been changed to depend on competitive examination in that year, influence played a major role throughout the career of an official.[28] The place of patronage in recruitment and promotion continued in the political as in the other lines of the Company's service.

Some officials with influence or good fortune gained a political appointment directly on request. Others, less fortunate, had to manoeuvre by making themselves available at a time of need. One senior Resident wrote:

> There are two side-gates in the East to the Great Park of English Diplomacy. The one is Commerce. The other is Medicine. We owe, indeed, our Indian Empire to them. [29]

He goes on to recount the case of a Residency surgeon who opportunely obtained a political appointment. Thus, recruitment into the political line, for the most part, depended on individual combinations of influence and personal qualifications, as well as the chance factor of the available competition for the post at the time of a vacancy.

Since entry into the political line required the application — or at the minimum the acquiescence — of the candidate, personal factors played a major role in recruitment. Some civil and military officials sought service in this line because of the higher allowances, opportunity, prestige, or power that such an appointment would bring. Some chose it because their health could not endure a more arduous post.[30] Others were considered by their superiors in the Company, or apparently considered themselves, unfit for

any other sort of duty.[31] In still other instances, officials left more visible posts and joined the political line to protect themselves from demotion or disgrace.[32]

Although there were thus a wide range of personal reasons why individuals might wish to join the political line, inclination alone was not enough to secure an appointment. Some young aspirants were lacking in influence or luck and failed to gain a place in their chosen line. John Malcolm's ardent desire to join the political line remained frustrated for more than a dozen years. Apparently only after his unsolicited paper analyzing the Company's relations with the Indian states reached the Governor-General in 1798 did he gain entry to the political line.[33] Influence of some sort was therefore usually vital for entry into a Residency.

A wide range of types of patronage shaped recruitment into the political line. Connections by birth to a Director or other notable in England or to an official in India clearly worked to the advantage of some individuals in the political as in other lines.[34] Residents, particularly in the eighteenth century but less regularly later, selected their own staff (both European and Indian) and therefore exercised personal patronage for clients, relatives or friends, or friends of friends.[35] Residents and Political Agents, like other Company officials, constantly solicited or were solicited for 'influence' or 'patronage' for one or another appointment.[36] The Resident at Nagpur, in fact, wrote unhappily that his post had at its disposal less patronage than his colleague's at Hyderabad.[37] Overall, the greatest amount of patronage for immediate political appointments naturally rested with the Governor-General. Merely to serve in his presence was often a key to influence on behalf of oneself or one's friends. A large number of Residents or Political Agents, or their staffs, had service or personal connections with a Governor-General.

Training in the Political Line

Just as the Company made no formal rules for entry into the political line, so too, it provided no special training for its appointees. Civil officials were expected to be generalists, to have many

skills and serve in many varied posts during a career. As the political line developed, however, the need for some distinctive training and practical experience in the control of large Indian states began to be recognized by some in the Company.

A few individuals emerged as specialists in indirect rule — from the 1770s onward. They formed the core of the political line. Although frequently at odds over the policy and practice of indirect rule, these central figures nonetheless set the tone for the system of indirect rule in India and, eventually, for much of the rest of the British Empire. For the most part, the Company expected its officials to learn on the job, preferably but not necessarily under the guidance of a experienced superior. Thus, those already in the political line trained their successors.

Recognizing the delicate and vital role to be played by Residents, some Governors-General called new appointees to the political line to them for personal instruction. Wellesley in particular selected the brightest young writers to attend upon him and assimilate his expansionist policies. This Governor-General, for instance, sent three promising young Company servants to the experienced Resident at Mysore together with a letter expressing his reliance on the Resident:

> ...for a constant attention to the diligence and morality of these young gentlemen whom his Lordship has placed under your orders and instructions, as one of the best means of qualifying them for offices of trust and importance under this Government and....you should report without any hesitation any defect of inclination or abilities on their part.[38]

Indeed Wellesley supplied important Residencies and political missions with extra assistants

> ...partly with a view to the education of a suitable number of [the Company's] junior servants in the diplomatic line.... [The Governor-General] has it in contemplation to apply the principle adopted...to all the permanent Residencies at Foreign Courts, in India.[39]

This special training of young officials in the political line left Wellesley's mark on a whole generation of Residents.

The senior members of the political line thus passed on to their younger colleagues the experience they had gained in dealing with regional Rulers. Charles Metcalfe, who came to India at the age of sixteen during the administration of Wellesley, went off as Assistant to the Resident with Sindhia within a year of his arrival in Calcutta. One of the leading lights of the previous generation, John Malcolm (sixteen years his senior and by this point a long practised Resident) took Metcalfe under his wing. After about four years in India, in 1805, Metcalfe wrote:

> Colonel Malcolm...with full confidence...laid open to me the various plans which were in contemplation, gave me admission to all his papers, and...expatiated on the great field of political employment now open in Hindostan, the necessity of many appointments and missions, the superiority, as he seems to think, of my claims, and the great risk, if not certain injury of my quitting the scene of action.... I have long, as you know, looked upon the Political as my line of service...[40]

Metcalfe went on to a distinguished career with appointments in several Residencies.

One of the difficulties faced by inexperienced Residents, or by Residents experienced in one state posted to another, lay in the inadequate records maintained by most Residencies. While vast quantities of knowledge and information flowed from each Residency to Calcutta, many of the Residents lacked the bureaucratic skills or interest to organize this material in their own record rooms. In consequence, the lack of a coherent or consistent system of record-keeping in many Residencies hampered the efforts of later Residents to educate themselves in local precedents or circumstances so as to keep ahead of events. In a typical example, in 1811 the Resident with the Bhonsle Raja of Nagpur wrote privately in some despair to the Resident with the Peshwa in Poona seeking basic knowledge about the complex connection between these two Maratha powers:

> Do the Poona records afford any information on...the connexion [*sic*] between the Rajah and his ancestors, and the Peshwas? If I could produce the correspondence too of our first Residents here, something more might be authenticated.[41]

Another officer complained in 1856 about the record-keeping of his predecessors: 'The want of an index, the mixture of subjects in the same compilation and other slovenly office habits entail the loss of much valuable time and much extra labour.'[42]

By and large, aspiring members of the political line therefore learned from their superiors or figured things out for themselves. This education by example or by direct, practical experience eschewed instruction in the abstract theories or formal principles of their profession. Only rarely do we find evidence of members of the political line seeking to educate themselves with respect to international law and diplomatic practice. Nevertheless, a number of Residents assembled libraries, apparently at least a few of which contained works which did deal with the forms and practices of diplomacy. In a particularly informative instance, we find one acting Resident (Richard Jenkins in Nagpur) describing his personal, and unusual, efforts to educate himself in his profession while in office.

> It has long been my wish to form a collection for a Diplomatic Library.... I have already perused, I can scarcely say studied, a translation of Grotius (without notes); some Puffendorf with Barbeyrac's Commentaries (the French Edition); Burlamaqui, Vattel, Marten, and Ward.
>
> Ward...is amongst Mr. Elphinstone's books at Nagpore. I am aware that the most useful kind of work for a diplomatic character are the memoirs and correspondence of public ministers, and almost the only fund of practical knowledge on the subject — mere etiquettes and formalities may undoubtedly be reduced to rules in Europe, but books which treat of them can be of little use in India.[43]

This effort at an education in the theory of diplomacy and international law came after Jenkins had already been a dozen years in service in India, half of those on his own as acting Resident in the crucial posts with Sindhia or in Nagpur. I have found no evidence that any other Resident displayed comparable diligence in seeking out formal studies of diplomacy. Instead, virtually all Residents scorned study of the abstract or historical theory of international law or diplomacy in favour of empirical training, under the guidance of older but similarly trained superiors, or on their own in a Residency.

A few of the more theoretically inclined of the Residents wrote extensively for the edification of their colleagues. Most notably, John Sutherland compiled a survey of the history of the Company's relations with the various Indian states. The Governor-General then had this survey duplicated and circulated among all the important Residencies in 1833. Nevertheless, Sutherland himself admitted that his colleagues had failed to understand or learn from his work. Sutherland in 1837 wrote: 'A system has undoubtedly guided the British Government in the last few years in its relations with the native states, but it may be doubtful whether it is understood throughout the political department.'[44] Five years later, in 1843, the Governor-General's secretariat tried to expand on and update Sutherland's work. Calcutta requested the eighteen ranking Residents and Political Agents to submit, in addition to general information, specifically:

> 1st. A clear and succinct Statement of the Circumstances and considerations which led to the Formation of our Treaties or engagements from the earliest period of our connection, with the state or states within the sphere of your Political Superintendence, and also to any subsequent modifications...
>
> 2nd. The History of the reigning family; age of the present Chief, name and condition of the Heir apparent, noticing any peculiarity of local custom...
>
> 3rd. A specification of the [geography] of each state...

> **4th. The Revenues and Disbursements, with the amount of Tribute paid, in whatever shape, to the British Government...**
>
> **5th. The object, formation and constitution of any local or contingent Corps that may exist, when raised, from what sources paid, and from the limits within which it is bound to serve.**
>
> **6th. The Strength, organization and Character of native force not under British controul, with an account of the System of Police...**

Residents balked at such a 'very laborious business to collect the requisite materials' and suggested that the Political Department look in its own records.[45] Five years later, in 1848, the Government apparently gave up on updating Sutherland's original work and sent five copies to the Residencies and Political Agencies, most of which had long lost the first batch circulated in 1833.[46]

In 1854, the Court of Directors suggested 'the expediency of drawing up a manual or code of rules for the guidance of Political Officers, comprising the general principles and maxims with which it is incumbent on them to be fully acquainted.' Two years later, the Calcutta Secretariat circulated a letter to all Residents, Political Agents, and Chief Commissioners soliciting 'your opinion as to the form which this Manual or Code should be drawn up, the different heads into which it should be divided, and the various subjects it should embrace.' The other Presidencies circulated the same note to the Political officers under their control.[47]

Of the Residents and Political Agents who responded to a questionnaire as to the merits of the Directors' proposal, opinion proved divided fairly evenly. About half felt such a manual would be useless or harmful, due to the variety of local conditions and the need for flexibility. A typical response of this type judged a formal manual:

> If comprehensive it might prove embarrassing; and if not comprehensive it would be of little use. Local and peculiar causes must often prevent a rigid application of abstract principles, and most, if not all of the subjects which the Manual will refer to, have doubtless been long since definitely settled in each office by competent authority.... A Manual will never make a bad officer efficient, and a good officer will do just as well without one.[48]

In contrast the other half of the political officers responded that such a manual would prove of value, although their suggestions varied exceedingly widely as to its content and form. The conflict of 1857 and the subsequent reconstruction of the principles of the Residency system after 1858 made this project irrelevant as originally envisioned by the Directors. Thus, the education of Residents continued to be empirical and unsystematic throughout the period under study here. Most learned on the job, at the feet of their superiors. As a result, indirect rule through the Residency system remained inconsistent. As we shall see in Chapter 10, the Residency system did eventually reach a greater degree of uniformity of practice, but not until the twentieth century.

Promotion in the Political Line

Promotion for officials within the political line, like their recruitment and training, only gradually moved toward systematic expectations. Although certain identifiable patterns eventually emerged, there were few fixed rules concerning appointment or promotion in the political or any other line. Despite this lack of specific criteria for entry and promotion, and despite the absence of any substantial training except at the feet of their seniors, the members of the political line did gradually develop specific expectations for a career in that line.

The members of the service seem to have shared a consensus that a hierarchic grading of posts within the political line existed, although this ranking naturally continually changed over time. More specifically, by the early nineteenth century, officials in the

political line had clear expectations about the length of time and direction that promotion would take.[49] Within the civil establishment in India, therefore, the political line took form as an identifiable track along which a career could progress.

For a member in the political line, promotion — as with the initial appointment — usually came as a result of seniority, luck, and patronage, with or without demonstrated talent. From the earliest days of the Company, patronage played a large part in promotion. Even before his predecessor had retired, an Assistant Resident might be allotted by his patrons a place in the hierarchy of offices, as 'eventual Successor to the Residency' and allotted an enhanced salary and allowances.[50] Even in the early nineteenth century, patronage and seniority had a greater effect than experience in the political line. In 1801, after the Court of Directors replaced him with John Chamier, eleven years his senior in the Company's service but less experienced in political affairs, Josiah Webbe complained sarcastically:

> It is therefore become indispensably requisite that those educated in my school in the detestable maxims of speaking the language [of Indians] and of acting for themselves should make room in order that the now approved doctrine founded in the experience of the old servants and the knowledge of the native manners through the only authentic channel of a dubash [Indian translator] may be introduced.[51]

This stress on patronage and seniority continued, not as a formal rule but rather as a common practice. One official wrote in 1804: 'I believe it is an established rule in the Bengal Service for the Senior Assistant to be deputed' in the absence of the Resident and, when passed over, he should take it as a slur and request a transfer.[52]

Over time, some in the Company began to recognize that experience and merit in the political line bestowed some rights on its servants. In 1805, the Governor-General acknowledged that distinguished service by young officials in a Residency obliged the Company to offer promotion in this line.

There are also Junior Servants who have devoted their attention to the Political affairs of the Government, who will in due time...have just claims to the most arduous and distinguished situations in the Political line of the Service, and the Government which shall not attend to their claims will be unfaithful to its duty, and to its own reputation.[53]

Over time, customary rules developed, although subject to differing interpretations. In 1815, one aspirant asked his father in England, who asked the mother of Richard Jenkins, to ask Jenkins (then established as Resident at Nagpur, 1807-1827) for advice about a career in the 'diplomatic line' in the Company's service. Jenkins' answer lays out an unpromising set of expectations:

> ...the Salary of Second Assistant at a Residency is 600/month, and in this situation you would have to enter the line. At Nagpore you would have to build a bungalow...[for] not less than 3,000 Rupees at the outset. You would dine at the Resident's table, and therefore be at no expense except for personal servants, horses, etc. With regard to future prospects, it might and probably would be several years before you would get a First class Assistantship which would be 800 Rupees a month; and it is impossible to say at what distant period you might expect a Resident as they are not given by graduation, and if they were, there are numerous candidates, to throw such an expectation back, for a young man just entering the line, to a distant period — unless under very fortunate circumstances. I say nothing of the duties of an Assistant, as they are seldom very troublesome. Every thing [sic] considered I could scarcely recommend a young man to enter the line, who had any other good prospects in the regular branches of the service.... I shall be happy to do anything in my power to promote your views when I know them with certainty. Perhaps you have some friends at Madras who could ascertain whether an application from you or me would be likely to succeed....[54]

This discouraging advice does not appear to have sprung from personal bitterness on Jenkins' part nor his lack of influence in the Company. Jenkins was only thirty years old at the time and, following his retirement from service in India in 1828, went on to be a Director (from 1832) and then Chairman of the Court of Directors (from 1839) as well as Member of Parliament (from 1838). Rather, even by 1815, the system had begun to rigidify and only the most skilled, distinguished, influential, and/or lucky of the men in the political line could expect to rise quickly through the ranks. Unfortunately for us, the name of this aspirant is deleted in the original letter so we cannot trace his career in the political line, should he have decided to pursue one.

At about the same time, Jenkins wrote a letter of recommendation for Lieutenant Alexander Gordon, asking that this officer be appointed his second assistant in the Nagpur Residency. In this letter, Jenkins stressed those credentials which he considered commendable for a young man in the political line: skill in languages, personal temperament, and experience:

> Possessing considerable talents and requirements, a knowledge of the languages, and an acquaintance with the manners and habits of the Natives, highly necessary for a diplomatic man, he unites with these qualifications a degree of mildness and temper, particularly calculated to succeed in business with natives and to ensure their confidence and good opinion. He has been upwards of seven years at Nagpore [with the Residency escort], and during that time, has successfully studied both the Persian and Hindoostanee languages.... [H]e is also translating Khaffe Khan's History of the House of Timur.[55]

Jenkins' recommendation for Gordon worked and started him along the long track Jenkins had outlined earlier. Except for brief periods with his regiment, Gordon served only in the Nagpur Residency, rising from Second Assistant (1816-19, 1825-29), with a period as acting First Assistant (1819-24), then confirmed as First Assistant (1830-1), to full Resident (1832-3), just before his retirement in 1833.

In the same period, a man already on track in the political line, wrote describing his own expectations, and frustrations, in his career. James Caulfield explicitly guided his rise through the political line, according to the principles of promotion evident to him. While still a substantive Lieutenant, Caulfield obtained his entree into the political service by serving (with brevet or temporary rank) as Brigade Major in the Nagpur Subsidiary Force (1817-19). He moved up to First Assistant Resident at Indore (1819-22) and then Political Agent at Haraoti (Kotah) in 1822. Here, a substantive Major at the age of 45, Caulfield saw his career as stalled. He appealed twice to the Governor-General for promotion to a more highly ranked appointment. After six years in his post, he wrote, frustration '...reduced me to the alternative of throwing myself upon the indulgence of Government, or relinquishing every expectation of ultimately realizing [a Residency], which has been the labour of my life to obtain....'[56] The Government assured him 'no rule or principle of promotion exists in the Political Department, which requires that you should pass through a Political Agency, having higher allowances annexed to it, than that of Harowtee, before you are eligible for the office of Resident.'[57] The next year Caulfield received his promotion to Lt. Colonel but also went on sick leave. He remained as Political Agent in Haraoti until 1832. Only in 1839, after nominal service as Superintendent (1836) of the pensioned Princes of Mysore (Tipu Sultan's family) and Agent of the Governor-General (1836-9) with the pensioned Nawab of Bengal, did Caulfield briefly attain his Residency (in Lucknow, 1839-41) followed by another sick leave and retirement in 1841 at the age of 58.

Patronage continued to play an extremely significant role, especially in the upper reaches of the Residencies. In one instance, the incumbent Resident in Mysore resigned explicitly so as to allow the outgoing Governor-General before he retired to appoint his Private Secretary (John Malcolm) to the post.[58] The combination of seniority and patronage made calculations of one's career a matter of some speculation.

As might be imagined in a relatively small service like the Company's in India, gossip flowed freely — albeit privately —

among friends as to career prospects. One promotion or transfer would trigger a series of others as each man moved up one notch. To provide the flavour of such correspondence, I present excerpts from two letters of 1821 from Lt. Colonel William L. Gardiner of 'Gardiner's Horse' to his relative the Honorable Edward Gardiner, Resident in Nepal (1817-30), about the latter's possible promotion:

> Seeing [William] Fraser's appt. as junior member to the Board [of Commissioners, Ceded and Conquered Territories] sets me all agog and looks as if they were removing him to get you to Dehli [as Deputy Superintendent].... I feel they will do all they can to get you there.... I really hope Sir David [Octerlony, Resident Delhi] will stick and if he gets [Henry] Middleton to succeed Fraser he *will* stick.

The next month, some of the anticipated transfers occurred.

> [Thomas] Maddock's [Principal Assistant to Governor-General's Agent Saugor and Narbada Territories] letter today from Saugar says you go to Dehli and [Gerard] Wellesley [Resident Indore, 1819-1832] to Lucnow.... Fraser has given over charge to Middleton![59]

Since Edward Gardiner declined the transfer from Katmandu to Delhi on grounds of his health, gossip about a whole new arrangement of promotions sprang into life.

Over time and as the system of Residencies was consolidated after 1840, the 'established rules' about seniority took on even more authority. Nevertheless, while recognizing the rules of seniority, not all Governors-General adhered to them in making appointments. Dalhousie wrote privately to his Private Secretary in 1850:

> In common justice I *must* provide for George Lawrence whose service and losses demand it, if I can do so.
>
> I refuse absolutely to be bound by these accursed seniority pretenses which rise up to mar everything....

> [Duncan] Malcolm is junior in service but senior in [the] Political Dept. [*sic*] an advantage which is much more than counterbalanced by the inferiority of his services in every other respect.... I know of no services he had then performed to justify his promotion.... I was anything but pleased with him.[60]

Over the course of time, the body of experience about the methods and policies of indirect rule grew ever larger within the political line. In order to gauge the amount of experience represented by the incumbent Residents and Political Agents, I have determined, on an annual basis, the number of years of seniority each had. Summing these, I have calculated the percentage of these officials with a specific number of years of seniority. Such a process produced Chart 5.

As we can see from Chart 5, the vast bulk of Residents and Political Agents had a significant number of years of experience in India. Less than 1 per cent of these officials had nine or fewer years of seniority. Almost 98 per cent of Residents and Political Agents had ten or more years of experience. A plurality (5 percent) of these officials had 26 years of service in India behind them. More than 8 percent of officials in these posts had 40 or more years of seniority. Many years of experience in India were thus embodied in the upper levels of the political line.

Funding the Residencies

Analysis of the changing patterns of funding of the Residencies by the Company proves to be one of the most telling measures of the transformation of the Residency system. As with so many other aspects of the Residencies, the allocation and delivery of funds to the Residencies changed over time. During the eighteenth century, the Company had no effective means of assessing the worth of the Residencies, or of allocating or delivering moneys to them. Gradually, the Company largely regularized the fiscal system of the Residencies. By the mid-nineteenth century, the Residency budgets had been almost completely bureaucratized. Each of



Chart 5: Percentage of residents and political agents by number of years.

these stages thus reflects the level of systematization present in the Residencies.

In the Residency system, as in the other branches of the East India Company's administration, conflicting values about costs and responsibilities repeatedly exposed themselves. As a commercial company (which continued to pay dividends to its stockholders), and as a cost-conscious bureaucracy, the administration of India sought to minimize expenditures, especially the expenses of its personnel. The low level of manpower entailed in indirect, as opposed to direct, rule proved part of the attraction of the Residency system. A single Resident, with a minimal supporting British staff and an inexpensive Indian subordinate establishment, (ideally, from the Company's perspective) managed an entire Indian state. Direct rule would call for at least one British civil servant in each district. On the other hand, as the paramount power in India and the self-perceived successor to the Mughal Empire, the British Government of India sought to invest its representatives, particularly its political agents in the courts of the remaining regional Rulers, with impressive levels of pomp and dignity. This dignity often proved extremely expensive. These two factors — the drive for rationalized bureaucratic economy and the requirements of imperial display — continually contended for control over the budgets of the Residencies.

When the Company began sending out political Residents for the first time in the 1760s, it had no way of accurately predicting the fiscal needs of this new enterprise. Since the Court of Directors had yet to authorize moneys for such an undertaking, the Calcutta Government diverted funds from other sources. In 1774, for example, the Company drew on a fund allotted to a school in Burdwan for some such expenses.[61] To transmit funds to the Residents in the field, the Company relied, not always successfully (see Chapter 8), on its credit in the local money markets. On occasion, Residents had to foot the bills for the Residencies out of their personal funds since no money arrived from the Company.[62] Although the Calcutta government repeatedly chided the early Residents to limit their expenditures, no institutional check existed on the Resident's budget.

Indicative of the ad hoc nature of the early Residencies were the gratuities extended to Residents for their accomplishments in the pursuit of their duties. Reflecting the unrestrained financial attitudes of the Company's officials in India during the eighteenth century, the Calcutta Government often made handsome gifts to its favoured subordinates. In 1775, the Calcutta Council promised the Resident at Lucknow a bond worth Rs 100,000, bearing an interest of 5 per cent — out of Company funds — for having successfully negotiated a treaty with the Awadh ruler.[63] A decade later, the Council promised a 'Gratuity' of Rs 10,000 to John Hollond for his service as Resident at Hyderabad. The Court of Directors — elected by and representing the money-conscious shareholders — overruled both promises, reducing the former gift by 70 percent and disallowing the second altogether. The Directors went on to chide such extravagance, '...in future the Governors and Councils of our respective Presidencies, are restricted from making any Presents to our Servants in India, without the orders of the Court of Directors.'[64] Nevertheless, such liberality continued. In 1791, two serving Residents were made Baronets by the British Crown: Charles Warre Malet, who had undertaken political missions to Delhi and held the post of Resident Poona (1785-97) and John Kennaway, Resident Hyderabad (1788-94). The Court of Directors itself took out 'their letters patent at the Company's expense.'[65] This extraordinary behaviour contrasts strongly with the more bureaucratic patterns instituted later by the Company.

The Company thus began by conducting its Residencies ad hoc. It lacked the experience or the foresight to assess the measure of the worth of a particular Residency. Further, conditions faced by each Resident varied considerably among each other and over time. As a result, there was at first little uniformity in Residency budgets. The more persuasive or influential Residents, or those in particularly crucial Residencies, obtained higher levels of funding than the rest. Expenses varied drastically even at the same Residency. The total expenses of the Hyderabad Residency, for example, went up dramatically to Rs 180,000 annually with the appointment of a Resident from Bengal Presidency instead of one

from Madras in 1784. The new Resident justified his expenses by arguing that he represented Calcutta, 'a Superior Government', and that he was obliged to match the opulence of the Nizam's court. Therefore he needed more money than his predecessor who was only of the Madras cadre.[66]

The Directors tried to limit the salaries of Residents and the expenses entailed by them. In 1785, the Secret Department of Inspection recommended to the Directors that the salary of the Residents be restricted as a saving not only for the Company but for its allies as well, who were induced to give secret allowances to Company officials stationed in their territories.[67] Even before this report reached London, the Directors used the justification of excessive expense to order the Governor-General to recall the Residents in Awadh, Delhi, Goa, and Farrukhabad and to reduce the costs of or abolish the Residencies at Hyderabad and with Sindhia.[68] Due to the delays in reporting and transmission of documents to London, it was 1787 by the time the Directors received the charges for the Residencies for 1784. On seeing the costs of the Hyderabad Residency in particular, they responded with indignation that '...[we] are much hurt at the enormous...charges...amounting to the prodigious sum of curr[en]t Rup[ee]s 2,71,064' for that year alone. Reinforcing their earlier orders, the Directors ordered the immediate recall of the offending Resident and demanded that 'Some Rule or Standard must be adopted' on costs.[69]

Instead of the drastic cut-backs in the Residencies ordered by the Directors, the Governor-General's secretariat responded by bringing a more uniform system of payments to the Residency system. In some cases, a Residency had acquired a peculiar 'Perquisite'. The Awadh Resident, for example, held *ex officio* a monopoly over the saltpetre trade of that state, one of its major exports. When forced to relinquish it by the combined appeals of the Awadh government and the orders of the Company, the incumbent Resident stated that he would comply but at a cost to him personally of 20,000 pounds sterling (some Rs 200,000) per annum.[70] In place of this large, albeit unofficial income, on top of an official salary, in 1787 the Governor-General fixed the personal

allowances of the Lucknow Resident at only Rs 80,381 annually. This figure included the Resident's personal salary and also his 'table allowance'(covering his household expenses).[71] In 1789, the Governor-General continued the rationalization of the Residency expenses by requiring all Residents to submit monthly accounts. Further, he ordered that no presents worth over Rs 5,000 could be given without 'a Special order from the Government.'[72]

With the rapid expansion of the early nineteenth century, the Company began to bring the individual Residencies into a coherent system. In 1798, the Company reduced the widely disparate budgets of the Residencies at the courts of the Nizam, the Peshwa, and Sindhia each to a uniform Rs 96,648 annually.[73] As noted above, the Resident at Hyderabad had expended nearly three times this rate in 1784. In so reducing the costs of the Residencies, the Company did not intend to discount their worth. Rather, the effort intended to reward the Residents generously for their work, but in a scale comparable to their colleagues administering British India directly. Of the allotted budget, Residents received an official salary set, with a few exceptions, at Rs 34,313 annually.

The Governor-General's secretariat in 1807 made clear the principles that lay behind the setting of the budgets of the Residents. First, Residents should be able to support a life-style worthy of representatives of the Company:

> ...Residents at foreign Courts...should be freed from all inducement to violate the trust reposed in them and to acquire unauthorized emoluments, by receiving such a scale of allowances as will enable them gradually to accumulate a competency without departing from that style of life which is necessary to maintenance of their dignity as representatives of the British Government in India.

Second, the political line should attract the best of the Company's servants:

> The Most important Interests of the Government occasionally depend on the discretion, integrity and ability of officers

> **exercising diplomatic functions at foreign Courts and consequently the advantages of Diplomatic situations...[should] command the services of men of ability and experience.**

Third, Residents should not be tempted '...to violate their trust, arising from a disproportion between the emoluments of the office and the labor and responsibility of its duties.' Finally, Residents functioned relatively autonomously, stationed as they were '... in a foreign country...consequently removed in a considerable degree from the immediate superintendence and control of the Government...'[74] Indeed, the Company expected Residents to save their entire salaries, while they lived on the table allowances given them.

From the Resident's perspective, the desirability of economy in Residency expenses usually appeared less pressing than the demands of his position. With a few exceptions, each Resident tended to argue for larger Residency buildings and establishments. A Resident often had to rely heavily on his personal influence within the Ruler's court. In consequence, particularly prior to the 1840s, Residents felt the need to match the standards of panoply displayed by the Rulers and courtiers with whom they dealt. Reports of Residents often contained explanations of the dignities and honours they had to support together with accompanying budget overruns.[75]

As Residencies expanded their role in the state, a Resident often based his requests for an enhanced establishment on the growing press of work. Overseeing and reforming the Ruler's administration required the Resident to develop a parallel administration. He had to manage both information and local sources of power and money. On occasion, the Residency controlled volumes of money equivalent to the Ruler's own treasury. In several cases, a Resident either requested or simply carried out expansions in his office space or staff to meet the increasing demands of his duties.[76] To a Resident, therefore, some economy might be practised to please his superiors in the Company but in excess it could also detract from his capacity to control the Ruler and state administration.

The prominence of the Resident personally in the Residency is reflected in the allocation of resources in the budget. Looking at the six most important Residencies in 1816, we find 71 per cent of the entire Residency budget went for the Resident's salary and Table Allowance. In contrast, only 8 per cent paid for the entire Residency Office establishment, with the remainder going to the Resident's European assistants, including the post-master and surgeon.[77] This ratio of costs for the Resident versus the office establishment parallels that of other branches of the Company's administration. For example, Misra shows that 80 per cent of the budget of the Provincial Court of Appeal and Circuit at Patna went for the three European Judges while only 8 per cent paid for the entire Court Establishment.[78]

Gradually, the Residencies began to stabilize in a number of ways into a more bureaucratic system. The Company learned to estimate the appropriate size and budget for the establishment of each of the many new Residencies created on the basis of comparisons with the prior experience of comparable Residencies. The projected expenses of the Residency created at Sindhia's court in 1805, for example, were calculated as the average of the actual expenses of the Hyderabad and Poona Residencies.[79] Similarly, the new Political Agent at Kotah requested a budget using the expenses regularly incurred in the Agency at Jaipur, with a few 'necessary additions.'[80]

Many of the repeated demands for economy from Residents came from the Company's Directors and Board of Control in London, via the Governor-General in Calcutta. The Directors' concern was with British audiences, especially with the stockholders and with the members of Parliament who periodically voted on the renewal of the Company's Charter. The Governor-General's secretariat regularly transmitted repeated demands for reductions on to the Residents. As an example, the Governor-General's secretariat slowly reduced the individual and overlapping networks of 'intelligence agents' maintained by each of the major Residencies across India. In some cases, several Residencies had supported separate agents in the same court. Calcutta regarded this as savings due to the elimination of duplication; the

affected Residents considered the measure as a dangerous reduction in sources for intelligence.[81] In at least one case, the Resident personally paid the salary of the Indian assistant rather than lose his services for the Residency.[82]

The efforts by the Court of Directors to enforce economy on the Residencies on occasion led to unseemly squabbles among the different branches of the Company. In 1803 the Bombay Government set the salary of Alexander Walker, its new Resident at Baroda, at Rs 36,000 annually, based on a careful comparison with the current salary of the Resident at Goa. While the Directors approved the appointment, they deemed the allotted salary excessive and ordered it reduced by one-third.[83] Years after Walker's appointment, the Bombay Government and the Court of Directors were still bargaining over the pay due him; each proposal by Bombay met a counter-offer by the Directors. Finally, over eight years later, the Directors made their final offer of payment of the Rs 12,000 per year difference in pay as well as 8 per cent interest on the money owed.[84] Walker, however, continued in vain to demand from the Directors what he believed to be his just dues, even after his retirement from service in India.[85] Walker's successor in the Residency, among a number of others, also endured salary disputes with the Directors.[86] Such economies by the Directors in setting the salaries of Residents at levels considered inadequate by the Residents and others in India may have had an effect on the Residents' devotion to other decisions by the Directors.

On their part, the Court of Directors and the Calcutta Government sought to fix each Resident's allowance and 'table expenses' and then gradually cut back on incidental expenses as perceived excesses. As in other aspects of the Residency system, the Governor-General's secretariat brought the Residency budgets under its purview. In 1805, 'with the view of enabling the Governor-General in Council to impose an effectual check upon all the disbursements fixed or contingent,' it sent a circular to all Residents requiring they use prescribed expense forms. This circular strictly enjoined the Residents not to exceed their budgets, demanding that overruns of even a few rupees needed formal

approval.[87] It ordered that the total value of any presents given by the Resident on behalf of the Company to rulers or other notables be less than the total value of presents received. Further, it cancelled specific budget lines in several of the Residencies.

In a budgetary move that would strengthen his control over the Residencies (and at the same time reduce the political role of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies), the Governor-General even suggested that the Travancore and Baroda Residents — who were not under his direct control — be eliminated. The Madras Government refused to abolish the post of Resident in Travancore, despite substantial savings.[88] The Bombay Government responded in the same way about its Resident at Baroda.[89] Nevertheless, these Residencies eventually came under the same principles of accounting and the same prescribed forms as had become standardized under the Governor-General.[90]

Demands for reductions in Residency costs were repeated regularly.[91] Periodically the Governor-General, prompted by the Court of Directors, ordered massive economies throughout the Residency system. In September 1815, for example, the Directors specified cuts so sweeping that the Residents uniformly protested their consternation and inability to conform to all of them. In the face of these impassioned objections, the Governor-General suspended the reductions pending further study.[92] A dozen years or so later, in 1828, the Calcutta secretariat wrote to all Residents:

> Adverting to the necessity which exists for enforcing the most rigid economy in every branch of the public Expenditure...you will undertake a revision of all Establishments under your control...[making] any retrenchments which may appear practicable.

The Governor-General further specified particulars of cuts in almost all departments of each Residency.[93] The next year, he informed the Residents that the salary of their office would be reduced, albeit beginning with their successor.[94]

By the mid-nineteenth century, detailed rules were in effect as to the precise financial obligations and official perquisites of the Residents with respect to the 'articles of consumption', furniture,

animals of conveyance and movable property in the Residency.[95] Residents 'of the first grade' received a consolidated allowance of only Rs 66,000 annually, about two-thirds of the Residents' budget for salary and table allowance in 1798.

As we have seen in Chart 2, the number of political officials declined from the 1840s, even more rapidly than the decline in the number of Residencies. This reduction in the number of officials in a substantial measure reflected the Company's budgetary concerns. Thus, the Company remained acutely aware of the costs, as well as the benefits, of indirect rule.

At the same time that the Company rationaliżed the budgets of the Residents, it forbade them all illicit or unofficial sources of income. As we will see in our study of the strategies followed by the Indian Rulers in Chapter 7, Residents either solicited or were offered considerable sums to 'violate their trust'. The Company vigorously and repeatedly imposed strictures on the Residents in their financial dealings with Indian Rulers or courtiers. In 1820, all political officers who had not yet done so had to swear a solemn and official oath in front of their immediate superior officer to do their duty faithfully. They then had to sign the oath and submit it to government. Specifically, the oath bound them to forswear all personal 'pecuniary dealings' with Indian states or Rulers as well as any 'emolument or advantage'.[96]

Despite such oaths, some Residents continued to benefit financially from their dealings with the Indian Rulers. The variety and repetition of the Company's strictures against peculation reflected the diversity and the pervasive nature of the violations. The year after the above oath, the Company again gazetted an order that forbade transactions between Residents (or their staffs) and 'foreign Princes and Chiefs or Natives of rank or opulence' including 'all Sales, Purchases, and Transfers...of grounds, houses, Boats, Equipages, Horses, Elephants, Plates, Furniture, and generally every description of Private Property exceeding the value of 5,000 Rupees without the sanction of Government.'[97] Residents had a history of obtaining suspiciously good deals in such transactions from Rulers or courtiers with whom they dealt officially. The Company felt compelled to circulate similar orders periodically,

even through the mid-nineteenth century.[98] Nevertheless, such abuses apparently persisted.

The restrictions on exchanges between the Ruler and the Company, seen as a bureaucratic measure by the Company, was regarded by the Ruler as insulting. We have seen above that the Company decreed in 1805 that the value of presents given by the Resident to the Ruler should be no more than the value of presents received. Since, in Indian court tradition, the giver of the more valuable present in an exchange is the superior, this decree either placed the Resident as no more than the equal of the Ruler or else violated the tradition. By 1830, the Governor-General had forbidden any exchange of presents between the Ruler and Resident. In this the Company proved unrelenting.[99] As we shall see in Chapter 5, this ban on the exchange of presents was not the only part of court ceremonies so affected.

The Members of the Political Line

By examining the composition of the political line, I have discovered several overall patterns. The bulk of those who served in the Residencies seem to have chosen this as their speciality within the Company's service. For a military officer to make this career choice proved more of a commitment than for a civilian, however. The Company's Directors preferred to have civilians in these posts, although at the time of greatest expansion in the Residencies, the Company drew heavily on the more numerous military officers despite this prejudice. Each of the cadres of the three Presidencies likewise held a preference for its own members, although this rivalry in the selection of candidates somewhat diminished in significance over time.

In order to gain entry and promotion in the political line, a servant of the Company needed a patron, and usually some good fortune as well. Having obtained a post in a Residency, a young official would expect to learn his duties from his superiors. He could not rely on the Residency library or record room to provide much in the way of formal education. Rather, as with so much in the Company's service, a Resident would assume that his own

judgment would provide the best guide through unfamiliar circumstances. Over time, the political line thus developed into a body of men and experience who carried out the work of indirect rule.

In several areas, most notably that of funding, the Company tried to bring the Residencies into a more organized and systematic form. In place of the early ad hoc appointment and organization of the Residencies, the Company began to establish bureaucratic rules. This ordering of the Residencies, however, was by no means complete, even by 1857. The Residents continued to conduct relations with the Indian states with significant, and yet variable, autonomy. Part II demonstrates the kinds of functions of indirect rule carried out by the Residents from 1764 to 1858.

NOTES

1. Governor-General to Court of Directors 9 January 1789, *Fort William-India House Correspondence,* vol. 16, ed. Syed Hasan Askari (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1976), pp. 212ff.

2. My statistical analysis employed the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) programme. I compiled biographies for 615 British officials, virtually all who held offices defined as part of the 'political line'. These biographies include every post each official is known to have had as well as other pertinent data. This information, once coded, has allowed me to perform a quantitative analysis of virtually the entire political line from the 1760s until 1857. Among the sources drawn upon were the complete series of 'Personal Records', and 'The Madras Army Service Lists', the annual numbers of the *The East-India Register and Directory,* V.C.P. Hodson, *List of the Officers of the Bengal Army 1758-1834,* 4 vols. (London: Constable, 1927-28), Charles C. Prinsep, *Record of Services of the Honourable East India Company's Civil Servants in the Madras Presidency from 1741 to 1858* (London: Trubner, 1885) and numerous other manuscript and published volumes and records series.

Since not every official held office for a full year, the numbers have been weighted so that they reflect the proportion of the year the office was

actually held. An official holding an office for a full year thus counts as one; an official in office for as six months counts as one half, and so on.

3. For an example, see Personal Records (hereinafter cited as PR), 15:583, IOL.

4. The dual peak results from the summation of the distinct patterns of military and civilian officials, to be explained later with reference to Chart 4.

5. See Bradford Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy in India: Status, Policy and the I.C.S. in the Late 19th Century* (Delhi: Manohar, 1976), pp. 55-78 for a different approach to the measure of administrative efficiency.

6. Mysore had an infant ruler at the beginning of the century and then was under the temporary administration of British from 1831 to 1881. For an account of one Resident at Mysore, see Evans Bell, *Memoir of General John Briggs of the Madras Army* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1885), pp. 158 ff. See also Copland, *British Raj, passim*.

7. Richard Jenkins to George Seinton 23 March 1807, Eur MS E.111, 'Nagpore Residency Private Letter Book,' IOL.

8. Bernard S. Cohn, 'Recruitment and Training of British Civil Servants in India, 1600-1860,' in Ralph Braibanti, ed., *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, 1966), p. 103.

9. When the Resident at Gwalior withdrew from his post due to health problems, his younger brother, the commander of the escort, was appointed by the Governor-General to act in his place. Minute of the Governor-General, 19 September 1783, Eur MS Addl 29006, B.M.

10. Pay scales caused major debate throughout the period under study. One of the more drawn out disputes concerned the pay of Major, later General, Walker, Resident at Baroda, which continued for at least nine years. Turning down a Rs 30,000 settlement offer from the Court of Directors, Walker held out for the additional Rs 1,000 per month back pay he felt due to him and eventually won his case, including 8 per cent interest on the money. Public Letter to Bombay, 17 April 1811, and *passim*, Eur MS C.198, IOL.

11. PR 12:479, IOL. See also Political Letters to Bombay, 31 August 1804 and 29 August 1810, Eur MS C.198, IOL. The same was true for the other lines, see Court of Directors to Bombay Revenue Department, 10 January 1811, Eur MS C.198, IOL.

12. Political Letter from Court of Directors to Governor of Bombay, 29 August 1810, Eur MS C.198, IOL.

13. Even though the total number of military in the service actually declined during his administration, Ellenborough regarded this issue as the major factor in his quarrel with the Directors, Ellenborough to Wellington, 9 June 1842, cited in W. Broadfoot, *The Career of Major George Broadfoot, The Career of Major George Broadfoot, C.B. (Governor-General's Agent North West Frontier, 1844-1845) in Afghanistan and the Punjab compiled from His Papers and those of Lords Ellenborough and Hardinge.* (London: John Murray, 1888), p. 195. See Ellenborough's letters to Claud Clerk dated 29 July 1842, 3 May 1843 and 16 April 1843 for his frequent rewards of political posts for military officers, 'Claud Clerk Collection,' Eur MS D.538/39, IOL.

14. Letter of Ellenborough to Sir William Nott, 21 September 1842, quoted in J.H. Stocqueler, ed. *Memoirs and Correspondence of Major-General Sir William Nott, GCB,* 2 vols. (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1854), 2:169.

15. Ellenborough to Claud Clerk, 3 May 1843, Eur MS D.538 3a, 'Claud Clerk Collection,' IOL.

16. Henry Marion Durand had been Ellenborough's private secretary and had received the post of Commissioner of Tenasserim from the outgoing Governor-General. H. M. Durand, *Life of Major-General Sir Henry Marion Durand,* 2 vols. (London: W.H. Allen, 1883), 1:80.

17. John Hobhouse to [Viscount Lucius] Falkland, 24 October 1850, Eur MS F.81, 'Frere Collection,' IOL.

18. Governor-General to Falkland, 29 May 1851, 'Frere Collection,' F.81, Box 1, Bundle 11, IOL.

19. G.R. Glieg, *The Life of Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, Bart. and K.C.B., etc., Late Governor of Madras with Extracts from his Correspondence and Private Papers,* 2 vols. (London: Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1830), 1:142-3.

20. C.J. Napier to Roberts, 12 October 1844, 'Sir Henry Gee Roberts Collection,' Eur MS E. 265, IOL.

21. Private copy of Lt. Col. G. Le Grand Jacob's Memorial to the Court of Directors, 17 November 1855, Eur MS E.304/7, IOL.

22. Malcolm to Canning, private letter, n.d., quoted in John William Kaye, *The Life and Correspondence of Major General Sir John Malcolm,* 2 vols. (London: Smith, Elder, 1834), 2:375.

23. Malet to Pemberton, 28 June 1783, Eur MS F.149, 'Malet Collection,' IOL.

24. Malet to Governor, Bombay n.d. [1786], Eur MS F.149, IOL.

25. Minute of the Governor, 26 February 1834, PR 20:47.

26. W. Broadfoot, p. 359.

27. E.g. Governor of Bombay to John Hobhouse, India Board, 24 July 1850, Eur MS F.81, 'Frere Collection,' IOL.

28. For an analysis of the Indian Civil Service in the late nineteenth century, see Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy*, Cohn, *Recruitment*, and Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled*.

29. Kaye, *Malcolm*, 1:106.

30. E.g. Bengal Secret Consultation, 18 April 1781, Eur MS Addl 13612, B.M. and William Wilson Hunter, *Life of Brian Houghton Hodgson, British Resident at the Court of Nepal* (London: John Murray, 1896).

31. E.g. Henry Torrens was better educated and older than almost all of the other officials at his level in the service. His devotion to poetry apparently further alienated him from his colleagues. After a series of rapid and unhappy postings, he was appointed Resident at Murshidabad. His editor wrote of this as '...an appointment in which he had little or nothing to do...an office which the most ordinary person might have filled.... Mr Torrens was of the opinion that when he was sent to Murshidabad, it was a distinct declaration of the Government's intention to "shelve" him.' James Hume, ed. *A Selection from the Writings, Prose and Poetical, of the late Henry W. Torrens, Esq., B.A., Bengal Civil Service, and of the Inner Temple* (Calcutta: R.C. Lepage, 1854), p. ci.

32. Wellesley appointed his protege, Josiah Webbe, to a series of posts in the political line explicitly in order to protect him from dismissal and disgrace at the hands of the next Governor-General. Josiah Webbe to Thomas Munro, 9 November 1801 and 27 December 1801,'Munro Collection,'Eur MS F.151, file 5, IOL; M. Shawe to Malcolm, 27 February 1804, Eur MS Addl 13602, B.M.

33. This story may be coloured by the subject's later success in this line. Kaye, 1:23, 63.

34. Interestingly, I can find no evidence of a higher proportion of nobility, or sons of the nobility, within the political line during this period.

35. E.g. Resident Poona to Governor Bombay, 16 January 1790, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 2, ed. Govind Sakharam Sardesai (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1936), p. 170.

36. Letters requesting or using influence are found throughout the Residents' correspondence. E.g. David Octerlony, Resident at Delhi to Secretary to Government, 21 December 1804, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 18 July 1805, IOL.

37. Richard Jenkins to Bayley, 10 January 1815, 'Nagpur Residency Private Letter Book,' Eur MS E.111, IOL.

38. Governor-General to Barry Close, 4 September 1799, 'Mysore Residency Records. In Letter Book,' IOL.

39. Governor-General to Court of Directors, 31 December 1799, *Fort William-India House correspondence,* vol. 18, ed. H. Heras (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1974), p. 499.

40. Metcalfe to J.W. Sherer, 10 June 1805, quoted in John William Kaye, *The Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe,* 2 vols. (London: Richard Bentley, 1854), 1:155-6.

41. Resident Nagpore to Resident Poona, 27 August 1811, Eur MS E.111, 'Nagpore Residency Private Letter Book,' IOL.

42. Acting Political Agent Rewa Kantha to Secretary to Government Bombay, 29 November 1856, FPC, 12 February 1858, No. 31.

43. Richard Jenkins, Resident at Nagpur to Sydenham, 12 May 1810, 'Nagpur Residency Private Letter Book,' Eur MS E.111, IOL.

44. Sutherland published his survey for the British public as well as his colleagues in the political line. John Sutherland, *Sketches of the Relations subsisting between the British Government in India and The Different Native States* (Calcutta: G.H. Huttmann, 1837), pp. 185-7.

45. Secretary to Government Foreign Department Circular Letter, 9 September 1843, and Reply, FPC, 9 September 1843, Nos. 1,2.

46. E.g. Agent of the Governor-General Rajpootana to Secretary to Government of India, 17 February 1848, FPC, 10 December 1848, No.35, acknowledging receipt of the five copies.

47. Court of Directors dispatch 57 of 1854, 29 December 1854 and Circular Letter to Residents and Political Agents and Chief Commissioners, 5 November 1856, FPC, 7 November 1856, No. 16.

48. Political Agent Southern Maratta Country, 27 November 1856, FPC, 12 February 1858, Nos. 19-31 contain the answers from the political officials under Bombay.

49. Richard Strachey to Ricketts, 6 June 1816, 'Richard Strachey Letters,' 1813-17, Eur MS D.585, IOL. Richard Jenkins describes a career in the political line to an unknown relative who apparently considered pursuing it. Richard Jenkins to [name not given in the original] 17 September 1815, Eur MS E.111, 'Nagpore Residency Private Letter Book,' IOL.

50. Governor-General in Council to Court of Directors, 20 August 1784, *Fort William-India House Correspondence,* vol. 15, eds. C. H. Philips and B. B. Misra (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1963), p. 274. Similar-

ly, see Extract Bengal General Consultations, 25 November 1782, HMS 219:95 and Calcutta Council to Court of Directors, 28 February 1786, in *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 15, ed. C. H. Philips and B. B. Mishra (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1963), pp. 618-21 each of which establishes a waiting list for appointment to a Residency.

51. J. Webbe to Thomas Munro, 9 November 1801, Eur MS F.151, 'Munro Collection,' IOL.

52. Edward Waring to Barry Close, 10 December 1804, Eur MS Addl 13599, B. M.

53. Acting Governor-General to Chairman, Court of Directors, 30 November 1805, PR 17:387.

54. Resident Nagpore to [name not given in original], Eur MS E.111, 'Nagpore Residency Private Letter Book,' IOL.

55. Resident Nagpore to Secretary to Government (?), 24 August 1816, Eur MS E.111 'Napore Residency Private Letter Book,' IOL.

56. Political Agent Harowtee to Secretary to Government Political Department 3 March 1828, FPC, 21 March 1828, No. 24.

57. Officiating Secretary to Government to Political Agent Harowtee, 21 March 1828, FPC, 21 March 1828, No. 25.

58. John Malcom to his uncle, 9 August 1802, quoted in Kaye, *The Life and Correspondence of Major General Sir John Malcolm*, 2 vols. (London: Smith, Elder, 1854), 1:177.

59. William Gardiner to Edward Gardiner, 16 August 1821 and 21 September 1821, Eur MS C.304 'Letters of Colonel Willam Linneaus Gardiner,' IOL.

60. Dalhousie to F.F. Courtney, 8 July 1850 and 18 July. 1850, Eur MS C.204, IOL.

61. Governor-General to G. Vansittart, 2 June 1774, For Misc, vol. 14, n.p.

62. Resident Poona to Wilkinson, 5 July 1786, Eur MS F.149, 'Malet Collection,' IOL.

63. Council to Resident (Lucknow), 6 June 1775, FSC, 6 June 1775, No. 9.

64. Court of Directors to Governor-General, 16 April 1777, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 8, ed. Hira Lal Gupta (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1981), p. 83 and Court of Directors to Governor-General, 12 April 1786, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 10, ed. Rughubir Sinh (Delhi: National Archives of India 1972), p. 78.

65. Court of Directors to Governor-General in Council, 6 May 1791, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 16, ed. Syed Hasan Askari (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1976) p. 67.

66. Resident Hyderabad to Secretary to Government in the Secret Department, 13 November 1784, FSC, 14 December 1784.

67. Secret Department of Inspection to Court of Directors, 31 July 1785, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 15, eds. C.H. Philips and B.B. Misra (1963), pp. 474-91.

68. Court of Directors to Governor-General, 11 April 1785, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 9, ed. B.A. Saladore (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1959), p. 178.

69. Court of Directors to Governor-General, 27 March 1787, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol 10, eds. C.H. Philips and B.B. Misra (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1963), pp. 194-5.

70. Resident (Lucknow) to Governor-General, 25 October 1785, *Fort William-India House*, vol. 15, p. 618.

71. Governor-General's Minute, 23 May 1805, FPC, 27 June 1805, No. 161.

72. Governor-General to Court of Directors, Secret and Separate, 5 January 1789, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 16, ed. Syed Hasan Askari (1976), pp. 255-6.

73. I have converted all figures into Calcutta Sicca Rupees. Governor-General's Minute, 23 May 1805, FPC, 27 June 1805, No. 161.

74. Secretary to Government to Governor in Council Fort St. George, 15 September 1807, FPC, 15 September 1807, No. 30.

75. E.g. Resident Hyderabad to Secretary to Governor-General in the Secret Department, 13 November 1784, FSC, 14 December 1784, No. 26, Resident Delhi to Officiating Secretary to Government, 15 May 1828, FPC, 6 June 1828, No. 23.

76. Resident Indore to Secretary to Government with Political Department, 20 August 1822, FPC, 27 September 1822, No. 49.

77. For Delhi, Lucknow, Hyderabad, with Sindhia, Nagpur, Poona; the year is chosen because we have the most complete figures for 1816. See Comparative Statement showing reductions effected by the Orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors, n.d., FPC, 25 May 1816, No. 35.

78. The remainder went for the subordinate European officers. Banky Bihari Misra, *The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in Modern Times* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) p. 188.

79. Governor-General's Minute, 23 May 1805, FPC, 27 June 1805, No. 161.

80. Political Agent Harowtee to Resident Malwa and Rajpootana, 20 May 1822, FPC, 14 June 1822, No. 9.

81. E.g. Resident Lucknow to Chief Secretary to Government, 28 May 1809, FPC, 13 June 1809, No. 41. Also Resident Nagpore to Officiating Secretary to Government Political Department, 31 May 1828, FPC, 27 June 1828, No. 76.

82. Resident Delhi to Chief Secretary to Government, 11 February 1828, FPC, 2 May 1828, No. 1.

83. Extract Public Letter from Bombay, 3 February 1803 and Extract Public Letter from Court of Directors to Bombay, 31 August 1804, Eur MS C.198, 'Letters to and from Col. Alexander Walker,' IOL.

84. E.g. Public Letter to Bombay, 26 October 1810 and Public Letter to Bombay 17 April 1811, Eur MS C.198, IOL.

85. General Walker to Court of Directors, 7 May 1812 and At Committee of Correspondence, 31 March 1815, Eur MS C.198, IOL.

86. PR 16:717-64; PR 12:479-86.

87. Governor-General's Minute, 35 May 1805, FPC, 27 June 1805, No. 161.

88. Secretary to Government to Governor Fort St. George, 23 May 1805, FPC, 29 July 1805, No. 66.

89. Secretary to Government to Governor Bombay, 23 May 1805, FPC, 29 July 1805, No. 67.

90. Civil Auditor to Secretary to Government Secret and Political Department, 5 February 1816, FPC, 17 February 1816, No. 7.

91. E.g. Secretary to Government to Resident Delhi, 28 August 1806, FPC, 28 August 1806, No.5. Resident Lucknow to Chief Secretary to Government, 28 May 1809, FPC, 13 June 1809, No. 41.

92. Secretary to Government to Residents Delhi, Lucknow, Scindia, Nagpore, Hyderabad, Poona, Envoy Goa, Superintendent Political Affairs Bundelkund, 6 April 1816, FPC, 6 April 1816, Nos. 1-7, 11.

93. Resolution of Governor-General, 23 May 1823, FPC, 23 May 1828, No. 61.

94. Circular to Residents, 18 April 1829, FPC, 18 April 1829, No. 68.

95. Resolution of the Supreme Government in the Political Department, 2 September 1831, Eur MS D. 556, IOL.

96. Oath 14 October 1820, FPC, 14 October 1820, No.2.

97. Minute 31 October 1821, FPC, 31 October 1821, No. 107.

98. For example, in 1850 and 1854. Circular Letter to Residents and Political Agents, 29 May 1850, FPC, 14 June 1850, No. 2. Circular Letter, 28 July 1854, FPC, 28 July 1854, No. 10.

99. For example, Resident Mysore to Chief Secretary Fort St. George, 19 March 1830 and Vice President in Council to Secretary to Government, 3 June 1831, FPC, 3 June 1831, Nos. 27, 29.

4. The Origins and Mixed Growth of the Residencies: Phase One, 1764-97

Ambassadors and residents, at all courts, are considered in the double capacity of negotiators and state spies...

—Richard Joseph Sulivan
Resident to the Nawab of the Carnatic (1781-2)

Overview of the First Phase of the Residencies

As the English East India Company dispatched its early political Residents to the courts of neighbouring Indian Rulers, it lacked any overall plan as to their function. Initially, some among the Company's officials in India perceived a need merely for a reliable means for communication between Indian Rulers and the Company. This perceived need contributed largely to the original deployment of a few political Residents from 1764. Other Company officials (especially in London), however, regarded even such limited involvement in Indian politics as contrary to the Company's purposes, which they held to be primarily commercial. This latter attitude led the Company to recoil somewhat from involvement with the Indian states and thus to the hesitant and mixed policies that characterized the years 1764 to 1797.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the political context of the Company and Indian politics during this period of the Residencies. Then, in the bulk of this chapter, I turn to a detailed investigation of those functions which emerged primarily during this time. Fundamental among these duties were control over communication between the court and the Company, influence over the internal and foreign policies of the Ruler, and extraction of resources from the state by means of intervention on behalf of British policy in the state administration. Here the particular foci are British intervention through an examination of the Resident's role in dynastic succession, the Ruler's jurisdiction over Europeans, and influence over the appointment of Chief Ministers

in the state. Indians were by no means passive or simply reacting to British initiatives but I will reserve until Chapter 7 our investigation of the often formidable efforts by Indian Rulers themselves to control and to harness the Residencies to their own purposes.

The Historical Context in Brief

The English East India Company began its political involvement in the political world of India with no conscious plan or coherent organization. Each of the three Presidencies faced different demands and often held inconsistent orientations. Bengal proved most dynamic of the three. Its most notable Governor during this phase, Warren Hastings (1772-85), did much to foster this dynamism. Hastings had experience dealing with an Indian Ruler, having earlier served as commercial Resident with the Nawab of Bengal. The 1773 Regulating Act reorganized the Company and brought it under the control of Parliament and the Crown. Further, this Act placed the Governor of Bengal at the head of the Company in India, as Governor-General. At the same time, it expanded the Governor-General's council; the presence on the Council of a hostile majority from 1774 to 1776, and an uncertain balance of power on it thereafter, limited Hastings's authority. Governors-General following Hastings tended to favour less interventionist policies toward the states. The Governors of Madras and Bombay, functioning with various degrees of hostility and autonomy, detracted from unified support for the Governor-General's plans even into the nineteenth century.

According to the ideal type of indirect rule developed in Chapter 1, the Company moved only uncertainly and unintentionally toward exerting forms of indirect rule through its Residents. The ideal type of indirect rule requires the exertion of exclusive and determining political control, a control recognized by both parties. We will see below how the Company only hesitatingly moved toward each element of this definition.

Of the elements of indirect rule, the Company perceived earliest the need for exclusivity: excluding all external powers —

other than the Company — from influence within a particular Indian state. The Company began by eliminating the influence of other European powers, most notably the French, from the Indian states. By the end of the eighteenth century, it had largely succeeded in accomplishing this for the states in India.

During this time, the Company also began to recognize the benefits of excluding the influence of Indian Rulers from each others' courts. This proved far more difficult for the Resident to accomplish. By beginning to control communication at the courts where they were stationed, Residents started to institute elements of indirect rule. Residents ultimately established a formal monopoly over all official communication into and out of each of the Indian states, in some instances, however, not until the early nineteenth century.

In some states during this initial period, the Residents also began to experiment with means to exercise determining political control. The Company only gradually came to realize that, for indirect rule as a strategy to work for the Company, it had to be able to obtain the resources and policies it wanted from each of the states. Residents worked to identify and extract resources of the state for use by the Company. As part of this process, Residents learned the tactics by which they could determine the policies which the Rulers and state administrations would then implement, to the advancement of the Company's aims. While Residents improved these tactics, they by no means had perfected them by the end of the eighteenth century. Indeed, the Rulers often proved able, during this period, to determine Company policy to some measure.

Another key element of indirect rule, recognition by both sides of the Resident's capacity to exercise political control, as yet proved largely lacking. Apparently at this time, only in the court of the Nawab of Bengal did the Resident achieve a degree of this recognition. Elsewhere neither party appears to have fully accepted such a relationship, although at specific times in the courts of Awadh, Farrukhabad, Tanjore, and the Carnatic, the Resident certainly exerted decisive power that these Rulers had no choice but to accept. Routine recognition on both sides of the Resident's

capacity to exert decisive control had not yet been fully established.

In short, the Company had not yet come to understand or achieve the full extent of indirect rule. The Company lacked experience with such political forms and also a unified direction and purpose. Overall, the Company found many aspects of its relationships with the Indian Rulers to be unsatisfactory during this period. Nevertheless, by analyzing its actions, we can see it empirically learning the advantages and pitfalls of using indirect as opposed to direct rule over Indian states.

A broad survey of the extent of the Company's relations with the Indian states clearly contrasts its situations at the beginning and the end of the period covered in this chapter. In 1764, the Company held only three enclaves around the Mughal Empire, around the ports of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. Each of these three Presidencies faced a different set of Indian states. By 1797, the Company stood poised to begin its dramatic expansion across virtually all of India, accomplished during the early decades of the nineteenth century.

Of the three Presidencies during this period, Calcutta expanded its influence most extensively through both direct and indirect rule. By 1764, Calcutta had already brought the Nawab of Bengal under its sway. Due to its inexperience using indirect rule, however, the Company crudely degraded the authority of the Nawab until, while drawing a pension from the Company, he came to play virtually no role in its administration of the state. This treatment of the Nawab largely eliminated the advantages to be gained by the Company from indirect rule. By 1797, Bengal, Bihar, and the Benaras region had all been integrated into Calcutta's direct administration, although the Nawab of Bengal remained in name on the throne, under the supervision of a Resident. In Awadh and Farrukhabad, Residents were deeply involved in experimenting with elements of indirect rule. Under Governor-General Hastings in particular, the Calcutta Government had taken the lead in the Company's expansion and use of indirect rule.



MAP 1
INDIA IN 1797

The other Presidencies made far less extensive territorial advances. By 1764, the Company had begun to exert some elements of indirect rule over the Nawab of the Carnatic. As of 1797, the Company had taken over and then relinquished direct control of that Ruler's territory, as well as the small state of Tanjore. The Company's Residents in both those states, and in Hyderabad, still worked with little success to establish a stable form of indirect rule. The Residency in Travancore had already been established and then abandoned as its experiments with indirect rule proved futile. Wars with the Mysore Rulers had stripped that state of much of its territory — which the Company administered through direct rule — but the core of this state remained hostile to British efforts to even station a Resident at its capital. In short by the end of the eighteenth century, Madras had little success in its efforts to use indirect rule.

Bombay Presidency lay in the midst of the Maratha states and had to deal with them severally. Inconclusive wars and much hostile political exchange continued into the early nineteenth century between the Company and Maratha Rulers including the Peshwa, Sindhia, the Bhonsle, and the Gaikwad. In this context, Residents at the Maratha courts had to manoeuvre delicately to exert any influence in favour of the Company. By 1797, the Company had only reached a point of uneasy, temporary balance with these states; relations with them would not be stabilized by indirect rule until the second decade of the nineteenth century.

The first deployment of the Residencies thus proved to be highly tentative for the Company. The Company's councils remained divided and undetermined as to the Company's role in India as a whole and the place of Residents in particular. Residents did, however, begin to discover the advantages to the Company of various elements of indirect rule. They also hit upon tactics that enabled them to advance the Company's purposes within the Indian courts. Building on the Company's and the Residents' experiences during this period, the Company collectively would subsequently bring all of the states mentioned above (plus all of the others in India) under its direct or indirect rule.

Residents, Knowledge, and Information

During this period (1764-97), political Residents had as one of their primary tasks communication between the Company and the Ruler. In its fullest extent, communication entailed obtaining knowledge about the Indian state, analyzing this into useful information for his superiors, and representing Company policies to the Ruler and state administration.[1] Although Residents later acquired additional functions with indirect rule, communication continued among the Resident's most fundamental responsibilities. Generally, over time, Residents discovered increasingly effective means of deciding what materials would be valuable to the Company and how to gain access to and interpret them. Residents developed methods for portraying British perspectives to the Ruler and court. On their part, Rulers and courtiers tried to find ways of disguising or blocking access to the information sought by the Resident. The Ruler and court had, however, only limited success in presenting their views beyond the state through any medium other than the Resident. Establishing a monopoly over communications between the Indian state and the world outside thus provided a major sphere of responsibility for each Resident.

From the time of the Company's initial involvement in the politics of India, some high British officials felt the need for a reliable medium of communication. Since in the Company's dramatic early advances the army often overreached instructions that had been anticipated for it, the civil authority felt out of touch with events in the field. A number of the early political Residents were merely the military officers whose troops happened to be stationed nearest a particular Indian court. Thus, while a few irregular political Residents existed from 1764, their numbers and functions remained erratic for some years, as we have seen in Chapter 2.

At the time of his appointment as Governor of Bengal, Warren Hastings expressed his frustration at his lack of a reliable means of communication with the important Indian states. He regretted the extant situation in which, as of 1772:

> . . . all political correspondence [depended on]...the present Military Channel [whose] Influence has prevailed too much of late to the prejudice and Diminution of the Civil Authority and whose Interest at the same time naturally leads to the Views of War when it may be dramatically opposite to the interest of the Company....[2]

Consequently, Hastings proposed appointing regular political Residents, responsible to him personally, rather than to the Council or Company as a whole. He intended to select his nominees from among the Company's civilian — as opposed to military — officials. By this means he sought to gain centralized control over Company relations with the Rulers on its frontier. To replace military officers who doubled as Residents, Hastings proposed the appointment of a permanent Resident at each of the politically significant courts '...for the transacting of such correspondence and communications...as he, the Governor, should think proper to entrust to his Management.'[3]

Further, Hastings requested regular reports from the Company's agents in each Indian state, even from the commercial Resident at Poona (who came under the authority of the Bombay Presidency rather than Calcutta): 'It would, however, be a particular satisfaction to us to receive certain information of the present situation and views...by monthly dispatches or oftner should their [*sic*] be occasion.'[4] The Governor-General thus sought to build a reliable system for contact with Indian Rulers for the acquisition and presentation of knowledge and information.

Others in the Company's service in India agreed with the Governor-General that only a network of British Residents would provide this essential and dependable information. Writing in 1779, a Madras civil servant argued in support of such a Residency system:

> At present all intelligence is communicated by spies, a species of information that is little to be depended on. English residents, on the contrary, would be more tenaciously watchful, not only of all public actions, but of all private machinations.... This I am convinced is a matter of infinitely

> greater moment than it may at first seem to be. A local knowledge of the movements of the respective governments hath long been wanting. The English have hitherto deliberated in the dark; no information being to be depended on; all has been left to chance and the effect of accidental communication.
>
> But this measure could not be partially adopted, since one of its principal advantages would result from a comparison of the information furnished by the several agents, whose separate and unconcerted communications and reflections would be subsequently found to explain and illustrate each other.[5]

The Company indeed went on to develop just such a network of European Residents who dispatched ever increasing quantities of knowledge and information to the Governor-General's secretariat.

British efforts to obtain a broad range of knowledge exceeded those conventionally made by Indian Rulers. Long before the Company's arrival, the various Rulers and governors of the Mughal Empire had an established network of wakils posted to each other's courts to convey public news, official court *akhbar* ('newsletters'), and secret intelligence as well. The Company's Residents expanded on this type of reporting in both volume and scope.

Hastings and like-minded Company officials understood the value of diverse knowledge about the Rulers and people of each Indian state. Increasingly, the British, because of their interest in commerce and land revenue, their professed concern with 'the People,' and their general curiosity about things Indian, sought highly detailed knowledge of the Indian states even those outside of their influence. In 1779, a Company official urged that Residents should report everything that might conceivably be of use to the secretariat:

> The utility of collecting every possible information respecting the disposition, genius, talents, character, connections,

> views, interests, revenues, military strength, and even domestic history of those Princes or people, with whose affairs our own happens to be interwoven or related, either immediately or remotely, must be also equally clear.[6]

In the years that followed, the Company followed this drive for a broad range of knowledge about each state. In 1782, for instance, Hastings instructed his Resident in Awadh to '...Endeavor to obtain an early and minute Information of the state...[including:] Their Government,' 'Their military Defense and Distribution of...Forces,' 'Revenue,' the 'Disposition, and actual conduct of the Zemindars [landholders] and the Means taken for restoring and preserving the quiet of the Country,' 'The Character and Credit of the principal Animals,' and the general state of the finances and methods of revenue collection. The Resident should rely on 'Private Intelligence' to obtain all this knowledge.[7] Governors-General frequently repeated such demands that Residents extract all possible information about the states.[8] Thus, while the British Residents conveyed 'political' news about the courts, they also sought a broad range of intelligence as well.

Obeying such instructions, Residents composed and transmitted descriptions of the state's geography and the condition of its countryside, including the composition and disposition of landholders and people living there.[9] When the Governor-General considered it useful, for example in preparation for deeper British involvement in the administration of a state, he ordered the Resident to investigate conditions by personally touring the countryside. In 1785, the Resident newly appointed to the Poona court received orders from the Calcutta secretariat to follow an extremely circuitous route to take up his post, so as to be able to survey and 'elucidate this part' of the country.[10] Residents continued to fulfill this function.[11] Since, as we shall see, Indian Rulers recognized the power that such knowledge gave to the Company, they on occasion sought to block any such forays into their countryside by the Resident.

In addition to personal observation, the Residents employed a variety of indirect sources of knowledge. Chapter 8 describes the

'intelligence department', established in each Residency to collect knowledge from that state and from the Indian agents it employed in other states, often at some distance. In addition to openly employed newswriters, Residents and their Indian staff also had secret informants among the courtiers and officials of the state. These informants provided information in exchange for a variety of compensations including the expectation or promise of the Resident's favour or protection, or simply cash.

Some Residents found covert contacts personally abhorrent and also incompatible with British culture. Taking this position, Anderson (who served in the Residency with Sindhia 1782-85) uprightly pronounced his incapacity to match Indians in secret dealings: 'The natives of Hindustan are such adepts in intrigue...that they will always leave us behind them when we attempt to practice these arts'; other Residents, including Anderson's successor, seem to have relished such secret manoeuvring.[12] As Resident at Poona, Malet (1786-97) had a budget of Rs. 48,000 annually for intelligence and 'presents'.[13] The Resident at Nagpur later gloated, '...the treachery of a muttsuddy [Indian clerk] has given me possession of an important document... procured with a comparatively small expenditure of money on secret service.'[14] Similar proceedings were routine in other Residencies.[15] While the personal style of an individual Resident could alter the intelligence gathering function of that Residency significantly, nevertheless — gathering all kinds of knowledge which might prove useful to himself, to other Residents, or to the Company as a whole — comprised one of the main functions of each Resident. As detailed in Chapter 4, the Residents also developed tactics for presenting information to the court in a light advantageous to the Company.

Residents and many high Company officials in India — more than the officials in London — perceived the advantage that a network of communication provided the Company over the Indian Rulers. Residents increasingly communicated extensively with each other. Often a Resident proved able to provide knowledge or advice obtained at his court that was useful to the Resident at another. By 1789, the Company had established spe-

cial *dak*s (postal relays of runners which could cover 120 miles per day) among its major Residencies and Presidency towns. The Governor-General encouraged Residents to communicate fully with each other, and his secretariat monitored this increasingly voluminous inter-Residency correspondence.[16] Out of the Resident's information-gathering function came involvement in nearly all aspects of life within the Indian state.

Conflict within the Company over the Role of the Resident

The role of Residencies proved controversial from their inception. Governor-General Hastings initially sought primarily to establish communications links to the important Indian states. Even this limited role, however, raised issues of control between the Governor-General and both the other members of the Calcutta Council and the Court of Directors. If Residents were to be appointed, the Directors, the Council, and the Governor-General each sought the power of appointment to the Residencies for use as a reward or patronage to be bestowed on its own supporters. Further, knowledge about the Indian states proved valuable, thus each of these three parties sought control over the Residencies as the sources of this knowledge. Finally, the Directors feared that the Residents would drag the Company into costly military entanglements with the Indian states.

Until the end of his career in India, Warren Hastings continued to maintain that he, *ex officio*, held sole authority to appoint political Residents and that they were responsible to him personally, quite excluded from the authority of the Calcutta Council or the Directors or even the Company as a whole. In his letter of appointment to James Browne as Resident Delhi in 1782, Hastings made this position clear:

> Having judged it expedient at this time to have a Minister at the Court of Dehly on the Part of this Government, and being desirous to avoid the *eclat* of a publick [*sic*] appointment.... I do therefore by my own seperate [*sic*] authority, but with the knowledge of the other Members of the Board,

> appoint you [Browne] to be my agent, and the Minister of this Government, at the Court of Dehly...[17]

On their part, the opposing majority in the Calcutta Council and Court of Directors each persisted in asserting their own authority over the selection and control and correspondence of the Residents.

Appointment of the Awadh Resident proved a particularly heated object for these confrontations, although appointments to several other Residencies generated similar clashes.[18] John Bristow and Nathanial Middleton — the former the client of the hostile majority on the Calcutta Council backed by the Court of Directors, the latter the client of Hastings — were each appointed and recalled three times as Resident in Awadh as one or the other party in Calcutta gained temporary ascendancy: Middleton served 1773-4, 1776-9, 1780-82; Bristow served 1774-6, 1780-81, 1782-3. For a time (1780-1), the factions experimented with redefining the Residency by dividing charge over it: Bristow supervised 'Political negotiations, Correspondence and Transactions' while Middleton controlled 'Pecuniary' matters.[19] Needless to say, this internecine conflict reduced the effectiveness of the Awadh Residency for the Company during these years.

The issue of control of the Residencies went beyond the power of appointment to include the matter of access over the knowledge gained by the Residents. In 1775, the recently recalled Resident to Awadh, Nathanial Middleton, wrote that he viewed his late appointment as directly from the Governor-General, personally. This meant that Middleton refused to disclose his correspondence to anyone else in the Company's government.

> ...I received my appointment from the President [the Governor-General], was enjoined to correspond with him alone on all points relative to the Public Service and considered myself as responsible immediately to him for my conduct...therefore I refuse to give the Board my correspondence.[20]

The Court of Directors, however, sided with the hostile majority of the Council against Hastings, ordering Middleton to deliver all his correspondence with the Governor-General over to the Council.[21]

A further issue between the Governor-General and the Court of Directors involved the Residents' role in the states. On their part, the Court of Directors expressed scepticism that the appointment of such Residents as Hastings and others envisioned was worth the financial cost or the political danger. The Directors did not see the need to sanction any salary for a Resident in Awadh in 1775, for instance, until his worth to the Company had been demonstrated: 'The necessity of the measure and the services performed must be represented to us and we shall then consider what gratuitous recompense it may be proper for such service.'[22]

Although the Court of Directors recognized that some communication links were needed by the Company to a few Indian states, the Directors envisioned the Residencies fundamentally as European-style diplomats, concerned solely with the foreign policy of the Rulers and especially as an early warning system against the French. The Directors believed that the Residents' ability to give warning to the British about French machinations in the states came at the dangerous risk which a Resident's presence in a state posed for deeper Company entanglement with the internal affairs of the state. Further, the financial cost of the Residencies weighed heavily on the concerns of the Directors. They instructed the Governor-General in 1784:

> **That the present Occasion requires the best and earliest Information which can be obtained, of all that is passing in different Darbars [courts] of India, and of the Disposition of the Intentions of the Country Powers towards the English and French Nations, in respect to the Views which the French appear by the Papers before us to entertain against the Company and their Allies, and that every prudent Means of Conciliation be added to reconcile them where they may be adverse to the English Interest.[23]**

They were adamant, however, '...that Residencies ought to be established for these and no other present objects.' They went on to list the courts where they authorized the Company to establish Residencies: Delhi, Poona, Mysore, Hyderabad, and Goa. This list emphasizes the Directors' anti-French concerns and excludes states to which the Governor-General had already sent Residents, including Awadh and Gwalior.

The heated conflict between the Governor-General and the rest of the Calcutta Council ended only with the departure of Hastings in 1785 and his replacement by John Macpherson (1785-6), who owed his career to the Directors. Macpherson explicitly wrote to them at the time of his appointment, vowing

> ... not to avail himself of the privilege of deputing an agent on his own part to the Court of the Vizier [Awadh], though the present engagements with him provide for such a deputation. He [Macpherson] wishes to comply not only with the spirit but the letter of any orders that you [the Court of Directors] may be pleased to transmit to us on the subject of the Residency...[24]

Thus, while not denying his power as Governor-General to appoint a personal Resident, Macpherson declined to do so out of deference to the Directors. The succeeding Governors-General also avoided such overt confrontations with the Directors over the appointment of Residents.

In contrast to the limited role envisioned by the Directors, even before the end of the eighteenth century, some officials of the Company in India sought to use Residents to manipulate the external and internal policies of the Indian courts. By careful negotiation, the Residents were to break up combinations of Indian states forming against the Company and further to ally Indian states with the Company against others hostile to them. The Residents at the Maratha courts in particular held the charge to prevent their unification against the Company.[25] In 1794, Governor-General Shore (1793-8) wrote:

...the situation of a Resident at Ujjain [with Sindhia], affords us an opportunity of acquiring authentic intelligence... [Further] the influence of the Resident may be occasionally employed to impede or dissolve a combination unfavourable to the British interests, and that it will generally tend to a disunion of the Maratha interests....[26]

At the same time, these Residents at Maratha courts and at Hyderabad also held the brief to ally those states with the Company against Mysore, which the Company perceived as common enemies of the Marathas, Hyderabad, and the British. Until the conquest of Mysore (1799), diplomatic contests between the Resident and the wakils of Mysore, as to who received precedence and who held the ear of policy-makers, continued at Hyderabad and the Maratha courts.[27]

The conflict over control of the Residencies continued between the Governor-General and the Governors of the other two Presidencies as well as between the former and the Directors. During this period, each of the three Presidencies — Bengal, Madras, and Bombay — sent out its own Residents separately to the states with which they needed to deal. The Governors of each Presidency jealously defended their authority over their Residents, often leading to confusion and Residents working at cross-purposes with each other. Only gradually did the Governor-General in Calcutta secure control over virtually the entire Residency system, leaving only a few states under the authority of either Bombay or Madras by the end of the eighteenth century.

The two leading examples of this controversy between Calcutta and the Bombay and Madras Presidencies were the Residencies in Poona and Hyderabad respectively. In the early 1770s, the Governor-General could do no more than request Bombay and its Resident in Poona that he be informed of their negotiations with the Marathas.[28] By 1779, the Governor-General had appointed his own 'Minister' to the court at Poona, but continued to recognize the primary authority of Bombay's Resident to Poona in affairs there.[29] Not until 1784 could Calcutta exert the exclusive right to appoint the Resident at Poona, although in this first instance the

Governor-General accepted the Governor of Bombay's nominee for the appointment.[30]

The conflict between the Governor-General and the Governor of Madras followed a different pattern. As late as 1779, the former continued to complain about being kept in ignorance about events in Hyderabad due to lack of access to the reports sent from the Resident there who was appointed by Madras.[31] Eventually, the Resident at Hyderabad, John Hollond, began to correspond directly with the Governor-General. The Governor of Madras protested Calcutta's 'encroaching upon our authority' and, in 1780, recalled Hollond from the Residency for thus acting in an 'unbecoming and disrespectful manner.' The Governor-General responded by immediately reappointing Hollond as his own Resident at Hyderabad. Madras replied to this by withdrawing the Resident's escort, paid for out of Madras funds; the controversy continued to smolder until 1783 when the Governor-General finally prevailed.[32] Residencies in other major states were also eventually transferred to the authority of the Governor-General with the grudging acquiescence of the other Presidencies; the Mysore and Travancore Residencies, for example, were taken under the authority of the Governor-General after years of debate in 1807, although the Governor of Madras continued to receive reports from them.[33]

The value that the Company continued to place on control over the Residencies comes out in two confrontations between the Governor-General and the other Presidencies even in the nineteenth century. In one confrontation, the Governor of Madras objected vigorously to a perceived threat to one of his few remaining perquisites in the Residency system: the right of Madras to be the first to receive all communications from the Travancore Residency. In 1823, the Resident at Travancore sent a dispatch directly to the Governor-General's secretariat in Calcutta. Madras jealously objected, defending its rights. After apologies from Calcutta and Travancore, the Governor in Council of Madras generously forgave this temporary lapse, on condition it never recur. Calcutta acquiesced. The other confrontation occurred in 1839, when the Governor of Bombay wrote to all Residents in-

structing them to report regularly to him about all important events occurring in their states. The Governor-General reacted forcefully, demanding that the Governor withdraw these instructions immediately. Calcutta would not permit Residents to share their knowledge with Bombay directly. Rather, Calcutta conceded that it would forward whatever from the reports of the Residents it decided was appropriate for Bombay to learn. The Governor of Bombay retracted his instructions and excused his improper assertion of authority as 'due to a misapprehension.'[34] Control over knowledge and information generated by the Residents thus remained a valued resource, an object of contention even within the Company.

While the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras lost direct control over all the important Residencies, the civilians and officers on their establishments were not excluded from service in the political line. Although territorial claims were occasionally raised by candidates for a particular Residency, in general, officials from all three Presidencies served throughout India. Indeed, the official cadres which most held the office of Resident over the entire period to 1858 were the military officers of Madras Presidency (at 26.4 per cent) closely followed by Bengal civilians (holding 25 per cent).[35] Thus, while the Governor-General eventually took control over the entire Residency system, the careers of Company servants from all three Presidencies also advanced through service in Residencies.

The Residencies thus came to serve the Company as a whole, under the control of the Governor-General. The Company brought the individual Residencies into a system which extracted knowledge and information from the Indian states. Increasingly, the Residents gained a monopoly over the communications into and out of these states. Further, the Residencies also began to emerge as the means by which the Company could exert elements of indirect rule over the Indian states.

The Resident and the Succession of Rulers

Residents not only sought to control communication, they also began to assert a degree of interference in the internal affairs of the Indian states. The Company took an early step in this direction

through its interest in the succession of Rulers. This early interest in succession mirrored the Company's first perceptions of the Resident as a link to a particular Ruler rather than to the people of a nation (e.g. the Resident to Sindhia rather than to the Marathas). Prior to the establishment of a Residency at an Indian court, the Company often knew something about the Ruler but little about the administration or people of that Indian state. The Company's involvement in the succession of Indian Rulers grew significantly as an important early element of its exercise of indirect rule.

It is clear that the Company's councils remained divided until 1797 as to the legality and advisability of intervention in the succession of Rulers. Initially, the Company's limited political experience with the Indian states furnished little guiding precedent. The Directors in London counseled the principle of abstention from involvement in such matters in the states. Nevertheless, some of the Company's officials in India believed passionately that its interests demanded decisive and independent action by a Resident at the time of succession at a court. At this time, however, the Company rarely dethroned established Rulers as it would in a number of cases in the 1840s and 1850s.

The potential scope for intervention by the Resident in a succession (even in the eighteenth century) remained broad, in part, because of political conditions within many Indian states. The line of inheritance for most Indian dynasties followed no absolute — or even clear — rule. Male Rulers customarily engaged in sexual relations with a variety of types of wives and concubines; the offspring of each type made claims to their common father's estate. British Residents, acting as an independent and externally-based force, often proved to hold the balance of power among the disparate pretenders to the throne, each of whom might hold the loyalty of only a small faction in the court or army as his basis of support within the state. At the death of a Ruler, therefore, a Resident — and the Company's political and military force which he represented — often could prove the arbiter of succession, to the political and/or financial advantage of the Company.

Even before its first appointment of political Residents in 1764, the Company naively involved itself in the succession of Indian

dynasties. The wars between the British and the French in South India had as their ostensible cause the disputed successions of the Nawab of Carnatic; by establishing its candidate, the English East India Company triumphed over the French. In North India, the Company intervened repeatedly in the successions of the Nawab of Bengal. Siraj al-Daula succeeded to his grandfather's rule in Bengal in April 1756, but had not yet consolidated his rule when he came into conflict with the Company. Although his army temporarily defeated the Company at Calcutta that June, in 1757 his army lost utterly to the British at the battle of Plassey. In this battle, he himself fell captive to the Company and was executed a year later. These events made the province of Bengal subject to the military will of the Company. The Company at the time lacked much experience in indirect rule. Probably as a result, the officials of the Company began blatantly to manipulate the office of Nawab. The British installed Mir Jafar as Nawab in June 1757, deposed him in favour of Mir Kasim in 1760, and then restored Mir Jafar in 1763. Without going into the notorious details of these repeated depositions, we should note that with each transition the Company as a body — and the key Company officials as individuals — received vast sums as 'compensation' from their candidate for Nawab of the day.

Such crude manipulation of the office of Nawab reduced its incumbent to the obvious status of a mere puppet of the Company, of little use for its larger purposes. In 1772, the Company took over the direct administration of Bengal under its own authority as Diwan, an office received from the Mughal Emperor. As a result, Bengal henceforth remained distant from the ideal type of indirect rule, since the Ruler played little political role and the British carried out the entire administration of the state. In Bengal, therefore, the Company's heavy-handed intervention in succession came before it had developed experience with indirect rule. Although the Nawab of Bengal remained on the Company's budget, he provided little advantage for the Company. Quite rapidly the Company began to recognize that such blatant interference did not suit its interests in the long run.

Reflecting the hesitant policies of the Company with respect to involvement of the Indian states during this first period, the Company bridled at binding itself to any fixed policy on its role in a succession. Consequently, the Company's councils had to formulate a response to each succession on a case-by-case basis. In preparation for the eventuality of a succession in one of the states, Residents regularly sent back detailed reports on the health of the Ruler, the character and claims of all the pretenders to the throne, and the possible alternative scenarios for succession, with suggestions for Company policy in each case.

Particularly revealing of the Company's inconsistent policies in this regard are the debates of the Calcutta Council in 1775, as the death of the Nawab of Awadh became obviously imminent. Since the Company had defeated the Awadh army at Buxar in 1764, and had subsequently compelled the Awadh Ruler to subsidize the Company's army in the region, the Resident held a powerful influence there. On the old Nawab's death in 1775, as in most Indian successions, more than one pretender to the throne stepped forward. In this case, the prime contenders were two of the late Nawab's sons: Asaf al-Daula and his half-brother, Saadat Ali Khan. The issue of concern for the Calcutta Council, however, was not so much the justice of each claim to succession but rather the Company's most advantageous role in it. First, the Council posed the issue as 'Whether it be for the Interest of the Company that the Government should interfere in regulating the Succession...of Oude' and then unanimously affirmed it was. The second issue was whether the Company was obliged by treaty to intervene. Here the strong factionalism of the Council emerged: Hastings arguing in the affirmative was overridden by the hostile majority who voted no.[36] In consequence, the Company withheld from involvement. Unconstrained by the Company, Asaf al-Daula managed to crush the weak bid of his rival.

Although it eschewed direct intervention in this case, the Company did find two ways to take advantage of this interregnum in Awadh. First, over the objections of the Governor-General, the majority on the Calcutta Council unilaterally declared the Company's treaties with Asaf al-Daula's late father to have been

personal: the extant treaties lapsed with his death. In his vulnerable position, Asaf al-Daula therefore had to submit to compulsion from the Company and conclude a new treaty, more favourable to it. Among other provisions, this new treaty increased the subsidy payments due from Awadh to the Company for its support and ceded to it substantial territories, including Banaras. Second, the Company gave honoured sanctuary to the other contender, Saadat Ali Khan, together with a generous pension it required Asaf al-Daula to pay. The continued presence of his rival, waiting under the Company's wings, provided a clear warning to Asaf al-Daula not to oppose the advice of its Resident.

The Company's policies with regard to its intervention in a succession remained unsettled until the end of the eighteenth century. In some states, as in Tanjore in 1787, the Resident intervened decisively: he secured and sealed up the state palace and treasury with Company troops, took the former Minister into custody, and prohibited any accession until the Company could decide the succession.[37] To determine its stand, the Company looked not only to its own interests, it also consulted Brahmin genealogical specialists from Bengal, Banaras, and Tanjore as to the traditional Hindu religious precepts as well as local Tanjore custom.[38] Based on all this, the Company determined to disallow an adoption by the late Raja and instead installed the late Raja's brother on the throne.[39] As we shall see, the Residencies outside of the control of the Governor-General (in this case, the Tanjore Residency came under the immediate authority of the Madras Presidency) did not always conform to the norm for the other Residencies. Further, Tanjore's small size, isolation within Company territory, and utter dependence on the British made such decisive intervention relatively safe for the Company.

In more politically sensitive states, not under the Company's military control, the Company took a more cautious role during this period. In Hyderabad, for instance, the Company followed an ambiguous policy in 1796 when it believed — prematurely — that a succession was immanent. The Governor-General instructed the Hyderabad Resident that 'we have no right to interfere, but the situation...requires a previous decision on the part which [the

Company] is to take, as far as it can at this time be prudently planned.' The Governor-General went on to instruct the Resident not to intervene if the Company's goals would be achieved without it. The Resident was ordered to immediately acknowledge and throw the weight of the Company behind its preferred candidate, Sikandar Jah, should he ascend the throne. However, if another pretender should seize the throne, the Resident was to 'remain neuter, until you can inform me of all existing circumstances and receive my further instructions.'[40] Thus, the Company resolved not to interfere unless it had to. Since the Nizam of Hyderabad recovered his health, the issue did not arise for another seven years. By that time, the Company had established a degree of indirect rule in Hyderabad.

By intervening in the successions of some Rulers, the Residents began to exert their influence within the state. The transition between Rulers left the state particularly vulnerable to the influence of Residents. A Ruler who succeeded with the decisive backing of the Resident incurred an obligation to the Company. The Company had not yet formulated a consistent policy with respect to the Resident's role in such successions. Nevertheless, the interventions which did occur clearly marked some of the earliest intrusions of the Resident into the authority of the Ruler.

The Resident and the Ruler's Jurisdiction

Congruent with the Company's early perception of the prime role of the Resident as a communications link to the important Indian Rulers of the day, the Residents had relatively limited involvement with the administration in most states. As noted above, the Company was beginning to involve itself in the succession of Indian Rulers under its sway. A deeper step toward indirect rule can be seen in the Resident's involvement with the initial development of limited extraterritorial rights by the Company in some of the Indian states.

Overall, in their dealings with the Indian states, the British sought increasingly to exclude themselves and their clients from the authority of the Indian Rulers. Chapter 10 shows that the

British continually redefined the nature of the sovereignty which they accorded to Indian Rulers. The concept of extraterritoriality, although rarely explicitly used in India, nevertheless describes the growing set of exclusions asserted by the British against the judicial authority of Indian Rulers. During the eighteenth century, these extraterritorial rights remained fairly limited; some of the Indian Rulers could, on occasion, reject them. Nevertheless, the British gradually expanded these extraterritorial rights until they became one of the significant aspects of indirect rule in the Indian states.

The formal jurisdictional relationship between the British and individual Rulers over extradition was laid out in a series of treaties. Early agreements, such as one with the Marathas in 1739, had simply called for the return of fugitives: reciprocal extradition.[41] In other cases, subjects of either the Ruler or the Company were, in theory, to be tried in their own courts (i.e. the court of the defendant applied).

The first major confrontation between the Company and an Indian Ruler over extraterritoriality came in 1756, even before political Residents were deployed by the Company. A courtier of the Nawab of Bengal fled arrest on charges of peculation and sought refuge in the Company's fort at Calcutta. When ordered by the Nawab to surrender the fugitive for trial, the Company refused to recognize the Nawab's jurisdiction over people found within its fort. In reply, the Nawab simply expelled the Company from Calcutta, killing those Company officials who resisted and imprisoning some in the infamous 'Black Hole'. Before the Nawab allowed the Company to return, he bound the Company by treaty to extradite anyone he charged with a crime.[42] This first effort by the Company to extend extraterritorial protection against the jurisdiction of a regional Ruler proved a costly British mistake.

A similar issue arose in 1776, again with the Nawab of Bengal. In this instance, two Indian officials of the Nawab, residing in Calcutta, incurred debts. Some British subjects brought civil actions against them. The usual division on the Calcutta Council at the time occurred. The faction hostile to the Governor-General held that because the accused '...had not connection with the

Company, they are not subject to the jurisdiction of [the Company's] Supreme Court.' The Governor-General, however, supported by the Supreme Court, maintained '...every Person residing within the Bounds of the Town of Calcutta or any of the Company's Factories is a British subject and amenable to the Supreme Court...for every act done or committed during the time in which a Man is so Resident...although he may have removed himself from it to any other place in the provinces.' The hostile majority won out in this instance.[43] Eventually, however, the opposing view prevailed: all people living within Company territories, even servants or relatives of Indian Rulers, were subject to the authority of its courts.[44] That is, the Company refused to grant extraterritorial exemptions to Indians within its territories, even the employees or relatives of Indian Rulers. On its part, the Company increasingly asserted extraterritorial exemptions for various categories of people within Indian states. After the Company began to post political Residents, extraterritoriality proved one of the Residents' most effective tools in securing the support of influential classes of people within the Indian state.

The category of people first protected by the Resident's exertion of extraterritoriality were Europeans, of all nationalities. As the British presence in India grew, the Company increasingly used extraterritoriality on the basis of race. Since extraterritoriality implies a separation, the setting apart into distinct legal categories of foreigners and indigenous people, it did much to buttress the racial distinctions between European and Indian which the British wished to make. Thus extraterritoriality helped the British maintain control over Europeans as a whole in India and therefore over European military expertise as well.

Throughout its expansion and rule in India, the Company saw European culture and military science and technology as the major causes of its nearly unbroken string of dramatic battlefield victories against Indian armies. To maintain its control over this European expertise, the Company concluded numerous treaties with Indian Rulers which recognized Company legal control over 'any English or French subjects, or any other person from among the inhabitants of Europe.'[45] The extent of British control over

Europeans (or Americans) varied. Most of the treaties gave the British authority to forbid or permit the residence or employment of each European within the state. Early examples of this sort are treaties with the Rulers of Bengal (1765), Sawantwadi and Kolhapur (1766), Awadh (1775), and Travancore (1795). By 1841, some eighteen more states concluded such treaties with the Company.[46] The number of states with such treaties continued to grow until, in 1876, the Government of India laid down a blanket prohibition, even in cases where no treaty provision to this effect existed, on any Ruler hiring any European without British approval.[47]

As we will see, the Company continued to extend its extraterritorial protection ever more widely. Over time, the Residents, and some Rulers, nominated other categories of people as exempt from the jurisdiction of the local Ruler. This growing extension of the Company's authority eventually turned the Residency into a rival center for jurisdiction and protection within the Indian state.

The Resident and the Internal Affairs of the States

Even during the eighteenth century, Residents began to involve themselves in aspects of the internal administration of the Indian states most directly under its military power, most notably Bengal, Awadh, Farrukhabad, the Carnatic, and Tanjore. As Residents empirically developed means to control communications, the succession, and the jurisdiction of Rulers, Residents also sought to exert sufficient influence in the state to identify and extract resources from it. Since — except in Bengal — the Company itself proved as yet unwilling and unable to tap directly the sources of production, the Residents sought to work through the Ruler and extant state administration. Thus, Residents spent much of their effort developing tactics for the exertion of limited control in the state administration by means of influence over the office of Chief Minister.

Many factors limited the depth of the Company's involvement in the internal affairs of the states at this time. The Court of Directors largely sought to prohibit what they regarded as costly

and improper intervention. Several of the Governors-General and a number of the Company's career servants in India seconded the Directors' policies. Further, the Company lacked the manpower and the experience to commit itself to widespread intervention. Among other matters, the Company already faced substantial problems in administering the territories it already held in Bengal (including Banaras and Bihar) and South India.[48] Its tentative efforts in this direction proved unworkable. The Residents as individuals and the Residencies as institutions lacked experience in the techniques of extensive indirect rule. They were only beginning to obtain some of the local knowledge about the states that would later enable them to involve themselves more effectively in the Ruler's administration.

Nevertheless, in states where the Company's military power overshadowed that of the Ruler, the Residents did begin to explore the potential for intervention in various aspects of the states' internal administrations. I have already examined the simultaneous interventions in communications and in the succession and jurisdiction of Rulers. Residents also experimented with means to extract resources from the states by inducing reform in the revenue collection system. In a few instances (Awadh 1782-3, Tanjore 1773-6, the Carnatic 1792), the Company attempted to collect land revenues and to administer territories in these states directly. In each case, these attempts proved futile and the Company restored the administration to the Ruler.

Official policy and practical capacity combined to limit the Resident's direct involvement in administration. Instead, two less direct but closely related patterns emerged. In the first, the Company as an institution — and the Residents as individuals — took resources out of the top of the system, that is, from the Ruler's treasury. In order to maximize this accumulation of visible resources at the top of the system, the Residents sought to reform the Ruler's revenue collection administration until it could more efficiently extract the resources from the producers. To do this, much of the effort by the Resident intended to strengthen the Ruler and focused particularly on the appointment of his Chief Minister.

Over time, the Company tended to take three broad kinds of material resources from the states. The first consisted of commercial goods. Political Residents for the most part proved uninvolved in such matters of trade. The correspondence of the Residents rarely mention commerce or commercial goods. The Company's commercial concerns related most to the political Residencies at times when Residents negotiated the annexation from the states to the Company of territories valuable as production areas. The second material resource provided by the states to the Company was manpower. A Resident represented, and guarded the rights of, the Company's Indian employees, civilian or military, who were indigenous to that state. I will examine these duties extensively in future chapters. The third major resource, the land revenues of the state, are most pertinent here. Residents negotiated loans, subsidies, war reparations, and gifts from the Rulers to the Company. Such transfers occurred throughout the period of the Residencies and comprise a continued theme in this book. We have already seen some of these transfers of treasure at the time of a succession of a Ruler or following a military defeat at the Company's hands.

Residents had to develop the means by which the revenue administration of the Rulers would tap the sources of production and produce a visible surplus in the state treasury. Once wealth was accumulated there, the Residents found ways to transfer some of it to the Company's coffers. Residents therefore sought to strengthen the Ruler's capacity to collect land revenue, and to support a Chief Minister willing and able to generate a surplus visible to the Company, as preconditions for the extraction of this resource.

During this experimentation with Residencies, a tripartite division of power in the Indian courts under Company influence began to emerge: the Ruler, the Minister, and the Resident. The Ruler, as hereditary head of the state, comprised the primary centre and the sole source of legitimizing authority within the state. Even if still *de jure* subordinate in most cases to the Mughal Emperor, the Ruler nevertheless held political authority within the state. The Chief Minister, in contrast, served only at the will of

the Ruler. Nevertheless, as the head of the administration, the Minister controlled the finances and managed the state. Third, the Resident, representing the Company, increasingly formed an alternative source of power, protection, and patronage.

The Rulers proved a rich source for the Company. The Company as an institution obtained vast amounts of wealth from the Rulers of Bengal, Awadh, Tanjore, and the Carnatic.[49] The Company would continue to obtain such capital from the Rulers throughout its history. Although some of the Company's officials as individuals also acquired fortunes from the Rulers, the Company repeatedly — albeit only partially successfully — sought to stop such transfers of wealth from the Rulers directly to its officials.

The incumbent Chief Minister had an interest in retaining his own control over the administration. Although the titles of the position varied among states (most commonly diwan, wazir, or naib, although other titles were used), the chief executive officer of the state carried out the administration under the direction of the Ruler. The Minister, like the Resident, had to pursue his own agenda within the authority of the Ruler. Incumbent Ministers often represented the vested interests of already entrenched state officials. Reform directed by the Company clearly threatened such Chief Ministers and their constituencies. As a consequence, the incumbent Minister and the Resident often proved rivals.

During the eighteenth century, the Company came to regard an uncooperative Minister as the major block to the administrative reforms directed by the Resident. Installation of a Minister responsive to the Resident's direction thus proved a recurrent issue. In the words of Warren Hastings: '...there can be no medium in the Relations between the Resident and the Minister, but either the Resident must be the Slave and Vassal of the Minister or the Minister at the absolute Devotion of the Resident.'[50] Eventually Residents largely subordinated the Minister and thus came to rival the Ruler himself.

Indicative of the Company's attitude in the eighteenth century, that a strong Ruler was the blessing of the British Government to the people of the state and a corrupt Minister a threat to all, is a

statement of the purpose of indirect rule as understood by the Awadh Resident in 1784:

> To restore the Sovereign his Dignity, to curb the Ambitions of his Minister, to correct the disorder and abuses of his Government were the salutary and important objects of my Designation at the Court of Oude. Their Accomplishment would have established the english [*sic*] Influence over these rich and flourishing provinces on a Basis of more stability than any we had yet secured — an Interest in the hearts of the People acquired and confirmed through the Blessings they derived from us.

The Resident goes on to point out the bitterness of the rivalry which had developed between him and the Awadh Minister.[51]

This rivalry between the Resident and the Minister arose in a number of states, often coupled with the larger problem of conflict within the Company over the level of intervention appropriate in the state administration. Governor-General Hastings tended to support vigorous intervention by his Residents in the reform of the states where the Company was strongest, most notably Awadh. For five months, at virtually the end of his term in India, Hastings personally remained in the Awadh capital in order to use his influence to strengthen that Ruler and 'reform' the state administration. As we shall see in Chapter 9, where Awadh is examined in depth, that state continued to be one in which the Company frequently intervened, rarely with satisfactory results, until 1856.

Hastings's successors as Governor-General opposed intervention in the states. Cornwallis (1786-93) in particular determined not to permit the Residents to intervene. He assured the Court of Directors:

> ...[the Residency] being a System now positively and declaredly established that the Company shall not interfere in any Respect in the Details of the [Ruler's] Government, strict orders are to be sent to [the Resident] neither to interfere himself, nor suffer an Interference.... The whole

> management of the...Country is left to his Excellency and his Ministers...[52]

Cornwallis even exchanged letters with Rulers assuring them (as here with the Awadh Ruler): 'In short leaving the whole management of your country to your Excellency and your Ministers, I will put a stop to the interference of others...' including the Resident.[53] Nevertheless, interventions continued, justified by local circumstances as exceptions to official policy.

Two examples from 1786 illustrate how the Residents felt bound on one hand by official policies and promises to Rulers forbidding intervention and compelled on the other by the conviction that only intervention could properly reform the administration. In the first example, unhappy conditions in the small north Indian state of Farrukhabad led the Resident and the Nawab each to seek to place his own candidate in the office of Chief Minister. Initially, the Resident succeeded in installing his man. The Nawab then complained to the Governor-General that the Resident had 'entered into authority over the affairs of the country and money' by appointing an incompetent Minister. The Nawab went on to accuse that Minister of administering the state to the Resident's personal financial advantage.[54]

The Resident denied the charges against him and his appointee. The Resident further justified his actions by suggesting the need to compensate with a trusty Minister for the Ruler's weaknesses: 'There are few vices to which [the Nawab] is not addicted, and few crimes of which he is innocent...the abject imbecility of the Nabob renders the appointment of a Dewan [Minister] indispensably necessary....'[55] Eventually, the Ruler rejected the Resident's candidate but selected an alternate acceptable to the Resident. Significantly, there seems to have been no British discussion at the time of deposing the Nawab, as there probably would have been during the mid-nineteenth century.

The second example from 1786, that of Tanjore, also demonstrates this dilemma between the official policy of non-intervention and the Resident's perception of local need for intervention in the appointment of a reforming Minister. Years before

(in 1773), the Company had invaded and taken direct control over Tanjore. The Directors, however, had vetoed this act and ordered the Raja restored to full control over his territories. At that time, the Company had concluded an agreement that forswore 'all [Company] Interference in the internal Government' of the state. When Residents had subsequently violated this stricture on occasion, the Court of Directors had repeatedly checked them and firmly enforced the terms of the agreement. Nevertheless, in 1786, the Resident felt so distraught at the disorder he perceived in Tanjore that he intervened once again. He forcefully lectured the Raja with 'salutary advice' on how to improve conditions for the people of that state. The Resident also 'advised' the Chief Minister to resign for 'his Master's Welfare.'[56] The Raja and the Minister both rejected this advice.

Fearful of incurring the wrath of the Directors by violating yet again their regulations against intervention, the Resident appealed to the Governor of Madras. The Governor in turn made a heartfelt plea to his superiors:

> But what will the Court of Directors or the nation think if the Government in a Country protected by our Arms and Supported by our Influence, we truly suffer the Iron Hand of Oppression to exterminate its Inhabitants without using every possible Effort to relieve them? This appears to me to be one of those cases, in which the Dictates of Humanity unite with the Strongest Calls of Political necessity, to break through all Restraints for the Safety of much injured People.[57]

Supported by the Governor-General, the Resident then proceeded to displace the offending Minister.[58]

Cries for intervention by Residents were not, however, always heeded by all their superiors. A later example from Tanjore illustrates this. In 1796, the Ruler of Tanjore and his Minister had once again incurred the hostility of the Resident by failing to heed his advice on reforming the administration of the state. The Governor of Madras authorized the Resident to 'take effectual means for the removal' of the Minister and even to arrest him. In

this instance, however, the Governor-General reversed the Resident's intervention in the administration of the state.[59]

The Company obviously moved toward testing means of implementing aspects of indirect rule although it as yet lacked any full understanding of the concept and satisfactory precedents. In Awadh, the Company influenced the appointment or dismissal of several Ministers and put forth a series of proposals for reform, none of which produced the desired results.[60]

Nevertheless, the Company refined its policies over time. Governor-General Shore (1793-8) distinguished between indirectly inducing a Ruler to authorize the policies the Company wanted and directly forcing those reforms on him. In 1797, Shore recalled the Awadh Resident (transferring him to a judgeship in British territory) for having gone beyond the 'limits of prudence and propriety' in too crudely forcing reforms on the Awadh Ruler. While, Shore wrote,

> ...the application of the Vizier [the Awadh Ruler] for the assistance of the Government authorizes our Interference in suggesting, promoting and controlling the plan of reform, the direct exercise of our authority over his affairs should be made as little apparent as possible, that no room may be granted for exciting distrust or suspicion for giving plausibility to misrepresentation, or for success to the artifices of those who are interested in counteracting our intentions.... Without the Vizier's concurrence, no plan for reform can be adopted and persuaded on [*sic*] unless the authority of the Company were declared paramount — This we have no right to do....[61]

Seeking to establish the Company's footing in Awadh on a more satisfactory basis, the Governor-General went himself — as had his predecessor Hastings — to Awadh, not trusting in the medium of the Resident. There he used 'argument and Remonstrance, aided by the Influence of my public station' to induce the Awadh Ruler to dismiss the incumbent Minister and appoint and support one who would 'reform' as the Company wished.[62] The Governor-General further urged the Resident to

provide the Awadh Minister with his full support in making the reforms. The Governor-General instructed the Resident:

> I [Shore] therefore rely on the success of [the new Minister's] Exertions, for improving the Administration.... [But] without the constant countenance and support of the Company's Government, the most strenuous efforts of this Minister for this purpose must be unavailing. It will be your principal Duty to afford him that Countenance and Support, by giving him your advice and assistance upon all occasions, and by representation and remonstrance to the Vizier [the Awadh Ruler], whenever the occasion may justify them.[63]

The Resident thus had the charge of directing and supporting the Chief Minister to strengthen the Ruler's administration of the state.

Thus, despite the Company's reluctance and limited capacity to intervene in the internal affairs of the Indian states, it had begun to exert some elements of indirect rule in the few states particularly under its military control. Even in these states however, the Resident tended to concentrate on influencing the Chief Minister. This was to be the means by which the Company brought about the establishment of an administration that would carry out its goals in the state; even by 1856, the Company still sought a satisfactory means to accomplish this.

Conclusion

Over the course of the 1764-97 period, the Company and the Residents had begun to move toward some exertion and understanding of elements of indirect rule. The Residents played an increasing role in the communications of the states. They intruded themselves into the succession and the jurisdiction of Rulers. They also made some limited forays into the internal administration of the states.

One of the key elements in the exercise of indirect rule is the capacity of the ruling power to exclude other powers from the ruled state. The British expulsion of the French Company effec-

tively eliminated any European competition in the Indian states. This was not, however, apparent to the Company at the time. The Company explicitly voiced its fears of a French incursion until as late as 1803. Individual French and other European officers continued to strengthen Indian states against the Company until the end of the last of the Maratha wars in 1819. Russia loomed as a potential rival in 'the Great Game' into the twentieth century. Still, the British accomplished the virtual exclusion of other powers from outside India from involvement with the Indian states by the end of the eighteenth century.

Initially, most in the Company regarded the Residencies as means of communication with the Indian states. The growing political role of the Company led it to use the Residents to start to influence the Rulers into policies favourable to the British. Further, the Governor--General and his secretariat began to pull the Residencies into a larger system that enabled them to start to learn about the internal conditions of these states. The Residents also started moving to assert their control over communications into and out of the states. Having excluded other non-Indian powers, the Company also moved to use its Residents to exclude other Indian powers from the states under their influence. This control gradually moved to a monopoly over communications among most Indian states during the course of Phase Two.

Another element in indirect rule is the exertion of determining political control. Residents began to move toward this determining control in several areas. Control over communication provided part of the means for increasing Company influence over the affairs of the Rulers themselves. Residents, in several instances, also exerted a determining part in the succession of the dynasty. In some of the more dependent states, the Resident acted decisively to install the candidate of the Company's choice, even reversing the partial enthronement of unsatisfactory candidates. In states less securely linked to the British, the Resident played a more cautious role. Residents did not yet dethrone established Rulers, as they would later. Nevertheless, even this limited intervention in succession proved a key issue in the exertion of the Resident's growing control over the Ruler.

Another vital means to begin to assert the Resident's indirect control in the state was his interposition of the Company's protection between the jurisdiction of the Ruler and accused individuals in his state. To this point, I have concentrated on the extension by the Resident of extraterritorial jurisdiction over Europeans. We will see later that the Residents extended this extraterritoriality over increasingly comprehensive groups within the state. Hence, it too became a means for the expansion of the Resident's control in the state.

The last element in indirect rule examined in this chapter was the Resident's interference in the revenue collection administration, specifically concentrating on the appointment of the Chief Minister of the state. This attitude reflected the Company's position that a strong Ruler, supported by an efficient Chief Minister, would be the best and most just way to improve conditions, and revenues, in a state. The Company would continue to experiment with measures by which the Resident could influence a state administration to bring about conditions desired by the Company. Overall, however, the Company involved itself only to a limited extent in the internal affairs of the Indian states prior to the nineteenth century.

The Indian Rulers also learned from their interaction with the Residents and the Company. During this period, the Rulers did much to make the Residencies serve their own purposes, as we shall see extensively in Chapter 7. During this period, the Rulers retained some degree of autonomy and capacity to oppose the Residents directly. This autonomy and capacity, however, would decline over time.

Residents thus began to discover the techniques and levels of intervention that worked best, as well as those to avoid, in order to accomplish British ends. These strategies and tactics had, however, by no means been fully worked out by the end of the eighteenth century. This period of the initial confrontation between the Residents and the Rulers, between the Company and the Indian states, proved formative for both.

NOTES

1. Bernard S. Cohn shows how the British took unprocessed knowledge and then 'codified and transmitted' it as 'information.' See 'The Command of Language and the Language of Command', *Subaltern Studies IV: Writings on South Asian History and Society,* ed. Ranajit Guha (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 276.

2. Secret Department Consultation, 29 July 1772, Eur MS Addl 28973, Warren Hastings' Papers, Proceedings of the Council, vol. 1, March-December 1772, BM.

3. BSC, 4 October 1773, PR 12:401.

4. Governor-General to Resident (Poona), 13 October 1773, BSC, 13 October 1773, No. 9.

5. Soon after Richard Sulivan wrote this, he himself began a brief and controversial career as a Resident at Arcot and then Hyderabad. Richard Joseph Sulivan, *An Analysis of the Political History of India: In Which is Considered, the Present Situation of the East, and the Connection of Its Several Powers with the Empire of Great Britain,* 2nd enlarged edn, (London: T. Becket, 1784), pp. 307-8.

6. Sulivan, p. 31.

7. Governor-General to Resident Lucknow, 23 October 1782, FSC, 21 April 1783, No. 14.

8. E.g. Governor-General to Resident Lucknow, 14 September 1795, Eur MS Addl 13522, BM.

9. For an example of the Governor-General's instructions for the Resident to gather such information, see Governor-General to Resident (Lucknow), 23 October 1782, FSC, 21 April 1783, No. 14.

10. Resident (Poona) to Governor-General, 11 May 1785, Malet Collection of Private Letters, F.149, IOL.

11. One of the last such tours during the period covered in this book came in 1849-50 as the Resident in Awadh surveyed that state extensively, preliminary to the Company's decision to annex it. Governor-General Dalhousie used the knowledge in Sleeman's' report in his arguments to London for the annexation of Awadh. Reeves, *Sleeman*. See also Resident (Lucknow) to Secretary to Government, 21 June 1849, India Political and Foreign Consultations (hereinafter cited as IPFC), 1 September 1849, No. 78.

12. Resident (with Sindhia) to Governor-General, 24 December 1786, *Poona Residency Correspondence,* Vol. 1, ed. Jadunath Sarkar (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1936), pp. 17-18.

13. Secretary Bengal Council to Resident (Poona), 6 June 1787, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 2, pp. 118-19.

14. Resident (Nagpore) to Governor-General, 8 May 1801, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 5, ed. Y.M. Kale (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1938), p. 93.

15. For Poona in 1798, see Resident (Poona) to Governor-General, 2 September 1798, (Bombay: Government Central Press,) *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 6, ed. G. S. Sardesai (1939), p. 224.

16. E.g. Governor-General to Messers Porcher, Redhead and Gardiner, 4 September 1789, Malet Collection, F.149, IOL; Governor-General to Resident (Hyderabad), 26 January 1797, Political Consultations, 27 January 1797, No. 77, Eur MS Addl 13583, Correspondence with Kennaway and Kirkpatrick, 1793-8, BM.

17. Governor-General to Resident Delhi, 20 August 1782, *Indian Records Series, Browne Correspondence*, ed. Krishna Dayal Bhargava (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1960), p. 1.

18. E.g. Banaras and Hyderabad. See Hastings' impassioned claim against the hostile majority on the Council to his right to appoint the Resident at Banaras. Governor-General's Minute, 14 January 1781, Eur MS Addl 28996, B.M. See also his plea to the Court of Directors to reverse their dismissal of the man he appointed Resident Hyderabad. Governor-General's Minute, 29 July 1783, Eur MS Addl 29000, BM.

19. Bengal General Consultations, 3 October 1780, Home Miscellaneous Series (hereinafter cited as HMS) 219:75-81.

20. Middleton to Board, 6 February 1775, FSC, 6 February 1775, No. 11.

21. Court of Directors to Governor-General and Council, 4 July 1777, *Indian Records Series, Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 8, ed. Hira Lal Gupta (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1981), pp. 100-1.

22. Court of Directors to Governor-General, 3 March 1775, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 7, ed. R.P. Patwardhan (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1971), p. 106.

23. Secret Letter of the Court of Directors to Governor-General, 16 March 1784, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 15, eds. C.H. Philips and B.B. Misra (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1963), p. 202.

24. Governor-General in Council to Court of Directors, 22 February 1785, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 15, eds. C.H. Philips and B.B. Misra (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1963), p. 375.

25. E.g. Governor-General to Resident with Sindhia, 28 November 1781, BSC, 10 December 1781.

26. Minute of Governor-General, 7 April 1794, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 1, ed. Jadunath Sarkar (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1936), pp. 403-4.

27. E.g. Governor-General to Resident Hyderabad, 28 September 1795, Political Consultations, 28 September 1795, No. 43, Eur MS Addl. 13583, BM.

28. Governor-General to Governor Bombay, 7 January 1773, BSC, 7 January 1773, No. 2, and Governor-General to Resident Poona, 13 October 1773, BSC, 13 October 1773, No. 9.

29. Governor-General to Governor Bombay, 8 February 1779, BSC, 8 February 1779.

30. Governor-General's Minute, 26 November 1784, BSC, 14 December 1784 and Resident Poona to Boddam, 8 February 1786, Malet Collection, Eur MS F.149, IOL.

31. Governor-General to Select Committee Fort St. George, 1 November 1779, BSC, 1 November 1779.

32. Fort St. George to Governor-General, 13 March 1780, BSC, 15 May 1780, Fort St. George to Governor-General, 19 May 1780, BSC, 12 June 1780; Governor-General to Fort St. George, 29 June 1780, BSC, Eur MS Addl 28994, BM; and Hollond to Governor-General, 9 June 1780, BSC, 17 July 1780, Eur MS Addl 28995, and James Grant to Governor-General, 31 January 1783, Eur MS Addl 28999, BM.

33. The debate over this process had taken some time to be resolved. See Fort St. George to Court of Directors, 8 March 1805, BPC, 2 May 1805, No. 5. Governor of Fort St. George to Governor-General, 31 October 1806, Madras Political Consultations, 31 October 1806.

34. Secretary to Government of India with Governor-General to Secretary to Governor Bombay, 9 January 1840, FSC, 18 May 1840.

35. These figures are calculated by summing the number of years each Residency was filled and then dividing by the number of those years each category of official held them. All these figures are based on my index of Residents, discussed extensively in Chapter 3.

36. FSC, 3 February 1775.

37. Governor of Fort St. George to Resident (Tanjore), 31 January 1787, Extract Fort St. George Secret and Military Consultation, 31 January 1787, Eur MS 13687, BM.

38. Governor Fort St. George Minute in Council, 24 January 1797, FPC, 20 February 1797, No. 42.

39. Governor Fort St. George to Resident (Poona), 21 May 1787, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 2, ed. Govind Sakharam Sardesai (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1936), p. 109.

40. Governor-General to Resident Hyderabad, 11 March 1796, Political Department Consultation, 11 March 1796, No. 54.

41. One of the Company's first of such agreements was with the Marathas for the reciprocal exchange of debtors who had fled from one to the other. Aitchison, 7:9-13.

42. Aitchison, 2:198-9.

43. Secret Department Consultations, 8 January 1776, Eur MS Addl 28980, BM.

44. The Company explained this to Indian Rulers. E.g. Governor-General to Court of Directors, 29 January 1793, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 17, ed. Y.J. Tareporewala (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1955), p. 245.

45. E.g. Aitchison, 3:66-7. The language of these treaties varies somewhat. See also Great Britain. Parliament. Parliamentary Papers (Commons), Sessionals *1812-13*, 8:279-82.

46. Aitchison, 9:21, 2:237-40, 8:186-9, 220-2. See also Tupper, vol. 1, p. 105 for an alternate listing.

47. Proceedings Political B, December 1876, Nos. 58-9, cited in Tupper, 1:110.

48. For details of the effects of the 1793 permanent settlement, see Walter Kelly Firminger, *Historical Introduction to the Bengal Portion of 'the Fifth Report'*, 2 vols., Reprint (Delhi: Neeraj Publishing House, 1984).

49. For example in 1782, Hastings instructed the Awadh Resident to obtain from the Ruler a renewal of an offer for a loan of Rs.10,00,000, as well as further loans from the Chief Minister. Governor-General to Resident Awadh, 6 May 1782, Eur MS Addl 29115, BM. The Rulers of Tanjore and the Carnatic also had large amounts transferred to pay the Company's expenses. Governor of Madras to Resident Tanjore, 8 January 1782, Fort St. George Select Consultations, 8 January 1782. Richard Barnett discusses this for Awadh, *North India between Empires*.

50. Governor-General to Resident Lucknow, 23 October 1782, FSC, 21 April 1783, No. 14.

51. Resident (Awadh) to Governor-General in Council, 8 February 1784, FSC, 24 February 1784.

52. Governor-General to Secret Committee of Court of Directors, 17 May 1787, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 16, ed. Syed Hasan Askari (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1976), p. 115.

53. Governor-General to Nawab Wazir, 21 July 1787, in Aitchison, 2:119.

54. Nabob of Furruckabad, Received 11 May 1786, FSC, 5 September 1786, No. 1.

55. Resident Farruckabad to Governor-General, 30 July 1786, FSC, 5 September 1786, No. 2; Resident Farruckabad to Governor-General, 30 July 1786, and Governor-General to Nabob of Farruckabad, 5 September 1786, FSC, 5 September 1786, Nos. 2, 7.

56. Resident Tanjore to Governor Fort St. George, 29 June 1786, FSC, 22 August 1786, No. 21.

57. Minute of the President Fort St. George, 25 July 1786, FSC, 22 August 1786, No. 22.

58. Minute of the Governor-General, 30 August 1786, FSC, 30 August 1786, No. 1.

59. Governor of Madras to Resident Tanjore, 17 January 1796, Fort St. George Military and Political Consultation, 17 January 1796, Eur Addl MS 13684, BM.

60. These will be discussed in Chapter 10.

61. Governor-General to Resident Awadh, 30 April 1796, Eur MS Addl 13522, BM.

62. Governor-General to Vice-President in Council, 21 March 1797, Eur MS Addl 13526, BM.

63. Governor-General to Resident Awadh, 13 April 1796, Eur MS Addl 13523, BM.

5. Expansion and Indirect Rule: Phase Two, 1798-1840

> We place a resident, who really is king of the country, whatever injunctions of non-interference he may act under. As long as the prince acts in perfect subservience, and does what is agreeable to the residents, that is, to the British Government, things go on quietly; they are managed without the resident appearing much in the administration of affairs...but when anything of a different nature happens, the moment the prince takes a course which the British Government think wrong, then comes clashing and disturbance.
>
> —James Mill (1832)

Overview of the Second Phase of the Residencies

Between 1798 and 1840, the Company extended the Residency system dramatically over the vast bulk of the Indian subcontinent. As the Residencies expanded in number and role, they formed a system of indirect rule encompassing nearly all the states of India. The system grew inconsistently as the various Residents, Rulers, and their respective subordinates interacted. Although wars punctuated this period, they did less than the Residencies to shape this system of indirect rule.

During this period, Residents enforced the exclusivity essential for indirect rule. Residents firmly established their monopoly over the flow of knowledge and information between Indian states and the outside world. Building upon the experience of their predecessors, Residents gradually overcame the resistance of Rulers to this monopoly. Residents directed the creation of new political relations between the Company and states. By means of the Resident, each of these states came under the Company's influence, to the exclusion of relations with the other states, either in India or beyond it. Having thus isolated each of the Indian states, the Resident could concentrate his efforts on intervention within the state itself.

Indirect rule requires both the ruled and the ruling to recognize the power of the latter to control. The changing relationship between the Company and each Indian state was displayed in, and affected by, the symbolic interactions between the Resident and the Ruler. In formal court ceremonies, recognized by all parties as significant, the role of the Resident proved subject to frequent renegotiation and constant reassessment by both sides. Some Residents became adept at harnessing or altering the symbols expressed in these rituals until, to some degree, the symbols served the Company's purposes rather than the Ruler's.

By strongly asserting the Company's authority to arbitrate succession within a dynasty, the Resident gained a degree of ascendancy over the incumbent Ruler. Further, Residents occasionally determined that an incumbent Ruler lacked fitness for rule and deposed him. The Resident then placed a relative or an alternative dynasty on the throne. Residents thus came to submit even the incumbent Ruler to the authority of the Company.

The Company transferred much of the financial burden of its military defense and its control over the states to the states themselves. Ultimately supported by the Company's armies, Residents proved able, with a few notable exceptions, to overpower any overt hostility within any state. Creating bodies of subsidiary troops, loyal to the Company but subsidized by the states, the Company freed itself from much cost and from potentially embarrassing local entanglements as well. These forces also removed military power from the Ruler and placed it under the Resident's control. Subsidiary troops thus obviated the need for the Company's own troops in many states.

Residents drew upon support from elements from within the indigenous society. Heavy reliance on the external support of the Company or its troops would undermine the very purpose of the Residency. Thus, the Resident built for the Company a constituency from within the court, state administration, and general populace. By exempting ever larger categories of people from the jurisdiction of the Ruler — and thereby making them dependent for protection on the Company — the Resident carved out his own

base of support. Such support for the Resident came at the cost of that of the Ruler.

With these bases of support, the Resident could proceed to intervene deeply in local administration. The Resident's earlier tentative influence over the Chief Minister expanded greatly, despite the frequent objections of Rulers. In some instances, Residents took control over the administration out of the hands of Rulers whom they considered incompetent or irresponsible, sometimes returning the Ruler to control when circumstances improved. In some instances, Residents never restored the displaced Ruler to supervision of the administration. The British defended such deep intervention by invoking British principles of morality and responsibility to the people of the state.

During this period, in short, the Company created a system approaching the ideal type of indirect rule in most of the states. Overall, the Resident came to exercise an exclusive and determining political control in most states. Further, the Resident and the Ruler both recognized this control in many, but not all, Indian states.

These developments did not occur steadily or with premeditation. The Company engaged in heated internal debate over the morality and pragmatic costs and advantages of indirect rule. Over this period as well, the Company experimented with different types and depths of involvement in the internal affairs of states. This chapter examines, from the Resident's perspective, the significant aspects of the growth of the Residencies and the expansion of indirect rule that characterized the early nineteenth century. Chapter 7 analyzes this same period and process from the Ruler's viewpoint.

Historical Context in Brief

During the 1798-1840 period, the drive for expansion by the officials of the Company in India largely overcame London's opposition to such expansion. Official policy, set by the Directors or the Governors-General, often proved less compelling to Residents on the spot than their own perception of local circumstances. In fact,

official Company policy reversed repeatedly, reflecting the frustrations and conflicts among policy-makers.

Official Company policy vacillated during this period among theories about the efficacy and morality of types of involvement with the states. Governor-General Wellesley (1798-1805) set the standard for aggressive policies toward the Indian states, prior to his recall for exceeding London's tolerance for wars and intervention. Wellesley — and more significantly, the Company officials in India whom he trained and inspired — moved beyond the 'ring fence' policies of the earlier period. The official policy of this Governor-General (largely opposed by the Directors in London) called for a 'subsidiary alliance' system: the Company subordinated the states with respect to military and foreign relations but left them internally free of intervention by the Resident. Between 1805 and 1813, acting at the direction of London, subsequent Governors-General sought to reverse this expansion. The Company officially instituted a policy of non-intervention and disengagement from existing involvement, especially with the states in western and central India. Dissatisfied with the results of that policy, the Company again became interventionist under Governor-General Lord Hastings (1813-23). During this administration, the Company formulated a system of paramountcy: the Company as the paramount power held superior rights in all the states, empowering it to intervene whenever it felt intervention justified. Bentinck (1828-35) redefined Company policy once again. The Company came to see its intervention as illegal in terms of its treaties with most of the states. Consequently, the Company ordered its Residents to withdraw from involvement in the states' internal affairs. Nevertheless, should any of the Rulers so violate British standards for good government, the Company felt justified by overarching principles of morality to intervene decisively.

In contrast to these meanderings in official policy, actual practice by Residents often followed markedly different channels. Local circumstances in each state to a great degree determined the course followed by the Resident there. Further, career officials of the Company, unlike the Governors-General, provided continuity

on the ground more fundamental than temporary currents of official policy eddying above. As a result of these discrepancies between official policy and actual practice, historical accounts based on the formal policy of one or another Governor-General are filled with qualifications and exceptions to explain the deviations from official policy which we explore below. Looking at the Residency system over this entire period, more consistent patterns and principles of action are clear. Even Governors-General — whatever their intentions before leaving England might have been — once in India responded to the demands of the Company's officials there. By 1840, the Company's ambitions had plunged it into Afghanistan in the west and Burma in the east. At both these geographic extremes of the subcontinent, the limits of the Residency system became apparent.

Comparing the territories under direct or indirect British control in 1798 with those in 1840, we see the scale of expansion during this period. By 1797, Bengal Presidency had expanded its direct rule over lands to Banaras and had partially subordinated Awadh to the Resident's indirect control. The Hyderabad Resident struggled to retain that state as an ally but by no means had established indirect rule. Madras Presidency directly administered substantial lands taken from Mysore state but Tipu Sultan remained unrelievedly hostile to the Company. The Rulers of the Carnatic and Tanjore, while under the sway of the Company, also presented Madras with fundamental problems of control. Bombay Presidency held only a limited enclave on the coast; the surrounding Maratha powers remained far from under the Company's management. In short, the Company up to 1798 had yet to piece together a coherent or effective system of indirect rule.

By 1840, the entire subcontinent, the only major exceptions being Sind and western Punjab, lay under the Company's direct or indirect control. Not all states had yet been fully integrated into a system of Residencies but in each of them movement in that direction continued apace. Each Resident worked to gain effective influence over the Ruler and, in many cases, the state administration as well. In some states, such as Mysore, the Ruler remained only in name, as a legitimization for administration of the state by



MAP 2
INDIA IN 1840

British officials. By the 1840s, a system of Residencies carried out extensive indirect rule: the Resident could exercise exclusive and determining political control, a control recognized both by the Ruler and the Resident, although varying in extent among the states.

While during this period the Company and a number of Rulers came to blows, the Company remained committed to supporting Rulers, either in their states or as dependents on the Company. In this period, the Company fought numerous wars including the fourth and final war with Mysore (1799), two wars with the Marathas (1803-5, 1817-18), a war with the Gurkas of Nepal (1813-16), and the first of the wars in Burma (1824-26), in addition to a number of minor armed conflicts. Significantly, although British victories were occasionally so overwhelming as to place their opponent totally at their mercy, they did not normally eliminate the defeated states totally. Rather, the Company restored to the throne most of the defeated Rulers. Where they deposed a particular Ruler, they usually replaced him by a relative (as with the Nawab of the Carnatic in 1799), or another dynasty (as in Mysore in 1799). In some cases they even created a kingdom for a defeated opponent (e.g. Tonk in 1817). Undoubtedly, the Company seized some lands and resources from defeated states yet the British normally preserved at least a remnant of the state. Even those relatively few Rulers whom the Company left entirely without territories received substantial pensions from the Company. All this indicates that the British recognized the legitimacy of Indian Rulers.

British respect for the hereditary authority of Rulers permeated its relations with Indian states and informed the British proclivity for indirect rather than direct rule. We should keep in mind contemporary events in Europe, from the French Revolution of 1798 founding the First Republic to the Revolutions of 1848 in France (setting up the Second Republic) and elsewhere in Europe. Governors-General in India tended to be of the English aristocracy and the British officials of the Company, if not of that class originally, sought largely to identify with it. Thus, the British recognized the morality, as well as the practicality, of sustaining

Indian Rulers rather than simply terminating their dynasties and imposing direct British rule over their states.

The Residency system underwent dramatic reorganization over this period. In an effort to create a hierarchy of order, the Company experimented with its structure. While political officials at major courts retained the title Resident, a variety of other titles also came into use. To honour the incumbent war hero, the Governor-General awarded William Nott the Residency at Lucknow (1842-3) with the elevated title of Envoy. Political officers at smaller courts (e.g. at one or more of the Rajput courts) were entitled Political Agents. Some Political Agents combined supervision of minor courts with the direct administration of neighbouring British territory. This proved the case, for example, in the tribal areas of central India and the north-east where, although British territory under direct rule, various small chiefs held sway. Further, the Resident at Delhi, because of the breadth of his duties and the number of Political Agents under his authority, for a time held the title Agent of the Governor-General. These changes of title reflect the increasing complexity of the Residency system.

The Resident's Network of Knowledge and Information

Residents continued during this period to have the acquisition and control over knowledge and information as among their primary functions, however, now in a far more systematic way. Residents negotiated treaties bringing additional Indian states within the Company's orbit. Residents sought more detailed knowledge of the internal conditions of each state. Residents also learned how to present material formally at court, in a way most beneficial to the Company. Over time, the experience of individual Residents, and the Residency system as a whole, accumulated significantly. They developed means to obtain specific knowledge about individual states, including the details of life at court, in the capital, and — to a lesser extent — in the hinterland. Residents also acquired the experience, and the staff, to assess all this into information useful to themselves and to the Company as a whole in formulating its own policies. Further, the Residents

and the Company created networks by which to convey and store this body of knowledge and information systematically.

Residents served as diplomats with Indian states hitherto beyond the Company's sphere of control. For example, the Company sent missions to Persia (1799 and 1810). It fought wars in the Mauritius (1809-10), the Moluccas (1810) and Java (1811) and seized Aden on the Arabian Peninsula (1839). While the Company posted British officials as Residents in these distant outposts, our prime concern is — as was the Company's — the states of India proper.

In the Deccan and South India, Residents posted to the several Maratha states and to Hyderabad during this period sought to manipulate the foreign policy of those states to the Company's advantage. Residents held the particular charge of excluding from those courts the foreign agents of Mysore's Tipu Sultan (until his defeat and death in 1799) and the French (perceived as threatening the invasion of India as late as 1803). The Company also inserted itself between the Hyderabad and the Maratha courts, seeking to mediate or even arbitrate relations between them. In 1800, the Governor-General wrote to the Resident at Hyderabad that doubtless all parties 'will immediately perceive and admit the propriety and reasonableness' of such interposition.[1] Residents at each of the several Maratha courts worked in coordination to break up the various Maratha alliances which formed and reformed among those powers until the last Maratha war ended in 1819. Until the Company excluded all external powers from a court, it could not hope to exercise indirect control in that state.

The Company also deployed its Residents as diplomats in North India. The Resident at Delhi served as the centre for the Company's diplomatic efforts in Rajasthan, the Punjab, and beyond in Afghanistan. The Delhi Resident had unusually broad duties. As of 1822:

> He controls and superintends the affairs of His Majesty [the Mughal Emperor] and the Royal Household. He conducts our intercourse and diplomatic relations with the powerful

> **ruler of the Punjab, and is the source on which our Government must depend for all its information regarding events passing in the North Western parts of Asia. He exercises through an Assistant stationed at Loodianah, a cognizance over the conduct of the two Ex Kings of Cabul and their followers residing under British protection, and is the channel of our correspondence with the Rajah of Bikaneer, and the Rana of Dholpore Barie. Assisted by the Officer called the Deputy Superintendent, and by two Officers stationed in the Hills, he controls and superintends the affairs of the numerous dependent Sikh and Hill States, [and] Mahomedan Jageerdars west of the Jumna, who enjoy the protection of the British Government. In Rohilkund and the Doab, the concerns of the Rampore Jageer and of the family of the Nawab of Furruckabad claim his chief attention, and there are likewise several Political Pensioners, Jageerdars and other Natives of rank residing within the Western Provinces who look to him as the medium of communication with the Government, and as the authority for adjusting all their claims and disputes.[2]**

In one fifteen month period (1817-19), one single Resident at Delhi separately negotiated and concluded eleven distinct treaties with as many states in the Punjab and Rajasthan; while each treaty followed a general pattern, each contained distinct provisions.[3] (The general uniformity and yet the individualistic variety of these treaties suggest the systematic strategy and yet need for initiative in tactics characteristic of the Residencies of this period.) Most Residents, however, confined their duties to affairs internal to one state in particular.

Residents progressively expanded their role and became the prime source for the regular flow of information to the Company's headquarters in India and on to London, about the foreign policy of the Indian states and much else besides. The Company went on to instruct each Resident to keep a daily diary 'and transmit by every post the record of each day with such observations as may appear to you to be necessary...[4] These daily observations

received the scrutiny of the Governor-General's secretariat. Further, the Residents' extensive reports and recommendations related to significant events, people, or aspects of life or politics in court or the state as a whole. Frequently, the secretariat queried the Resident for further elaboration or support for a point or position.

As the Governor-General drew the lines of authority over the various Residencies into its own hands, the Calcutta government developed departments and procedures to deal with the increased need for the coordination of such communications. In the early days, vital papers were frequently delayed in transit or, as the Governor-General admitted, 'by some accident mislaid.'[5] By the early nineteenth century, the Calcutta government implemented a series of departmental reorganizations so as to manage relations with the states most effectively. When the Governor-General objected to delays of nearly two weeks between the dispatch of a report by the Resident with Sindhia and its receipt in Calcutta (thus incurring well over a month's time for replies to queries) the Resident established a more rapid dak.[6]

Specific Governors-General and their secretariats varied considerably as to the degree of instruction they sent to the Residents. Some Governors-General, most notably Wellesley, sent extensive instructions to their Residents.[7] Wellesley also called Residents to him personally for instruction, explaining in one case, '...the general complexion of Affairs in Hindostan appearing to his Lordship to render a personal communication with you at this time extremely desirable....'[8] Perhaps intentionally, such verbal instructions remained unrecorded for the scrutiny of the Court of Directors — or future historians.

The increasingly close control exerted by Calcutta over the Residents contrasts with earlier years when Residents generally had considerably more autonomy and discretion. The Governor-General told a Resident in 1782:

> You will now receive your last Instructions, and even these are superfluous. You must act upon your own judgment — and trust the Board for their approval of whatever you do for

> the public service.... Do not therefore, cramp yourself by the letter of our Orders, but decide with boldness and decision.[9]

With more information about the states, the Governor-General's secretariat could monitor the Residents far more closely.

The Residents provided the Governor-General's secretariat with a mass of material, including running accounts of all that was notable about each of the states. A newly appointed Resident would often look at the accumulated records from previous Residents in order to inform himself about local conditions, personalities, precedents, and on-going issues. An accumulation of precedent and policy thus came to guide the members of the political line. Fortuitously, these preserved records also provide the present-day historian with detailed source material about the Resident's views on daily events.

Beyond obtaining knowledge about the state, the Residents also processed and analyzed this knowledge into information that then circulated through the Company. Each successive Resident in a state, and each successive generation of Residents, built on the work of their predecessors. As the number of Residencies grew, the amount of material thus made available to the Company about the important courts of India gave it an ability to coordinate its efforts in a way unmatched by any single Indian Ruler. This growing network provided the Company with what Mountstuart Elphinstone called 'the immense advantage of a familiar knowledge of all the Durbars in India' that the Company held over any single Indian Ruler.[10]

Further, the extent and quality of the knowledge available to the Company far exceeded that of the Rulers. Thompson contrasts the disparate situations of the British and Maratha Rulers and generals during the several Maratha wars. He describes the Marathas' virtual lack of knowledge about the resources of the English, of the events in the other regions of India, or even of accurate or detailed maps of the battlefields of their own region. This he contrasts with the detailed British knowledge of the resources, conditions, and topography in the Maratha states.[11] I might suggest, however, that the British tended to filter

knowledge of the Maratha social, political, and economic institutions through British cultural assumptions, often at considerable variance from the Maratha's own perceptions. This qualification aside, the information provided by Residents and other Company officials generally provided the British with advantages over the individual Rulers.

Residents were expected by their superiors to advise on matters of Company policy. Since their official correspondence remained on file in the secretariat, and copies went on to the Court of Directors in London, the Residents understood they wrote for several audiences. Given the relatively rapid changes in official policy and the delays in transmitting a query and receiving a reply, Residents occasionally found themselves on record in conflict with the policy of the day. Further, Residents often composed their reports with an eye to the complexion of their superiors; as William MacCulloch (the retired Chief Examiner of Indian correspondence at the Company's headquarters in London) noted in 1832, 'A political resident is the historian of his own proceedings, and may occasionally give them a false colouring in his reports to Government.'[12] The Company at different times created filing classifications which limited these audiences somewhat. For a time, Residents directed all correspondence on sensitive subjects to the Secret Department, for example, thus reducing the audience to select officials of the Company in Calcutta and London.

At times the reports of the Resident to the Governor-General, while useful in setting policy, also proved embarrassing to the latter when received by the Court of Directors. Wellesley's secretary wrote a 'private and confidential' letter to the Resident with Sindhia saying 'Lord Wellesley thinks (the Resident's official report) to give his Enemies in Leaden Hall Street (the Directors) room to found an accusation against Lord Wellesley of injustice and rapacity....' He went on to suggest the Resident modify his assessments to match Wellesley's stance.[13]

Further, Residents often confined their more speculative or personal information to unofficial — that is personal — correspondence with other Residents, the Governor-General, or other policy-makers within or without the Company.[14] When faced

with a difficult situation, Residents might write privately to each other, as in 1813 Richard Jenkins (Resident Nagpur, 1807-27) did to Mountstuart Elphinstone (his predecessor as Resident Nagpur, 1806-7, then serving as Resident Poona, 1811-19):

> ...I should be very grateful for any hints with which you would favor me for improving the Treaty — [Barry] Close [Elphinstone's predecessor as Resident Poona, 1801-1811, at the time in retirement] mentioned the idea which had occurred to you about making the Rajah's districts in Berar subservient to the purpose of security for the annual payment — A similar idea struck me but I have not been able to pursue it to a satisfactory result.... If you have leisure pray let me have your opinion more fully.[15]

Although such letters were private, they still had to be recorded in the 'Residency Private Letter Book' for the information of the Governor-General's secretariat and future Residents, among others. In addition to advice, copies of existing treaties and other records circulated among the Residencies.[16]

To allow themselves more freedom of expression, Residents also exchanged 'demi-official' letters in order to inform each other or their superiors without committing themselves to a position officially. In frustration at being unable to monitor or officially criticize the content of such letters, the Governor-General finally forbade this

> ...habit prevalent among Political Officers of communicating among themselves upon public matters in what they term Demi-official letters which are not placed upon record. [In future]...no fact shall be withheld which it is important for the Government of India to know.[17]

The secretariat thus expected to learn everything about the Indian states that the Residents could obtain. Residents, however, continued to correspond privately with each other, off the record.

Gradually achieving a near-monopoly over official communication into and out of the state, the Resident then selectively presented information about the Company to the Ruler and court.

For example, Residents officially announced to the court all British military victories and each succession, of the British monarch, or the Governor-General, or Indian Rulers.[18] Residents also explained the Company's views on itself and the events and politics of the day. An illustration of the Company's coordination of information among the various courts came in 1803. The Company had just enthroned its candidate as the Maratha Peshwa and, to overcome opposition from other Maratha powers, wished to muster support for its act. The Governor General instructed the Resident at Lucknow 'that this important event may be proclaimed at the Residency by a Royal Salute, and that [the Resident] will suggest to his Excellency the [Awadh Ruler] the propriety of his directing a Salute be fired in Honor of that occasion.'[19] A few months later, pursuant of extracting a further public commitment from the Awadh Ruler for the Company's position, the Company ordered the Resident to 'suggest' to him 'the propriety of dismissing any Vakeels or news Writers...who may be in attendance at His Excellency's Court or Resident at Lucknow' from the Maratha powers opposed to the Company or its choice as Peshwa.[20] The Resident at Hyderabad received identical orders to 'suggest' the same public acts by that Ruler.[21] In this way, Residents presented information according to the Company's interests.

Residents also advised or directed the Ruler and his administration on ways to bring their state into line with current Company policy. There were obvious advantages to the Company of having a Resident convey this in person rather than by letter or messenger. The Resident affected the reception of the message through his presentation. He assessed the response of his audience, flexibly judging exactly how much information would be suitable for the court to hear. As Chapter 7 shows, the Company systematically blocked efforts by Rulers to establish or maintain alternative means of communication beyond their states. As a result, the Resident gradually became the sole official link for communication between the court and the outside world. Consequently, he did much to shape the Ruler's and state's perceived places in it.

The Resident in Indian Court Ritual

Both Ruler and Resident recognized that each formal meeting between them held political significance and expressed the state of their relationship. As a result, each side had a stake in controlling the symbols to be displayed in each enactment of such a ritual. During times of transition in the relationship between the Company and that particular regional state, the formal meetings between the Ruler and Resident took on special significance since they announced these changes.

The Governor-General proved aware of the subtle balance which Residents had to maintain between excessive display of their influence over Rulers and inadequate assertion of guiding direction. In 1815, even as he sought to assert paramountcy over the states, Governor-General Lord Hastings instructed:

> ...a respectful urbanity, and a strict fulfillment of established ceremonials, should thence be preserved by the Resident toward his Excellency. The latter must be conscious of the power of the Resident to exercise influence over him; so that any parade of that influence in the eyes of others must be no less useless than revolting; it must, therefore, be the care of the Resident cautiously to abstain from any such ostentations of authority.[22]

The Resident should thus not displace or degrade the authority of the Ruler — at least overtly. Rather he should manipulate it subtly.

During the nineteenth century, Residents often sought to exert influence over the shape of the rituals of the court. To accomplish this, Residents took a hand in choreographing the rituals. There were often extensive preliminary negotiations between the Residency and the court to try to reach a consensus among the parties as to the symbols to be displayed by the principals. While the Resident might supervise these negotiations at a distance, they were normally conducted directly by the Residency Munshi (whose role will be examined in depth in Chapter 8) on the one hand and the Ruler's courtiers on the other. The more fundamental issue of the significance of the symbols agreed upon often,

however, remained unresolved since these negotiations could rarely reconcile the conflicting values of the principal parties.

For an Indian court, the very presence of the Resident at a ritual became in itself a symbol to be harnessed to advance its own purposes. For example, the participation of a Resident in his court life on occasion strengthened a Ruler's hand in his conflicts with regional rivals by demonstrating the Company's support. When Rulers maintained their own wakils, the presence of a Resident in a court ritual, his role in that ritual, or his significant absence would all be reported by those wakils to their masters: the Ruler's rivals or allies. Thus, everything a Resident did at court held political significance.

Part of the Resident's frequently expressed frustrations stemmed from his dual role as symbol and also as agent of indirect rule. On one hand, the Resident represented the Company in the formalities of the court. As such, he was a dignitary whose every action was enveloped with symbolic meaning. This very dignity, however, restricted the Resident in his other role as agent of Company policy. A Resident often needed to act unofficially, behind the scenes, in order to negotiate the terms of the Company's relationship with the local state. The Resident had to control the Ruler indirectly without too evidently diminishing the Ruler to an empty puppet. Some more pragmatic Residents found that their ritual role restricted the performance of their other duties. One Resident complained that his meetings with court required '...so much parade and so large a concourse of people, that a visit... is a serious and rare affair.'[23] Many Residents therefore reserved themselves personally for court rituals and carried out the duties of indirect control through their Indian subordinates.

As with the succession of Rulers, the Company did not enter a regular policy of aggressive manipulation of court rituals until the nineteenth century. In 1785, for instance, the Governor-General himself had promised the Mughal imperial heir apparent that he would demonstrate the same '....Honors and Respect and Attachment as I would shew to the Eldest Son of the King of England if he was in these Provinces.'[24] In 1792, the Company's Government

received complaints from the Ruler of Travancore that the Resident at his court had been disrespectful to him. Although the Company decided that the Travancore Resident had been innocent of any wrongdoing (other than perhaps lack of tact), it still recalled the Resident since it felt the accusations against him had rendered him useless for further effective service there.[25]

After 1798, however, the British Residents began to make repeated efforts to secure control over court rituals. Over time, Residents increasingly used their roles in rituals to modify court traditions. As an author, the Resident — often working through his Munshi — privately negotiated new choreographies for extant ceremonies, or even forbade their performance. Drawing on European traditions, the Residents occasionally suggested novel symbols (such as European style crowns or other paraphernalia) or whole new ceremonies (such as official breakfasts at the Residency) so the court could express meanings expected or desired by him personally or the Company as a whole. As an actor, the Resident increasingly displayed roles expressive of British expectations for that court in the new order of India. As an audience, the Resident learned about the court and responded to its symbolic statements. He further transmitted a description and interpretation of the rituals he observed to his superiors in the Company.

One example of a Resident's proposed modification of extant ritual, illustrating his multiple roles, came in 1835. Major John Sutherland of the Bombay military establishment, newly appointed Resident at Sindhia's court in Gwalior (1835-9), unilaterally proposed significant rewriting of the protocol of that court. Having served as an officer attached to the Residency at Hyderabad (1817-25, 1827-30, 1833?-4) and as First Assistant Resident Delhi (1826-7), as well as Private Secretary and Aide-de-Camp to the Vice President of the Bengal Council, and Officiating Military Secretary (1830-3?), Sutherland had experience at several levels in the Residency system to guide him.[26] He would later go on to serve in other Residencies (in Rajasthan) and publish in 1837 an analysis of British relations with the princes.[27] His evident bent toward theorizing about — and transforming — the Residen-

cy system emerged with his suggestion for 'reform' in the symbolic relationship between the Resident and the Ruler. This suggestion came within a month of his appointment in Gwalior, his first appointment as full Resident.

Sutherland proposed redefining the ritual relationship between the Resident and the Ruler to conform to his own understanding rather than extant tradition.[28] Sutherland noted carefully, as he approached Gwalior city for the first time, that the Maharaja of Gwalior emerged from his capital, attended by his nobility, to greet the Resident's arrival, as precedent demanded. Further, following each formal visit by the Resident to court, the Gwalior Ruler would come 'with similar State and ceremony to return the visit of the Resident.' Sutherland wrote to his superiors proposing termination of these rituals, reserving them only 'for occasions on which the Governor-General, or other high functionaries of the (Company's) Government might visit to this Court.' Sutherland suggested 'that it would be sufficient if the Resident and the Minister and Chiefs of the State met on terms of equality....' He did not specify the exact symbols he proposed deploying to indicate this 'equality'.

Justifying his proposed modification, Sutherland asserted that he knew the best interests of the Gwalior Ruler better than the Ruler himself. Sutherland explained how he believed the Ruler would interpret the ceremonies:

> ...where corresponding usages prevail...I know that there, as here, they are considered as infringements on the dignity of the Sovereign, from which he would gladly be relieved.

Sutherland also, however, disparaged the conservatism of Indian Rulers that would prevent them, unlike him, from altering traditions for their own good.

> I do not expect that it will be attended to — for such is the almost superstitious adherence of this people to form, that I am not quite sure whether, under even the sanction of [the Company's] Government, it would be satisfactory to them to omit the performance of a ceremony to which, however

> **reluctantly fulfilled, they have been accustomed — and it is perhaps sufficient that they should understand that it is not our wish to impose on them any conditions which can justly be considered derogatory to their several stations.**

Sutherland also explained that the Company need not worry too much about perpetuating such elaborate ceremonies to bolster the position of the Resident since '...we have now so much the substance of power that we need not stickle for the shadow.'

Unfortunately, we cannot know the reaction of the Gwalior court to Sutherland's proposed changes in its traditions. Before his proposal reached the Gwalior court, the Company's Government itself rejected it. In accordance with Bentinck's policy of non-intervention, the Company ordered him 'to leave all matters of ceremonial on their present footing' and chided him for showing too much initiative for intervention.[29] Thus, there is no evidence as to the differences between Sutherland's imputation of the meanings of these rituals to the Gwalior court and the understanding actually held by the court, or as to its reaction to his proposed changes.

In other cases, however, the changes in protocol introduced by Residents did reach Rulers. Since most such changes proved discordant with the Ruler's understanding of the proper relationship between them, Rulers apparently regarded most such rewritings as violations of established traditions. Rulers often complained to the Governor-General that the Resident had engaged in improper procedures, insulting to the dignity of that Ruler. What the Ruler complained of as insult often proved to be the Resident simply representing a policy the Company wished but the Ruler did not. Here the Company usually backed the Resident.[30]

The growing power and wealth of the Company, and the concurrent decline of the Indian courts, helped the Residents in such manipulation of symbols. In 1828, the Resident in Delhi successfully argued for the continuation of his budget for the substantial number of horses, camels, and elephants attached to that Residency. He maintained that they were necessary to sustain the 'Residency Pageant' and further, that he regularly loaned them

out to 'prominent natives' thus placing them under obligation to the Company.[31] This subtle control over the trappings of court life contrasts with the blatant rejection of Delhi court ceremony by this Resident's successor.

Some Residents initiated such fundamental reformulations of ritual exchanges that the Ruler complained and the Company could not approve. As Acting Resident at Delhi (1829-30), Francis Hawkins (on his own initiative and without prior consultation with the Company or the Mughal Emperor) radically altered the rituals his predecessor had respected in his relationship with the Emperor. Probably contributory to Hawkins' blatant reformulation of the imperial court ritual was his lack of prior service in Indian states. From his arrival in India in 1783 until his appointment to Delhi in 1829, he had served most of his career as judge and magistrate in areas of direct British rule (1791-1826). Even his appointment to Delhi was primarily administrative rather than political: Senior Member of the Sadr (Chief) Board of Revenue in Delhi territory as well as Acting Resident.[32] The Company's Government first heard about Hawkins' rescript of his role in a detailed letter of complaint from the Mughal Emperor which listed a dozen breaches of etiquette and acts of disrespect toward him and his imperial family.

Contrasting the imperial accusations and Hawkins' justification of his actions illustrates clearly the lack of consensus between the two parties about the symbols to be used, and their significance. The Resident and the Emperor agreed on the actions performed but disagreed profoundly on their meanings.[33] In summary, the charges and responses were: First, the Resident presented nazr (an offering, usually of gold coins, from an inferior to a superior) to the Mughal heir apparent with one hand. The Resident explained that this was the first time he had been 'obliged to submit to the humiliating Ceremony of presenting Nuzzurs' and so he paid no attention to the manner of his presentation. Second, the Resident demanded a chair for himself while in the presence (on the other side of a *parda* or cloth screen) of an Empress. The Resident saw this as a matter of principle 'necessary to maintain the Dignity of the high and important Station of

Resident and Chief Commissioner at Delhy.' Third and fourth, the Resident rejected offerings of meat dishes from the imperial kitchen and an imperial nosegay from the Emperor. The Resident refused them because he did not want to tip the imperial servants bearing the offerings. Fifth, the Resident rejected a *shuqqa* (Arabic for 'a piece,' here 'a royal order or communication from a superior') from one of the imperial relatives. This was part of Hawkins' project of reducing the status of these relatives. Sixth, the Resident infrequently attended on the Emperor; Hawkins asserted that he was too busy with his more important duties. Seventh, the Resident made an unauthorized and disrespectful entry into the imperial palace. Hawkins had given an English friend a tour of the place, riding on horseback into the throne room. Eighth through twelfth centred on controversy over the Resident's improper usage of the imperial titles and forms of address in correspondence. The Resident answered these by stating, 'The present King of Delhy is not such, either *de facto* or *de jure*, for he possesses no Territory, no power or authority whatever beyond the walls of his Palace.' Hawkins went on to explain that the charges stemmed from a 'conspiracy' by the Emperor and courtiers to humiliate him and the Company.

While the Company at this time did wish to degrade the political importance of the Mughal Emperor, it felt that the Acting Resident had gone too far in unilaterally rewriting his role in the rituals of the imperial court. Therefore, the Governor-General chided — but did not otherwise punish — the Resident for having 'been wanting in the proper observance of the established forms of etiquette to which all natives of Rank attach so much importance and which are particularly due from the British Representative towards the Royal Family at Delhi.'[34] Hawkins apparently stayed on as Acting Resident despite this gentle censure.[35] Since Hawkins died the next year, the Company did not pursue the imperial complaints further.

Residents understood that they were, as actors in rituals, themselves powerful symbols. Increasingly during the nineteenth century, Residents in a number of courts reshaped ceremonies so that their roles grew more central. In smaller states like Tanjore, the

Company's control over rituals began relatively early. In the accession of 1798, the Resident reported that he publicly installed the Raja on the throne (the Company also arbitrated the succession *de facto*): 'In the presence of his People I put the seal of the state upon the fourth finger of his right Hand, and delivered the sword to Colonel Aston to be presented by him' to the Ruler.[36]

Such installations at the hands of Residents came later for the more powerful states. In Awadh, the Resident rewrote the coronation ceremony in 1823 so that he, and not as before the Mujtahid al-Asr ('highest Shii religious authority of the age'), performed the coronation of the Awadh ruler.[37] In Hyderabad, the Resident led the new Ruler to the throne by the hand and then installed him on it in 1829.[38] In these and other reformulations of extant ceremonies, Residents symbolically asserted the Company's new role as guardian of the Rulers. Further, by enacting these altered rituals, the Residents demonstrated to the various audiences that all parties accepted this reformed relationship.

Conversely, Residents also manipulated rituals to indicate their lack of support for a Ruler. Particularly during times of the Company's periodic policy of non-intervention, Residents used their withdrawal from court rituals in order to indirectly control a Ruler. Always widely noticed, the Resident's absence from ritual intercourse with a court had significant political implications for the Ruler. As an example, in 1833 the Resident at the Awadh court withdrew from 'the habit of receiving and giving public parties at the Palace and the Residency' until the Ruler implemented administrative reforms desired by the Company. The Ruler realized the power of such a symbolic withdrawal of support and wrote a number of letters of 'anxious request' for the Resident's return. The Resident wrote: '...I have thought it my duty to turn that wish to as much account as possible.' Under 'extreme' pressure, the Ruler finally submitted a reform plan acceptable to the Company and the Resident resumed participation in the rituals of court.[39]

Over the 1798-1840 period, therefore, Residents increasingly mastered the rituals of the Indian courts. They developed tactics to manipulate these rituals for the Company's purposes, at least in

part. Chapter 7 shows that Indian Rulers also proved skilful at using the Resident for their purposes as well. In short, the symbolic interactions between the Resident and the Ruler reflected the relationship between the Company and the state. Further, these public performances helped shape that relationship by suggesting to various audiences subtle, or major, changes in the relative standing of Resident and Ruler.

The Resident and the Ruler

The Company's transition to a more interventionist policy regarding successions in the Indian states occurred at the end of the eighteenth century. Since each succession involved a peculiar set of circumstances, the degree of the Company's intervention varied from case to case. Controversies erupted within the Company as to the proper policy to follow. The Resident at Delhi, Octerlony, for example, resigned when his movement of troops to decide the Bharatpur succession of 1823 was countermanded by the Governor-General (in this instance, the Company eventually intervened militarily in 1826 as Octerlony had advised). Nevertheless, during this period, such interventions became frequent despite occasional official pronouncements against them. However, the Company largely retained a Ruler on the throne rather than annex the state directly into its direct rule. The Company often found the interregnum a particularly efficient time to alter the relationship between the throne and the Resident.[40] The Company also occasionally placed a minor on the throne, as in Mysore in 1799; the Resident would then deal with a Regent or Regency Council.

The first instance of the Company's shift in policy came clearly in Awadh, at the death of Asaf al-Daula in 1797. As the Awadh Ruler sickened, the Governor-General instructed the Resident not to intervene if it appeared that the succession would conform to the Company's interests (in much the same way as he had instructed the Resident in Hyderabad the previous year, see Chapter 4). In Awadh, the Company had decided to support Asaf al-Daula's evident nominee: his putative son, Wazir Ali. In the

event, the Resident oversaw this succession without directly intervening. Soon after his installation, however, Wazir Ali proved insufficiently cooperative with the Resident. At the beginning of 1798, the Company decided to install a more compliant Ruler. The Resident therefore suddenly gave heed to allegations of Wazir Ali's illegitimacy (rumors abounded concerning Asaf al-Daula's sexual incapacity). The Resident thereupon acted to depose Wazir Ali after only a few months as Ruler. The Company then recalled its dependent, Saadat Ali Khan, from exile and installed him on the throne after he had lived more than two decades in Calcutta, under the Company's protection. In exchange for his unexpected elevation, Saadat Ali Khan agreed to another treaty, once again increasing Awadh's payments to the Company, ceding more territory, and reimbursing the Company Rs1,200,000 for its 'exertions' in putting him in his putative nephew's place.[41]

It is important to note that the Company was not the first power to try to exercise this right to arbitrate, and/or profit from, succession. The Mughal Emperor had routinely followed this policy to the eighteenth century. Interestingly, at the same time that the Company began to exert such power, another would-be paramount power, the Maratha Sindhia, did so as well. Mahadji Sindhia (d. 1794) and then his adopted son Daulat Rao Sindhia (d. 1827) built the power of their dynasty within the Maratha confederation. From about 1754, Mahadji had been moving toward some of the same goals as the Company of supervision over the less powerful Rulers of India; Daulat Rao controlled the Mughal Emperor until 1803. In the Awadh succession detailed above, Daulat Rao Sindhia demanded payment from Wazir Ali, asserting that the Emperor would not legitimize the succession by accepting nazr and bestowing khilat until such payment was made.[42] Awadh Rulers, in fact, continued to accept Mughal imperial authority until 1819.

The Company varied, however, in its official policy about intervention in successions. Whatever official policy at the time might be, the Company determined its role on a case by case basis. Governor-General Hastings recognized the deleterious effects of such intervention on the Rulers:

> **In nothing do we violate the feelings of the native princes so much as in the decisions which we claim to privilege of pronouncing with regard to the succession to the musnud [throne].... [A Ruler we impose] will profess infinite gratitude as long as our support is useful to him; but, once seated, his subsequent attachment will always be regulated by the convenience of the day.[43]**

Nevertheless, the Company usually determined on pragmatic grounds of its own interest, that it had the right, and even the duty, to arbitrate succession.

Numerous instances of decisive Company intervention occurred including the succession of the Raja of Tanjore (1798), Maharaja of Mysore (1799), Gaikwad of Baroda (1800), Nawab of the Carnatic (1801), Nizam of Hyderabad (1803), the Peshwa of the Marathas (1803), the Bhonsle Raja of Nagpur (1818), Rao of Cutch (1819), Raja of Bharatpur (1826), Nawab of Awadh (1835), Maharaja of the Punjab (1839). Further, where successions proceeded more routinely than those listed above, the Company's intervention either was unnecessary (because it went smoothly along the lines the Company desired) or so subtle as to be unremarked. In other instances, the Company pointedly decided not to try to arbitrate the succession. Thus, the Company's policies of intervention are apparent in the successions of Rulers. The British disasters of the First Afghan War (1838-42), however, showed the Company that intervention beyond its power to support its candidate could be a costly mistake.

Examining the Company's internal discussion over its disposition toward one Ruler, we can see how Hastings' official policy of paramountcy interacted with the Resident's practice. In 1817, the Company faced a decision with regard to the Peshwa of the Marathas. The Peshwa had, in the judgment of the Resident, instigated or at the very least connived at the murder of a high minister from the Gaikwad (then under British protection) who had been sent to the Poona court. On the extreme insistence of the Resident (who threatened to break off diplomatic relations), the Peshwa finally arrested the courtier accused by the Resident. This

courtier then escaped custody. Believing the Peshwa to be totally unreliable and the number of Company troops available inadequate to force his compliance with British policy, the Resident laid out the four options (and his assessment of them) available to the Company.[44] First, impose a minister on the Peshwa, as the Resident at Hyderabad had recently done for that Ruler. Two objections arose to this: there was no suitable candidate at court and the Peshwa could only be forced into agreement with this by putting him under virtual house arrest. As a result, this option would not be advantageous to the Company. Second, the hostile acts of the Peshwa

> ...justify us in treating His Highness as an open enemy, in which case we might either restrain him by a new treaty, and weaken him by cessions, or entirely remove him from the Government...increase the Subsidiary force, and place His Highness's whole army under British officers...compel him distinctly to renounce all connection with the other Marathas...[and] insist on a right of advising him in his internal administration.
>
> [Third]...in a just war...conquer his dominions...bestow them on whomsoever, and with whatever conditions we chose. We might set up his brother, either unconditionally or with all, or some, of the cessions and restrictions mentioned....

Alternately, the Company might install the Raja of Satara, who was nominally head of the Maratha state, although long removed from active politics; the Company had similarly substituted dynasties in Mysore. Fourth, the Company could simply annex the state into direct rule.

Out of all these options, the Resident advised that the Company depose the Peshwa in favour of his brother since

> this would keep up the old form of Government, official employment to the public servants, civil and military, and would be as agreeable as the present state of affairs to the rest of the inhabitants of the country.... [H]e would certainly

> be less obnoxious than an English Magistrate, with an Adowlut [British judiciary] and an establishment of Police.

The Governor-General responded that unless the Peshwa capitulated utterly to the Resident's advice, the Resident was to declare war. Following the war, the Resident was to arrange for

> ...the maintenance of a preponderating military force in our interests in His Highness's territory, and the appropriation to its payment of a larger portion of His Highness's resources... [This subsidiary force] nominally in the service of the Paishwa, will be in effect under our exclusive control.

This was in addition to complete isolation from the other Maratha powers and cessions of extensive lands to the Company. Should the Peshwa not agree, the Company could simply place his brother on the throne. Supporting this elevation of the brother was '...the forcible claim of birth and the advantages of making the smallest deviation from the strict line of succession.' This course of action, however, would cause 'considerable embarrassment with reference to the disposal of his (the former Peshwa's) person and his future establishment'.[45]

Subsequently, the Peshwa appeared at first to capitulate to the Resident's demands, signed a new treaty, and then suddenly attacked the Residency, leading to the Third Maratha War (1817-19). Following their victory, the British annexed the Peshwa's domains, exiled him, and awarded him and his dependents a massive pension of Rs 2,210,000 annually, including Rs 579,866 to the much discussed brother.

The British were determined to maintain some vestige of the Peshwa's state. Since the Peshwa's brother had opposed the Company during the war, he had disqualified himself — in the Resident's view — for elevation to 'sovereignty'. As an alternative, the Resident advised the Company to create '...a small sovereignty' for the Raja of Satara as an outlet for Maratha national pride and a source of employment for Maratha nobility, and to conciliate 'the Mahratta tribes to the new order of things.'[46] Like the Mughal Emperor, this Raja had *de jure* status but had also long

been *de facto* under the control of his nominal subordinates, including the Peshwa. The young Raja thus obtained the Company's recognition of his sovereignty and received a state to support him. Nevertheless, he had to pass through four years of training and probation by the Resident. Until 1822,

> [the Resident]...with two English assistants, conducted all the affairs of the State, all orders being issued in the Rajah's name, and the Rajah's seal being affixed to all public documents. The Rajah sat in the Kutcherry, or Durbar, alongside Captain Grant Duff [the Resident], to see how business was conducted.... [The Resident] came armed with absolute power and relinquished it gradually as he found others born and bred in the country fit to exercise it.[47]

The policy of paramountcy thus was adjusted to local circumstances.

The officials of the Company generally recognized the hereditary rights of Rulers and their families, even when the Company deposed them from the throne. Over the years, Company Residents and other officials arranged substantial pensions for these former Rulers and their relatives. Although some motivation for this may have come from a cynical wish to manipulate Indian public opinion, the scale of the awards suggest that they reflected British sensibilities as well. Table 4 lists the major stipends paid to Rulers whom the Company had removed from control over their states, as of the fiscal year 1827-8; the total came to more than Rs 10 million (over 1 million sterling) annually.

Table 4 demonstrates the inconsistent assignation of stipends by the Company. The deposed Peshwa and his dependents ranked second in the amount assigned. The Nawab of Bengal, for example, received nearly double the amount assigned the Mughal Emperor. The latter, who came only fourth on the list, received little more than the Raja of Tanjore. Although virtually all of India, at least *de jure*, was the former possession of the Emperor, the Company assigned only some territory around Delhi for the maintenance of him and his large imperial family. As is clear, there is only an approximate relationship between the value of the

territories annexed by the Company from the Ruler and the size of the stipend assigned. As a rough rule of thumb, however, the Company assigned to deposed Rulers stipends equivalent approximately one-fifth of the net revenue of their former state, although historical accident rather than uniform policy largely determined the sum.

Table 4
Stipends Paid to Rulers or Former Rulers
By the Company Annually in Rupees (1827-1828)

Recipient	*Stipend*[a]	*Gross Revenue*[b]	*Net Revenue*[c]
Nawab of Bengal	2,500,000	38,622,5803	1,197,741[d]
Maratha Peshwa	2,210,000	17,462,219	9,699,700
Nawab of the Carnatic	2,065,400	14,043,430	9,110,640
Mughal Emperor	1,340,983	3,000,000[e]	1,600,000*
Raja of Tanjore	1,183,500	4,500,490	2,527,020
Mysore Sultans	889,549	11,784,680	8,791,370
Rajas of Sagur and Kalpi	250,000	700,000*	70,000*
Nawab of Surat	162,675	250,000[f]	100,000*
Raja of Banaras	134,282	7,385,320	5,061,730
Nawab of Farrukhabad	108,000	500,000*	400,000*
Nawab of Masulipatam	50,000	8,463,650	6,508,080
Total	10,894,389	106,712,369	75,066,281

*Estimated.

[a] Including stipends to dependents. [b] From territories formerly under that Ruler but administered by the Company. [c] Net revenues after revenue and judicial charges, charitable allowances, and stipends chargeable upon revenue, and in some cases provincial corps are deducted. [d] Land revenue only, net revenue from all sources were about Rs 65,000,000. [e] This is the estimated revenue from the Delhi area only. [f] Estimated customs collections and revenue.

Figures are based on [John Clunes], *An Historical Sketch of the Princes of India. Stipendiary, Subsidiary, Protected, Tributary, and Feudatory; with a Sketch of the Origin and Progress of British Power in India* (Edinburgh: Smith, Elder and Co., 1832), p. 128. These figures have been cross-checked with slightly different numbers in a letter by B.S. Jones to Charles Grant, 1 August 1832, in Parliamentary Papers, *Sessionals 1831-32*, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix VI, Political or Foreign, pp. 202-3, reprinted in Irish University Press, *Series of British Parliamentary Papers*, Colonies, East India, vol. 11, pp. 888-9.

In addition to these fixed pensions, the Company also made gratuitous gifts to individuals on special occasions. On the occasion of the marriage of each of Tipu Sultan's daughters, the Company disbursed to them some Rs 15,000, in addition to their regular annual pension. Since Tipu Sultan had been killed fighting against the British years before, and the Company had no treaty obligation whatsoever to his family, the sizable pension and occasional gifts reflect the Company's perception of a moral obligation rather than a legal one. This respect for the rights of former Rulers to pensions declined somewhat over time, as we shall see.

Table 4 also shows that deposing a Ruler could be quite financially advantageous for the Company. Since the Company's costs were already deducted from the figure for the net revenue, the amount of over Rs 75 million annually from these former states added handsomely to the Company's income. Because the Company would have had to defend these same territories be they either under direct or indirect rule, there would have been few additional expenses. That the Company refrained from annexing all of India indicates its degree of respect for the legitimacy of Indian sovereignty.

The Resident and Subsidiary Forces in the State

Residents proved able to exert extensive control over the administration in the Indian states largely because of the Company's military superiority. As the Company's agents, Residents held the support of this military force either immediately or from a distance. Should the Resident's influence in a state be challenged or rejected, all parties came to learn that the Company's armies would enter and crush the opposition. Significantly, while Residents were expected to carry out their indirect control of the state without recourse to the Company's armies, they were not barred from doing so. Residents compelled by local circumstances to call in Company troops to put down disorder in the state were rarely censured. In 1817, when Richard Jenkins had to rely on troops to

repel an attack on the Residency in Nagpur, he received praise rather than blame for his actions.[48]

The Company, indeed, occasionally used military force to establish Residencies. Tipu Sultan's refusal to accept a Resident at his court formed the pretext for the final war in Mysore (1799) and then the establishment of a Residency in that state. The attack on the Residency in Poona in 1817 — apparently directed by that state's ministers — likewise resulted in the Third Maratha war (1817-19).

In the vast majority of confrontations, the Resident ultimately triumphed over his opponents because of the explicit or implicit threat — rather than the actual deployment — of the Company's armies. In consequence of this arrangement, the Company made particularly efficient use of its military forces. A single body of troops, strategically located, could simultaneously support Residents in a number of nearby states.[49]

To extend the efficiency of its military base further, the Company followed an overall strategy of transferring much of the burden of its military commitment to the Indian states. On one hand, the Company pushed consistently for the constriction of the independent military forces under the command of each of the Indian Rulers. After the Company gained military advantage over each Ruler in turn, it then consolidated that advantage by compelling each of them to restrict their own army. In some cases, the Company specified the maximum size and type of that army by treaty.[50] In all cases, treaties forbade that Ruler from deploying his army outside his state without the permission of the Company. Further, the Resident placed pressure, including financial pressure, on the Ruler to decrease his budget for that army. Consequently, the armies of virtually all the Rulers withered, losing either numbers or efficiency or both.

In the place of the Ruler's army, in a number of instances the Company substituted bodies of troops under the direction of the Resident but paid by the Ruler through subsidies to the Company. While these subsidiary troops might uphold the authority of the Ruler, they did so at the will of the Resident, giving the latter unmatched military power in the state. On their part, Rulers

gained access to European military power through the use of Company troops — European officers but Indian rank and file — in exchange for loyalty and a subsidy or cession of territory to the Company. The cost to the Ruler was that the Resident directed these subsidiary forces and permitted them to be used by the Ruler only under limited conditions. In this way, the Company retained control over European military skill, had its troops subsidized by its allies and potential rivals, and ensured the Ruler's dependence on the Company.

Over time, the Company signed treaties which called for the creation of subsidiary troops of one kind or another in some seventeen Indian states as Table 5 indicates.[51] Comparing the dates of these treaties with the interventionist and non-interventionist official policies of the Company (discussed extensively below), I find only a general correlation. Local circumstances in each case, and not official policy alone, determined when such a subsidiary force would be agreed upon between the Ruler and the Company.

Table 5 indicates the year of the treaty authorizing a subsidiary force. Qualifications must be appended in several of these cases, either because subsidiary forces were not immediately instituted or the treaties were cancelled after some time. Nevertheless, this table shows the growth of this system.

In exchange for organizing and disbursing the funds for subsidiary forces, the Company acquired substantial resources from states. In some cases, the subsidies were paid in cash by a Ruler, as 'tribute' (so indicated on Table 5). In the majority of cases, Rulers assigned the land revenue from some territory in order to pay the subsidy. Hyderabad, for example, ceded the Northern Circars in 1766, in exchange for the promise of the use of some of the Company's troops, although Company troops were not actually used by that state until over thirty years later. In 1814, the Company established the 'Russell Contingent' (after the then Resident, Henry Russell, who had served in the Hyderabad Residency as Assistant Secretary 1800-1, Secretary 1802-5, 1806-7, Acting Resident 1805, and then Resident 1810-20) in Hyderabad and later took the rich territory of Berar to pay for it. Many of the

Company's choicest territories came from such arrangements, as when Awadh ceded half its lands in 1801. Should subsidy payments fall into arrears or even threaten to fall into arrears, the Company claimed a justification for deeper intervention in that state's administration.

Table 5
Treaties Providing for Subsidiary Forces with Amount of Subsidy in Rupees (1832)

Ruler	*Year of Treaty*	*Net Subsidy*[1]	
Nawab of Bengal	1760	*	
Nizam of Hyderabad	1766	4,900,000	(territory)
Maratha Peshwa of Poona	1775	*	
Nawab of Awadh	1775	13,073,400	(territory)
Raja of Tanjore	1778	*	
Nawab of the Carnatic	1781	*	
Raja of Travancore	1788	894,980	(tribute)
Raja of Mysore	1799	2,800,000	(tribute)
Gaikwad of Baroda	1802	1,356,260	(territory)
Raja of Gwalior (Sindhia)	1803	15,612,780	(territory)
Raja of Gohud (Dholpur)	1804	*	
Raja of Cochin	1809	228,570	(tribute)
Rajas of Nagpur, Indore	1816-17	4,209,950	(territory)
Raja of Cutch	1819	324,000	(tribute)
Amirs of Sind	1839-41	*	
Raja of Lahore	1846	*	
Begam of Bhopal	1849	*	
Total of figures given above		43,399,940	

[1] Figures are as of 1832. * Indicates not applicable due to annexation of the state or treaty not yet created as of 1832.
Figures are from [Clunes], *Historical Sketch*, p.128 and, Aitchison, passim.

One of the first uses of a subsidiary force by a Ruler came in 1774 when the Awadh Ruler used Company troops to fight in the

Rohilla War on his behalf. British officers with the Company's troops complained that they had done the bulk of the fighting while the Awadh troops extracted the spoils of victory. In future, the Company made sure that it, rather than the Rulers, determined how these troops were deployed. As a result, Rulers had to contend with a military force within their state that obeyed the Resident's rather than their own orders.

Some on the Indian side realized the eventual cost to the Ruler of such troops. The Chief Minister of Hyderabad objected to the establishment of subsidiary forces in the state because their presence

> ...would raise the British Government on the scale of Political weight and importance so would it have a tendency to lower that of His Highness who would scarcely be numbered any longer among the Sovereigns of India, but like the Nawaubs of Oude and Arcot be considered a mere dependent of the Company.[52]

Despite the prescient Minister's objections, the Company did conclude a treaty with Hyderabad establishing such a force.

Since the Rulers could not deploy these subsidiary forces against external enemies, the benefit from the forces redounded almost exclusively to the Company. These troops contributed substantially to the Company's overall military power within India. Their subsidies provided a vital source of income to defray the military expenses which the Company would largely have incurred in any case. The Company's total military charges at this time were some Rs 100 million annually.[53] Thus the income from subsidies of over Rs 43 million covered a considerable part of the Company's military commitments. So successful did these subsidiary forces prove to be that the Company ordered Residents in states without them to modify existing treaties on the model of states already having such forces; the Company sent along copies of the earlier treaties to be emulated.[54]

Internally within the state, the troops did guarantee the Ruler that, as long as he satisfied the Resident, he could not be deposed by *coup d'etat* or revolution. Conversely, Residents occasionally

used the troops to depose a Ruler who proved too obstreperous to the Company. The subsidiary forces thus gave the Resident a powerful means of influence over the Ruler. Officials in the Company recognized this; in 1811, N.B. Edmonstone, the Secretary to Government, wrote the subsidiary force was the 'most effectual and apparently the only mode' of counteracting the weaknesses in the system of indirect rule.

> The prince reposes in indulgent security under the assured protection of his ally [the Company]; his military is neglected.... The protecting power...is burthened with the control of discontent and insubordination...without possessing the means of exercising restraints of local authority. It retains only the negative although certainly most essential benefit, of being no longer exposed to the disquietude or the danger arising from the existence of an independent dominion left at liberty... but it incurs a danger of considerable magnitude, the danger arising from the eventual aversion of the present or future head of the state to an alliance, which while it protects his dominions, controls his power, and wounds his pride, [an aversion due to] the weakness, the folly or the vices of his character, and the intrigues and machinations of his ministers, advisors, or feudatory chiefs, who have no natural interest in the preservation of the alliance.... [This] demonstrate[s] the importance of obtaining, if possible, a security...of placing a corps in the pay of the allied state under the command of British officers.[55]

Lacking such a subsidiary force, the British could do little to control the collapse of the state into disorder, which deprived the Company of the benefits of the alliance while loading it with the dangers and costs of the protection of an unreliable ally. With such a force, the Resident could intervene deeply into many aspects of the administration of the state.

The greatest controversy within the Company came over the use of these troops for the enforcement of the Ruler's land revenue demand. At various times, the Company authorized their use to support the Ruler's revenue agents against recalcitrant

landholders. The argument for such use went: the Ruler paid for the troops and therefore should be able to make use of them in the only way he had need of military force. Further, the Resident could use the subsidiary force to induce the Ruler to conform to Company policy. Should the Ruler not heed the Resident, the Resident could unilaterally withdraw the subsidiary force in the midst of the collection season.[56]

Such use of the subsidiary troops, however, involved the Company in enforcing revenue extraction as directed by the Ruler's agents. British officers commanding the troops recoiled at punishing offenders unless the officers themselves were convinced of the justice of the revenue demand and the punishment. The Company came to see this as obnoxious to British sensibilities, having the burden of administration without the supervision of it. In some cases the Resident insisted on investigating each case before allowing the troops to act. This soon proved unworkable due to the substantial delays incurred as the local revenue agent had to request his superiors to request the Ruler to request the Resident to order the subsidiary forces to act.

Eventually, due to such difficulties, the Company generally forbade the use of the subsidiary troops for revenue enforcement altogether. Consequently, their value to the Ruler diminished considerably but their value to the Company continued. This issue of intervention proved particularly troublesome to the Company and the Ruler.

The Resident and the Ruler's Jurisdiction

Residents, in addition to seeking ascendancy over the Ruler and influence over the state administration, extended their own authority over the individual people of the state. As elsewhere in Asia, extraterritoriality proved to be a mechanism by which the British legitimized their limitation of the jurisdiction of non-white Rulers. Europeans, by excluding themselves, and their designees, from the judicial authority of indigenous Rulers, established a system that fundamentally undercut the political control of those Rulers. As we began to see in Chapter 4 with respect to Company

assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction over Europeans, the Resident came to be the agent for British extraterritoriality in the Indian states.

Going beyond Europeans, the Resident created around himself a base for protection and authority over various categories of Indians. Over time, the Company excluded ever larger categories of people from the authority of the Ruler and placed them under the jurisdiction of the Resident. Since the Residents could often exert this jurisdiction at their discretion, by this means they acquired an unmatched ascendancy over the interests of many significant individuals and, in some cases, ultimately the entire population of the state. The Residency came often to rival or even eclipse the court of the Ruler himself.

From the time of their entry into the political world of India, the officials of the East India Company experimented with and then expanded their use of extraterritoriality as a political tool.[57] Some Indian Rulers, recognizing these British efforts to trench upon their sovereignty, opposed — usually with limited success — these expansions of British jurisdiction. Nevertheless (over time and unevenly, reflecting local conditions) the Company excluded Europeans and various categories of Indians from the judicial authority of the several Rulers and brought them under its own. By gaining judicial authority over each of these groups within the state, the British were able to shift them, in some measure, from the Ruler's constituency to their own.

The practice of British extension of extraterritorial protection over Europeans followed only general patterns rather than any uniform consistency. As a rule, the Resident — often in consultation with his superiors — decided on a case-by-case basis whether to permit the Ruler to try individual Europeans for crimes in his state. Overall, the British tended increasingly to exclude Europeans who held employment in the Company and then Europeans of all types from the judicial authority of the local Ruler. A counter-example to this trend came in 1831 (under Bentinck's non-interventionist policy) when the Company informed the Resident in Travancore that Europeans — unless servants of the Company — were subject to local laws in all instan-

ces.[58] Not until the 1850s did it become general practice that no Ruler's court could try a European. Only in 1871 did the Government of India lay down an overall policy that 'no Native State can be allowed to try a European British subject according to its own forms of procedure and punish him according to its own laws.'[59] Even after this, exceptions to this general policy continued to appear.[60]

For the individual Europeans concerned, the Company's extraterritorial protection proved a valuable asset. Europeans of all descriptions took shelter within the Company's protection even as they lived and worked within a Ruler's domain. Although these Europeans often had employment or business with the Ruler himself, they nevertheless remained protected from the Ruler's authority at the discretion of the Resident. The British Resident monitored and assumed authority over the Europeans in that state. While the Ruler could not force Europeans to pay their debts to him, his European creditors frequently dunned the Ruler through the Resident's auspices. Some Europeans proved so blatantly exploitative of their status that Residents themselves complained about the low quality of people who were nonetheless entitled to the Company's protection.[61] Several Residents became incriminated by using their official protection over Europeans to assist them — including members of the Residency staff — in exploiting Indian Rulers financially. Extensive and notorious cases of this sort involved, on at least one occasion, the Awadh, Hyderabad, Travancore, and Carnatic Residencies among others.[62]

In addition to Europeans, growing categories of Indians also received shelter under the extraterritorial protection of the Company, via its Resident. The Company protected its Indian employees generally shielding them from the judicial authority of the Ruler in whose state they allegedly committed a crime. Even when accused of serious crimes like murder or treason, these Company employees usually retained extraterritorial rights. Company policy varied with the circumstances of the case. In some instances the Resident merely used his influence on behalf of the employee, and interceded with the Ruler in the Ruler's courts.

In other cases, the Company totally excluded the employee from the jurisdiction of the Ruler, bringing the accused wholly under Company jurisdiction.

In addition, the Company sheltered its employees by granting them the privilege of petitioning the Ruler of their native place, through the auspices of the Resident stationed at that court, on behalf of themselves or their families. The Company's employees regarded this right as highly valuable and exercised it extensively. In Awadh alone, some 50-60,000 individuals held this right, submitting an average of 1,366 such petitions annually.[63]

Such became the Resident's influence that, in most instances, his intercession with the Ruler overrode further inquiry. Despite the protests of Rulers in individual cases or against the system as a whole, the British persisted.[64] This system of extensive petitioning occasionally became so abusive that even the Residents themselves objected. The Company discovered some of its employees petitioning on behalf of strangers in exchange for payment.[65] One Resident found that his predecessors had been supporting a local shopkeeper's invalid petitions which had obtained for him a landholding to which he had no right. Since the shopkeeper always appeared at the Residency in a Company uniform with a certificate of discharge signed by a Company officer, his petitions had been duly endorsed by the Resident and sent on to the Ruler for satisfaction. Only after fifteen years of supporting this man's petitions did a Resident discover that the uniform had been purchased and the shopkeeper had no legitimate connection to the Company.[66] Despite such abuses, the Company continued to extend extraterritorial jurisdiction over its employees. For some Indian employees, access to such extraterritorial protection proved a major attraction of service to the Company.

The Company also used extraterritoriality to build constituencies among the notables at the courts of various Indian states. The Company extended its extraterritorial protection over such notables either with the concurrence of the Ruler himself or simply unilaterally, with a variety of justifications. The result in all cases, however, was a significant number of influential people

who looked to the Company rather than their Ruler for protection and justice and therefore inclined toward British interests.

Court politics in India had the tradition of extreme shifts of fortune. Some Rulers saw in the British Resident the means at hand to secure the lives and property of their favourites and dependents from the hands of their successors. In many instances, a Ruler simply commended such notables to the Resident's protection, as did the Nizam of Hyderabad in 1798.[67] In other cases, the Resident issued formal guarantees. In either case, the payment by the Resident of a regular pension usually marked the recipient with the special status as the client of Company.

Courtiers on occasion found these guarantees of the protection of the Resident invaluable. The Resident intervened on behalf of a number of disgraced guaranteed pensioners, saving them from loss or harm, even when the Company recognized the validity of the charge against them.[68] It is not surprising that many, including incumbent officials, sought the extraterritorial protection of the Resident. Ordinary pensioners of the Ruler offered a full year of their stipend to any who could make their pension payable from the Resident's rather than the Ruler's treasury; Chief Ministers on occasion offered to exchange policies favourable to the Company for a guarantee of their safety.[69] Thus, by holding out the possibility of extraterritorial protection, the Resident could secure the interest of prominent courtiers and administrators for indirect control over the state.

Even without the concurrence, and occasionally over the protests, of the Ruler, the Company extended its protection over prominent people at court. In a dispute between one Ruler and his mother which the former considered a family matter, the Resident explained to the Ruler his right to intervene

> ...in all disputes and discussions...which may be referred by either party to the Resident...that officer must, in virtue of his office and of high authority of the British Government which he represents, have an unquestionable right, not only to argue the matter in dispute with either or both of the high personages concerned in it, but to persist in the argument

> **with either in behalf of the other, so long as hope of conviction may remain, to the end of obtaining justice toward the party which he considers as aggrieved...**[70]

These rights expanded further in the 1840s and 1850s.

Since it recognized the legal authority of Rulers, however, the Company did not feel it could simply assert Company jurisdiction without justifying it. In each assertion of extraterritorial protection, the Company sought to legitimize its action on the basis of some principle. Some within the Company criticized this occasional and inconsistent expansion of intervention in the judiciary of states. Among these critics, Malcolm wrote of the dangers in first raising the expectations of courtiers that they could find protection with the Resident and then frustrating them by denying it as outside the scope of the Company's competence.

> **Our right of interference...is so limited, that it is not one case in a hundred, of those that are brought forward, that an officer can do more than state calmly and clearly, to the party who seeks redress, the reasons and principles which prevent him from attending to his representation or complaint.**

Malcolm argued against any Company intervention rather than a confusing practice that weakened the Ruler without improving the system of justice.[71]

Further, the Company occasionally revoked its extraterritorial protection, should the immorality of the client be too repugnant. Mirza Sulayman Shukuh, a brother of the Mughal Emperor, had been living for many years in Awadh, enjoying both a pension provided jointly by the Awadh Ruler and the Company, and also the Resident's protection, all due to his imperial birth. In 1821, he allegedly murdered the father-in-law of one of his sons, in retaliation for the victim's reported assassination by magic of one of the wives of Sulayman Shukuh. Because Sulayman Shukuh's defense relied on belief in the efficacy of charms and magic, the Resident regarded his crime as an affront to 'civilized' behaviour. The Resident expelled him from the extraterritorial protection of the

Company and restored him to the jurisdiction of the Awadh Ruler in whose domain the murder occurred. Later, when Sulayman Shukuh received a punishment deemed too severe by the Resident, the Company intervened to mitigate the sentence and restore his pension.[72] At other times, the Company withdrew its extraterritorial protection from individuals charged with immorality, criminal behavior, illegitimacy, or simply being 'inimical to British Interests.'[73] Thus, when the accused needed the Company's extraterritorial protection most, the Company might withdraw it unilaterally.

At times, the Company wished to openly display the extent of those who sought its protection. To manifest the extent of the Resident's support among the notables of court, some Residents held a weekly *darbar* or

> ...periodic Levee...attended with as much pomp, and state as the Resident's establishment could furnish... [where] the vakeels [representatives] of the Oude Princesses, the guaranteed nobles. . .and many other persons who from long usage were in the habit of visiting the Residency and of styling themselves the dependents of the British Government...presented nuzzers [submissive offerings] to the Resident.[74]

Those individuals who attended the Resident's darbar, or simply declared themselves his dependent, often received the protection of the Company through the intervention of the Resident on that basis alone.

The Company did not just wait to be approached. At various times, particularly when the Company was in conflict with a Ruler over policy, the Resident canvassed for support at court, offering extraterritorial protection in return. The Governor-General might instruct the Resident to make his dissatisfaction with the Ruler known: the Governor-General 'deems it not improbable, that the principal persons to whom the foregoing communication is to be made, may come forward with declarations expressive of their indignation of [the Ruler's] unwarrentable views and soliciting the protection of the British Government.'[75]

The extension of extraterritorial protection over key members of the court, therefore, proved a potent weapon in the Resident's efforts to gain indirect control over the state.

Further, the Company on occasion set up pensions for prominent officials in the states, totalling quite significant sums. In 1804, the Company conferred a pension of Rs 12,000 annually on the Wakil of Sindhia who had just negotiated the treaty of Sindhia's surrender to the Company during the Second Maratha War (1803-5).[76] Since Sindhia remained a danger to the Company, the next year, the Governor-General explained this strategy to the Resident with Sindhia:

> **Most of Sindiah's reputable Sirdars [nobles] and officers will quit him if properly encouraged in the event of War, you will endeavour to publish proper encouragement to them particularly, you will not fail to promise to all pensioners and Jaghiredars. . . full and regular payment...provided they should quit Sindiah and join the British armies. This plan will leave Sindiah without an officer of any rank or character.... It must also be proclaimed that every man who remains with Sindiah will lose his pension or jaghire.[77]**

By 1812, the Resident at this court paid some Rs 245,000 annually to courtiers, in addition to the Rs 400,000 pension that the Company paid to the Ruler himself.[78] In the event, the Resident managed to isolate Sindhia from the other Maratha powers and he remained out of the third and final Maratha war (1817-19).

Perhaps the most extensive extension of pensions and, with them, formal guarantees of protection to courtiers came in Awadh. Following massive loans totaling more than Rs 52 million extracted by the Company from the Awadh Ruler during the first half of the nineteenth century, a class of 'guaranteed pensioners' emerged out of those people nominated by the Ruler to receive the interest from these loans in perpetuity. Once enrolled as in this class by the Awadh Ruler making that loan, the 'guaranteed pensioner' and his descendants were 'placed under the care of the British Government, expressly to secure...justice, and protection... [never to] be abandoned to the Oude Government.'[79] Of the

amount annually distributed to these several thousand 'guaranteed pensioners,' I have identified the recipients of Rs 2,183,090 annually according to the following distribution: 76 per cent to relatives of the Awadh Rulers, 1 per cent to dependents of the Awadh Rulers, 15 per cent to former ministers of the Awadh government and their families, and the remaining 8 per cent to charitable and religious trusts.[80] Their 'guaranteed pensioner' status put them into a distinct legal and social class.

In addition to British jurisdiction over individual or classes of notables, the British also established their relationship to the subjects of a state as a whole. The Governor-General later wrote of the Resident's responsibility to shelter all '...persons looking to the British Government for protection.'[81] Whenever the British wished to demonstrate the need for deeper intervention in a state, they appealed to the needs of 'the People' at large. As an example, in 1820 the Resident Hyderabad sought to prove the need for 'reform' by opening the Residency to complaints 'from all Parts of the Country.' He explained:

> The surest mode of protecting the People from wrong and restraining the local officers from injustice, is to give free access to complaints, and promptitude and facility to Investigation. I make a point, therefore, of receiving and communicating to the Minister every Petition that is offered to me.

He began to receive petitions for British intervention 'of every description' at an annual rate of 1,563.[82]

Indicative of the involvement of the Company's Resident in the affairs of the people of the state is the issue of public health. As early as 1802 — just six years after Edward Jenner had first demonstrated the cowpox vaccination against smallpox — the Governor of Bombay ordered the Resident at Poona to disseminate this vaccination among the ordinary people of the state.[83] By 1811, some 12,700 people of Poona had received this 'obvious and undoubted...proof of [British] benevolence.'[84]

The most comprehensive extension of Company jurisdiction within the Indian states came, for some of them, at the time of

their annexation into the direct administration of the Company. Many of the treaties signed by the Rulers permitted British intervention in the state's administration should conditions justify it. The fundamental principle, raised repeatedly whenever the British contemplated annexation of a state, was the obligation to shield the people of that state from the alleged unjust authority of their Ruler. This justification of a British responsibility higher than that of any treaty obligation appears in a number of British extensions of its authority. The Company justified its annexation of Coorg in 1834, for example, by unilaterally proclaiming: '...it is the unanimous wish of the inhabitants of Coorg to be taken under the protection of the British Government.'[85] The Company, apparently, presumed to know the unanimous wish of the people of Coorg even if the people themselves did not realize or express that wish. Such annexations, justified by the Company on behalf of the people of the state, became particularly frequent later, as we shall see.

The Resident and Indirect Rule

The form and degree of indirect rule established and practised by Residents varied. Nevertheless, throughout this period, the Resident's influence in a state generally extended beyond the Ruler to encompass significant components of the state administration. Over time, Residents as individuals and as a whole developed tactics that enabled them to exert influence over the officials of the state. Ideally under indirect rule, Residents merely offered subtle suggestions to the Ruler for him to pass on to his subordinates. In practice, Residents more frequently criticized actions already taken by a state official. In extreme cases, the Resident virtually co-opted supervision of the Chief Minister from the Ruler; the Resident acted as *de facto* head of state, issuing directives for the Minister to carry out. In a few instances, the Resident effectively set aside the Ruler and Chief Minister and administered the state through British officials, a practice which approached direct rule.

The overall British attitude toward the states after 1798 differed significantly from what it had been in earlier years. The 'subsidiary alliance' policy of Governor-General Wellesley (1798-1805) made the Company's interests the overriding consideration with respect to its intervention in the states. As the Governor-General wrote to his brother Henry during negotiations with the Awadh Ruler:

> The right of the Company to secure the British interests in the province of Oude must be considered as the fundamental principle of every arrangement.... The British Government would be justified in pursuing the measures necessary for the security of those interests, not only without his Excellency's consent, but even in opposition to his endeavours to counteract them.[86]

The principle that British interests overrode all others underlay many of the actions of Residents throughout the nineteenth century. In the instance at hand, Henry Wellesley went on to compel the Awadh Ruler — despite fervent objections — to cede half his territories to pay for the subsidiary forces in the state.

Although Wellesley's official policy called for intervention in the external but not in the internal affairs of states, in fact the Residents followed his principle of Company interests above all and engaged in deep intervention in the domestic affairs of a number of states. Even after Wellesley's recall by the Directors and the institution under his successors until 1813 of an official policy of non-intervention in both the external and internal affairs of states, Residents continued to take an active role in state administration.

In Baroda, for example, the Company intervened deeply despite official policy against such intervention. Following the ruling Gaikwad's death in 1800, a long succession struggle ensued. To bring about its success, one faction enlisted the military support of the Company and contracted for a subsidiary force. In order to pay off the unruly elements of the state army which that force replaced, the new Ruler incurred a substantial debt to the Company (Rs 4,138,732, half held directly by the Company, half

held by Indian bankers, guaranteed by the Company).[87] The Resident required the Ruler to place valuable territories, desired by the Company, as security. Payment on the debt soon fell into arrears. In 1805, the Company annexed those rich territories permanently.[88] Further, the active Resident at this court, Alexander Walker (who served as Junior Member of the Malabar Commission 1800-2, Resident Baroda 1802-11, including Kattywar from 1808-11), took an active role in the state administration and society.

Frequently, (as was the case in Baroda) one central issue between the Resident and the Ruler was the role of the Resident in the selection of the Ruler's officials. Finding the Ruler unwilling to appoint a person acceptable to the Company as Chief Minister, the Resident modified the organization of the administration in 1807. Bypassing the official Chief Minister, the Resident successfully completed 'negotiations' for the appointment of his candidate as 'Khasgui-wallah' (*khasagi wala*, 'King's favoured one' or, sometimes 'treasurer'). The Resident also induced the Ruler to define this official's 'constitutional voice in the administration of Public Affairs' with the power 'to control, and direct the operations of the executive part of the Government,' effectively displacing the Chief Minister.[89] The Resident also wrote the Chief Minister insisting that this official be given power to reform the state.[90] Thus, when the Ruler refused to permit the Company to select the Chief Minister, the Resident circumvented that office and channeled the state administration through the next level, which he did indirectly control.

Not only did this Resident thus try to reform the revenue system and the rest of the Baroda administration, he also sought to reform the society as well, attempting to eradicate such customs as infanticide. This reform was, according to the Company at the time, 'introductory to an era of civilization and tranquillity among the turbulent race, to the improvement of whose morals and worldly circumstances the effects of Government under so well qualified an Agency as that of Major Walker had thus sedulously directed.'[91] All this took place during a period when official policy was stated as against any internal intervention. In Baroda,

various levels of intervention by the Resident persisted until 1820 and were renewed periodically thereafter.

This type of manipulation of the administration was similar to the arrangement worked out by the Resident in Hyderabad in 1809 and sustained until 1843. Despite both official Company policy against internal intervention and a lack of treaty rights permitting involvement in the state administration in Hyderabad and elsewhere, Residents often intervened on the basis of their own perception of local circumstances. Rather than justify such acts in terms of treaties, which would not be possible, the Governor-General instructed the Resident in Hyderabad to advise in the selection of the Chief Minister on the basis of mutual understanding of the relative standing of the state and the Company: 'The right of the British Government to interpose its influence in the selection of a successor to the office of Prime Minister to the state of Hyderabad is a point so well understood...that it is unnecessary to state any observations on it upon the present occasion.'[92] The Governor-General and the Resident discussed the strengths and weaknesses of each possible candidate. Then the former ordered the latter to advise the Ruler, 'observing the utmost degree of delicacy,' to appoint their selection.[93] The Ruler, however, refused this advice and appointed his own choice as Chief Minister. After three months of heated negotiation, the Resident arranged that its choice, Chandu Lal, should be appointed Dewan (assistant Minister), with all the duties, albeit not the name, of Chief Minister.[94] The Resident then tried to channel all the business of the state through the Dewan. For years the struggle of the Resident to hold the Ruler to this awkward arrangement continued (see Chapter 9).

Periods when the Company officially decreed that the Resident should not intervene thus did not mean that Residents did not continue to do so. It did mean, however, that occasionally Rulers could successfully reject the Resident's advice, at least temporarily. In 1812, for example, at least two Rulers balked at conforming to the Resident's advice about the Chief Ministership. In the first of these examples, the Resident with the Nawab of Bengal tried to '...urge, by every argument in my power, the absolute expediency

of their Highnesses selecting a respectable, intelligent person to fill the station of Dewan of the Nizamat; but it proved a vain undertaking....'[95] This was in a court where the Ruler had for long been totally dependent on the Company. In the second example, the Resident passed on a letter from the Governor-General to the Maratha Peshwa suggesting that the incumbent Minister be dropped. The Peshwa refused.[96] As we have seen, such blatant obstruction of the Resident's intentions eventually led to the Third Maratha War (1817-19) and the deposition of the Peshwa. Nevertheless, if the Ruler refused absolutely, it could prove difficult for the Resident short of using overt force. Such force would be in direct opposition to the principles of the Company at the time. Such frustrations with non-interventionist policies led the Company to reverse itself and try a different official policy.

Under Governor-General Lord Hastings (1813-23), the Company officially shifted from an extreme non-interventionist policy in both external and internal affairs to a policy more tolerant of internal intervention. To an extent, the Governor-General recognized that the Residents acted according to their own values, controlling not only the Rulers but also the Company, despite its official policies. Hastings wrote about how individual Residents regularly exceeded the legal limits on interference in the states, in this way:

> In our treaties with [the Rulers] we recognize them as independent sovereigns. Then we send a resident to their courts. Instead of acting in the character of ambassador, he assumes the functions of a dictator; interferes in all their private concerns; countenances refractory subjects against them; and makes the most ostentatious exhibition of this exercise of authority.

Hastings then explained how the Residents manipulated the Company's Supreme Council so that intervention desired by Residents received official sanction:

> To secure himself the support of our Government, he [the Resident] urges some interest which, under the colour

> thrown upon it by him, is strenuously taken up by our Council; and the Government identifies itself with the Resident not only on the single point but on the whole tenor of his conduct.[97]

Despite such awareness that he was being led into support for an intervention he did not prefer, Hastings tended to back the initiatives of his Residents. Hastings' successor, Amherst (1823-28), likewise admitted to having been persuaded from an earlier strong non-interventionist position to one permitting it, due to the arguments of the career officials of the Company who served as Residents.[98]

Residents in the field generally clambered for even more leeway to intervene. Charles Metcalfe (then Resident Delhi) wrote to Richard Jenkins (then Resident Nagpur) celebrating a policy shift in 1814 to greater official tolerance for intervention by Residents.

> How impracticable the non-interference system is found to be; or if practicable, how constantly deviated from!... It is curious to observe how frequently we are compelled by policy to deviate from our *fixed* principles.... Therefore, I rejoice at this partial abandonment of the non-interference system. But I want to see it openly renounced...let us take every fair opportunity of securing and aggrandizing our power.[99]

The generation of Company officials who had been trained — and unleashed to a large degree — to establish and administer the subordinate alliances under Wellesley thus applauded a return to deeper involvement in the Indian states.

Despite such fundamental shifts in official policy, I can trace continuities in the practice of intervention in a number of states. As we have seen for Hyderabad and Awadh, the level of the Resident's exertion of control over the state did not strictly mirror changes of official policy from intervention to non-intervention and back. Travancore is a representative example of intervention

reflecting patterns determined more by internal factors than official policy.

The Residency in Travancore had been terminated in 1791 due to conflict between the Resident and the Ruler, in a large part over arrears in the subsidy due to the Company. Following the last Mysore war (1799), the Company re-established the Travancore Residency, citing fears of a French invasion. Immediately, the Resident intervened in the state administration in order to extract the arrears due in the subsidy. As part of this intervention, in 1799 the Resident received permission from the Company to arrange the appointment of the Chief Minister.[100] Thereafter, despite the official policy of non-intervention, the Resident continued to interfere in the state administration. The Travancore court tried a number of tactics to foil the intervention of the Resident, apparently resorting at last in 1809 to an attack on the Residency. The subsidiary force, whose costs were charged to the Ruler, defended the Residency. The death of the Ruler the next year and the Resident's role in the succession of the 'young Rajah' allowed the Resident to exercise even more control over the state.[101] Between 1811 and 1814, the Resident had a major part in the state administration. The high officials of the state each used to report to the Resident twice every week 'to report extraordinaries, and to confer on public Business.'[102] Thus, during the period when official policy called for non-intervention in the internal affairs of the state, very much the reverse occurred in Travancore.

Although under Governor-General Hastings (1813-23), the official policy became paramountcy, the Company decided to withdraw from direct administration of Travancore state in 1814. The Company removed the Resident from close superintendence over state affairs but had him arrange for a Chief Minister, trusted by the Company, to take over that role. Consequently, in 1814 the Resident invited a candidate for Chief Minister to Travancore from Mysore where he served the Company as Native Assistant to the Mysore Commissioners (British officers then administering that state in the name of that Ruler). The Travancore Resident then sent his candidate with a letter to the Rani (acting as Regent) '...suggesting the propriety of appointing him to the Diwan of

Travancore with the forms usually observed upon such occasions.' Although the Rani changed the terms of the appointment somewhat, she did as the Resident had advised.[103] Under this new arrangement, the Resident received instructions to make his intervention less obvious.

> [The Resident] will carefully abstain from any open interference in the administration of the country, and...will cease to receive complaints from the subjects of the Rajah, but uniformly refer them to their own Government for redress of grievances, continuing however at the same time to afford privately, both to the Ranee and the Dewan, but invariably in terms of conciliation and respect, the reasonable assistance of good Council, with a view to the permanent interests of the alliance, and to the progressive improvement of the country.[104]

This imposed Chief Minister, however, and his successors simply carried out the directions of the Resident. Until 1829, Travancore remained in what Jeffrey calls a 'Dominant Resident' relationship between the Resident and the Ruler.[105] Thus, in Travancore as well, the change in official policy and the practice on the ground were not in perfect accord.

Many Residents had particularly strong feelings in favour of intervention in the states. Richard Jenkins (who served in the Residency with Sindhia 1804-6 and then as Resident Nagpur 1807-27) looked forward to the Maratha wars as a way to break the old, limiting treaties under which the British merely could 'jog along as we can.' A war would lead to new treaties where, Jenkins privately predicted to a fellow Resident,

> ...we can do what we like.... I would even destroy [Maratha] power altogether, and make one or two new central states like that of Mysore, out of the old dynasties.... [We] have the experience of the past to guide us in a good measure to the stipulations required to guard against the inconveniences... [which prevent us from] appointing the Minister...[and] doing everything at once.... [We should put] it out of the

> power of any future [Ruler] to revert to half measures, which might as hitherto, sacrifice what our previous exertions have secured...[106]

Indeed, following the Raja's attack on Jenkins in the Nagpur Residency which caused that state's involvement in the Third Maratha war, Jenkins arbitrated the succession and exercising his discretionary authority, instituted virtually direct rule using British officers (1818-26). The Company later described:

> The plan proposed and adopted by Mr. Jenkins as a temporary measure consisted in a reduction of the Native Establishments and placing each department under the control of an European Officer, the Resident himself having the whole under his general superintendence.[107]

This moved far from the ideal of indirect rule and much toward direct British rule. As such, it (and similar practices in other states) became highly controversial, even during the period of official paramountcy.

Intervention by Jenkins in Nagpur beyond the limits of official policy placed Governor-General Hastings in an uncomfortable position. On the one hand, Hastings 'regretted' that such 'direct executive administration of the State' had taken place. On the other, he maintained that it had been 'unavoidable' and suggested disguising the directness of the rule by changing the nominal designation of the British officials to make them appear appointees of the Nagpur Ruler. The ultimate goal, according to the Governor-General, was to restore the 'distinct and substantive power' of the state and 'to render the Civil and internal administration as free from interference as possible.' Still, under the circumstances the Governor-General supported his Resident's actions.[108] This Jenkins took to be 'full vindication' for his actions from the 'unqualified applause' of his superiors.[109] The Court of Directors in London, however, did not agree; as the debate raged, the Directors wrote criticizing both Jenkins and the Governor-General for exceeding the authority of the Company in India. The Directors judged the Resident

> ...to have assumed the authority which it was scarcely competent for the Governor-General in Council to have delegated to him.... [The Directors could] conceive few proceedings pregnant with more dangerous consequences or calling more loudly for animadversion.[110]

This example is only one from an ongoing series of conflicts of Company policy about the level of interference proper for a Resident in an Indian state.

Eventually Residents discovered that, when they nominated a Minister, they often later regretted it since they felt less free to criticize him than they could a Minister nominated by the Ruler. Frequently, therefore, the Resident refrained from nominating a particular individual but rather exercised a veto against unacceptable nominations by the Ruler. Further, Residents often suggested to Rulers that they sack incumbent Ministers who did not meet the Company's expectations. In 1820, the Resident at Baroda convinced the Ruler to fire the current Minister but refused to 'select some other person [despite]...repeated entreaties by [the Ruler].' Finally, the Ruler proposed a candidate 'in whom I [the Resident] readily concurred, both as he is the fittest man in the state for the appointment, and his removal from Kattywar would take away one of the principal obstacles to the sort of settlement we wish to make in that province.'[111] Such interactions came to resemble a guessing game. Each of the Ruler's choices were vetoed by the Resident until the Ruler hit upon the man whom the Resident desired the Ruler to nominate. In one case, the Resident wrote the list of his choices on a paper which he kept before him and had the Ruler continue to suggest names until the Ruler named one of those listed.

During this policy of paramountcy, Residents often went beyond the determination of the appointment of Ministers to extensive supervision of the state administration, even in the hinterland. The Company proved particularly interested in 'reforming' the state revenue collection system. By gaining knowledge of the resources of the state down to the district level, the Company could not only reorganize the state administration more effective-

ly, it could begin to assess better the value of the state in the Company's new paramount system. The Company then used the reports of the Residents to shape its future demands on the state.

The Company's efforts to reform the Awadh administration continued to prove problematic for the Company. In 1823, for example, the Resident reported an unacceptable level of maladministration. The Company demanded the Ruler either present an effective plan for wholesale reform or it would impose one on him. The ongoing efforts by the Resident to induce the Ruler to institute the plan, once it had been agreed upon, met with failure from the Company's perspective. As the Resident admitted: 'It is obvious that no sincere cooperation can be expected from His Majesty or His Majesty's ministers in carrying into effect the salutary system of reform so urgently and so powerfully recommended by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council.'[112]

Other states had similar problems, from the Company's perspective. In Hyderabad, the Resident (Metcalfe) by 1821 wrote: 'I shall never hesitate to exercise direct interference' and began making the 'appointment of European managers in several districts.'[113] Metcalfe argued that the Company's pattern of using Indian officials made it 'become the acknowledged patrons of the local authorities,' precluding repudiation of the abuses they performed under British patronage. He therefore urged the use of European officials whom he could trust not to abuse their position. Rather than diminish the Ruler's authority, Metcalfe argued that such an efficient revenue system instead strengthened it:

> Another of the chief objects of our Exertions, secondary to the prevention of oppression, (is) the preservation of the integrity of the Nizam's sovereignty.... [T]o protect him against [his Minister's] usurpation has become a part of the anomalous duties of the British Resident at this court.[114]

Thus, intervention of this sort, he held, prevented the necessity for annexation and direct British rule. He wrote the next year:

> I suppose our interference in His Highness's affairs to be not merely a right, but also a duty, arising out of our supremacy in India, which imposes upon us the obligation of maintaining the tranquillity of all countries connected with us, and consequently of protecting the people from oppression, as not less necessary than the guaranteeing of their Rulers against revolution.
>
> Interference in the Internal concerns of states under our protection is neither desirable nor generous, when it can be avoided; and should only then be resorted to, when it is clearly necessary for the preservation of the people from the misery and destruction which must ever attend oppression and misrule.[115]

He goes on to argue for intervention in Hyderabad on exactly those grounds. Despite the strong reservations of the Governor-General about th_ morality and wisdom of such deep intervention, he acquiesced in the proposals of the Hyderabad Resident. European officers directed by the Resident completed a land settlement in Hyderabad. The Resident followed this up with an extensive tour of the state.

Even though the level of British involvement rose, the results never equalled the optimistic expectations of the Company. In Hyderabad, the Company gradually increased the number of Europeans in the administration until it reached a peak of 119 in 1828.[116] Nevertheless, after more than seven years pursuing Metcalfe's plan for deep intervention, the Company had to admit '...the benefits realized [by Company intervention] in some degree fall short of what was hoped and anticipated.'[117]

Toward the end of the 1820s, the Company found its policy of paramountcy and practice of deep intervention in the states increasingly unsatisfactory. Such intervention reduced the benefits expected from indirect rule. Deploying large numbers of British officials, ostensibly in the Ruler's service but really directed by the Resident, resulted in obvious confusion, frustration, and waste for all parties. The Residents saw themselves as taking on the bur-

dens of administration without the satisfaction of visible improvement. Rulers found that they lost control of their administrations with little resulting benefit. Conditions for the people of the state did not seem — even to Residents — to have improved sufficiently to justify Company efforts. In 1826, for example, the Acting Political Agent in Jaipur wrote:

> [during]...interference with the interior management of Native Governments...our embarrassments are innumerable, while the benefits effected in one way are frequently overbalanced in other respects, by the deep discontent that it creates among the high classes of the community.... I was painfully in doubt as to the degree of responsibility that might attach to me, for the continuance of the numerous abuses that I know to exist, and believe to be increasing.[118]

His superior concurred:

> There is no question of Indian Policy so difficult to be solved as that which relates to our Interference in the affairs of Protected States. Circumstances often compel us to interfere. On the other hand, the Mischiefs and Embarrassments generally caused by our Interference are evident, and forcibly mark its impolity.... [A]void interference as much as possible.... [It is best] sparingly exercised for the cure of greater Evils.[119]

Thus, both the Rulers and the Company were dissatisfied by the Resident's deep intervention into the affairs of the states.

Under Governor-General Bentinck (1828-35), the Company recognized that the Residents' experiments with extensive intervention failed to produce the results desired from indirect rule. The Company therefore reversed its official policy once again and decreed no intervention in the internal affairs of the states, except when absolutely necessary. Bentinck resolved to conform to '...the policy on which we now act, of relieving the Native Princes of India in alliance with the Honourable Company, from every degree of [British] controul and interference in their internal administration, which can be avoided.'[120]

Instead of the Resident intervening himself, he was to use the Chief Minister and the Ruler to accomplish the Company's goals indirectly. The Resident was expected to use respect 'and conciliation in the management of natives, which by rendering them contented and efficient in their proper stations, enables them to become the zealous and useful instruments of maintaining the honor and power of the British Government in India.' Residents who failed to succeed at this were censured.[121]

In some states, the Company quickly reversed its policy of deep intervention to conform to Bentinck's ideas. In 1829, the newly enthroned Ruler of Hyderabad requested that the Company withdraw the Resident from control over the state administration. The Governor-General complied. The Hyderabad Resident thereupon withdrew the European revenue officials he had inserted into the administration.[122]

At the same time, however, the Resident refused to allow the Hyderabad Ruler himself to continue practices the Company now officially repudiated. When the Hyderabad Ruler tried to reappoint under his own authority some of the same Europeans whom the Company had employed to supervise revenue collection, the Company forbade any Indian state from appointing any British subject to such an administrative post.[123]

This non-intervention policy did not, however, mean that the Company reduced its pressure on the states to 'reform,' only that the Company was reluctant to involve the Resident fully in this process. One of the most consistently frustrating cases for the British was Awadh. The British perceived extreme instability and abuse in that state, yet earlier Company efforts to reform the state through deep intervention by the Resident had not improved the situation. As a result, the Resident and even the Governor-General pressured the Awadh Ruler to reform but refused to give him much help in doing so. Indeed, the Company refused to allow the Awadh administration to use the subsidiary force (which the Ruler had paid for) against revenue defaulters, except on a case by case basis following detailed investigation of the case by the Resident. This investigation led to such endless delay as to make the subsidiary force useless for enforcing revenue collection.

In 1831, the Governor-General personally threatened the Awadh Ruler with annexation of his state unless he reform his administration:

> There are parallel cases to the present state of things in Oudh to be found in the History of India from which your Majesty may take example.... [W]herever the country of rulers bound to the British Government by treaty has been taken possession of direct by act of aggression on our part, it has always been justified upon the ground of the disorders which prevailed and the unfitness of the native Government to conduct affairs and their failure to establish a proper systematic Government that should be a source of happiness and contentment to the people. The stories of Bengal and Benaras, of Arcot and Tanjore are all of this description. May God arrest that this Kingdom of Oudh...during the lifetime of your Majesty come to such a state...which I have hinted above.[124]

The Awadh Ruler's response to such a direct threat was to request the Company supply him with British revenue officials and the support of British troops to institute the reforms. The Resident refused both requests; the Awadh administration would have to reform but the Resident would only offer advice and criticism, not the Company's direct aid.[125]

Many officials in the Company, especially those trained under the earlier practices, dismissed Bentinck's policy of non- intervention. As one Political Agent put it '...no theoretical System of non-interference founded upon the surest maxims of the most refined policy will be found an efficient guide for our rule over a country so distracted by mutual disinterest, aggression and animosity...'[126] Disorder in the states made the British feel superior about their own administration. Conversely, however, the same disorder made the British question the morality of remaining aloof from reform to end it.

Even Bentinck realized the dilemma that his policy of restraint caused:

> ...as long as it shall be held to be inconsistent with a rigid adherence to existing treaties to push our interference beyond the limits of friendly counsel, or measures of a merely negative character, the task [of reform]...must be utterly hopeless.... Is it possible that construction of our obligations can be right, which makes our protection instrumental to evil alone, and to evil of such magnitude?[127]

The British thus felt themselves morally compelled to intervene and yet frustrated when they did so. This dilemma would continue to lie at the heart of any system of indirect rule.

Despite official policy, several Residents continued to intervene, when local conditions appeared to call for it. The Company took charge of the administration of parts of Baroda (1828-32) when that Ruler failed to meet the Company's financial demands and advice for reform. Prior to such interventions, the Resident tried to obtain the consent, however reluctant, of the Ruler. In at least one case the Resident obtained an official apology for misgovernment and request for intervention from the Ruler. The Raja of Sawantwadi stated in an official memorandum (no doubt at the Resident's dictation): 'My country has been thrown into disorder and confusion more than once through my own misconduct, and the Honourable Company now, at my request, undertakes to restore my authority.' This Ruler goes on to promise not to remove his Minister, approved by the Company, 'without the consent of the British Government.'[128] The Resident clearly obtained such a frank confession and request in order to justify this departure from the Governor-General's official policy against intervention.

By the 1830s, the costs of the Resident's intervention were becoming quite clear. Even Metcalfe, who had earlier called for and carried out deep intervention in Hyderabad in 1835, repudiated his earlier practices:

> As a diplomatic agent I have had a part in carrying into effect both interfering and non-interfering policy.... Our attempts to interfere for the better government of other states have often been wretched failures as to our purpose.... The ques-

> tion of interference altogether is, indeed, the most difficult of any in Indian policy; but interference is so likely to do evil, and so little certain of doing good, that it ought, I conceive, be avoided as much as possible.[129]

Thus, even Metcalfe recognized the futility of intervention. By this point, the Company as a whole had learned empirically that regular interference in the affairs of the court or in the administration of the state led to the diminution of the advantages of indirect rule for the Company. As a result, the Residents became reluctant to plunge into the factional conflicts of the court or to assume responsibility for the state administration unless a clear advantage to the Company could be appreciated.

This new attitude becomes clear in the case of Gwalior. In 1827, the Resident had involved the Company deeply in the factional conflicts that surrounded the posthumous adoption following the death of Daulat Rao Sindhia. Subsequently, following the policy of non-intervention, the Resident withdrew from the factional struggles that followed. Although the young Ruler, Jankoji Sindhia, twice (1832, 1833) fled to the Residency for protection against the Regent, his adoptive mother, the Resident remained uninvolved in the court or administration. When the Resident (Richard Cavendish, who served in Delhi 1815-22, 1824-27 and Ajmere 1827-31 before his appointment as Resident at Gwalior 1831-35) finally acted in support of a revolt against the Regent which forced her out of power, the Governor-General censured him for having intervened and finally transferred him to Nagpur (where he served as Resident 1835-39, the last two years in absentia). The new Resident, Sutherland, returned to adherence to the strict policy of non-intervention. (Sutherland was an experienced Resident, having served in the Hyderabad and Delhi Residencies before taking over as Resident at Gwalior with Sindhia, 1835-39; he went on to be the chief political agent in Rajputana, 1839-48, dying in office.) In 1835, the young Gwalior Ruler begged the Resident for help in reforming the administration and court. The Resident refused, however, offering no more than advice when consulted.[130] The Governor-General supported Sutherland's non-

interventionist position, ordering that the Resident '...should readily afford his advice when sought for all general questions of policy, but should carefully abstain from mixing himself up with particular interests and parties at the Durbar.'[131]

This official policy did not mean that the Company gave up interest in the states. Rather, the Company wished to avoid the entanglements of frequent interference in the court. In this way, it intended to reserve the Resident's intervention for major and fundamental 'reforms.' Sutherland explicitly stated that when conditions became sufficiently chaotic due to misrule in Gwalior state, the Company should threaten to withdraw, or indeed should withdraw, from support of the offending state administration. The ensuing extreme chaos would justify the Resident's intervention. In such conditions, the Company could '...consider itself entitled to interfere authoritatively for the correction of such abuses, in whatever manner may seem best to itself.'

Both Residents and Rulers explored the possibilities and the limitations of Company policy of non-intervention. Due to official sanctions against intervention — except in instances of extreme provocation — Residents could not always force Rulers to act as the Company would desire. Under such conditions, some Rulers showed an independence frustrating to the Residents. In 1841, for example, the Resident at Baroda explicitly forbade that Ruler to employ as Minister any of the people the Resident proscribed. The Resident went on to specify '...you are bound to appoint a person to this office [Minister], with the approbation of the British Government.'[132] The Ruler refused to acquiesce in this demand for a veto by the Resident in the appointment of his Minister. Instead, the Ruler proclaimed that he himself would perform the duties of Minister. In the face of such a position, the Resident could only bluster that the Ruler had better do it properly. Chapter 7 shows that Rulers developed other tactics as well to rebuff Residents without triggering major intervention.

This non-intervention policy gradually spread through the Residency system. One of the Residents more interested in the theory of indirect rule that emerged from the practice of the Residents, Sutherland, recognized the need to lay out the principles

that lay behind the Residency system as a whole. As he suggested in 1837: 'A system has undoubtedly guided the British Government in the last few years in its relations with the native states, but it may be doubtful whether it is understood throughout the political department.' In that year, Sutherland published a book analyzing and describing the history of the Company's role with respect to the states in order to make this policy uniformly effective.[133] The Company then circulated this book among the Residents in order to inform and guide them as to the system as a whole. This book, however, was a rare and isolated effort to bring the Residents into an understanding of the system. Rarely referred to in the correspondence of the Residents, it does not seem to have had much effect on their understanding or practice of indirect rule.

Even Residents who understood the policy often disagreed with it. James Fraser (Resident Mysore 1834-6, Resident Travancore and Cochin 1836-8, Resident Hyderabad 1838-52) consistently opposed it; he resigned in 1852 in a dispute over policy with the Governor-General of the day. As the Governor-General wrote:

> From this [non-intervention] doctrine...Genl. Fraser continuously and consistently dissented, and...contended against it on every possible opportunity, and to the extreme verge of official deference.... He conceived that it was at once the duty and the interest of the British Government, as the *de facto* paramount or Imperial power of India, to prevent the arrival of a disastrous crisis in the affairs of our faithful and useful ally, the Nizam, by the timely promotion of reforms...[134]

Fraser was not alone in willfully asserting his judgment, based on his experience in the field, over the official policy of the Company.

The fundamentals of the principle laid out by Bentinck remained officially in force through the 1840s. The practice of Residents, however, continued to vary widely as they interpreted it in their individual circumstances. In 1840, over a decade after Bentinck formulated this policy of non-intervention, the Political

Agents in the Rajput states were reminded by their superior to conform to it, except when intervention proved necessary by local conditions:

> The principle which our Government inculcate in such matters is, and necessarily must be, to leave to the Chiefs of all States the exercise of their own free will in the dismissal and nominating of the minister. The exceptions being where the Chiefs themselves and the Ministers of their nomination have proved, through experience, incompetent to preserve the peace of the Country — and to perform in this, and in other things obligations and engagements to us and others.[135]

The actual practice by Residents in the states, thus, on occasion differed in fundamental respects from the official policy set by the Governor-General. During the 1840s and 1850s, debate revolved around what constituted justification for an exception to this non-interventionist policy.

Conclusion

Scholars have conventionally focused on the texts of official treaties and on the policies of Governors-General in order to demarcate the stages in the relations of the Company and the states.[136] While treaties and official policy tell us much about the Company's relationships with the states, of greater significance were the Residents' practices. Many Residents opposed the official policy of the day and interpreted or ignored treaties in order to perform their duties or follow principles they regarded as superior. Even Governors-General acted contrary to their official policy when they believed it politically or morally necessary. By going beyond the official policies set in London or Calcutta to examine the interactions of Resident and Ruler in specific states, we can better understand the Residency system. Contrasting the patterns of actual practice with official policy, rather than dismissing them as mere exceptions, thus emerges as our central program.

British intervention even in any one state displayed considerable variation over time. In some states the level of intervention peaked at one point and then declined considerably thereafter. In others it fluctuated several times, reflecting Company policy of the day, the acts of successive Residents, and local circumstances. Among the specific factors affecting the relations between a Resident and a Ruler were the personalities and situation of each. The stage of life in which the Ruler happened to be, for instance, usually affected the level of the Resident's intervention in that administration in a cyclical way: high following the death of a Ruler and during the possible minority of his successor, lower when a Ruler appeared particularly mature and competent, higher again should he sink into incapacity through old age, disease, or dissipation. The strategies and tactics employed by a Ruler directly influenced the Resident's opportunities to intervene. Similarly, a particularly strong or weak Indian Chief Minister would also alter the Resident's capacity to control the state administration. Likewise, the personal abilities, philosophy, and experience of individual Residents varied widely. Despite all these variations, their relative positions as Ruler and Resident placed them into broad patterns, common throughout the system of indirect rule in India, and beyond.

During the 1798-1840 period, the Company extended and developed a system of Residencies across virtually all of India. Through the Resident's control over political communication into and out of the state and through the Resident's irregular intervention into most aspects of the internal affairs of the state, the Residency emerged as the means by which the Company exercised indirect rule. During this period, these developments were by no means smooth or direct. Rather, the variety of local situations and the inconsistencies of official Company policy led to checks, reverses, and frustrations on all sides. Nevertheless, at the end of this period, the Residents had discovered means to move toward goals set by the Company, even as the Rulers had discovered the means to harness the Residency to their advantage on occasion (see Chapter 7). Both sides had also empirically discovered some of the problems inherent in indirect rule.

The network of Residencies provided the Company with an overview of India as a whole, and of the internal conditions of each state. The cultural blinkers and preconceptions of the Residents often obscured their vision, however. Nevertheless, despite its imperfections, the Company assembled information from the Residents into an overall picture of Indian politics unmatched by the Rulers.

Over time, the Company tried to isolate the states from each other by inserting the Residents as the exclusive medium for political communication among them. Residents negotiated treaties binding most Rulers to communicate officially with each other only through their Residencies. Even for those states without such a treaty, the Resident strove to enforce this provision wherever he proved sufficiently influential. Surveillance by the Residents over the Ruler and court established and enforced a monopoly on interstate political communication. During this period, however, this monopoly was not perfect; Rulers continued to bypass and evade the Resident's restrictions.

Residents also began to manipulate the rituals and symbols of court ceremony. Although the Rulers and the court ritual specialists continued to set the terms of the ceremony, gradually the Residents — guided by their own ritual specialists, the Residency Munshis — moved to take control over their formal exchanges with the Rulers. The shifting relationship between the Company and most of the states, from relative equality in some instances to domination by the former in virtually all cases by 1840, was reflected and partially influenced by such shifts in the ritual relationship between the Resident and the Ruler.

The Company moved to a policy of intervention in succession wherever British interests seemed threatened. Official Company policy did not always permit such interventions, nor did the Company's officials always choose to exert it. Nevertheless in a number of telling examples, the Company did so. Residents used these examples to illustrate the seriousness of their advice to these and other Indian dynasties.

Despite the Company's decisive interventions in some crucial dynastic successions, the British recognition of the legitimacy of

Rulers persisted. This British recognition in a large measure explains their commitment to indirect, as opposed to direct, rule. The generous provisions made by the Company for former Rulers and their relatives provides additional evidence of this British attitude.

Behind the Resident's advice to Rulers lay the practically invincible military power of the Company. In a crucial move to shift the financial burden of this power onto the Rulers, the Company established subsidiary forces in several states. In addition to the advantages to the Company of reduced expenditures, this also placed disciplined troops under the immediate control of the Resident. Since these forces largely replaced the Ruler's own armies, the Resident commanded the most potent military force in the state. With such a force at his command, the Resident gained tremendous leverage over events in the state. In practice, however, subsidiary forces could prove an irritant to the Ruler and administration. Consequently, Residents had to work out the effective uses and limitations of these troops.

Beyond developing a military base of support for the Resident within the state, the Company also built a judicial base for him. Excluding a series of groups of people living within the state from the Ruler's jurisdiction and placing them under the discretionary jurisdiction of the Resident, the Company created an ever growing constituency of supporters. This use of extraterritoriality made the Resident a rival with the Ruler for protection and authority within the state.

The Company's wavering policies toward the intervention of the Resident in the internal affairs of the state illustrate its efforts to reconcile principle with practice. Periods when the Company's official policies withheld Residents from interference in the appointment of Ministers or the orders of Rulers proved most frustrating for Residents. Residents saw in the conditions of the state violations of British morality. Consequently, these periods saw frequent exceptions to or violations of the official Company policy of non-intervention, as Residents pleaded for the right to interfere or simply acted to do so without official sanction. Conversely, periods when the Company's policies permitted deep

intervention by Residents, to the extent of nearly full management of the state administration by Residents using British officials under their direction, albeit in the name of the Ruler, also proved frustrating. The Rulers and Indian officials of the state complained of usurpation of their rights and of diminished revenues for the state. The Resident and his superiors in the Company found themselves enmeshed in an administration that often refused to produce the results they desired. In some instances, even the Residents realized that such deep interventions produced few improvements and much dislocation.

Eventually, the British hit upon a policy that would remain through the 1840s: Residents were to advise and criticize freely but to remain aloof from intervention except where justified by local conditions. Such interventions as were justified should be extensive and decisive. This left considerable room for variation in the practices of particular Residents. It also left 'justifiable' open to a range of interpretations.

By the 1840s, the Company had encountered the geographical limitations of its Residency system. On the north-west border of India, the Company began to engage in what would be a futile series of wars in Afghanistan. The Company began the first Afghan war (1838-42) in order to establish indirect rule there. The Company's Resident in Kabul, backed by its armies, was to establish its candidate as Ruler. The distance from India and the intervening communications problems, as well as local conditions in Afghanistan, made this effort a bloody failure. At the end of the fighting, the Company had lost some 20,000 soldiers and about Rs15,000,000, Kabul had been sacked by the Company in revenge, and the Afghan Ruler deposed by the Company had regained the throne. The Company therefore failed utterly to establish indirect rule or even a Residency in Kabul.

In Burma as well, the Company's efforts to extend its indirect rule proved abortive and unsatisfactory. The expanding Burmese and British Empires clashed in Assam and the Chittagong region during the First Burmese War (1824-6). Although the Company gained some territory and established a Residency at Ava in 1830, it withdrew the Residency as ineffective in 1840. In subsequent

years, the British would again go to war to resolve its relationship with Burma.

The 1798-1840 period, therefore, saw the greatest expansion of the Residency system. During this time, the Residents developed a system of indirect rule. Chapter 6 begins at the point where the forces for expansion lost ascendancy to those for consolidation and the number of Residencies declined as their level of regular intervention decisively increased.

NOTES

1. Secretary to Government to Resident Hyderabad, 29 May 1800, Eur MS Addl 13584, BM.

2. At this point, the name of the office was Agent of the Governor-General in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, although it reverted to Resident Delhi later. PR 18:779. For the details of how he performed these duties see Narendra Krishna Sinha and Arun Kumar Dasgupta, eds, *Selections from Ochterlony Papers (1818-1825) in the National Archives of India* (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1964) and K.N. Panikkar, *British Diplomacy in North India; A Study of the Delhi Residency, 1803-57* (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1968).

3. PR 7:642 and Aitchison, *passim*.

4. E.g. Governor-General to Messers Porcher, Redhead and Gardiner, 4 September 1789, Malet Collection, F.149, IOL; Governor-General to Resident (Hyderabad), 26 January 1797, Political Consultations, 27 January 1797, No. 77, Eur MS Addl 13583, Correspondence with Kennaway and Kirkpatrick, 1793-98, BM.

5. Governor-General to Select Committee Fort St. George, 1 November 1779, BSC, 1 November 1779. The Governor-General admitted that his staff misplaced or lost other records as well. See Governor-General to Resident Hyderabad, 28 March 1782, and Governor-General to Political Agent Benaras, 27 April 1782, Eur MS Addl 29115, BM.

6. Secretary to Government to Resident Sindhia, 6 July 1803, Eur MS Addl 13601, BM.

7. See the 38-page letter of instruction, Secretary to Government to Resident Poona, 23 June 1802, Eur Addl MS 13597, BM. This was just one of many such letters of instruction sent at this time.

8. Secretary to Government to Resident Sindhia, 10 November 1801, Eur MS Addl 13601, BM.

9. Governor-General to Resident Sindhia, 15 March 1782, Eur MS Addl 29115, BM.

10. Letter to Close, 8 June 1816, quoted in T.E.Colebrooke, *Life of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone*, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1884), 1:317.

11. Edward Thompson, *The Making of the Indian Princes* reprint (London: Curzon Press, 1978), pp. 19-21.

12. W. MacCulloch to T. Hyde Villiers, 19 January 1832, Parliamentary Papers, Sessionals *1831-2*, Minutes of Evidence, VI, Political or Foreign, Appendix 3, p. 767.

13. Secretary to Government, private and confidential, to Resident Sindhia 1 May 1804, Eur MS Addl 13602, BM.

14. E.g. Nagpore Private Letter Book, 26 January 1807-27 November 1808, MS Eur E. 111, IOL.

15. Resident Nagpore to M. Elphinstone, 7 April 1813, Eur MS E.111, IOL.

16. Resident Nagpore to M. Elphinstone, 27 April 1816, Eur MS E.111, IOL.

17. Secretary to Government of India with the Governor-General, circular letter to all Residents, etc. 23 July 1842, FPC, 10 August 1842, No. 1.

18. E.g. The conquest of Mysore was announced with much fanfare. Resident Sindhia to Governor-General, 26 May and 17 June 1799, Eur MS Addl 13600, BM.

19. Secretary to Government to Resident Lucknow, 31 May 1803, Eur MS Addl 13526, BM.

20. Secretary to Government to Resident Lucknow, 25 August 1803, Eur MS Addl 13526, BM.

21. Secretary to Government to Resident Hyderabad, 25 August 1803, Eur MS Addl 13585, BM.

22. Political Letter frcm Governor-General to Court of Directors, 15 August 1815, *Papers Respecting a Reform in the Administration of the Government of his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier...1st January 1808 to the 31 December 1815...* (London: EI Co, 1824), p. 853.

23. Minute of Sir C. T. Metcalfe, 14 December 1829, FPC, 19 December 1829, No. 22.

24. Governor-General to the Prince, 18 March 1785, FSC, 22 March 1785, No. 6.

25. See FPC, 17 December 1792, Nos. 8, 13 and 11 January 1793, Nos. 4, 5 and Fort William to Court of Directors, 18 May 1793, in *Fort William-India House Correspondence,* vol. 17, ed. Y.J. Taraporewala (New Delhi: National Archives of India, 1955), pp. 534, n.7, 252.

26. Bengal Service Annual List 2, 68:3, IOL.

27. J[ohn] Sutherland, *Sketches of the Relations Subsisting between the British Government in India and the Different Native States* (Calcutta: G.H. Huttmann, 1837).

28. J. Sutherland to Secretary to Government of India, 15 February 1835, India Political Proceedings (hereinafter cited as IPP), 5 March 1835, No. 116.

29. Secretary to Government of India to Resident (Gwalior), 5 March 1835, IPP, 5 March 1835, No. 117.

30. E.g. Governor-General to Nabob of Furruckabad, 5 September 1786, FSC, 5 September 1786, No. 7.

31. Resident Delhi to Officiating Secretary to Government, 15 May 1828, FPC, 6 June 1828, No. 23.

32. PR 24:874. The Company administered the area around Delhi in the name of the Mughal Emperor but without his involvement.

33. Charges from the King of Delhi and Responses of Acting Resident Delhi to Chief Secretary to Government, Political Department, 1 February 1830, Foreign Political Consultations (hereinafter cited as FPC), 19 March 1830, No. 6 .

34. Acting Resident (Delhi) to Chief Secretary to Government Political Department, 1 February 1830, and Chief Secretary to Government to Resident (Delhi), 19 March 1830, FPC, 19 March 1830, Nos. 6, 7.

35. K. N. Panikkar claims that Hawkins was relieved of his duties with respect to the Mughal Emperor but I have found no evidence to suggest this. See his *British Diplomacy in North India* (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1968), p. 150.

36. Resident Tanjore to Governor and Commander in Chief Madras, 2 July 1798, Eur MS Addl 13690, BM.

37. Resident to Secretary to Government, 26 August 1823, BPC, 12 September 1823, No. 21.

38. Resident Hyderabad to Chief Secretary to Government, 25 May 1829, FPC, 12 June 1829, No. 54.

39. Resident (Lucknow) to Secretary to Government in the Political Department, 23 August 1833, FPC, 13 September 1833, No. 24.

40. In the Tanjore succession of 1798, for example, the Governor-General made agreement to a Company Commission of Inquiry a condi-

tion of the accession of the next Ruler. Minute of the Governor-General, 1 June 1798, FSC, 1 June 1798, No. 1.

41. Aitchison, 2:125-9.

42. Resident (Sindhia) to Governor-General, enclosure 4 December 1797, FSC, 6 February 1798, No. 14.

43. Rawdon-Hastings, *Private Journal*, p. 27 (entry of 1 February 1814).

44. Resident Poona to Governor-General, 21 March 1817, in *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 13, ed. G.S. Sardesai (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1958), pp. 95-100.

45. Acting Chief Secretary to Government to Resident Poona, 7 April 1817, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 13, pp. 127-40.

46. Resident Poona to Governor-General, 18 June 1818 and Governor-General to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 26 August 1820, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 13, pp. 397, 493-6.

47. Letter of John Briggs, quoted in Evans Bell, *Memoirs of Gen'l John Briggs of the Madras Army with comments on some of his Words and Work* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1885), p. 140.

48. PR 17:413 .

49. This efficiency came on top of the Company's savings due to the use of primarily Indian soldiers and non-commissioned officers with only a few British commissioned officers in command. The nearly fatal flaw in this strategy, the over-commitment of the same troops to a number of purposes, did not reveal itself until 1857 when the British officers lost control over their Indian subordinates.

50. E.g. for Awadh in 1768, Aitchison 2:100-1.

51. Aitchison, 1929, vol. 9, pp. 22-5. Respectively, Aitchison, 1929, vol. 7, pp.20-4 and vol. 2, pp. 105-8 and vol. 10, pp. 86-8, and vol. 10, pp. 43-51, and vol. 10, pp. 225-6, and vol. 9, 240-5, and vol: 6, pp. 315-17, and vol. 3, pp. 422-4, and vol. 5, pp. 385-94, and vol. 10, pp. 263-6, and vol. 6, pp. 115-19, and vol. 1, pp. 56-9 and vol. 4, pp.116-17.

52. Assistant Resident to Governor-General, 20 August 1798, FSC, 18 September 1798, No.7.

53. [John Clunes], *An Historical Sketch of the Princes of India, Stipendiary, Subsidiary, Protected, Tributary, and Feudatory; with a Sketch of the Origin and Progress of British Power in India by an officer in the service of the Honourable East India Company* (Edinburgh: Smith, Elder, 1833), p. 209.

54. E.g. Secretary to Government to Resident Travancore, 17 December 1804, Eur MS Addl 13692, BM.

55. Secretary to Government to Resident Poona, 1 November 1811, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 12, ed. G.S. Sardesai (Bombay

Popular Press, 1950), pp. 112-13. Not everyone in the Company agreed with Edmonstone. Munro believed the presence of subsidiary forces to be dangerous for the Company because it committed them to enforce the Ruler's abuse of his people. Thomas Munro to Governor-General, 12 August 1817, quoted in G.R. Gleig, *The Life of Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, Bart. and K.C.B., late Governor of Madras,* 3 vols. (London: Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1830), 1:462-7.

56. E.g. Resident Lucknow to Vizier, n.d., BPC, 2 May 1813.

57. See Michael H. Fisher, 'Extraterritoriality: Concept and Practice in Princely India' in *Indo-British Review* 15,2 (December 1988):103-122.

58. Tupper, *Indian Political Practice,* 3:10.

59. Proceedings Judicial A, August 1871, No. 24, para 8, cited in Tupper, 1:2.

60. The Foreign Jurisdiction and Extradition Act of 1879 was the most complete of a series of Acts dealing with this issue. See Tupper, 3: Appendix D for the text of this Act and 3:1-4 for a discussion of the issue.

61. E.g. Resident Lucknow to Secretary to Government, 17 April 1823, BPC 9 May 1823, No. 51 which includes a list of the Europeans in Awadh.

62. Court of Directors to Governor-General, 4 October 1797, *Fort William-India House Correspondence,* vol. 18, ed. H. Heras (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1974), pp. 97-8; Peter Wood, 'A Vassal State in the Shadow of Empire'; Colin Macauley, Resident Travancore (1800-11), published a pamphlet in his defence, *Desultory Notes on a Cursory View of Some Papers Extracted from the Records of the East India House. Printed for the Use of the Committee of the House of Commons on the Travancore Petition.* See also *A Reply to Lt.-Gen. Macauley's Desultory Notes on the Travancore Petition* (London: George Taylor, 1832).

63. This was of 1837 when the number of individuals eligible had been narrowed somewhat from earlier years. William Henry Sleeman, *A Journey Through the Kingdom of Oude,* 2 vols. (London: Richard Bentley, 1858), 1:287-8. Resident Lucknow to Chief Secretary to Government, 21 March 1831, BPC, 8 April 1831, No. 6.

64. E.g. King of Oude to Resident Lucknow, 14 October 1826, BPC, 30 December 1826, No. 43.

65. Resident Lucknow to Political Secretary to Government, 7 October 1837, IPC, 16 October 1837, No. 199.

66. Political Secretary to Government to Resident Lucknow, IPC, 17 June 1839, No. 79. Sleeman, *Journey,* 1:285-6.

67. Assistant Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 22 August 1798, FSC, 18 September 1798, No. 8.

68. Munshi Sital Parshad, 'Mirat al-Auza, Persian MS 2149, fol. 301, Raza Library, Rampur. Resident Lucknow to Secretary to Government, 2 February 1828, BPC, 22 February 1828. Resident Lucknow to Magistrate Cawnpur, 6 December 1833, FPC, 27 December 1833, No. 38a. Letter from King [of Awadh], 15 August 1830, FPC, 24 September 1830, No. 48.

69. Persian MS 235, Regional Archives, Allahabad. Resident Lucknow to Political Secretary to Government of India, 16 January 1834, FPC, 23 January 1834, No. 42. Assistant Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 17 August 1798, FSC, 18 September 1798, No. 6. Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 11 February 1805, FSC, 16 May 1805, Nos. 69-72.

70. Resident Lucknow to Vizier, 17 April 1812, BPC, 8 May 1812.

71. John Malcolm, *A Memoir of Central India*, 2 vols. (London: Kingsbury, Parbury, and Allen, 1823), p. 446.

72. Secretary to Government to Resident Lucknow, 3 February 1822, BPC, 3 February 1822. Resident Lucknow to Secretary to Government, 20 June 1828, BPC, 1 August 1828, No. 13. Resident Lucknow to Secretary to Government of India Foreign Department, 20 October 1851, India Political and Foreign Consultations, 19 December 1851, No. 115.

73. Acting Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 8 September 1805, FSC, 4 October 1805, No. 87.

74. This practice continued in Awadh until 1831 when a newly appointed Resident found it a 'pompous and senseless exhibition.' John Paton, *An Abstract of Political Intercourse between the British Government and the Kingdom of Oudh*, ed. Bisheshwar Prasad (Allahabad: Allahabad University Press, 1944), p. 120. Resident Lucknow to Secretary to Government in the Secret and Political Department, 2 May 1833, Foreign Secret Proceedings, 16 May 1833, No. 3a.

75. Secretary to Government to Resident Lucknow, 21 September 1801, HMS 580:1254, 1258.

76. Secretary to Government to Resident Sindhia, 5 October 1804, Eur MS Addl 13603, BM.

77. Secretary to Government to Acting Resident Sindhia, 2 April 1805, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 20 June 1805.

78. Eur MS D.514/1, Richard Strachey Correspondence, n.p., IOL.

79. Persian MS 808, 1356, Regional Archives, Allahabad. Acting Resident Lucknow to Secretary to Government, 7 July 1831, BPC, 29 July 1831, No. 62.

80. I have compiled the figures from Aitchison, *passim*, Persian MS 808, Regional Archives, Allahabad, various East India Company papers,

and Uttar Pradesh, *Union Political Pensioners in Uttar Pradesh* (Allahabad: Superintendent of Printing and Stationery, 1964).

81. Secretary to Government to Resident Lucknow, 22 January 1813, BPC, 22 January 1813.

82. Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 1 September 1820, FSC, 30 September 1820, Nos. 8-11.

83. Secretary to Government Bombay to Resident Poona, 10 October 1802, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 7, ed. G.S. Sardesai (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1940), p. 26.

84. Resident Poona to Chief Secretary Bombay, 28 April 1811, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 12, ed. G.S. Sardesai (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1950), p. 11.

85. Aitchison, 9:361.

86. Secretary to Government to Henry Wellesley and Lt. Col. Scott, 19 September 1801, Eur MS Addl 13526, fol. 82b, BM.

87. [Clunes], p. 106.

88. Aitchison, 6:340-7.

89. Bombay Council to Governor-General in Council, 2 December 1806, FPC, 1 January 1807, No. 2.

90. Resident Baroda to Seetaram Rowjee Dewan Baroda, 1 November 1806, FPC, 1 November 1807, No.3.

91. Bombay Government, Secret Letter to Court of Directors, 14 October 1808, PR 9:328.

92. Chief Secretary to Government to Resident Hyderabad, 31 December 1809, quoted in John Sutherland, *Sketches of the Relations subsisting between the British Government in India and The Different Native States* (Calcutta: G.H. Huttmann, 1837), p. 53.

93. Chief Secretary to Government of India to Resident Hyderabad, 17 February 1809, Hyderabad Residency Records, 39:77-92.

94. Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 16 June 1809, FPC, 29 July 1809, No. 5.

95. Superintendent of Nizamat Affairs to Persian Secretary to Government, 10 March 1812, FPC, 12 June 1812, No. 115.

96. Resident Poona to Governor-General, 13 October 1812, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 12, p. 223.

97. Rawdon-Hastings, *Private Journal*, pp. 26-7 (entry of 1 February 1814).

98. Minute of Governor-General 3 September 1825, quoted in Adrian Sever, ed. *Documents and Speeches on the Indian Princely States*, 2 vols. (Delhi: B.R. Publishing, 1985), 1:149-50.

99. Charles Metcalfe to Richard Jenkins, 3 November 1814, quoted in John William Kaye, *The Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe: Late Governor-General of India, Governor of Jamaica, and Governor-General of Canada*, 2 vols. (London: Richard Bentley, 1854), 1:394.

100. Governor-General to Resident Travancore, 25 April 1799, Eur MS Addl 13692, BM.

101. Political Letter from Fort St. George 15 March 1811, PR 12:663.

102. Resident Travancore to Chief Secretary to Government Fort St. George, 7 March 1829, FPC, 10 July 1829.

103. Resident Travancore to Chief Secretary Fort St. George, 28 June 1814, Madras Political Consultations 23 August 1814, pp. 4559ff.

104. Chief Secretary of Fort St. George to Resident Travancore, 23 August 1814, Madras Political Consultations, 23 August 1814, pp. 4570.

105. Jeffrey lays out four types of relationships between the Resident, the Ruler and the Minister. The four are:

(i) the 'dominant Resident', in which the Resident controlled the Minister and reduced the ruler to a cipher; (ii) the 'balanced' system, in which British governments, impressed by Anglicized Rulers and Ministers, instructed Residents to achieve an equitable division of functions and responsibilities among the three principals; (iii) 'laissez faire', in which Rulers and Ministers were left largely alone, providing that the state remained free of blatant disturbances or misrule; (iv) the 'imposed Minister', in which an Anglicized, trustworthy 'native' from outside the state — or sometimes a European — was established as Minister.

Robin Jeffrey, 'The Politics of "Indirect Rule": Types of Relationship among Rulers, Ministers and Residents in a "Native State",' *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 13,3 (1975): 261-81. Jeffrey identifies and discusses each of these types in Travancore and identifies each with a specific period in that state: (i) 1814-29, 1847-57; (ii) 1860-77; (iii) 1877-1904; (iv) 1904-47. Jeffrey carefully traces the changes from one to another in terms of the local personalities and circumstances in Travancore. He argues for Travancore — and I concur on the basis of evidence from some other states as well — the personality of each of the three principals, the length of tenure of each, and the British policies of the day were three significant factors in determining the type of relationship prevalent at the time. Looking beyond Travancore to an all-India perspective, however, I can find all four of Jeffrey's types in both the second and third of my phases of the Residency and I would alter the periods he assigns for each in Travancore.

106. Resident Nagpore to Resident Sindhia, 22 February 1816, Eur MS E. 1.11, IOL.

107. PR 17:414.

108. PR 17:414-15.

109. Resident to Secretary to Government, 15 September 1826, PR 17:425.

110. Court of Directors, Political Dispatch, 10 May 1826, PR 17:435.

111. Minute of M. Elphinstone, 3 May 1820, Parliamentary Papers, Sessionals *1831*-32, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix VI, p. 351.

112. Resident Oudh to Secretary to Government, 10 September 1824, BPC, 26 November 1824, No. 53.

113. Resident Hyderabad to Acting Secretary, Secret and Political Department, 2 February 1821, FPC, 24 February 1821, No. 57.

114. Resident Hyderabad to Secretary to Government, 20 June 1822, FPC, 19 July 1822.

115. Resident Hyderabad to Secretary to Government, 31 August 1822, FPC, 20 December 1822, No. 1.

116. Resident Hyderabad to Acting Secretary to Government Political Department, 12 April 1828, FPC, 2 May 1828, No. 25.

117. Secretary to Government to Resident Hyderabad, 4 May 1827, FPC, 1 June 1827, No. 34.

118. Acting Political Agent to Agent of the Governor-General Rajputana, 20 January 1826, FPC, 17 February 1826, No. 26.

119. Resident Delhi to Acting Agent Jypoor, 26 January 1826, FPC, 17 February 1826, No.26.

120. Minute of Governor-General, 15 November 1829, FPC, 27 November 1829.

121. Governor-General to Court of Directors, Political Consultations, 28 February 1832, Nos. 6, 9, Madras Service Army Lists, 1, vol. 38, section 231.

122. Secretary to Government to Nizam, 21 August 1829, Hyderabad Residency Records, 67:331-5.

123. Secretary to Governor-General to Resident Hyderabad, 5 November 1831, FPC, 2 December 1831, No. 80. This expands on an earlier order prohibiting the employment by the Nizam of any European not in the Company or British royal service, by order of the Court of Directors, Secretary to Government to Resident Hyderabad, 24 October 1828, FPC, 24 October 1828, No. 2.

124. Report of meeting between the Governor-General and the King of Oudh, 20 January 1831, BPC, 2 April 1831, No. 24.

125. Resident Awadh to Secretary to Government, 27 March 1831, BPC, 15 April 1831, No. 45.

126. Acting Political Agent Harowtee to Resident Delhi, 5 June 1829, FPC, 26 June 1829, No. 24.

127. Minute of Governor-General, 30 August 1831, FPC, 30 September 1831, No. 2.

128. Memorandum 25 December 1832, in Aitchison, 8:199-200.

129. Minute of Metcalfe 14 August 1835, in John William Kaye, *The Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe,* 2 vols. (London: Richard Bentley, 1854) 1:196-7.

130. Resident Gwalior to Secretary to Government of India, 18 March 1835, IPC, 6 April 1835, No. 63.

131. Secretary to Government of India to Resident Gwalior, 6 April 1835, IPC, 6 April 1835, No. 64.

132. Aitchison, 6:366-70.

133. J[ohn] Sutherland, *Sketches of the Relations subsisting between the British Government in India and The Different Native States* (Calcutta: G.H. Huttmann, 1837), pp. 185-7.

134. Government of India to Resident Hyderabad, October 1841, quoted in Hastings Fraser, *Memoirs and Correspondence of Gen'l James Stuart Fraser of the Madras Army* (London: Whiting and Co., 1885), pp. 121-2.

135. Officiating Political Agent to Governor-General Rajpootana to Officiating Political Agent Meywar, 27 July 1840, FPC, 24 August 1840, No. 30.

136. E.g. Adrian Sever, ed. *Documents and Speeches on the Indian Princely States,* 2 vols. (Delhi: B.R. Publishing, 1985).

6. Consolidation of the Residency System of Indirect Rule: Phase Three, 1841-57

> [I] ventured to suggest that Political Agents were not so powerful as [the Maharaja of Chhatarpur] seemed to think.
> 'Aren't they merely advisors to you?' I asked.
> 'But, my dear sir,' he retorted, 'what sort of advice is that when I am obliged to take it?'
>
> —J.R. Ackerley, 1923

Introduction

The Company firmly established its system of indirect rule over virtually all of India by the mid-nineteenth century. Its border conflicts on India's geographical peripheries aside, the Company had brought each Indian state into its exclusive political control. No other external power could intervene in any state, or even have political relations with it. Residents exerted the power to interpose their involvement in each state whenever and in whatever area the Company decided was justified: court ceremony, the jurisdiction of Rulers, the appointment of ministers, and the succession and tenure of the Ruler himself. Both Resident and Ruler generally recognized the Resident's ability to affect any of these. While the Company thus exercised indirect rule, however, it had yet to fully resolve the ultimate place of these states within its rule over India as a whole.

As we will recall, the number of states on Chart 1 peaked in 1840, gradually declining thereafter. This decline reflected no disengagement by the Company with the states, rather it signalled consolidations of several sorts. By the 1840s, the Company had reached the geographical limits of its capacity to control, as its unsatisfactory efforts to establish effective Residencies on India's peripheries — in Afghanistan, Nepal, and Burma — made evident. The Company added few new states to its Residency system

during this period. From efforts to extend, the Company turned to efforts to deepen its hold over states already under its sway.

The Company tried to consolidate its existing Residencies so as to increase the efficiency of its indirect control. We have already seen how the Company tried to introduce bureaucratic procedures into the Residencies. Overall during this period, each Residency contained fewer British officers, yet Residents exerted greater degrees of power over the states. This decline in the number of political officers appears on Chart 2. The remaining Residents tended to rely on more forceful tactics, confronting Rulers with ultimatums and depositions rather than working more subtly from behind the screens of authority as earlier.

The Resident's arbitration of the succession of Rulers and the appointment of Ministers occurred virtually whenever the Company chose. Neither Rulers nor Ministers could successfully repudiate the Resident's will, at least not openly. At the same time, the Company itself had not fully determined exactly where it was necessary and proper for the Residents to intervene. Its policy-makers debated such interventions but, once decided upon by the Company, the Rulers could do little in overt ways to reject them.

Nevertheless, the Company remained largely dissatisfied with the results of its indirect rule. Despite the Residents' various efforts, the British could not seem to bring about the quality of the internal administration of the states which it sought. Residents tried a range of tactics but neither intervention by a Resident nor withdrawal of his support from an administration seemed to bring about conditions envisioned as ideal by the British: a tranquil, prosperous, but indigenous state governed by an 'enlightened' Ruler who anticipated and fulfilled every British policy with little or no need for the Resident's intervention. Out of frustration, many British policy-makers turned to direct as opposed to indirect rule as the answer. The Company therefore moved toward integration of over a dozen states into direct British administration. While earlier the Company had preserved or reestablished Indian states out of territories it had conquered

militarily, it now annexed into its direct rule states it had previously recognized.

Whenever the Company felt justified, it set aside or deposed Rulers, pensioning them off. Justifications used by the Company for such action included its judgment of misgovernment, lack of what the Company regarded as a legitimate heir, or simply the Company's own self-perceived need for intervention at the time. The state might then be annexed into direct British rule. Further, the Company derecognized several already pensioned dynasties. Such actions provided enhanced revenues to the Company, increased opportunity for employment for its British servants, and extended to the people of the state what the British considered culture and morality.

As a result of all these factors, the net number of Residencies declined following 1840. The conflict of 1857 demonstrated to the British that their annexations and interventions could have costly consequences. Following 1858, the British reversed these policies and settled upon a stable pattern of relations with the Indian states.

Historical Context in Brief

During the whole of the 1841-1857 period, the Company continued to debate heatedly its policies toward the states. Not all British officials favoured policies of deep intervention and annexation. Nevertheless, the overall trend moved strongly in this direction. Even when the British government opposed a particular annexation, it felt powerless to reverse the process. About Sind in 1843, for instance, W. E. Gladstone (at the time a member of Peel's cabinet as President of the Board of Trade) wrote that the entire British Cabinet was unanimously opposed to the annexation, 'But the Ministry were powerless, inasmuch as the mischief of retaining it was less than the mischief of abandoning it [once annexed].'[1] In most instances, however, the significant policy-makers supported rather than futilely opposed annexations.

The Court of Directors — which had earlier proved one of the greatest brakes on expansion — reversed its former role and sup-

ported a more annexationist policy. In 1841, the Directors authorized the Governor-General to abandon '...no just and honourable accession of territory or revenue...' by annexing states into British control.[2] At times, the Directors advised an even more aggressive policy than its servants in India felt justified.

Each Governor-General of this period also tended to support some sort of aggressive policy toward the states. Auckland (1836-42) intervened militarily in Afghanistan to reinstall a deposed King under the guidance of a British Resident (the First Afghan War, 1838-42). Ellenborough (1842-4) annexed Sind (1843) and oversaw the forceful creation of a British-dominated Regency in Gwalior (1844). Hardinge (1844-8) directed the First Sikh War (1845-6) which resulted in the annexation of part of the Cis-Sutlej Punjab. He also threatened the Raja of Kashmir with deposition. Dalhousie (1848-56) was noted for his policies of both deeper involvement in the affairs of the states and annexation. Using the 'doctrine of lapse' (i.e. the Company named itself heir to all Rulers who lacked any heir whom it recognized), he annexed Satara (1848), Nagpur (1853), and Jhansi (1854), as well as eight smaller states. Following the second Sikh War (1848-49), he annexed the Trans-Sutlej Punjab. Following the Second Burma War (1852-53), he annexed Pegu. He annexed Awadh (1856) on the grounds of misgovernment. He derecognized the dynasties and stopped the pensions of the Peshwa of the Marathas (1851), the Nawab of the Carnatic (1855), and the Raja of Tanjore (1855). He also in effect annexed Berar from Hyderabad (1853) to secure the subsidy due to the Company. Even Dalhousie, however, did not move as far as some Directors wished, refusing to annex Hyderabad completely or to intervene in Bahawalpur, as some of them urged him to.

Many Residents in the field also tended to push for intervention or annexation at this time, with or without prior authorization from above. Their actions, 'sub-imperialisms', sometimes dragged the higher levels in the Company along. Thus, most levels of decision-makers tended to support the Company's 'forward' policies during this period.

The annexation of Indian states by the Company was not an entirely new policy. Deep interventions and annexations had oc-

curred before; nevertheless, the depth of the Company's intervention and the extent of its annexations were extreme during the 1841-1857 period. A full discussion of the debates in Parliament, the British press, or even the upper levels of the Company of each of these wars, annexations, and depositions would be out of place here. What is important to note however is that the Company's policy of respect and support for the Indian states, albeit while bringing them into indirect rule, had clearly undergone a fundamental change; the Company's imposition of its authority over the Indian states predominated until 1857.

The Company's Policies on Intervention

During this period, Governors-General officially continued the same general policy with respect to the internal affairs of the states that had prevailed since Bentinck: non-intervention except where justified. The issue repeatedly, however, was who in the Company, and what circumstances, determined sufficient justification. Since the ethos of the Company had shifted fundamentally from respect for the states — while making use of them — to open control over the states, most officials in the Company felt justified in intervention and annexation far more often than earlier.

Each Governor-General sought to impose his will and judgment on the Residents. Setting the tone, in 1842 the new Governor-General, Ellenborough, sent an identical letter to each Resident and Political Agent. He thereby intended to ensure that 'one clearly understood principle' guided the entire Residency system. He further ordered the Residents to convey the substance of his policy to the respective Rulers.[3] He wrote,

> ...you [Residents] will on all occasions manifest the utmost personal consideration and respect for the several Native Princes with whom you may communicate. You will consult and attend to their Personal wishes, you will give them, whenever you are requested to do so, or whenever it may appear to you to be required for their interest and that of the British Government with which theirs is particularly iden-



MAP 3
INDIA IN 1857

> tified, such advice as may seem to you best calculated to conduce to their comfort, to their prosperity, and their Honour; but you will not unnecessarily intrude with such advice on occasions not requiring it for such high and just objects, but leave them in the ordinary concernments of their families and their Courts not only without controul, but without observation.

Residents were therefore officially enjoined to show respect for the dignity of Rulers. This injunction apparently sought to counteract instances of high-handed superiority displayed by some Residents toward Rulers.

The Governor-General wished Residents to assure Rulers that, as a matter of policy, the Company did not intend to annex any state but rather '...is desirous on all occasions of respecting the Independence of Native States....' While urging overt respect toward Rulers, the Governor-General did not imply absence of intervention. Rather, Residents should reserve their interventions for significant issues and exhibit outward respect while asserting the Company's power: '...the necessary acts of authority may be clothed with the veil of courtesy and regard.'

Despite this official policy of external respect for the dignity of Rulers, the Company intended to hold them firmly in line. The Governor-General made clear that Residents were to brook no disorder from any Ruler.

> [The Company] will view with the severest displeasure...any Power as may have a tendency to disturb the Public Peace of India... whether effected by direct hostilities between States or by the outbreak which the badness of a Government may provoke, or its weakness permit....

Regardless of any legal treaty limitations, the Company had recourse to a higher justification for any sort of intervention in any state: 'The British Government...is deeply responsible to Providence...[for] the happiness of all the Tribes and nations within the limits of India under whatever form of rule....' Thus,

the Resident could act however the Company decided was justified by this highest authority of its responsibility to 'the People' of India.[4]

As we have seen, a wide gap often occurred between official public policy and the Company's actions in a particular instance. Each Governor-General interpreted the concept of 'justification' for British intervention differently. Further, each Resident in the field also used his own judgement as to how to treat that Ruler. The intervention of Residents and Political Agents at their own discretion in the appointment of Chief Ministers became almost routine. The political officer supervising Rajputana wrote his subordinate Political Agent in Meywar in 1846:

> I am not in the habit of troubling Government with questions of this kind, and consider it to be quite within the province of the local authorities to recommend to a Native Prince the removal of a Minister when satisfied of his unfitness or unworthiness.[5]

In fact, a member of the Governor-General's Council advised a newly appointed Resident in 1853: '...Lord Dalhousie thinks better of an Agent who does not trouble him with many reports [about internal affairs].'[6] Thus, unless the Governor-General wished to make a public issue of a particular situation, Residents normally had significantly more discretionary power over the internal affairs of a state than ever before.

As elsewhere in the Company's administration, officials in the political line were largely left to manage affairs on their own. In specific instances, the Governor-General issued detailed orders to a Resident but this was far more the exception than the rule. Having laid out his general policies and expectations, the Governor-General usually concluded his instructions with an expression of trust in the Resident's discretion. For the most part, an accumulation of experience and field-tested methods guided Residents. Residents nevertheless occasionally received criticism, censure, demotion, or even dismissal for actions later judged poor or against the intention of his superiors. Formal standing orders,

however, were remarkably absent even by the end of Company rule (1858).

At the end of 1854, the Court of Directors instructed the Company to formulate for the first time a code of regulations and policies for the members of the political line. These instructions, however, were neglected by the Company's Government until early in 1857 and then efforts to compile such a code were aborted by the disruptions of that year. Thus, in 1874 when the Government of India called for 'all standing orders or instructions at any time issued to Political Agents,' the Foreign Secretary discovered only three vaguely relevant documents.

The first of these documents was the circular letter issued by Ellenborough on 26 April 1842 (discussed above). While exhorting Residents to respect Rulers and yet intervene wherever justified, it said virtually nothing of substance about how this was to be done.[7] The second document is a 'demi-official letter' of the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, dated 18 November 1843. This contains general advice to a newly appointed Resident at Nepal.[8] The final document of 28 June 1821 consisted of the general advice and instructions of John Malcolm to his subordinates in Central India. Of greater detail and extent, Malcolm's instructions urge that the British official should keep distant from his 'native' subordinates, remain accessible to petitioners but promise nothing, interfere as little as possible in local affairs and 'maintain on a high ground, not only the purity, but the disinterestedness of the English character.'[9] These three documents formed the total of official standing orders issued over nearly a century to the members of the political line. The paucity of 'standing orders' produced by the political line reflects the division between the grand policies at the top of the Residency system and the relative autonomy of individual Residents, except in special cases, in the running of the system on a daily basis.

The Resident in Indian Court Ritual

One measure of the increased level of intervention by the Residents in the states is the Resident's manipulation of the major

symbolic expression of the Ruler's status: court ritual. During this period, the attitude of the Company and its Residents toward court ritual largely altered to conform to the larger change in the Company's ethos toward the states in general. By and large, officials of the Company gradually distanced themselves from the values expressed by the court ceremonies. Without always going so far as to abolish court rituals, the British nevertheless tended to regard them as essentially ineffectual and far removed from the real business of administration. To some extent, some felt attracted to the pageantry as they might be to a romantic fancy dress party. In either case, most Residents sought to show other Europeans that they regarded much of the ceremony of the Indian courts as essentially hollow pretence and empty pageant.

When addressing European audiences in India or Britain, the British symbolically contrasted their honest, plain black frock coats or formal uniforms with the pretentious glitter and clashing colours of the pageant of the 'oriental' courts they controlled. To heighten this contrast, Residents asserted sartorial discipline on their subordinates. From the 1830s, the Company's Political Department adopted its own formal dress for diplomatic service. For instance, the Mysore Commissioner was upset at '...the diversity of uniform worn by the Officers under [his] orders, belonging as they do to the Civil service and every branch of the Army.' He obtained permission to make each of them '...assume the dress prescribed for the Political Department...' and thus achieve British harmony.[10]

This contrast between British views of the motley Indian courts and the uniform demeanor of the Resident and his staff extended to what the British perceived as morality as well. As the Resident in Baroda wrote in 1856, 'In India, again, most Political Officers reject every thing that is subtle and tortuous and consider the interests of the British Government are best served by a strict adherence to what is just and honourable.' He contrasts this upright British attitude with the use by non-Britons of 'every artifice, trick, cunning device, and deceit....'[11]

While they personally discounted the values expressed in the Indian court rituals, Residents realized — to some extent — the

meaning these ceremonies continued to have for Indian audiences, both in court and among the general populace. The Company's policy was to respect, or at least not overtly insult, court rituals while at the same time indicating to European audiences its low estimation of them. Thus, Residents of this period often participated in rituals for the sake of their effect on the Ruler and the Indian audience.

Particularly representative of this attitude was the Company's policy toward the rituals associated with the Mughal Emperor.[12] Although the Emperor continued as the nominal sovereign of the Company until 1857, many Company officials regarded him at best as a quaint vestige of the distant past. British tourists made a visit to the Mughal Emperor's palace, the Red Fort, a stop on their procession through India's ruins. Guided by the Emperor's *chobdars* (court officers each bearing a silver or gold mace who heralded visitors) and limited in their access to the imperial court only by a prohibition on their use of umbrellas or entry into the living quarters of the Emperor's family, these tourists wandered freely through the neglected imperial audience halls, gardens, and even the throne room.[13] Some tourists included in their itinerary an audience with the Emperor himself.

In discussing the Company's relationship with the Emperor, we should distinguish between the personal attitudes of Company officials and the official position of the Company itself, although the two were occasionally conflated inadvertently at the time. One visit to the Mughal Emperor by a party of British Company officials, in 1843, held untoward symbolic significance. The Company had by then long ceased to perform the official rituals of submission to the Emperor as nominal sovereign. When the Governor-General visited Delhi, he refused to meet with the Emperor lest the Company's ambiguous position with respect to Mughal sovereignty be affected by any symbolic exchange between them. Nevertheless, the Governor-General's secretary and some other political officers took it upon themselves to consult the Delhi Residency records and pay tribute to the Emperor. This party of Company officials approached the Mughal Emperor, sitting in state. As the traditions of the Mughal court required, they

presented him with gold coins. In exchange they each received a tinselly cloth.[14] To the English party, this was no more than a lark, a hollow reminder of past imperial glories. Although the imperial ritual of the submission of a nazr (Arabic, for a symbolic presentation of a gift from an inferior to a superior) and bestowal of khilat (Arabic, a robe of honor bestowed by a superior on an inferior) had become as tattered as the rest of the Mughal court, it clearly continued to retain significance for some of its audiences.

Both the Governor-General and the Mughal court apparently recognized that the ritual exchange of nazr and khilat such as had just occurred signified the submission of the Company officials, and thus the Company itself, to the sovereignty of the Mughal. When the Governor-General learned of the enactment of this ritual submission, he censured his subordinates who had taken part in it. We can assume the Mughal court appreciated the ritual. Since the Company did not publicly in India repudiate its standing acceptance of Mughal sovereignty until 1858, the Indian public would also have regarded this ritual as in accordance with the sovereign status of the Emperor. At the time of this visit (1843), the Governor-General had particularly wished to avoid such ritual submissions to the Mughal Emperor because he proposed to '...induce him [the Emperor] to give up his place of residence to us. I have thought it a great object to have him out [of]...the Palace of Delhi' and use it for Company offices.[15] Apparently still wary of the unsettling impact such a symbolic move might hold in India, the Company did not implement this proposal until after the 1857 conflict.

During the 1857 conflict, the British came to appreciate the continuing power that symbols such as the Mughal Emperor still retained in India. Even after the British assassinated two of his sons, tried the Mughal Emperor for treason, and exiled him to Burma for his part in the conflict, the British continued to support him financially, albeit at a much reduced level. The British also made special efforts to desecrate the Mughal imperial court by holding Christian services in his audience hall and quartering Sikh cavalry in his Imperial Mosque. Thus, even when the British thought themselves masters of the situation militarily, they recog-

nized the potency of significant elements from the Indian court tradition. Following 1858, the British sought to reformulate the symbols of the remaining Indian Rulers and harness them to British imperial designs.

Jurisdiction of Residents

The Company's official policies and the actions of some of its Residents with respect to the jurisdiction of Rulers were sharply divided in the 1840s and early 1850s. On the one hand, the Company had contracted treaties with many states guaranteeing the jurisdiction of rulers by specifying reciprocal extradition of subjects of one accused by the other. On the other, the Residencies increasingly cut into the jurisdictions of the various Rulers by unilateral decisions to exclude individuals or classes of people from the Rulers' judicial authority.

Although reciprocity continued to be legally in force through many treaties, in practice Rulers had almost always found it far more difficult to extradite their subjects from Company hands than the reverse. By 1851, the Company's courts exerted effective power to demand the surrender of any person accused of a crime in British territory, no matter who the defendant was or where located at the time.[16] Prasad points out naturalization was not reciprocal in practice. A person born in British territory could not 'throw off his natural allegiance to the British Government.' One born in the territory of a Ruler, however, became a British subject by even a relatively short domicile, for example one year, in British territory.[17]

At the same time, the Residency became the juridical shelter for almost anyone who sought it. Numerous prominent or simply fearful people sought the protection of the Resident. A letter to the newspaper, *The Englishman*, in 1852 explained 'The Residency is becoming, as it should be, a refuge for the destitute...' and goes on to add to an ongoing list of Indian judges, landholders, and other prominent notables of the state who had already taken refuge under the protection of the Residency, despite the hostility of the Ruler to this.[18] Anyone who was a 'dependent' of the

Residency — as determined by the Resident — came under his jurisdiction rather than that of the Ruler. The Governor-General's secretariat itself proved unable to keep official policy current with local custom. In 1856, it wrote to a political officer in central India to try to clarify the limits of jurisdiction of the Residency. The Secretariat wrote that as they understood it, the political officer had jurisdiction in criminal matters over accused servants and dependents of the Residency but not if the accused was a subject of the Indian state and the plaintiff an Indian subject of the Company. That is, the court of the accused in a criminal case had precedence. In fact, Residents often asserted their jurisdiction in any case in which the Company had an interest. This included cases where both parties were subjects of the Indian state.[19]

The Governor-General had in fact already written of the Resident's responsibility to shelter all '...persons looking to the British Government for protection.'[20] The Company as a whole, therefore, sought to expand the range of people in the states who would look to it for protection. The Company would itself benefit from protecting them by making the Resident rather than the Ruler the object of their loyalty. When the Resident had thus built a constituency, consisting of prominent courtiers, administrators, and landholders of the state, he could use them to intervene in any area of the state he chose.

The Resident and the Ruler's Succession

The Company came during this period to assume the right to arbitrate the succession of any Ruler it chose. This does not imply that the Company always decided to intervene. Dalhousie, for example, elected not to interfere in the disputed succession in Bahawalpur in 1852. He argued, against strong sentiment elsewhere in the Company, that it would be impolitic to intervene in this succession, although the Company gave shelter and protection to the defeated pretender. Nevertheless, wherever the Company did choose to intervene, it did so decisively.

Two successions in 1843 illustrate the high level of intervention and attitude of superiority imposed by the Company. In both

incidents, the Company exercised visible and determining political control, characteristic of indirect rule. Following these exercises of power by the Company, all parties in both states would have to recognize the existence of indirect rule by the Resident.

At the time of the death of the Maratha Holkar of Indore (without a clear heir) in 1843, the Company assumed it held the authority to determine the succession. The Governor-General instructed the Resident, Robert Hamilton, to 'endeavour to inform yourself with respect to the health, and disposition' of all potential candidates. The Resident further declared publicly the Company's arbitration of the succession, thus precluding any factional struggles and also eliciting public opinion on the several potential candidates. The Resident affirmed that

> I have distinctly declared to all parties that...the nomination of a person to occupy the Guddee [throne] rests solely with the Governor-General. To this all assent...[21]

The Resident thereupon proceeded to determine the heir and then install him.

The Governor-General, however, had wished to make a further point to this state and the others about the supreme position of the Company. He censured the Resident for having installed the new Ruler without first exacting a price. The Governor-General had wished to draw up a new treaty, agreement to which would be the precondition for the installation. Since the Resident's premature enthronement of the Ruler precluded such a precondition, the Governor-General unilaterally redefined the status of the Ruler retroactively. The Governor-General sent a letter — which he declared to have the force of a treaty — to the Ruler specifying that the British Government had really been 'bestowing on Your Highness the principality of the Holkar State.'[22] The Governor-General also instructed the Resident to have the Ruler present a nazr of 101 gold coins to the Company on the letter's receipt. This symbolic and effective imposition of the supremacy of the Company clearly marks a manifest exercise of indirect rule, even at the risk of degrading the Indian Ruler.

A second succession incident from 1843 followed a similar path. We have already seen how the Resident at Gwalior had refrained from intervention in the factional struggles following the accession of Janokji in 1827. By the 1840s, in contrast, the Company proved willing to intervene decisively. In 1843, Janokji Sindhia died without an heir. The Resident stepped in and supervised the posthumous adoption of a son. The Resident also nominated and installed its candidate as Regent. This Regent, however, proved unable to control events, despite the support of the Resident, and eventually resigned. The Governor-General recalled the Resident for having proven unsuccessful, and threatened Gwalior with the Company's army. (Alexander Spiers, who had been Resident at Gwalior since 1841, was transferred to Nagpur, where he served until his death, 1843-7.) Much to the surprise of the Company, threats and the subsequent military incursion met with substantial resistance. After several battles against the Gwalior army, the Company's overwhelming force prevailed. The Governor-General personally negotiated a treaty reducing the size of the Gwalior army, imposing reparations of Rs 2,600,000 in cash from Gwalior to the Company, and established a Regency under the direction of the new Resident, William Sleeman; the Resident would administer the state for a decade until the Ruler reached his majority.[23] [Sleeman already had a reputation for having extirpated the 'thugs' (organized robbers who strangled their victims); he served in Gwalior during 1843-9 before his transfer to the Lucknow Residency, 1849-56.] In both incidents, therefore, the Company demonstrated its capacity and willingness to exercise determining political control over the succession of Rulers.

The level of the Company's interference in succession, however, reached its peak with the 'doctrine of lapse'. Although this 'doctrine' did not originate with Governor-General Dalhousie (1848-56), he exercised it most frequently and extensively. This doctrine specified that when an Indian Ruler died, lacking a legitimate — by the Company's judgment — male heir, the Company inherited his state. The lengthy and heated debate in Britain and among the British in India over efforts to justify or invalidate

this doctrine on the basis of interpretation of Hindu, Muslim, British, or international law lies beyond the scope of this book.[24] Of significance here is that the Company had moved beyond a commitment to indirect rule and began to favour annexationist policies wherever it felt justified.

During the course of its expansion across India, the Company had first taken the most visible resources from the state. Now that the pace of expansion had been slowed — the Company having reached the geographic limits of its capacity to conquer and control states — it turned to the resources deeper in the states. By this point, the Company sought to move to closer control over the sources of production by collecting land revenues directly. That is, the Company sought to annex valuable territories of some of the states into its direct rule. This contrasted with the Company's earlier tendency to use the Indian state administrations to collect revenues and then have the Residents tap the surplus accumulated in the Ruler's treasury. The Company used the doctrine of lapse as a major justification furthering this process.

The details of the application of the doctrine varied considerably. The Rajas of Satara and Jhansi had both adopted sons prior to their deaths (in 1847 and 1853 respectively). Despite this formal adoption, the Company refused to acknowledge the adopted son as heir. In the case of Satara, the Governor-General further justified annexation on the grounds that the Company had created that state and, when it served the Company's convenience, the Company could annex it as a practical, administrative consolidation. Dalhousie wrote in response to his critics:

> I cannot conceive it possible for anyone to dispute the policy of taking advantage of every just opportunity which presents itself for consolidating the territories that already belong to us, by taking possession of states which may lapse in the midst of them; for thus getting rid of these petty intervening principalities, which may be made a means of annoyance, but which can never, I venture to think, be a source of strength, for adding to the resources of the public treasury, and for extending the uniform application of our

> system of government to those whose best interests, we sincerely believe, will be promoted thereby.[25]

In the case of Nagpur, the Ruler had no son — natural or adopted. The Company annexed that state at the Raja's death in 1853. The Company also annexed a number of smaller states under this doctrine. Thus, the Company clearly showed that it only awaited the death of the incumbent Ruler as a convenient point to annex his state, when justified by its own administrative purposes.

Dalhousie did make some distinctions among the states, based on their historical relationship to the Company. He did not intervene in Bahawalpur, for example, because he regarded it as more independent than Satara, Jhansi, or Nagpur. The point here is not the fine distinctions of Dalhousie's policies but rather the spirit of the time. Overall during this period, the Company demonstrated relatively little respect for the sovereignty or existence of the Indian states, compared to earlier times.

The Company extended its assertion of its right to determine successions even to the Mughal imperial dynasty. The reigning Emperor, Bahadur Shah II (1837-57), represented to the Company a vestige of the old political order. While the Company wished to eliminate the Emperor's remaining political authority, it feared to do so abruptly. As a result, the Resident at Delhi had reached an agreement in 1852 with the heir apparent that the Company would recognize his claim (against his brothers') in return for acquiescence in a diminished political status. Specifically, in exchange for the support of the Company, the heir agreed to accept a reduced title (from Padshah, 'Emperor,' to Shahzada, 'King's son'), meet the Governor-General in ceremonies symbolizing equality, and transfer the imperial palace (the Red Fort) to the Company, taking residence elsewhere. In 1856, however, the Company obtained the opportunity to further degrade the Mughal dynasty when this heir apparent predeceased his father. The Company refused to recognize the Emperor's choice of another son as heir. Indeed, the Company determined to abolish the dynasty altogether on the death of Bahadur Shah. This

proposed blatant interference in the imperial succession did much to raise public hostility to the Company in 1857, when the Emperor proved a major focal point for the uprising against the British. The Emperor's symbolic trial in 1858 for treason, his deposition, and his exile by the Company all marked the anti-climax of the Company's policy of intervention in the succession of Indian Rulers.

The Resident and Annexation

In addition to the doctrine of lapse, the Company used its judgment of 'misgovernment' to justify intervention in the Indian states. Following the Resident's determination that the Ruler was intolerably maladministering his state, the Company decided how it wished to intervene. In some instances, the Company annexed territory from the state or else took control of the administration, with or without the deposition of the Ruler. As 'Paramount Power', the Company asserted its right to intervene in these ways, even in the absence or in opposition to the provisions of a treaty, whenever it felt justified. As the man on the spot, the Resident reported on local conditions and advised when he believed an intolerable level of misgovernment prevailed due to a rise in crime or a decline in revenues, among other indicators.

This assertion of 'misgovernment' was coupled with the Company's assumption that it had an overriding responsibility to the people of the state to protect them from their Ruler. Since the Company supported the Ruler, preventing the rebellion by his people that the British believed his misgovernment would otherwise have brought on, the Company felt it had a duty to depose a misgoverning Ruler itself. Clearly the definition of misgovernment was subject to some degree of interpretation. Nevertheless, the Company used such a justification in several instances.

This policy of intervention — based on the Resident's perception of misgovernment — contrasted sharply with the Company's earlier policies. In 1796, for example, the Governor-General had indicted the Governor of Madras for violating the rights of the Raja of Tanjore by forcing an annexation treaty. The Governor-

General at that time had called the proposed treaty transferring some districts to the Company 'absurd', 'unjustifiable', and 'extorted by intimidation'. The Madras Government had justified the treaty by asserting the areas had been misgoverned by the Raja but the Governor-General annulled the treaty explaining:

> If the plea of maladministration can be assumed, for depriving any of the Native Potentates, connected with the East India Company, and dependent on their support, of the Rights or possessions which they hold by Treaties, all professions of regard for Public Faith ought to be renounced — The same pleas would authorize the assumption of the management of Oude and Travancore...however strong our anxiety for the correction of...ruinous management...may be, we can only employ our Influence and representation and remonstrance for this purpose; and, if these fail, we may lament our disappointment, but we have no right to proceed to the forcible introduction of English administration, under any terms inconsistent with existing engagements.[26]

By the 1850s, the Company had reversed itself and used mismanagement as its justification for extensive annexations. Awadh, one of the very examples referred to in 1796, was the last annexation accomplished by the Company (1856) before its own termination by the British crown in 1858.

In Awadh, as in Hyderabad, the Resident had long used indirect control to try to ameliorate local conditions by reorganizing the state administration. Despite decades of intervention, the Resident, however, remained unsatisfied with the policies and functioning of the local administration. In both states, the Residents therefore advised more radical tactics. At different times, the Residents in Awadh and Hyderabad recommended withdrawing all British support from the Ruler and thereby precipitating further disorder and chaos. This chaos would then clearly justify Company intervention. Although in neither case did events ensue along these lines, the Company finally decided to annex Awadh, and nearly annexed Hyderabad. Chapter 9 examines the reasons for these disparate decisions.

The annexation of Awadh in 1856 provides a prime example of this kind of justification, based on British protection of the 'people' of a state against 'misgovernment'. Despite the lack of any treaty provision, the British were obliged by duty to assume the administration of the state, as was explained by the Governor-General to the Ruler:

> ...the British government, influenced by a regard for its reputation among nations, and still more by the obligations which many years ago it took upon itself in relation to the people of Oudh, can no longer lend its countenance and support to a government, whose existence is the fruitful source of misrule, oppression, and misery to all who live under its control.[27]

Using the justification of a higher duty to the 'people' of the state than to any treaty arrangements, the Company could annex any state it chose. Only the disruption of the 1857 conflict halted this drive for direct rule and restored the British to a commitment to indirect rule through the remaining states.

Scale of Direct and Indirect Rule in India

While annexation was not unique to the 1841-58 period, British attitudes toward annexation clearly altered during this time. Over the entire period of the Company's expansion in India, it had taken over direct administration of territories hitherto under Indian Rulers. Nevertheless, the Company had tended to preserve or reestablish Indian states in the conquered lands wherever practical. In contrast, wherever practical the Company now tended to remove territories from the states it had earlier supported.

The scale of annexations proved dramatic. At the same time, the vast majority of states remained within the system of indirect rule. To provide a sense both of the scale of annexations and also the continued place of indirect rule within the British Empire, I have constructed Table 6.

Table 6
Area and Population under Indirect Rule, 1841 vs. 1857

State	*Area (in 1,000 sq.mi.)*	*Population (in 1,000)*	*Year Annexed*
Awadh	24	10,000	1856
Bahawalpur	15	473	
Baroda, Kathiawar	25	1,935	
Bharatpur	2	600	
Bhopal	7	664	
Cochin	2	300	
Cutch	7	581	
Gwalior	33	3,228	
Hyderabad	95	10,660	
Indore	8	815	
Jhansi	4	200	1853
Kashmir	80	1,521	
Kolhapur	3	500	
Mysore	31	3,000	
Nagpur	76	4,650	1854
Punjab Kingdom	102	17,000	1849
Punjab states	18	3,200	
Rajputana states	114	8,724	
Satara	8	400	1848
Sind	5	105	1843
Travancore	7	1,011	
Other states	142	9,346	various
Totals	.....	.....	
Indirect Rule 1841	808	78,913	
Annexed 1841-56	220	32,356	
Indirect Rule 1857	588	46,557	
Direct Rule 1857	981	164,870	
India	1,569	211,427	

The figures on this table are the result of my effort to reconcile figures taken (on occasion widely at variance) from several sources including the following: John Briggs, *India and Europe Compared, Being a Popular View of the Present State and Future Prospects of our Eastern Contenental Empire* (London: W.H. Allen, 1857), facing p.19; John Sutherland, *Sketches of the Relations Subsisting between the British Government in India and the different Native States* (Calcutta: G.H. Huttmann, 1837), *passim*; William Lee-Warner, *The Native States of India*, 2nd ed. of The Protected Princes of India, 1894 (London: Macmillan, 1910), *passim*; G.B. Malleson, *An Historical Sketch of the Native States of India in Subordinate Alliance with the British Government* (London: Longmans, Green, 1875), *passim*; Great Britain, Parliament, Lords, 1852-53, 3rd Report, Select Committee of the House of Lords, Appendix of Minutes of Evidence taken, pp. 119-43.

From this table, we can see that as of 1841 over 800,000 square miles, containing nearly 80 million people, came under indirect rule. This comprised over half of the territory and some 37 per cent of the population of India as it was defined then. Between 1841 and 1857, 220,000 square miles (an area over four times larger than England itself), on which lived over 32 million people, were annexed into direct British rule. By 1857, the proportion of population and area under indirect rule stood at approximately 22 per cent and 37.5 per cent respectively; they remained at about this level thereafter. While states still comprised quite substantial parts of the Empire, they had been reduced by annexations from their 1841 level.

Although this table is suggestive, it should not be taken as exact. The figures are at best estimates based on imperfect British surveys of both the area of these states and their populations. Further, the very definition of indirect rule remained imprecise. I have placed states, like Mysore, or areas, like Berar, that were under the nominal sovereignty of an Indian Ruler but under the direct administration of the British for long periods, under the rubric of indirect rule although a case could be made for the reverse. Further, the line between the smallest states under indirect rule and the largest landholdings under direct rule remained obscure until 1947. The British themselves never settled on any specific official number of princely states: at various times the official number of states appeared in the range of 500 to 700.[28] Thus, indirect rule proved more an ideal type than a precise category.

Conclusion

During the 1841-57 period, the Company moved from exhibiting some degree of respect for the Indian states to virtually open manipulation of them for its own ends. The fighting of 1857 had as a prime cause the policy of annexation, which incited many Indian Rulers and former Rulers, such as the Mughal imperial family, the family of the ex-Ruler of Awadh, and the Rani of Jhansi to fight against the British. After 1857, the British crown

took over the government of India from the Company and returned to a policy of indirect rule. Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858 placed her authority behind British guarantees of unencumbered succession to the remaining incumbent dynasties. In 1860 the Government of India sent a sanad of adoption, specifying this guarantee, to 140 Rulers. Thus, the relationship between the Indian states and the British shifted after 1857.

During the decades leading up to 1857, if a Ruler did not meet British expectations, the Company felt justified in deep levels of intervention, to the extent of deposition of the Ruler. In a number of areas of the court and state administration, Residents intervened as they saw fit, even at the cost of the respect they showed the Rulers. We have focused on three areas of intervention during this period. The succession of Rulers had clearly come under the Company's purview. In some cases, Residents made a point of publicly displaying their own decisive role in deciding disputed successions. A Ruler who owed his accession to the tacit or active approval of the Company incurred an obligation which affected his relationship to its Resident. The Ruler also knew that his nomination of a successor likewise depended for confirmation on the approval of the Company. Potential heirs saw the Resident as their assessor, whose good reports might prove vital to their future prospects. The role of the Resident in the succession thus did much to set the tone of his relationship to the Ruler and would-be heirs. Even after the British crown guaranteed the incumbent dynasties, this declaration reflected and reinforced British political authority over the Indian Rulers.

One of the areas in which Residents intervened more deeply and, on occasion, more arbitrarily during this period was that of the Ruler's jurisdiction. The extraterritorial protection extended by the Resident over important people living within the Ruler's state had been a powerful means of building the Resident's constituency, even before this time. The Company stressed its right to interpose itself between the Ruler and the 'people' of the state. This self-perceived right proved an important justification for many of the Resident's interventions. In its largest sense, this also justified the deposition of some of the Rulers, on the basis of the

doctrine of lapse or the British assertion of maladministration by a Ruler.

Similarly, the Resident's attitude toward court ritual also shifted. Residents distanced themselves personally from the values expressed in these rituals. They were also willing to manipulate these rituals to reflect the superiority of the Company. To some extent, Residents recognized the power these rituals held for the people of India. The Company, however, clearly underestimated the power of the Rulers themselves as symbols, as the events in 1857 demonstrated.

Having surveyed the history of the Residency system from 1764 to 1857, I now turn in Part 3 to a more detailed analysis of the system from the perspective of Indians. Rulers developed strategies and tactics to deal with the Resident, either to minimize his negative impact or to turn him to their advantage. Indians who staffed the Residencies also had a major impact on the shape of indirect rule.

NOTES

1. *Contemporary Review* (November 1876) quoted in F.J. Goldsmid, *James Outram: A Biography*, 2 vols. (London: Smith, Elder, 1880) 1:347.

2. Minute 30 August 1848, Parliamentary Papers *1849*, xxxix, pp. 224-8.

3. Secretary to Government with Governor-General Circular Letter to Residents in Nepal, Lucknow, Indore, Nagpur, Gwalior, Hyderabad, the Commissioner Mysore, Political Agents Rajputana, Sind, Baluchistan, and North-West Frontier, 26 April 1842, FPC, 13 July 1842, No. 1.

4. E.g. the Governor Bombay threatened Gwalior with serious consequences unless he reformed, saying treaties were not 'exclusively' the limits on the relationship. Minute of Governor 13 February 1841, Pol. Dept. (Bombay), 12A/1842-43, quoted in Mani Kamerkar, *British Paramountcy: British-Baroda Relations, 1818-1848* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1980), p. 198.

5. Agent of the Governor-General for Rajpootana to Political Agent Meywar, FPC, 17 October 1846, No. 272.

6. John Low [at the time Resident Hyderabad, soon to be Military Member of the Supreme Council] to Henry Lawrence, 20 February 1853,

quoted in Herbert Benjamin Edwardes and Herman Merivale, *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence*, 2 vols. (London: Smith, Elder, 1872), 2:227.

7. The full text of the letter, some 500 words, is quoted in full in Charles L. Tupper, compiler, *Indian Political Practice: A Collection of the Decisions of the Government of India in Political Cases*, 4 vols. (Delhi:B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1974 reprint), 3:156.

8. Tupper, *Indian Political Practice*, 3:156-7.

9. Printed in full in his *A Memoir of Central India*, 2 vols. (London: Kingsbury, Parbury, and Allen, 1823), Appendix 18, pp. 433-75.

10. Commissioner Mysore to Secretary to Government of India with the Governor-General, 3 March 1838, FPC, 24 October 1838, No. 65.

11. Resident Baroda to Secretary to Government of India, 29 November 1856, FPC, 12 February 1858, No. 32.

12. Panikkar discussed the treatment accorded the Emperor by the Company, *British Diplomacy*, pp. 115-59.

13. E.g. Mrs Colin Mackenzie, *Six Years in India: Delhi: The City of the Great Mogul* (London: Richard Bentley, 1857).

14. William Edwards, *Reminiscences of a Bengal Civilian* (London: Smith, Elder, 1866), p. 12.

15. Governor-General to Claud Clerk, 12 September 1843, MS Eur D. 538, Claud Clerk Collection, IOL. As Panikkar points out, the Company had considered evicting the Emperor as early as 1803, *British Diplomacy*, p. 14.

16. Bisheswar Prasad, *Paramountcy under Dalhousie* (Delhi: Ranjit Printers, 1964), p. 60.

17. FPC, 30 November 1850, No. 6 and 6 May 1848, No. 162, and Section 2 of Regulation IX of 1822, cited in Prasad, *pp. 57-8*.

18. *The Englishman*, 6 March 1853, quoted in *Hyderabad Affairs*, comp. Moulvie Syed Mahdi Ali (printed for private circulation, 1883), 6:84.

19. Secretary to Government of India to Agent of the Governor-General for Central India, 19 August 1856, FPC, 26 September 1856.

20. Secretary to Government to Resident Lucknow, 22 January 1813, BPC, 22 January 1813.

21. Secretary to Government to Resident Indore, 27 April 1844 and Resident Indore to Secretary to Government, 20 May 1844, FPC, 28 December 1844, Nos. 106, 107.

22. Aitchison, 4:34-5.

23. Aitchison, 5:416-21. For an extensive discussion of this incident, see R.C. Majumdar, 'Ellenborough and Sindhia' in R.C. Majumdar, ed., *The History and Culture of the Indian People*, vol. 9, *British Paramountcy and*

Indian Renaissance, Part 1 (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1963), pp. 222-34.

24. See Prasad, *Paramountcy under Dalhousie.*

25. Minute of Governor-General, 30 August 1848, quoted in Sever, 1:200.

26. Governor-General in Council to Governor Madras, 20 June 1796, Fort St. George Military and Political Consultations, 28 June 1796.

27. Governor-General to King of Oudh, n.d., IPFC, 6 June 1856, No. 192.

28. A survey published for the edification of British officials in 1932 illustrates the various ways the Indian states could be categorized, to either enhance or diminish their scale. Anonymous, *The Origin, Rise and Consolidation of the Indian States* (1st ed. printed for private circulation, 1932) (Delhi: B.R. Publishing, 1975 reprint), pp. 15-16. This source gives 560 as the number of states. William Lee-Warner counts the states as either 680 or 693, depending on whether Nepal and the Shan States of Burma are included, *The Native States of India*, p. vii. V.P. Menon, who had to negotiate with each of them about entry into India or Pakistan, sets the figure at 'about 700', *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States* (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1956), p. 14.

7. The Indian Rulers and their Relations with the Resident: 1764-1857

> **Wherever the subsidiary system is introduced, unless the reigning Prince be a man of great abilities, the country will soon bear the marks of it in decaying villages and decreasing population.... However just the motives may be from which such a force acts, yet the situation in which it is placed renders it acting at all too much like the movements of the Praetorian bands.**
>
> —Sir Thomas Munro
> Governor of Madras (1820-27)

The Indian Rulers: An Overview

Indians, as much as Britons, shaped the system of indirect rule in India. The first two parts of this book have concentrated on British policies and actions. We now turn specifically to see how the system developed from the perspective of the Indian Rulers and courts. While Chapter 10 develops a diachronic analysis of four states, here we look at the states as a whole, selecting examples illustrative of the various strategies and tactics deployed by Rulers as the Residency system spread over India.

Rulers, courtiers, and administrators of the states — like the Company and its officials — pursued their own interests through the Residency system. Indian courts initially tried to fit Residents into the existing, indigenous network of communication and diplomacy: treating Residents from the Company much as they had traditionally treated wakils posted to their court from other Indian powers. As the Company increasingly diverted from the patterns of action that had been followed by Indian powers, so too did Residents diverge from the practices of Indian wakils. Rulers and courtiers therefore experimented with new tactics and strategies for dealing with Residents.

The Ruler and his courtiers continued to attempt to maintain their own network of wakils and agents with the British and with other Indian states in order to counter the power of the Resident over communications. These wakils informed the Ruler about events at these other centres of power, represented their Ruler's perspective to the world, and strove to influence policies and events at the Company headquarters and at other Indian courts to their Ruler's advantage, through overt and covert means.

Even as the Resident gradually attempted to close off such alternative means of communication, the Ruler and court endeavoured to manipulate the Resident, using him and his Residency for their own purposes. Rulers sought control over knowledge and information flowing into and out of their states through the Resident. They also sought to harness the Residency to support their administration, or at least to block it from unwanted intervention in the internal affairs of the state. To do this, over time each Ruler developed tactics and strategies which he deployed with respect to Residents.

In order to examine the means used by Indian rulers to deal with British Residents, this chapter first deals with the Ruler's external relations, primarily his communications with either the Company or other Indian powers. Despite the Rulers' efforts, their own network of wakils grudgingly gave way to the Company's system of Residencies. Residencies gradually attained a monopoly over formal interstate political communications. As a result, Rulers found themselves forced to work through, or around, the Residents in their external relations.

This chapter also deals with the internal affairs of the state. As we have seen, the Residents (especially during the nineteenth century) intervened in all aspects of the court, the administration, and the state as a whole. Each Ruler attempted at different times and in various ways to make the Residency serve his interests rather than those of the Company.

Attempts at control by the Ruler over the Resident concerning external or internal issues met with mixed results, in part depending on the local situation: the relationship among the Ruler, his Minister and court, the Resident, and the society of the state as a

whole. The outcome of particular tactics and strategies by a Ruler depended as well on the situation and policies of the Company and of neighbouring states at the time. As a whole, Rulers increasingly lost the capacity to oppose the Resident outright. Nevertheless, the actions of individual Rulers did much to shape the role of the Residency in their states. The roles that emerged for the Residencies varied widely from state to state and over time. Overall, the patterns of action by Rulers in a large measure constituted the system of indirect rule; Indians were not mere passive victims of the Company.

Indian Rulers reformulated their relationships to the Residents and the Company over time. Each Ruler developed the relationship with his Residency according to a unique chronology. States which encountered the Company earliest, such as Hyderabad and Awadh, dealt with the Company throughout the period under study here. States which lay outside of the Company's influence longest, for example the Punjab and Afghanistan, initially confronted the Company only in the early to mid-nineteenth century. These latter states, therefore, generally met more experienced and purposeful Residents from the beginning of their relationship with the Company. As a result, there is no single chronology for the strategies and tactics used by different Rulers. The responses of the Company to these different strategies and tactics, however, varied according to its policies and experience at that point, leading to different outcomes. During the eighteenth century, some Rulers could treat the Company and its Resident on a footing of near equality. By the 1840s and 1850s, most Rulers could, at best, hope to achieve their goals by manipulating the Resident while not opposing him openly.

The strategies developed by Rulers varied considerably. Some Rulers rejected or isolated the Residency, precluding its effectiveness for the Company. Other Rulers incorporated the Resident into the world of the court by financial or cultural means. Still others, who were unable to dominate the Residency resigned themselves to it, submitting to indirect rule. Each strategy contained a variety of tactics and resulted in a range of consequences.

Residents and Wakils

Traditionally, the most extensive and regular links between Indian Rulers and those outside their states came through their network of wakils. Each Ruler maintained wakils at the court of each of the other powers politically important to him. These wakils sent back information about that court. Further, they manoeuvred as diplomats and lobbyists on his behalf.

Normatively, a Ruler welcomed the attendance of wakils from other Rulers at his court. Such representatives at a Ruler's court displayed his prominence and provided the medium by which word of 'Presence' (as the Ruler was called) disseminated through the world. Rulers circulated an official court *akhbar* (daily court diary), describing the official version of the significant events at court. The wakils in attendance then distributed these akhbar, supplemented by private reports, to their masters.

As Rulers came into increasing contact with the Company, some began to comprehend its potential usefulness or danger to their interests. As a result, they sought to establish and maintain communication links to it under their own control. Over time, a number of Rulers dispatched wakils to Calcutta, Madras, or Bombay in order to represent them at the Company's Presidencies. These wakils, like Residents, conveyed formal political messages between their Ruler and the Company. They also gathered knowledge about the Company from public and private sources and sought to influence Company policy to the advantage of their masters.

As was customary, some Rulers expected the Company to reciprocate by posting accredited representatives at their courts, representatives whom the British called Residents. The Company thus received requests for a European representative from a number of Indian Rulers including (among the earliest) the Nawab of Bengal (1763), the Nawab of Awadh (1772), the Peshwa of the Marathas (1776), the Raja of Tanjore (1776), the Rana of Gohad (1779), and the Bhonsle Raja of Nagpur (1781).[1] Conversely, the Company initially accepted the presence of wakils at its Presidencies representing Rulers as the norm, especially at the dawn of the Company's entry into Indian politics.

Well into the nineteenth century, Rulers induced the Company to accept the presence of their wakils at its Presidencies. Rulers and the Company concluded treaties permitting not only the presence of a Resident at the Ruler's court but further allowing the Ruler to place his own representative at the Company's head-quarters. In fact, a number of treaties specified that Rulers had the right to post wakils with the Company, including treaties with the Rulers of Bengal (1757), Nepal (1801), Baroda (1802), Gwalior (1803), Nagpur (1804), Sind (1809), and Indore (1818).[2] Rulers learned the value of such wakils as a partial counterbalance to the Resident.

Over time, these wakils proved problematic for the Company, undercutting as they necessarily did the Resident's monopolistic control over political communication. Thus, even where such wakils were accepted by the Company on the basis of precedent or treaty, it gradually constricted their role, excluding political matters from their purview.[3] Eventually, the Company confined the Ruler's official political contacts with powers outside of the state to the Resident alone. Nevertheless, in the early period, a certain equality prevailed between the Rulers and the Company as wakils from one and Residents from the other functioned in much the same world.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, at least one Ruler convinced the Company to subordinate its Residents to his wakils. The Resident at Poona reported himself frustrated at obtaining effective access to the Peshwa's court. The Governor- General then advised him that:

> His Highness the Nizam possesses facilities of communication with the Peshwah which you cannot acquire. His Highness has also a deep interest in the success of my proposed negotiation at the Court of Poonah. Adverting to these considerations, I have determined to commit to the management of the Court of Hyderabad a negotiation, in the issue of which the Nizam is as much concerned as the British Government.... I therefore desire you to suspend all further proceedings.... I request you merely to second, as far as you

> may be able, the endeavours which may be employed by the Nizam's Agents....[4]

The Company soon learned, in this instance and others, that it could not assume the interests of any Indian Rulers were identical to its own. Consequently, Rulers found the Company unwilling to entrust its business to their wakils instead of its Residents.

In their rivalry with each other, Rulers apparently perceived the acceptance by the Company of a wakil from one of them as a political statement to the others. This became explicit, for instance, in the Company's relations with the Marathas. Once a unified kingdom, the Marathas had broken up into a number of rival powers. The Company's Bombay Presidency lay in the midst of these Maratha states and therefore found its every act fraught with political and military consequence. In 1776, one among the conflicting pretenders for the office of Peshwa sent a wakil to the Bombay Government. The most militarily powerful of the Marathas from the late 1760s until his death in 1794, Mahadji Sindhia, objected to his rival's presumption, as well as to the hostility of the Company implied by the acceptance of that wakil. The Bombay Government at first rejected Sindhia's protest:

> We cannot allow the Minister [Sindhia] any right to complain of our receiving Vakeels from any power whatsoever.... [It] is the indisputable right of every Government.[5]

Overriding this, however, the Calcutta Government warned Bombay of the dangerous implications of its action.

Indeed Mahadji Sindhia, more than almost any other Ruler, exerted his powerful military position to offset the Company's influence. Specifically, Sindhia continued repeatedly to assert his exclusive right to link all the Marathas with the Company. Hoping to avoid antagonizing Sindhia over the deputation of a Resident to the court of a rival Maratha Ruler (the Bhosle Raja at Nagpur) in 1781, the Company ordered that Resident to 'act under the control' of the Resident at Sindhia's court, thus respecting the superiority of Sindhia over the other Maratha powers.[6] By 1783,

Sindhia had apparently intimidated the Bhosle Raja, inducing him to distance himself from the Resident at his court. That Resident, in frustration at his subsequent lack of influence and access to the Bhosle Raja, returned to Calcutta.[7] In 1785, Sindhia objected when the Governor-General wished to appoint a Resident at Poona, with the Maratha Peshwa. Sindhia indicated through his own British Resident his opposition to, and then 'repugnance' at, the appointment of a Resident for the Peshwa.[8] As with the Resident at Nagpur discussed above, the Company sought to avoid exacerbating Sindhia's hostility and therefore ordered the Poona Resident to report to it via the Resident at Sindhia's court.[9]

Sindhia continued to manipulate the Resident at his court to demonstrate to his enemies that the British supported him. The Resident with Sindhia observed in frustration in 1787:

> That the attendance of the English Resident is highly useful to Sindia in the prosecution of his ambitious schemes is a fact which I believe has been long pretty generally admitted and was lately placed in a very strong light by the King [Sindhia], who did not scruple to observe in public Court 'upon the advantage which would result from its being known that the English Minister was advancing with [Sindhia's] army towards Jaynagar.' Hence, it would seem as if the appointment of a Resident at the Durbar of this Chief were less calculated for the service of our own Government than for the advancement of his views....[10]

Due to his strong military position, Sindhia proved particularly successful at using the Resident at his court. Further, he continued in some degree to control communications between the Company and other Indian states. In 1790, Sindhia induced the Governor-General to refuse to meet with the wakil of the Maratha Ruler Holkar rather than offend Sindhia.[11] In 1797, Mahadji Sindhia's successor blocked official contact between the British Resident at his court and the Mughal Emperor.[12] The Sindhias remained the controlling 'guardians' of the Emperor until the Company captured Delhi in 1803.

Sindhia was not alone among Rulers in using independent linkages with other powers to counter the Resident. The court of the Peshwa of the Marathas (up to 1799) used the wakils of Tipu Sultan of Mysore to try to stave off domination by the Resident. The Resident at Poona had to make severe threats to the Peshwa's court before it required these Mysore wakils to leave Poona. Even when the Resident had forced the Poona court to expel the Mysore wakils, it did not require them to depart suddenly, rather tolerating their slow movement in short, hesitant stages away from court. The Marathas clearly did not wish to lose the presence of these alternative agents who balanced, to some degree, the Resident. In a larger sense, a powerful Mysore state also seemed to the Marathas to block the hegemony of the Company in South India. The Marathas' extremely limited participation in the Company's war against Mysore, despite their treaty obligations to support it fully, apparently confirms this.[13] The Company met with frustration at courts where alternative means of communication with other powers persisted. Increasingly, the Company charged its Residents — backed by its overwhelming military power — with securing the Company's monopoly over the foreign relations of the Indian states.

As we have seen, exclusivity stands as one of the essential elements of indirect rule. In one of the Company's first important steps toward indirect rule it gradually removed the function of political communication from the Rulers' wakils and transferred them to its Residents. Beginning in 1792, the Company induced some fifty-five states individually to agree by treaty to channel all foreign political contacts through the Resident.[14] Although the exact phrasing of the clause varied somewhat, a typical treaty read: the Ruler in question abjured any 'negotiation or political correspondence with any European or Native power without the consent of the said Company.'[15] While the Company thus did not literally forbid Rulers from having a foreign policy, it did insist all communication pass through its hands and meet its approval.

The pattern of treaties including such a clause marks the Company's assertion of exclusive control over inter-state relations in expanding waves over India. Three states concluded such

treaties prior to 1797: Tanjore (1792), the Carnatic (1792), and Travancore (1795). By 1840, some thirty-one Rulers had consigned their official political communications to the Resident. Among the first were Awadh (1798), Mysore (1799), Hyderabad (1800), Gwalior (1804), and Cochin (1809) followed by others in Rajasthan, and central and western India. During the 1841-57 period, the Company contracted no further such treaties with Rulers, reflecting its consolidation rather than expansion over new states at this time. After 1858, only a few major Rulers relinquished their political communications (including the Raja of Banaras in 1911, who did so in the very 'Instrument of Transfer' that elevated him to the status of Ruler, see Chapter 9).[16] In practice, however, the Company expected all states to observe this restriction from as early as the Resident could enforce it. On their part, Rulers sought to avoid such restrictions on their foreign relations.

Rulers did not always hold to their official obligation to abstain from communication except via the Resident. Rulers apparently sustained an underground exchange of wakils despite the efforts by Residents to detect and preclude it. The Raja of Tanjore revealed to the Resident in 1813 that wakils and agents from the Rulers of Mysore, Berar, and Nagpur had come secretly to his court. The Governor-General commended the Raja of Tanjore for his revelations and warned the Rulers and Residents at the offending courts to terminate such unauthorized communication at once. Although the Raja of Nagpur would not conclude a treaty prohibiting such communication until 1826, the Company nevertheless forbade the practice at this time.[17] Rulers thus gradually lost their right to political communications independent of the Company. Only in 1921, with the constitution of the Chamber of Princes by the British Parliament, did this British monopoly over political relations among the states officially end.

The Rulers' Alternatives to the Resident

Despite official prohibitions against the communication of political messages through their wakils, a number of Rulers continued to maintain these agents with the Company for other reasons.

These wakils gathered knowledge and information and influenced Company policy on behalf of their employers, using overt and covert means. On several occasions, a dismayed Resident found that the Ruler had obtained — by means of his agents in Calcutta — copies of the Company's instructions even before the Resident had himself received them. Two such examples out of the many available illustrate this. The Resident at Poona wrote in askance to the Governor-General in 1786 when a letter of secret instruction from the Company to him prematurely reached the court via the Poona Ruler's agent in Calcutta:

> This [purloined] letter has caused me a good deal of Embarrassment.... Such a letter reaching the Minister so immediately after my arrival at the Durbar, through a channel unknown to me and containing matter so very opposite to his wishes...must necessarily be very inauspicious to the commencement of my Commission.[18]

In a similar case in 1844, the Awadh Ruler and his court, and even members of the Residency staff, learned the Governor-General's secret instructions to the Resident before the Resident himself.

> [A] copy of this identical letter arrived at Lucknow three days before the original reached me and its contents were actually known to the King, Minister and one or two others before I was myself aware of them.... [M]y Head Intelligence Writer, previously to the perusal of the original, read out to me a letter which tallied with it nearly word for word...secretly transmitted to the Minister by a friend from Calcutta.[19]

Such situations proved highly awkward for the Resident. Moreover, knowledge obtained through his wakil in Calcutta could forearm a Ruler about the Resident's next move.

As Rulers gradually lost control over their foreign relations, the continued presence of their wakils at the Company's Presidencies became increasingly a matter of prestige. In 1833, the Awadh

Ruler wished to continue the office of his wakil in Calcutta by appointing a new man, the incumbent having died in office. The Governor-General opposed the appointment, thinking thereby to reduce the status of the Ruler by terminating the office of wakil. The latter objected vigorously (as paraphrased by the Resident), saying:

> ...there had always been a Vakeel from this Durbar at Calcutta.... [A]s other Native Rulers had Vakeels at the Presidency, it was somewhat injurious to his dignity that no one should attend the Governor-General's Durbar from Lucknow, and [he] assured [the Resident] that he had no political objects in view.[20]

Thus, the Awadh Ruler, even eschewing a formal political role for this wakil, valued that office as a symbol of his dignity and, presumably, a useful means of informal communication and influence. In this instance, the Ruler prevailed, at least until 1853. At that point, the Governor-General of the day objected firmly to the presence of an Awadh wakil in Calcutta. The incumbent Ruler again appealed that abolition of the wakil would reduce his honour. The Resident thereupon worked out a compromise acceptable to the dignity of the Ruler but effectively accomplishing the goal of the Company: the office of wakil would be left vacant but labelled only 'suspended' rather than terminated.[21] Not until 1885 did the last Ruler, the Maharaja of Kashmir, lose his right to maintain a wakil in Calcutta.[22] For Rulers, their wakils provided highly valued communication and representation to the outside world in both practical and symbolic terms.

In addition to Rulers, even Ministers of some states maintained personal wakils in the Presidency towns to look after their own interests, occasionally as distinct from those of their Rulers. For example, as late as 1843, the Chief Minister of Hyderabad state was reliably reported to spend some Rs 200,000 annually on his wakils at Calcutta 'to acquire the information and establish the influence necessary for that purpose at the seat of the Supreme Government....'[23]

The Rulers attempted a number of other tactics, beyond maintaining a wakil, to get around the confining channel of the Resident. One was to try to set up a direct correspondence with the Resident's superiors. In his conflicts with the Resident, the Travancore Ruler sent letters to the Governor of Madras via his wakil (1803) and then even by the ordinary mail (1809), rather than allow the Resident to monitor his communications.[24] To counteract this, the Governor of Madras published in the Government Gazette an order:

> ...[prohibiting] all persons in the Service of the Honourable Company and all others enjoying the protection of the British Government under the Presidency of Fort St. George from holding any Communications, correspondence or personal intercourse whatsoever with His Highness the Rajah of Travancore or with any of the Ministers or Officers of that Prince, excepting with the express consent and concurrence and through the official Channel of the British Resident at His Highness' Durbar.[25]

Despite such proclamations, at various times other Rulers followed similar tactics, writing directly to a Governor, the Governor-General, or even the English monarch. Rulers also sent secret missives to other Rulers.[26] In each instance where the Company discovered the correspondence, it returned the letter or agent, sternly warning the Ruler that he must pass all his political messages via the Resident.[27]

This conflict between the Rulers and the Company over means of communication, alternative to the Resident, continued with respect to other media as well. Many Indian Rulers sought to hold open a variety of political connections with the outside world even as the British sought to discover and close each of them down in turn, channelling all such contact through the Resident. In 1830, the Mughal Emperor ennobled the social reformer (and initiator of the Bengal Renaissance), Ram Mohan Roy, with the title of Raja. He then dispatched Roy to England as his imperial ambassador. The Company refused to sanction such an embassy and permitted Roy to travel to England only as a private citizen.

Nonetheless, Roy continued to lobby on behalf of the Emperor — being instrumental in obtaining an enhanced pension for him — as well as for social and political reforms in India. Roy died in Bristol in 1833 still on the imperial payroll. Other Rulers also sent missions of this type, with presents for the English Monarch and messages for the Government and people of Britain. Most met the same mixed results due to the Company's antipathy. For example, the Awadh Ruler sent two envoys to Britain in 1834, with the Company's acquiescence. The delivery of his presents for the English King was, however, blocked by the Company and they were eventually returned to India.[28]

In addition to networks of wakils or individual missions, some Rulers also maintained an independent postal system, or dak, beyond their states. The Awadh Ruler, for example, had such an established system with fourteen major cities in North India. In 1840, the Company pressured him to abolish the system. As we have seen above with his wakil to Calcutta, the Awadh Ruler took this abolition as an affront to his dignity. He agreed to another compromise, however. He relinquished his private system and, in exchange, the Company agreed to carry his letters and those of his Ministers in its postal system free of postage or (acknowledged) censorship.[29]

Such independent communication links were clearly issues of prestige rather than economy for Rulers. Later, when the Awadh Ruler applied for permission to establish an electric telegraph line linking his capital with the British line at Cawnpur, the Company agreed, but only if it would operate and control the line. The Ruler refused; he apparently saw no benefit from the telegraph if it served British interests rather than his own.[30] Such postal, telegraph, and other communications systems proved to be a continued point of friction between other states and the British long after 1858.[31]

During the decades leading up to 1857, Rulers had great difficulty in maintaining channels of communication alternative to the Residents. Nevertheless, many Rulers successfully did so, at least temporarily. Ultimately, Residents proved able to command a monopoly over the communications links. Thus, Rulers had to

deal largely with the Residency system, opposing or using it, rather than working outside of it.

Rulers' Efforts to Block or Terminate a Residency

Prescient Rulers quickly recognized the danger to their authority the establishment of a Residency tended to entail. Into the early nineteenth century, the more powerful Rulers retained the capacity to block or terminate a Residency when it suited their policies to do so. A few Rulers refused a Residency altogether. Haydar Ali (ruled c.1761-82) and Tipu Sultan (1782-99) of Mysore stood out as particularly anxious to avoid having Resident posted to their court. Wellesley commenced the Fourth Mysore War (1799) with Mysore's unwillingness to accept a Resident as the casus belli.[32] In 1800, the Raja of Berar went to great lengths to avoid the appointment of a Resident at his court. He repeatedly postponed scheduled meetings with the Company's representative. When such postponing tactics failed, the Raja met with the Company's agent but, in the words of that frustrated representative, showed '...no intention, as I soon found, of treating of the terms of the proposed alliance. He eluded the advances I made for introducing this topic...' until the Company's man requested his own recall in failure.[33]

Some Rulers who already had Residencies requested the Company to withdraw either the Resident personally or the Residency as an institution. The Poona court, after only a brief experience of a Resident (combining commercial with some political duties), objected first to the person nominated to be the next Resident and then to the presence of any Resident at all. The Poona court wrote 'that [the Peshwa] wanted all the Europeans to leave Poonah, and that if the English must have a Vakeel there...a carcoon [Indian commercial representative] would be sufficient.'[34] After conflicts over the role of the Residency in their respective courts, the Nawab of Awadh (1783) and the Raja of Travancore (1791) each caused its abolition. Ultimately this proved a futile tactic in the Ruler's struggles to regain control over communications and to reduce the Resident's involvement in local affairs. In each of the

three cases above (Poona, Awadh, and Travancore), the Ruler's success proved only temporary since the Company soon restored a Residency with even greater impact on the state.[35] It proved ever more difficult for Rulers to remove a Resident or a Residency.

Eventually, the negative effects of a Resident on a Ruler's independence became clear to other Rulers. In 1821, the British encountered in Jaipur:

> ...the strong opposition that has been made to the residence of a British Officer at this place. That sentiment still continued in full force and is perhaps the only one in which the ruling Party here seem to be all unanimous.[36]

Nevertheless, Jaipur eventually got a Political Agent despite its opposition.

After some experience of the British, the Amirs of Sind likewise 'uniformly evidenced the strongest repugnance' at the appointment of a British Resident at their capital.[37] In their 1834 Treaty with the Company, they specified that even the Company's commercial agent at the mouth of the Indus 'shall not be a European gentleman.'[38] Only over the vigorous objections of the Sind Rulers — and after British military pressure had been brought to bear — was a British Resident finally appointed by the Company to Sind in 1838. The forceful policies of the Resident soon provoked an attack on the Residency in 1842 and led to war and then the Company's annexation of Sind in 1843.

In some cases, Rulers or their supporters resorted to the most extreme tactic to repudiate the Resident: attacking the Residency with force of arms. Rulers or their supporters attacked or killed political agents in Banaras (1799), at Sindhia's court (1805), in Travancore (1809), in Nagpur (1817), in Poona (1817), in Jaipur (1835), and in Sind (1842). In 1857, several Residencies, including most prominently Delhi and Lucknow, were destroyed or besieged. Significantly, while the British punished the specific leaders of such attacks, after 1857 the British in fact strengthened their reliance on Indian Rulers and indirect rule as a policy. Violent tactics, however, remained extreme and unusual resorts

for Rulers. More broadly applicable were efforts by Rulers to use, rather than oppose overtly, the Residency system.

Rulers' Employment of Company Officials

Faced with such severe constraints on their own communication links and difficulties in avoiding or ending the establishment of a Residency, some Rulers tried to make use of the Residencies for their own purposes. Rulers attempted a variety of means to accomplish this. We have already seen how Sindhia used the presence of a Resident at his court to bolster his cause against his rival Rulers. Over time, however, the Company tried to discover and counter all such efforts at manipulation of Residencies by Rulers.

Rulers preferred to deal with Residents who were sympathetic to their state. In an effort to ensure that the Company appointed a responsive man as Resident, some Rulers made their own suggestions of candidates. While the Company regularly suggested or vetoed appointments of the Ruler's Minister, as we have seen, it rejected any suggestion by the Ruler as to the selection of its Resident. Thus, for a Ruler to initiate the nomination of a candidate was for the Company to disqualify him.

Another device used by Rulers was openly to hire a Company employee. In at least seven instances, a Ruler turned the tables on the Company by formally appointing a Company official as ambassador on his behalf. During the eighteenth century, Rulers proved successful in using this tactic. At different times in the 1760s, the Ruler of the Carnatic hired a former Governor of Madras (George Pigot) and a future Governor-General (John Macpherson) as his ambassador to the English King.[39] In 1772, the Mughal Emperor appointed John Morrison, a Company official, as his 'Embassador to the Court of Great Britain'. The Governor-General indignantly rejected this proposal, censoring Morrison for his disloyalty. Nevertheless, Morrison simply resigned the Company's service and carried on to England in the capacity of Ambassador for the Mughal Emperor.[40] In 1786 the Court of Directors complained: three Rulers (of Awadh, Bengal, and Tan-

jore) 'have at this time Persons who call themselves Agents, Residents in London in the Persons of three of our own Servants Mr. Halhed for the First, Sir John D'Oyley for the Second and Mr. Ross for the Third.'[41]

In a related tactic, Rulers (including those of the Carnatic and Awadh) employed British Residents stationed at other Indian courts to represent them as well as the Company. The Awadh Ruler paid a salary to the Company's Residents at the Mughal court and with Sindhia in exchange for their representation of the Awadh court as well as the Company. The Company was itself at this time trying to obtain strict control over both the employment of Europeans by Indian Rulers and also their political communications. In 1787, the Governor-General (at the orders of the Directors) declared an end to this practice of Residents serving Indian Rulers in addition to the Company. The Residents had to be servants of the Company alone, at least officially.[42]

Rulers nevertheless tried to continue employing Company officials as their political agents despite the Company's absolute prohibition of the practice. The Company's extension of its control over the Rulers and its own officials eventually made this virtually impossible, however. In 1831, for example, the Awadh Ruler appointed Thomas Maddock — at the time Resident at his court — as his delegate to the Court of St. James. The Governor-General vetoed the proposal and demoted Maddock from the Awadh to the Nepal Residency. Unlike some of his predecessors who might have protested or ignored this order, Maddock meekly obeyed.[43] As we shall see later in this chapter, despite the ban on the open appointment by Rulers of Company employees, Rulers continued to meet some success in secretly employing the services of some Company officials. Rulers also managed to harness the Residency as an institution to the advancement of their own objectives.

Rulers' Uses of the Residency

Rulers tried to control communications with the outside world by using the Resident for their own purposes. Some Rulers dis-

covered that they could extract knowledge from the Resident by simply asking a direct question of him about knowledge that the Resident possessed and the Ruler — at least officially — did not. Especially in the nineteenth century, the British developed a belief that they themselves were morally superior to Indians. It seems to have been dissonant with the sense of honour of some Residents and of their moral purpose in India to either dissimulate or avoid a direct question. This placed the Resident in an awkward position. As the Resident at Nagpur put it when asked a point of fact by that Ruler: 'To this direct question I thought it necessary to give a candid reply, but without entering into the detail...before I am instructed....'[44] When one Resident answered a direct question too directly and gave away secret knowledge, the Governor-General chastised him and sent a circular letter to all Residents ordering them to reject any future question from a Ruler about secret matters as an 'improper request'.[45] The Company thus tried to shift the onus of impropriety from the Resident to the Ruler.

A few Rulers proved aware of their need to influence public opinion among European audiences and thus influence Company policy in their favour. The Company was able to garner support for its domination over the Rulers by portraying them in a negative light. After the Company deprived them of their own means for communication, some Rulers turned to the Resident and the Company to represent them. To counteract their generally bad press, Rulers also made efforts to induce the Company to control critical articles against them. On at least three occasions (1794, 1822, 1834), the Awadh Ruler, for example, sought to gain better publicity for himself by appealing to the Governor-General to censor the English language press. In one of these instances, that Ruler wrote:

> I am apprehensive lest the Inhabitants of distant countries, who are unacquainted with the real state of the case, may believe [the newspapers'] contents to be true.... [I] have the honor to request that your Lordship in Council will...take measures for discovering the authors of these libels and on

ascertaining them to inflict such severe punishment as will effectively prevent their committing similar offences in future.... I trust that you will at least order special injunctions to be given to the Printers, to abstain in future from publishing such extravagant and unfounded stories.[46]

For the most part, such requests by Rulers to the Company for positive publicity met with little respect from the Company or the press.

Rulers' Uses of Company Divisions

Prevented from bypassing or controlling the Resident or the Residency, some Rulers attempted to play one part of the Company against another. This met with only limited success, and then usually only during the early stages of the Residencies, while the Company underwent internal struggles and reorganizations. In each case, the several Presidencies or the several political agents of the Company in question reconciled their interests against those of the Ruler.

Until the Governor-General subordinated the other two Governors, uncertain lines of control over relations with the states remained an issue that Rulers could try to exploit. The Nawab of the Carnatic in 1775 wrote to the Governor-General seeking his intervention against the Governor of Madras, within whose Presidency the Nawab lay.[47] The Nawab wrote explaining his recognition of the supremacy of the Governor-General: '...knowing that you and the Supreme Council [in Calcutta] were appointed by the King and Parliament and Company for the regulation of all the affairs of the English Nation in India, and to enquire into the merits of every cause....' He then went on to allege that the Madras Government '...wrote to me for their own private emolument instead of the interest of the Company.' The Nawab's accusation of corruption against the Madras Governor weighed heavily in the Company's estimation. The Nawab continued that the Madras government, to discredit him, had '...transmitted...the most false and groundless stories against me...to Europe without

your knowledge.' He concluded by appealing for protection against the Governor of Madras by the higher authority of the Governor-General. The Nawab also explained that the Court of Directors and King of England had written letters of support for him and had expressed their recognition of his sovereignty. This highly sophisticated appeal by the Nawab, using a variety of arguments designed to hit upon the several points of difference and mistrust between the Governor-General and the Governor of Madras, illustrates the skill with which some Rulers sought to exploit and foment the disunity within the Company characteristic of the early Residencies. Eventually, in 1796, the Governor-General closed ranks with the Governor of Madras, now firmly under his authority, and instructed the Nawab to channel all his correspondence exclusively through the Madras Government.[48]

In instances where two Residents were nearby, some Rulers tried to set one against another. Sindhia employed this tactic in 1783, when the Resident attached to him accompanied him to Delhi, where the Mughal Emperor and his Resident were present. Sindhia approached the Delhi Resident, apparently intending to play him off against the Resident of his own court. The Delhi Resident, however, spurned Sindhia's advances.[49] Other Rulers in similar situations apparently followed this tactic. The Amirs of Sind seem to have played one Indian agent of the Company off against another just before the establishment of a Resident at their court.[50]

Even into the nineteenth century, Rulers exploited organizational divisions within the Company. In 1807, the Travancore court used its access to both political and commercial Residents to try to gain advantage.[51] In 1832, the Mysore Ruler and court set the Resident and the Company's Commissioners (who divided authority in Mysore) off against each other.[52] Using the fissions inherent in any large organization, these and other Rulers managed temporarily to divide the Company against itself. Ultimately, however, the Company reasserted its unity against such tactics by the Rulers.

The Rulers' efforts to retain their own means of communication or to use the Resident or the Residency for their purposes in this

regard thus met with only limited success at best. Over time, the capacity of the Rulers to openly oppose the Company proved increasingly futile. Nevertheless, Rulers continued to develop and deploy tactics that enabled them to counteract the intervention of the Residents in their internal affairs, at least in part.

The Indian Rulers and Indirect Rule

Rulers and their officials proved even more fundamentally concerned about the Resident's unwanted involvement in the internal administration and politics of their states than about the Company's monopolization of their political links to the outside world. Despite the efforts of Rulers, Residents intervened in the administration to some degree in virtually all states. In a few states, Rulers managed events so that the Resident generally did little more than inform his superiors about local conditions and bolster the status quo. Elsewhere, however, Rulers lost control over the administration to the Resident, who went so far as to manage the state, issuing orders and making appointments in the name of the Ruler. Overall, the Ruler and his officials largely sought to restrain the Resident from any unwelcome interference in the administration, especially in areas they considered absolutely inappropriate such as the Ruler's domestic affairs. At the same time, Rulers tried to make use of the Resident, and the subsidiary force he controlled, to strengthen the dynasty and state administration militarily and politically.

The capacity of Rulers to limit the Resident's intervention in the administration varied widely. Some Rulers simply rejected the Resident's suggestions. Other Rulers developed countermeasures that gave them some control over the degree, frequency, and type of the Resident's intervention. During the nineteenth century, Rulers found it more difficult to overtly oppose the Resident; nonetheless many Rulers found subtler ways to retain their independence from the Resident, bending him to their will. A number of Rulers simply capitulated almost fully in the face of the Resident's power. The relative success of Rulers and officials in resisting or using the Resident depended on the strategies and

tactics each side used, as well as larger issues such as the respective personalities and conditions of the Ruler and the Resident, the local situation in the state, and Company policy of the day.

Rulers and administrators made diverse efforts both to maintain their control over the administration of the state in the face of the Resident and, indeed, to try to use the Residency for their own advantage. I have delineated three overall strategies developed as conscious policy or through happenstance by various Rulers or their supporters at different times. First, they tried to neutralize the Resident by trying to reject, avoid, isolate, discredit, or otherwise render him ineffective for the Company. Second, Rulers and officials tried to co-opt the Resident (or a member of his staff) into the Ruler's interests rather than the Company's. Third, they submitted themselves to the control of the Resident by withdrawing from involvement in the state administration, either by choice or perforce. In this third pattern, the cultural life of the court, or the presence of the Resident himself, became the main validation of their status as Ruler. By no means chronological, these strategies met with varying results.

In many ways, these strategies overlapped with the strategies we have already examined above for the Ruler and foreign relations: incorporate the Residents into the existing system of wakils, maintain media of communications alternate to the Resident, prevent a Residency from being established in the state, use the Resident or the Residency for the Ruler's own purposes, and divide the Company against itself. Through our examination of these strategies, and their specific tactical applications, we can assess Indian resistance to or manipulation of the system of British indirect rule.

Rulers Reject the Resident's Intervention

During the early stages of the Residencies, a number of Rulers proved able simply to reject the Resident's interference in their internal affairs. As we have seen above, a few Rulers managed to stave off the imposition of the Residency on their state, at least temporarily. Even after a Residency was established, some Rulers

during periods when the Company bound itself not to intervene, proved able to reject the Resident's advice and intervention in the internal affairs of the state.

At least in the early stages of the Residency, some Rulers found it incompatible with the Resident's status as a wakil posted to court that he should interfere in internal matters of state. Even the Mughal Emperor, virtually a prisoner at the time, rejected the Resident's advice that he change Chief Ministers. As the Emperor resentfully indicated to the Governor- General in 1784:

> ...I trust hon'ble sir, you will allow that it is not very probable that the supreme Minister of any State, should resign his Office, and retire to a private Life, on the advice of a Foreign Resident at his Master's Court...[53]

Further, the Mughal Emperor continued to send orders to the Company. For example as late as 1794 the Emperor ordered the Company to use its army to restore his imperial family to power.[54] Thus, in the eighteenth century, some of the Rulers simply continued to assume they could reject the advice of the Resident and treat the Company as a subordinate power. During the nineteenth century, exactly such 'advice' from a Resident did have the probability, indeed the near certainty, of inducing a Minister to resign, in Delhi or virtually any other state.

At various times, a number of other Rulers also tried by decree or request to preclude the Resident from involvement in the affairs of the administration. In 1799, the Awadh Ruler clearly followed such a course. By strictly interpreting the extant treaties with the Company (according to the Resident) the Ruler's:

> ...views are directed to the enjoyment of a full authority over his household affairs, hereditary dominions, and subjects, according to the most strict interpretation of the clause of the 17th article of the treaty.... [W]hat he aims at is the independent management of his Dominions, to the exclusion of an interference and inspection on the part of the English Government, and to the gradual diminution of its influence over the internal administration of his country.[55]

In this instance, as in most others, the Company responded to each such effort at rejection by the Ruler according to its own policies at the time. Here, the Company wished to follow a policy of increased intervention and so it brushed aside the Ruler's commands or careful reading of the treaty and pushed for more control by the Resident; short of appealing for justice, the Ruler had no other recourse in the face of the Company's armies. In other instances, the Company accepted the argument of a Ruler that the Resident had no right to intervene. As we have already seen (in Chapters 4-6), the history of intervention reflected a combination of local issues — including the attitudes and actions of Rulers — and Company policy of the day.

Rulers Avoid Residents

One of the uses made by Rulers of the rituals and ceremonies of the formal meetings with the Resident was to avoid, rather than reject through direct confrontation, the Resident's demands. This tactic — especially effective in the face of the Resident's insistence on a measure uncongenial to the Ruler — consisted of avoidance by the Ruler of meetings or the topic, often using a diplomatic excuse. A number of Residents report how frustrating consistent use of this tactic was for them.[56]

Since the Resident normally worked through influence or suggestion and respected the formalities of court intercourse, he could not force the Ruler's hand without risking a dangerous confrontation and breach of etiquette. A Ruler who remained officially indisposed, on a hunting trip or pilgrimage, or simply politely deaf to a Resident's efforts to raise and stick to a controversial topic, could postpone serious negotiations over something the Company wanted but he did not. This stalling could gain the Ruler valuable time, useful for instance to discover what his rival Rulers had agreed to with their Residents.[57] Ultimately, however, this tactic could only hold off the Resident temporarily. The Company could eventually force the Ruler's hand through ever-increasing levels of threat or simply by ignoring his opposition and carrying out the measure on the basis of the Company's military power.

Rulers Isolate the Resident

Of great concern to most Rulers was the Company's identification and then appropriation of their revenues or accumulated funds. In many ways, the Indian states represented to the British a source for a range of resources. The officials of the Company, often perceiving their own needs as more important than those of the states, sought to identify and extract many of those resources, regardless of the needs of the Rulers. To obtain knowledge of the state, the Resident had to develop sources of information from within its administration. This some Rulers prevented, at least in part, by isolating the Resident from those officials and courtiers who might form potential informants.

Rulers hit upon various tactics for isolating the Resident. The Peshwa allowed the Resident to communicate with the administration only through a single designated official, one whom the Resident found 'in no respect a proper person for the purpose.'[58] The Raja of Jodhpur also limited the Resident's communications to a single (to the Resident's mind, unsatisfactory) official in 1824.[59] Other Rulers also proved able to isolate Residents in this way for considerable periods of time.

Some Rulers decreed an unofficial ban on all contact with the Resident for the officials and notables of the state. In Hyderabad, the Ruler consistently prevented his officials or other notables from approaching the Resident. Hyderabad Residents Sydenham (1805-10), Metcalfe (1820-5), and Fraser (1838-53) each reported how frustrating this isolation could be. Sydenham wrote that the Ruler 'wished there might be no personal intercourse between [the Minister] and myself.'[60] Metcalfe wrote 'how little the intercourse is which exists between the Court and the Residency.... [P]revented either by their own inclinations or by the Jealousy of the Nizam...none of those who can be called the Nobles of the City have any personal communication with the Residency.'[61] In the same vein Fraser wrote:

> I have remained in the same isolated state as at first, and in which I imagine that most, if not all, of my predecessors have been purposely kept.... [S]carcely any person above the

> rank of a merchant or soucar [moneylender], or at most, some native gentleman who happens to be entirely unconnected with the Government, is even permitted to come near me...[because it] was forbidden or tacitly prevented.... [M]en of rank and eminence remain entirely strangers to me, and I to them.[62]

Courtiers or officials who broke the ban and heeded the Resident's invitations incurred displeasure and, occasionally, punishment by the Ruler.

Allied to this tactic, Rulers blocked access to knowledge about the state's finances from the Company. In 1843, following the financial exploitation of Hyderabad by officials of the Company and other Europeans, the Nizam apparently hoarded huge amounts of specie in his private treasuries while at the same time letting Hyderabad state itself go as hugely into debt. Whenever the Resident's threats about the state debt became too severe, the Ruler calmly assured him that there was plenty in his private treasuries to cover the deficit.[63] By keeping the Company uncertain about the financial condition of the state, a Ruler could sometimes avoid expropriation of the 'surplus' by the Company in the form of loans or subsidies to the Company.

Other Rulers hit upon the same tactic. Barnett has pointed out how the Company tried to acquire an economic portrait of Awadh during the late 1770s and the widespread and deliberate devices used by the administration to keep knowledge — and therefore the substance — of these revenues out of the Company's hands.[64] The Awadh court continued to follow this tactic well into the nineteenth century.[65] By cutting the Resident off from information about the state, the Ruler could avoid informed interference.

The cost to the Ruler, on occasion, was poorly informed intervention by the Resident. In 1826, the Company's acute need for cash induced the Governor-General to order the Resident at Lucknow to secure a loan from the Awadh Ruler of Rs 5,000,000 at low (5 per cent) interest. That Muslim Ruler objected to the loans on religious grounds (as usury) and on practical grounds (pleading his own debts). Nevertheless, the Governor-General persisted,

determined to believe that the Ruler had vast sums hidden away. When the Ruler tried to make four concessions by the Company a prerequisite for the inevitable loan, the Governor-General promised to consider them and extracted the funds. In the end, the Ruler obtained full satisfaction about none of the four points.[66] Thus, the Resident might plunge ahead in pursuit of the Company's goals, heedless or ignorant of its effects on the state.

Control over knowledge and information thus proved a goal of the Rulers as well as the Company. By limiting the types and amount of knowledge to which the Resident had access, Rulers could try to protect their resources from expropriation by the Company. By rendering the Resident ineffective for the Company, either through isolation or through discrediting him, the Rulers strove to preclude intervention into the internal affairs of their states.

Rulers Discredit Residents

In some instances, Rulers or their officials neutralized the Resident by discrediting him in the eyes of the Company. Rulers, their Ministers, or simply anonymous sources made a range of accusations against Residents, some apparently true, others patently false, most unprovable at the time and even more so today. A Resident who stood accused of almost any charge usually lost — even if just temporarily — some of his effectiveness for the Company. The Resident at Delhi wrote in 1785 about

> ...the Difficulty of removing a Suspicion [of the Resident] of any kind once conceived.... Suspicion, like the poisoned shirt of Hercules, can only be thrown off with the Life of the Wearer.[67]

Rulers and their courtiers apparently realized this. Residents proved particularly susceptible to accusations against them in the days before the Company had worked out precedents and built a bureaucratized Residency system.

The range of charges against the Residents varied widely. Rulers or officials accused a number of Residents of using their

position to extort money; some undoubtedly did so. Even lacking any supporting evidence, Rulers and their supporters levied many such charges against Residents. The Chief Minister of Mysore state, for example, allegedly accused the top British Political Officers in that state of corruption. After a flurry of concerned inquiries by the Company, the Chief Minister dropped the accusations and even denied having made them.[68] The Chief Minister of Hyderabad wrote the Governor-General accusing the Resident in that state of two charges of sexual misconduct: kidnapping the daughter of a brazier for sexual abuse and demanding an Indian official of the Company supply — on pain of dismissal — a daughter for the Resident to marry. After much unpleasant investigation of the Resident's behaviour, these charges were dismissed by the Company as unfounded.[69] Some Rulers accused their Resident of simple incompetence.[70]

Most frequent were charges by a Ruler that the Resident had engaged in improper procedures, insulting to the dignity and honour of that Ruler. Especially during the early days of the Residencies, a Ruler who distrusted a Resident, and expressed his distrust to the Company, could render that Resident at least partially ineffective. Such accusations by Rulers against Residents of insulting behaviour could be taken quite seriously by the Company.[71] In some cases, the Company recalled accused Residents since they had so alienated the court as to be 'useless' for further political intercourse there, regardless of their guilt or innocence.[72] On occasion, Residents did follow procedures which the Ruler complained of and the Company could not approve. In 1830, as we have seen, the Mughal Emperor listed a dozen breaches of etiquette and acts of disrespect toward him and his imperial family by the acting Resident at Delhi. The Resident admitted to most of the acts but argued that such disrespect was Company policy. The Governor-General chided — but did not otherwise punish — the Resident for having 'been wanting in the proper observance of the established forms of etiquette to which all natives of Rank attach so much importance and which are particularly due from the British Representative towards the Royal Family at Delhi.'[73]

In other instances, the Company backed the Resident despite the hostility of the Ruler.[74] Often, the Ruler complained of an insult when the Resident was simply representing a policy the Company wished but the Ruler did not. The determining factors in the Company's decision to recall or support the Resident in the face of the Ruler's accusations seem to have been the respective reputations of the Ruler and Resident as individuals, the relative condition of the state and the Company, and the official and unofficial policy of the Company at the time toward intervention. By the 1840s and 1850s, much that the Residents did offended the Rulers and discrediting accusations by the Rulers against the Residents apparently carried less weight with the Company.

Rulers Co-opt the Resident into the World of the Court

Each of the Indian states had a distinct cultural identity which had persisted through time. When the Resident first arrived, the court determined the world in which the Resident necessarily functioned. All Residents therefore had, to some degree, to accept the local ground rules. By various means, some Rulers proved able to co-opt the Resident into the world of the court to such a degree that he identified with and served the state's concerns as well as, or in preference to, those of the Company.

Central to this strategy of incorporating the Resident into the interests of the Ruler often lay the separation of the Briton as a person from his institutional role as Resident, responsible solely to the Company. The British had done much to work out this same issue of personal versus public responsibility for the Company as a whole following the reforms of Robert Clive (1765-7) and trial (1788-95) of Warren Hastings, accused (among other charges) of taking personal profit from the use of his office. The Residencies were one of the divisions of the Company where it recognized that 'corruption', that is the blurring of the distinction between private and public interests, was most persistent and widespread.

Most Indian Rulers and officials had very different perceptions from the British about the relationship between an individual and the office he held. The British often remarked critically both on

the lack of distinction between a Ruler's privy and public treasuries and on an Indian official's treatment of his office as a personal possession. In some Indian states, official posts in the administration were routinely sold or 'farmed' (i.e. rented to the highest bidder) by a Ruler, a superior official, or the incumbent. During the nineteenth century, the British were themselves ending such practices in Britain as 'rotten boroughs' in Parliament (1832), the patronage of the Court of Directors in the appointments of Company officials (1853), and the purchase of British Army commissions (1871). British criticism of 'corruption' by Indians proved uneven. The Company both expected Indian Rulers to use bribery and be 'corrupt' and also smugly held these practices up to invidious comparison with their own standards (if not practice). British criticism of corruption among Europeans or Indians in the Company's service proved all the more strident since impurity within the Company tarnished its self-image of moral superiority over Indians.

The use of 'bribes' by the Rulers as a way of incorporating employees of the Company into the interests of the court proved effective for several British Residents. The Residencies, as the link between the Company and the states, proved repeatedly subject to the stresses due to discrepancies between these different moral systems. As we shall see in Chapter 8, the Indian officials who worked for the Company — and therefore shared both moral systems — proved particularly susceptible to the inherent stresses. Indeed, the Company did not at first clearly define the role of the Ruler in the financial affairs of the Residency itself.

The expenses of early Residencies were borne by the host Ruler. This meant that the Rulers paid not only the household expenses of the Residents but their official salaries as well. The salaries paid by the Rulers to the Resident often proved lavish by Company, or any other, standard. The Resident to Awadh, perhaps the most well paid, received Rs 240,000 annually (equivalent to some 24,000 pounds). Even after the Company temporarily withdrew this Residency, the Awadh Ruler continued this allowance to the former Resident. Later, the Company had the Ruler reduce the Resident's salary to half the amount, still a princely Rs 120,000.[75]

When the Court of Directors learned of this practice, they ordered the salary of the Resident reduced even further to the standard level for such offices: Rs 35,856, an 85 per cent reduction.[76]

As the Resident's relationship to Rulers changed toward indirect rule, the Company realized that having the Ruler pay the salary and expenses of the Resident would likely affect the Resident's freedom to control the Ruler. As a result, the Company itself assumed the expenses of the Residencies. Recognizing the temptations offered the Resident, the Company tried to set what it considered a generous scale of salary and benefits for the Residents. On the other hand, the Company persistently sought to economize on its expenses everywhere, including the Residencies. While Chapter 3 has gone into the details of the expenses of the Residencies, including salaries, it is important here to keep in mind that the scale of the Resident's official salary was dwarfed, compared to the amounts of money available at the discretion of the Rulers. As a result, one of the most widespread tactics used by Rulers or officials to co-opt the Residents was simply to bribe them. While, in some cases, the Resident undoubtedly used his position to extort money from Indians with whom he dealt, in others the initiative came from Rulers or courtiers seeking influence in the Residency.

The forms of 'bribery' used by Rulers and officials varied considerably. In some cases, they just offered the Resident money. Many bribes presumably went undetected and unreported by the Company. Nevertheless, Residents occasionally reported bribery attempts which they had rejected. Such reports of rejected bribery attempts were couched by the reporting Resident in language that proclaimed both British virtue and also the relative immorality of Indians. Examples of the sums offered as general sweeteners, without any immediate quid pro quo, indicate how interested Rulers and officials were in co-opting the Resident: Rs 100,000 (Resident Poona, 1791), Rs 400,000 (Resident Hyderabad, 1806), Rs 40,000 (twice, Political Agent Harowti, 1824).[77] In addition, the Resident at Poona repeatedly rejected the Rs 7,200 Rupees allowance for *mehmani*, or 'guest money' the Poona court insisted he take. Even though he did not accept the money, the court kept the

amount current. Finally, 'The subject having lately been again pressed against him [the Political Agent] with great earnestness, he was under the necessity of receiving ten thousand rupees on account of the arrears....'[78]

Less to demonstrate British virtue than to uncover British participation in Indian corruption, some Company officials reported bribes that had been accepted by their British predecessors or superiors in the Residency. One Resident at Delhi took bribes totalling over Rs 156,000 by 1829, as demonstrated by his assistant.[79] The Residency in Awadh was notorious as the place where 'the purity of the Company's servants has been most suspected.' At least one Resident (Maddock, 1829-31) was proved by his successor to have been systematically corrupt, and several others there were suspected by the Company to have been so.[80] In an unusual instance, a British tourist on her return to England published a book detailing a series of charges, evidently only partially true, against the Political Agent in Jaipur.[81]

Less direct were transfers of wealth from Rulers or their courtiers to the Resident as part of a private business transaction outside their official duties. Many Rulers, barred from direct bribery, were delighted to purchase an item or borrow money from a Resident or other Company official at far above the market rate. By 1795, the Awadh Ruler owed some Rs 5,000,000 to 'English Gentlemen', including Rs 750,000 to 'the Senior Assistant in the Resident's office.'[82] Other Rulers, such as those of the Carnatic and Tanjore, also involved large numbers of Company employees in financial arrangements highly profitable to those employees personally.[83] In Hyderabad (discussed more extensively in Chapter 9), some 5,000 of the Company's officials throughout India, both European and Indian, reaped large sums by personally loaning money to the state as private individuals or through corporate bodies. Later British-sponsored reforms of Hyderabad state's finances caused severe losses to some of these investors. In each case, these transactions presumably affected the performance of these officials by setting up a conflict of interest.

The British Government laid down a series of regulations to prevent such financial transactions. A 1796 Act of Parliament,

reiterated by the Governor-General, forbade all Europeans, including Residents, to have any financial transactions with any Ruler without the Governor-General's approval.[84] The Company, indeed, on several occasions felt the need for new regulations and then repeatedly circulated these regulations to all Residents, testimony to the ongoing threat of such abuses. As late as 1849, the Court of Directors still tried to close loopholes by 'prohibiting all sales of whatever amount, by political officers to the Native princes or Chiefs to whom they are accredited or to their relatives or Ministers.'[85] Nevertheless, such transactions seem to have continued, each one transferring wealth — and perhaps obligation — from the Ruler or his courtiers to the Resident.

Rulers also engaged in other tactics to co-opt Residents. Suggestive of his bonds of friendship with a former Resident (and perhaps to influence the current Resident), the Peshwa gave honoured employment to the illegitimate son of his court's late Resident and an Indian woman.[86] Other Rulers hired the children of members of the Residency staff, or hired away staff members themselves, or even hired a 'near Relative' of the Governor-General.[87] The quid pro quo expected by the Ruler often proved obvious to the Resident. In this last instance, the Resident reported that the Ruler made apparent what he expected in return. By employing Governor-General Hastings' relative, Dr. B. Macleod, as tutor for his son, the Raja believed:

> He binds himself to the Marquis of Hastings. He expects to obtain, through the influence of Dr. Macleod, the public recognition of his Son as his Heir and successor, and some other Benefits.[88]

Another man closely connected with Lord Hastings was deeply involved in the financial scandals in Hyderabad state.[89]

For their money, the Rulers and officials obtained a range of results. At best, they acquired information about Company policies, more favourable treatment at the hands of Residents, positive mention in the Residency reports, and some measure of control over the Company's involvement in their state. At worst, they received no favours from the Resident and were out the

relatively small — to them — amounts expended. Since the British expected Rulers to use bribery, exposure of a Ruler's attempted bribe only confirmed British expectations; Rulers rarely if ever seem to have been punished or chastised by the Company for making the attempt. Therefore, there were few reasons for the Rulers not to attempt to buy the Residents into their interests instead of those of the Company.

Rulers Incorporate Residents into Court Life

Far more subtle than bribes were efforts by Rulers to incorporate the Resident into the life of the court. Many Residents proved attracted to the 'oriental splendor' of the Rajas, Nawabs, and other Rulers. Numerous commentators have remarked how many Britons, arriving as officials in India, revised upward their perception of their own social class. Few of the Company's career servants were themselves from the hereditary British nobility yet, in India, the Residents in particular among the Company's officials took a place of honour and power among noble and titled Indians. Rulers seem to have played on the attraction their world held for many Residents.

Some Rulers bestowed ornate Persian titles on their Residents, thus enrolling the Resident into the cultural values and traditions of their courts. In Hyderabad, for example, titles received by Residents from the Ruler included Dilawar Jang, 'Bold in War' (John Kennaway, 1788-94), Hashamat Jang, Farzand-i Mahabbat Paiwand, 'Magnificence in War, Beloved Son' (James Achilles Kirkpatrick, 1798-1805), Sabit Jang, 'Proved in War' (Henry Russell, 1811-20), and Muntazam al-Daula, 'Regulator of the State' (Charles Metcalfe, 1820-5).[90] Since these Residents used these titles regularly in correspondence we must conclude that they identified with them and thus with the system of Indian honours.

The degree of incorporation of some Residents in the values and culture of courts is quite evident. The processions of Residents often imitated Mughal grandees. The early British Residents in particular became notorious even among their contemporaries for their affinity for the traditions and practices of the

court to which they were stationed. John Collins (Resident with Sindhia, 1788-1803, then Resident at Lucknow until his death in 1807) moved in state with a zananah [separate women's quarters] for his Indian wives and held the epithet 'King Collins' among his subordinates. David Octerlony (Resident in Delhi and supervising Rajputana, 1803-25, with a few absences for military service) also used to promenade his wives — in parda — on elephants around the Residency. James Tod (who served in the Residency with Sindhia, 1805-18, and in Rajputana, 1818-22) clearly identified with Rajput court life, as evidenced in his *Annals and Antiquities of Rajast'han or the Central and Western Rajpoot States of India.*[91] Residents at Lucknow annually distributed charity of Rs 400 of the Company's money at Muharram, the period of fasting and lament over the death of the Shii martyrs.[92] A Resident of Hyderabad sought to supplement his escort of 112 infantry with an additional 25 or 30 cavalry for '...a certain degree of Show or State — to the impression of which the natives are so susceptible...'[93] I might add that many Residents likewise proved susceptible to such degrees of 'Show or State'.

The degree to which Rulers consciously tried to co-opt Residents through incorporation into the style and culture of the Court can never be precisely known. To some extent, Rulers apparently simply believed that such a life-style would be appropriate for the Resident as a dignitary at their court. The effect, in any event, was to bring the Resident into participation in the traditions of the court. As we have seen, by the 1840s, the British had largely begun to distance themselves from such participation in the rituals of court, except to alter the symbols used so as to demonstrate British cultural and political superiority. Whatever the success of the Ruler's incorporative policies in the early days of the Residencies, therefore, by the mid-nineteenth century they largely proved less effective as controls over the Resident.

Rulers Defer to Residents

Faced by a determined Resident, who held the backing of the Company, Rulers could do little to oppose Residents openly.

From the Ruler's perspective, the inconsistent policies of the Company and Residents over time must have seemed whimsical, arbitrary, or deliberately provocative. The frustration felt by some Rulers in such situations led them to resign themselves to the will of the Company, throwing themselves on its mercy and entrusting themselves to its good will. Being subject to the imposition of indirect rule proved totally incompatible with the self-image of many Rulers.

Faced with an intolerable Company policy or Resident, a Ruler might cast the issue in terms of honour. The Ruler, refusing to cooperate in what he considered a dishonourable act, might offer to withdraw and let the British do whatever they felt proper. The Awadh Rulers tried these and related tactics. Asaf al-Daula (1775-97) appealed to the Governor-General, in his own handwriting, reporting his demeaning confrontation with the Resident over, in this case, the appointment of the Resident's nominee as state Treasurer:

> I represented to him [the Resident] in the most earnest and forcible terms by message, that this measure would be of no benefit to him — but that it would cover me with indignity and dishonor, in the eyes of all mankind.... For two days repeatedly I sent my [state] seal to [the Resident] by the Mawlavee, that he might do whatever he thought proper.... Allow me not to be rendered contemptible in this country where we have lived for three generations in Honor and Prosperity.[94]

By sending his seal to the Resident, Asaf al-Daula appealed to the British sense of the dignity of a Ruler. In this instance it succeeded.

Another Awadh ruler had less success with this tactic. Saadat Ali Khan (1798-1814), confronted by other unacceptable British demands, threatened to resign his throne to his heir rather than cooperate with the Resident. To his dismay, the British called his bluff and drew up a treaty by which he would cede all Awadh to the Company.[95] After much protestation on his part and appeals to the Resident, this Ruler eventually had to give up half his

territories in order to retain the throne. Other Rulers, like the Nizam of Hyderabad, also attempted this tactic saying: 'if there was anything with which [the Resident] was dissatisfied in the Administration of his Affairs, he wished [the Resident] would become his Minister.'[96]

Clearly, some of these offers to place themselves utterly in the Resident's hands were simply rhetorical or tactical moves by the Ruler. In other cases, however, Rulers did indeed withdraw from virtually all concern with the state administration. Mehta points out that the Rulers of Hyderabad, Awadh, Mysore and Baroda all withdrew from matters of state under Lord Hastings.[97] Lurid stories were circulated by Residents and British travellers about the dissipation of Rulers in sexual, religious, poetic or other artistic pursuits. Any truth in these stories probably had as their cause, at least in part, the frustration felt by these Rulers with their condition of being indirectly ruled by the Resident. Walia argues that the British intended to demean the princes in order to subjugate them to British supremacy.[98] At certain periods, this might indeed have been British intention. If so, these self-denigrating tactics by some Rulers would have advanced this British end. At least as much a contributing factor was the nature of indirect rule itself.

The Resident as Symbol of Status for Rulers

Rulers did not regard Residents only as a source of danger, many Rulers saw the Resident as an addition to their status and security. We have seen that the presence of many wakils, dispatched by other Rulers to a court, traditionally added dignity to the host Ruler as symbols of the world's regard for him. Residents from the Company were initially esteemed in this way. In 1785, the Mughal Emperor wrote that it would be disrespectful to him for the Governor-General to withdraw the Delhi Residency.[99] Residents, like the Company, however changed their relationship to the Rulers over time.

As Rulers saw the Company rise from the status of regional power to the dominant military and political force in India, they

endeavoured to use it to buttress their rule. We have already examined subsidiary forces as supports for Rulers. I now turn to the Ruler's use of the Resident himself.

The Resident, over time, became a symbol in the rituals of the court. His absence indicated to the audiences of these rituals that the Company was displeased with the Ruler; his presence indicated support. Thus, while Rulers tried to exclude Residents from unwanted interventions in the state, they also tried to use the Resident as a means of support for their rule or policies. The Residents were fully aware of this. In 1787, the Raja of Tanjore appointed his heir and then invited the Resident to dine with them both. The Ruler apparently believed that the presence of the Resident at such an occasion would bestow the Company's approval on the designated heir. After extensive discussions with his staff, the Resident decided to reject the invitation lest it lend the Company's tacit approval prematurely to the controversial appointment.[100]

With the establishment of paramountcy by the Company, the presence of a Residency — rather than a threat to the Ruler — had itself become an indispensable mark of his status. In several instances, Rulers pleaded that the Residency be maintained. When, in 1829, the Company proposed withdrawing the Residency at Pudukkotai on the grounds of budgetary economy, that Ruler wrote pleadingly for revocation of the order lest, in the words of the Raja, 'I may thereby suffer much dishonour, loss and shame.'[101] Under similar circumstances the same year (1829), the Ruler of the Carnatic referred to the proposed removal of his Residency as a 'great degradation to this Durbar.'[102] Likewise, when told in 1841 that his Resident was to be withdrawn, the Maharaja of Mysore:

> ...wept most bitterly...[saying:] So long as he had a Resident separately deputed to his Court, he felt he was still considered as one of the Princes of India — by his [Resident's] removal he would be lowered to the level of a Poligar [landlord]... I have more money than I spend but if I had not, I would gladly take a meal less and have the comfort and

> dignity of having a Resident and the Residency... I will *most gladly* pay all the cost of the Residency Establishment including the Resident's and Doctor's salary [if the Residency be retained].[103]

Other Rulers also protested the termination of the Residency at their courts as a reduction in their status. In 1843, the Mughal Emperor secretly obtained information about such a proposal to eliminate the Residency and showed great concern about it to the Resident.[104] In each of these cases, the Company permitted the Residency to remain as a symbol of the Ruler's dignity.

In some courts, the Resident — and the European culture which he embodied — came to stand as a model to be emulated by 'modern' courtiers and even Rulers. Nasir al-Din Haidar (1827-37) of Awadh, among other Rulers, attempted to demonstrate how modern and westernized he was by imitating European dress and customs. He even went to the extent of enrolling in the British Society of Architects.[105] In a further symbolic statement about his relationship to the Resident, in 1832, he proposed tearing down the Residency and building a new palace for himself on the prominent spot. The Company rejected this as degrading to its dignity and that of the Resident.[106] Thus, for both sides, the Residency proved a potent symbol within the state.

Conclusion

The strategies and tactics developed and deployed by the various Rulers and officials thus did much to shape how indirect rule functioned in a particular state. The variety in the treaties suggests how each state was able to affect its relationship with the British. While many of the same phrases appear in a number of treaties concluded during the same period, there are striking differences as well, as one or another Ruler objected to or insisted on one or another provision. In each court distinct local practices tended to vary as well, reflecting the peculiar history of the relationships between each Ruler and each Resident. One strategy of a Ruler or official would be matched by one of the Company;

different tactics followed by each side resulted in a range of outcomes. At times of crisis, as in 1857, Rulers had to make particularly difficult decisions as to whom to support and how.

Bound as Rulers were to the Resident as the agent of indirect rule over them, Rulers clearly had mixed feelings about their relationship to him. The efforts by the Rulers to control or use the Resident matched those of the Resident to control or use the Ruler. The outcome of these struggles was the Residency system. During the conflict of 1857, several Residencies, most notably that in Lucknow, proved crucial symbols. For the British, the Residency proved a rallying point and a bastion against the Indian 'mutineers'. For the Indian Rulers and deposed Rulers, the Residency was the germ of British imperialism that had to be expunged before it once again spread.

The decisions a Ruler made as to tactics and strategy might lead to his acquisition of new powers or new lands at the hands of the British, or to his loss of territory, rights, or even the throne. Thus, the actions of individual Rulers had significant effects on indirect rule in their state, and — when aggregated — on the system of indirect rule as a whole in India.

NOTES

1. Suja uddaula to President, BSC, 30 September 1772, No. 1; Secret Consultations, 23 December 1776, Eur MS Addl 28977, Warren Hastings Papers, vol. V, BM; Minute of the Governor-General, 7 August 1776, FSC, 7 August 1776, No.15; Arzee of Vakeel of Ranna of Gohud, n.d., BSC, 6 December 1779; Governor-General to David Anderson, 4 November 1781, BSC, 10 December 1781; Governor-General to Chapman, 28 November 1781, BSC, 10 December 1781.

2. Aitchison, *passim*.

3. Ibid

4. Governor-General to Resident Poona, 29 May 1800, Eur MS Addl 15596, BM.

5. Governor-General's Letter to Bombay, 9 December 1776, Consultations, 9 December 1776, Warren Hastings Papers, Eur MS Addl 28986, vol. 14, October-December 1776, BM.

6. Governor-General to Board, 28 November 1781, BSC, 28 November 1781.

7. Governor-General in Council to Court of Directors, 20 October 1783, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 15, eds. C.H. Philips and B.B. Misra (1963), p. 202.

8. Resident (Poona) to Governor-General, 11 May 1785, Malet Collection of Private Letters, F.149, IOL.

9. Minute of the Governor-General, 7 December 1785, FSC, 7 December 1785, no. 7a.

10. Resident (Sindhia) to Governor-General, 17 March 1787, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 1, ed. Jadunath Sarkar (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1936), pp. 144-5.

11. Secretary to Government to Resident (Sindhia), 6 October 1790, Foreign Miscellaneous Series, vol. 14, n.p.

12. Sindhia to Resident with Sindhia, 4 December 1797, FSC, 6 February 1798, no. 14. See also Governor-General to Resident Sindhia, 4 May 1795, Political Consultation, 4 May 1795, No. 5, Eur MS Add 13600, BM.

13. See Resident (Poona) to Governor-General, 1 March 1799, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 6, ed. G.S. Sardesai (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1939), pp.351ff.

14. William Lee-Warner, *The Native States of India* (London: Macmillan, 1910), p. 220. This figure apparently included states beyond India proper.

15. Aitchison, *passim*.

16. Aitchison, 2:89-95.

17. Resident Tanjore to Chief Secretary to Government Fort St. George, 31 August 1813, and Secretary to Government to Acting Resident Nagpur, 15 October 1813, FPC, 15 October 1813, Nos. 3, 4. Aitchison, 2:519-27.

18. Resident (Poona) to Governor-General, 12 March 1786, Eur MS F. 149, Malet Collection, IOL.

19. Envoy to King of Oude to Secretary to Government of India, Foreign Department, 31 August 1844, FPC, 5 October 1844, No. 155.

20. Resident (Lucknow) to Secretary to Government Political Department, 20 July 1833, FPC, 2 August 1833, No. 27.

21. Resident (Lucknow) to King of Oudh, 10 August 1853, Indian Political and Foreign Consultations, 26 August 1853, No. 52.

22. Prasad, p. 7.

23. Resident (Hyderabad) to Secretary to Government of India, 24 October 1843, FPC, 3 February 1844, No. 182.

24. Secretary to Government to Resident (Travancore), 28 January 1803, Correspondence of C. Macaulay, Eur MS Addl 13692, BM; Resident (Travancore) to Governor Madras, 24 May 1809, PR 12:659.

25. Proclamations, 17 February 1803, Madras Political Consultations, 11 February 1803.

26. E.g. as reported in Resident (Mysore) to Secretary to Governor-General, 2 June 1838, FPC, 1 August 1838, No. 69.

27. E.g. Secretary to Government Fort St. George Secret Department to Resident (Mysore), 4 January 1814, Foreign Miscellaneous Series, vol. 127, Madras Archives. Secretary to Government to King of Oude, 14 August 1826, BPC, 18 August 1826, No. 7.

28. Secretary to Governor-General to Resident Lucknow, 16 October 1834, BPC, 16 October 1834, No. 16. Resident Lucknow to Political Secretary to Government of India, 27 October 1838, IPC, 14 November 1838, No. 52.

29. Resident to Secretary to Government, 2 August 1839, IPC, 20 July 1840.

30. Resident to Secretary to Government, 22 March 1855, 7 August 1855, and 26 September 1855, Indian Political and Foreign Consultations, *passim.*

31. E.g. for discussion of this issue for Hyderabad in the late nineteenth century, see Sheela Raj, *Medievalism to Modernism: Socio-economic and Cultural History of Hyderabad 1869-1911* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1987), pp. 145-74.

32. See Chapter 10 on Mysore.

33. Resident Nagpur to Governor-General, 7 August 1800, *Poona Residency Correspondence,* vol. 5, ed. Y.M. Kale (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1938), pp. 55-83.

34. Bombay Council to Resident Poona, 3 January 1778, Consultation, 16 February 1778, Eur MS Addl 28990, Warren Hastings Papers, vol. 18, BM.

35. Board Resolution, 17 February 1784, Foreign Secret Consultations, 17 February 1784, No. 32. PR 12:651-59.

36. J. Stewart to Secretary to Government in the Secret and Political Department, 18 May 1821, in Narendra Krishna Sinha and Arun Kumar Dasgupta, eds, *Selections from Octerlony Papers (1818-1825)* (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1964), p. 152.

37. *Speech of J. Sullivan, Esq., on the Case of the Ameers of Sinde* (London: James Ridgway, 1844), p. 4.

38. Aitchison, 8:322-4.

39. See C.S. Srinivasachari, *The Inwardness of British Annexations in India* (Madras: University of Madras, 1951), p. 71.

40. John Morrison to Governor-General, 6 December 1772 and Governor-General to John Morrison, 12 December 1772, BSC, 12 December 1772, Nos. 59, 60.

41. Court of Directors to Governor-General, 21 July 1786, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 10, ed. Raghubir Sinh (New Delhi: National Archives of India, 1972), pp. 148-9.

42. Court of Directors to Governor-General in Council, 31 July 1787, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 10, ed. Raghubir Sinh (New Delhi: National Archives of India, 1972), p. 273.

43. Resident (Lucknow) to Secretary to Governor-General, 14 April 1831 and Minute of Governor-General, 11 July 1831, BPC, 29 July 1831, Nos. 13, 15.

44. Resident Nagpore to Governor-General, 17 October 1799, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 5, ed. Y.M.Kale (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1938), p. 40.

45. Secretary to Government to Agent of the Governor-General Delhi, 2 May 1843, FPC, 24 May 1843 and circular, No. 11.

46. Tafazzal Husayn Khan to Governor-General, 18 April 1794, CPC, 11:75. King of Oudh to Governor-General, 1 July 1822, BPC, 2 August 1822. King of Oudh to Governor-General, 3 November 1834, IPC, 10 December 1834, No. 26.

47. Nabob of Arcot to Governor-General, received 29 August 1775, FSC, 5 October 1775.

48. Governor-General to Court of Directors, 31 August 1796, *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 18, ed. H.Heras (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1974), p. 256.

49. Delhi Resident to Governor-General, 3 April 1783, *Indian Record Series, Browne Correspondence*, ed. Krishna Dayal Bhargava (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1960), pp. 44-5.

50. Agent of the Governor-General Bhooj to Secretary to Government of India, 29 June 1837, FPC, 31 July 1837, No. 38.

51. Commercial Resident Anjengo to President and Governor Bombay, 1 May 1807, Madras Political Consultations, 28 July 1807.

52. Resident (Mysore) to Chief Secretary to Government Fort William, 23 September 1832, FSC, 15 October 1832, No. 22.

53. Royal Shooka to Governor-General, 21 September 1784, *Indian Records Series, Browne Correspondence,* ed. Krishna Dayal Bhargava (Delhi: NAI, 1960), p. 194.

54. The Company accepted this order without response rather than explicitly disobey the Emperor. Shooka from His Majesty Shaw Aalum to Governor-General, received 15 July 1794, HMS 447:271-85.

55. Resident Lucknow to Governor-General, 20 September 1799, Private Letter, HMS 579:68-9.

56. E.g. in discussions with the Raja of Berar, the Resident met this tactic. Resident (Nagpur) to Governor-General, 7 August 1800, *Poona Residency Correspondence,* vol. 5, ed. Y.M. Kale (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1938), pp. 55-83. The Resident at Poona also frequently expressed his frustration at this tactic. Resident (Poona) to Governor-General, 25 August 1798 and 15 September 1798, *Poona Residency Correspondence,* vol. 6, ed. G.S.Sardesai (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1939), pp. 217, 230. Resident (Poona) to Governor-General, 17 August 1799, FSC, 10 September 1799, No. 9.

57. E.g. the Nawab of Bahawalpur wished to postpone his treaty with the Company until the Amirs of Sind had committed themselves. Acting Resident (Indore) to Secretary to Governor-General, 22 February 1834, FPC, 13 March 1834.

58. Governor-General to Resident (Poona), 29 May 1800, Eur MS. Addl 15596, Letters to William Palmer, BM. In this instance that powerful Minister in turn blocked access by the Resident to the Peshwa or to other members of the court. Resident Poona to Governor-General, 15 September 1798, FSC, 15 October 1798, No. 2.

59. Resident (Malwa and Rajputana) to Secretary to Government, 15 January 1824, FPC, 5 March 1824, No. 82.

60. Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 16 June 1809, FPC, 29 July 1809, No. 5.

61. Resident Hyderabad to Acting Deputy Persian Secretary to Government, 24 January 1824, FPC, 27 February 1824, No. 39.

62. Private Letter, Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, quoted in Hastings Fraser, *Memoir and Correspondence of General James Stuart Fraser of the Madras Army* (London: Whitney and Company, 1885), pp. 41, 316-17.

63. Resident (Hyderabad) to Secretary to Government of India, 14 August 1843, FPC, 18 November 1843.

64. Richard B. Barnett, *North India Between Empires,* pp. 151-63, 212-22.

65. E.g. in 1800, the Resident at Lucknow complained of this and the Governor-General supported his push for greater information. Governor-General to Resident Lucknow, 12 June 1800, BPC, 12 June 1800, No. 59.

66. Private Letter Lord Amherst to Resident Lucknow, 6 May 1826, Resident Lucknow to Governor-General, 20 May 1826, and Secretary to Government to Resident Lucknow, 20 June 1826, BPC, 23 June 1826, Nos. 6, 8, 10.

67. Resident Delhi to Governor-General, 9 September 1785, *Indian Records Series, Browne Correspondence,* ed. Krishna Dayal Bhargava (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1960), p. 259.

68. Resident (Mysore) to Political Secretary to Government, 12 February 1815, FPC, 21 March 1815, No. 60.

69. Minute of the Governor-General, 10 May 1800, FSC, 15 May 1800, Nos. 12, 16, 28.

70. E.g. Daulat Rao Sindhia to Governor-General, 14 October 1804, *Poona Residency Correspondence,* vol. 11, ed. Nirod Bhusan Roy (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1943), p. 92.

71. E.g. the Awadh Ruler's complaints against the Resident, John Baillie, of lack of respect reached and received the attention of the Governor-General in 1814, although Baillie's career did not apparently suffer. Francis Rawdon-Hastings, *The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings,* ed. Marchioness of Bute, Reprint (Allahabad: The Panini Office, 1907), p. 47.

72. E.g. see *Fort William-India House Correspondence,* vol. 17, ed. Y.J. Taraporewala (New Delhi: National Archives of India, 1955), pp. 534, n.7, 252.

73. Acting Resident Delhi to Chief Secretary to Government Political Department, 1 February 1830, and Chief Secretary to Government to Resident Delhi, 19 March 1830, FPC, 19 March 1830, Nos. 6, 7.

74. E.g. Governor-General to Nabob of Furruckabad, 5 September 1786, FSC, 5 September 1786, No. 7.

75. P. Basu, *Oudh and the East India Company,* pp. 119-20, 210-11.

76. Secret Department of Inspection to Court of Directors, 31 July 1785, quoted in *Fort William-India House Correspondence,* vol. 15, eds. C.H. Philips and B.B. Misra (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1963), pp. 474-9.

77. Court of Directors to Govérnor-General, 25 April 1792, *Fort William-India House Correspondence,* vol. 17, ed. Y. J. Taraporewala (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1955), p. 52; John William Kaye, *The Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe,* 2 vols. (London: Richard Bentley, 1854), 2:4;

Political Agent Harrowtee to Resident Malwa and Rajputana, 2 June 1824, FPC, 9 July 1824, No. 19.

78. Governor-General to Court of Directors, 16 August 1787, in *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 16, ed. Syed Hasan Askari (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1976), p. 132.

79. Assistant Resident Delhi to Chief Secretary to Government, 19 July 1829, FPC, 7 August 1829,No. 15.

80. Dundas to Governor-General, 21 March 1799, quoted in Edward Ingram, ed., *Two Views of British India: The Private Correspondence of Dundas and Lord Wellesley: 1798-1801* (Great Britain: Adams and Dart, 1970), p. 138. Political Agent (Bhurtpore) to Deputy Secretary to Government, Political Department, 31 March 1830, FPC, 30 April 1830, No. 49.

81. Mrs Harvey in *Adventures of a Lady in Tartary, etc.*, vol. 1, discussed in Minute of the Governor-General, 19 July 1856, FPC, 26 September 1856.

82. Court of Directors to Governor-General, 4 October 1797 in *Fort William-India House Correspondence*, vol. 18, ed. H. Heras (New Delhi: National Archives of India, 1974), pp. 97-8.

83. Resident Tanjore to Governor Fort St. George, 12 January 1796, Fort St. George Military and Political Consultations, 19 January 1796 in Eur MS Addl 13684, BM.

84. 1796 Act 37 Geo. III cap. 142, S.28.

85. Court of Directors Political Letter, 24 October 1849, No. 28 repeated in Extract Dispatch of Court of Directors, 1 March 1854, No. 3, FPC, 28 July 1854, No. 10. Circular Letter to Political Officers, 11 November 1850, FPC, 22 November 1850, No. 276.

86. Memorial of H.C. Malet, n.d., FPC, 20 June 1836, No. 15.

87. The Awadh Ruler hired the son of a Residency staff member at a disproportionately high salary. Acting Deputy Post Master General (Lucknow) to Resident Lucknow, 31 March 1815, FSC, 25 April 1815, No. 64. The Gaikwad. hired an Indian employee of the Residency away from the Company. PR 20:560-1. Resident Tanjore to Governor Fort St. George, 31 July 1822, Eur MS F.151, IOL.

88. Resident Tanjore to Governor Fort St. George, 14 October 1822, Eur MS F.151, IOL.

89. See Peter Wood, 'A Vassal State.'

90. 'Dar al-Insha', Persian Manuscripts, Andhra Pradesh State Archives, Hyderabad.

91. Originally published in 1829-32. 2 vol. reprint (New Delhi: K.M.N. Publishers, 1971).

92. Resident Lucknow to Officiating Secretary to Government in the Political Department, n.d., FPC, 20 June 1828, No. 12.

93. Resident Hyderabad to Secretary to Governor-General, 1 January 1794, FPC, 20 January 1794, No. 4.

94. Vizier to Governor-General, recd. 28 March 1783, HMS, 186:344-55.

95. Secretary to Government to Resident Awadh, 22 November 1799, HMS 579:207.

96. Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 5 December 1814, FPC, 10 January 1815, No. 26.

97. Mohan Sinha Mehta, *Lord Hastings and the Indian States; Being a Study of the Relations of the British Government of India with the Indian States, 1813-1823* (Bombay: Taraporevala and Sons, 1930), pp. 200-1.

98. Urmila Walia, *Changing British Attitudes Towards the Indian States, 1823-1835* (New Delhi: Capital Publishers, 1985).

99. Mughal Emperor to Governor-General, received 2 April 1785, *Indian Records Series, Browne Correspondence*, ed. Krishna Dayal Bhargava (Delhi: National Archives of India, 1960), pp. 244-5.

100. Resident Tanjore to Governor Fort St. George, 25 January 1787, Eur MS Addl 13687, BM.

101. Rajah of Pudacottah, 27 July 1829, FPC, 19 December 1829. A similar plea had to be made in 1842. Principal Collector Madura to Secretary to Government Political Department Fort St. George, 1 December 1841, FPC, 24 January 1842, No. 2.

102. Nawab of Carnatic to Governor Fort St. George, 1 September 1829, FPC, 2 October 1829, No. 3a.

103. Resident Mysore to Secretary to Government of India with the Governor-General, 12 December 1842, FPC, 25 January 1843, No. 118.

104. Secretary to Government of India with the Governor-General to Agent of the Governor-General at Delhi, 2 May 1843, FPC, 24 May 1843.

105. Resident Lucknow to Secretary to Government, 24 October 1836, IPC, 7 November 1836, No. 56.

106. Resident Lucknow to Secretary to Governor-General, 14 February 1832, BPC, 5 March 1832, No. 55.

8. Indians in the Service of Empire: Uncovenanted Servants in the Residencies, 1764-1857

> It is much to be wished at this juncture we had a Resident at Poonah, from whom we might at least obtain certain accounts of their intentions. At present, excepting at the Court of the Nizam, we are obliged to depend on Intelligence conveyed to us thro' black agents as to the views of every other Power of Hindostan and whose reports it is but too natural to suppose are calculated to suit their own interests.
>
> — Eyre Coote, 1781
> Commander-in-Chief, East India Company Armies (1777-82)

The Subordinate Staff in the Residency Establishment

Vital to the functioning of the Residency system stood the largely Indian subordinate establishment which manned each Residency office. In virtually all analytic pictures of the Residency hitherto published, the British Resident alone fills the page, to the exclusion of his Indian staff. Nevertheless, while the Resident headed the delegation, his Indian staff carried out most of the work of indirect rule and, in so doing, determined to a large part how the Residency actually functioned. British accounts at the time and recent scholarship alike have given these Indian assistants, clerks, 'intelligence writers', accountants, and treasurers only passing mention at best. Nevertheless, only when we have come to understand who these subordinates were and how they functioned will we have a clear picture of the Residency system as a whole.[1]

Nowhere before described as an entire body, these indigenous East India Company officials can only be known today through the aggregation of thousands of isolated references drawn from the day to day records of each Residency. As part of the bureaucratization of the Residency system in the first half of the nineteenth century, the volume and consistency of the Residency

records increased over time. This meant, among other things, that the sanction of the Governor-General's secretariat became requisite for the appointment, promotion, dismissal, and pension of each of these Indian subordinates — except for the very lowest paid. From passing references to such staff members (in the early days of the Residency system) and from the more extensive bureaucratic evidence (especially from the 1830s onward), I have compiled an extensive profile of the members of the Residency establishment. From this, we can discern patterns with respect to the identity, role, and career of hundreds of Indians in the service of the Residency. When petitioning their superiors in the Company, these Indian officials submitted extensive descriptions of their backgrounds, character, and service records, replete with testimonials from their British bosses. Further, a Resident often had to support his recommendation for personnel action with detailed evidence about the individual concerned. As a result of this documentation, I can often provide a comprehensive account of the lives of a number of individual Indians serving in the Residencies.

While it is not possible to compile a complete list of all of these employees of the Residency over the entire period in question, I have assembled at least basic information about 544 of the higher placed of them. This sample reflects disproportionate attention paid in the records to the more important among the Indian staff. I know far more, for example, about Munshis (who usually functioned as administrative assistants) than about peons (uniformed messengers) and therefore my sample excludes peons and other Indians below the status of uncovenanted civil servants. Nevertheless, this compilation represents a high proportion of the Indian subordinate staff in the Residencies of the entire period of this study.

To provide a quantitative representation of these Indian subordinates, Table 7, I have divided them by community (as categorized by the British and listed in their records): Hindu, Muslim, Parsi, and European (this last category also includes men of mixed Indian and European ancestry, as I shall discuss later). While it is clear that the British were acutely aware of the com-

munity with which they identified each of their subordinates, there seems to have been no conscious effort on the Company's part to institute any quota system or even to match the community of the subordinate with the identity of the Ruler or court to which the Residency was attached. For instance, Muslim Munshis do not seem to have been either favoured in or disbarred from service in Residencies attached to Muslim Rulers.[2] Nevertheless, certain other patterns of recruitment can be observed.

Table 7
Indians in the Residency Establishment
Percentage by community and office

Office	Community Hindu	Muslim	"European"	Parsi
Persian Office (N=207)	37	63	0	0
English Office (N=86)	48	5	44	3
Intelligence Office (N=123)	56	44	0	0
Treasury (N=70)	87	4	9	0
'Local Language' Office (N=37)	100	0	0	0
'Native Doctor' (N=21)	43	57	0	0
Total (N=54)	53	38	8	1

Examining the totals of all Indians in the Residency system from Table 7, certain tendencies are clearly evident. Overall, the majority were Hindu, but far less a percentage than their proportion of the population of India at the time. To permit a greater depth of analysis, I have broken each community down by the department of the Residency in which the subordinate served (in cases of service in more than one department, I have noted the department of their highest ranking appointment). Not all of the

Residencies contained all of the departments listed. Exceptions, however, were infrequent. The most problematic department to classify was that dealing with local languages. For example, those Residencies dealing with Maratha Rulers had a department covering correspondence in the Marathi language, Residencies in Rajasthan for the local language there. I have conflated in Table 7 all departments dealing with any of the regional languages under the rubric 'Department of Local Language.' I will refer to the information in this table throughout the chapter.

The Identities of Munshis in the Persian Department

As the Company entered the diplomatic world of late eighteenth century India, it conformed to a set of conventions not of its own making. Because the British used the extant political order indirectly, they had to master the extant political and diplomatic forms and conventions — at least in some measure — in order to succeed. Two centuries of Mughal imperial domination had made Persian language and court ritual the standard for most of India. Both attracted to what the British regarded as 'exotic oriental splendor' and also repulsed by what they perceived as 'pretension and deviousness,' the Residents needed a personal guide through the intricacies of Indian court life. The knowledge provided by this guide would then be transformed by the Resident into information to be used to accomplish British ends. The Residency Munshi and his supporting Persian Department provided this knowledge to the Resident and translated his advice and commands into Persianate forms for transmission to the court.

These Munshis, of course, had their own position and interests, not always identical with those of the Company they served. As employees of the Company, the Munshis were expected by the Resident to devote their entire attention and loyalty to it. As individuals with their own personal, familial, communal, and regional identities, the Munshis often used their knowledge to further their own agendas. In a number of cases, as we shall see, the Munshis used their knowledge of British conventions as infor-

mation that enabled them, or the Indian princes who occasionally secured their services, to manipulate the Resident and Company. Especially during the eighteenth century, Indian Rulers quite openly expressed their gratitude to the Residency Munshis for services rendered. Thus, the Ruler of Janjira expressed his 'inalterable gratitude' to a Residency Munshi by bestowing a jagir of a village on him. The Ruler intended this jagir 'as a place of retreat, whenever circumstances may deprive him of the employment which he now holds under [the Resident] and which (from the wonderful revolutions that for some years past have subverted the Mohamedan Power in Hindostan, and in which his paternal property has been involved), is his only dependence for a very large family.'[3] Munshis therefore advanced their own interests even as they served the Company.

An Islamic service elite had dominated the administrative and diplomatic world of India for centuries before the intrusion of the British. The Mughal Empire had relied heavily upon this elite. Most regional Rulers — including to some extent the East India Company — also drew upon this elite for its secretariat. Persian remained the official language of the East India Company until 1835. All this meant that the Persian Department of the East India Company handled British relations with the other regional Rulers. Further, since the major purpose of each Residency centred on relations with the regional court to which it was assigned, the Persian Department of almost every Residency formed the central core of its operations.

The prime qualification for appointment as Munshi was knowledge of the Persianate conventions of the diplomatic world of India, still nominally under Mughal rule until 1858. This Persianate knowledge was identified with, but not exclusively confined to, Muslims. Looking at the Persian Department as a whole (which includes Munshis as well as all others assigned to that Department) we see that 63 per cent of the Persian Office were Muslims while only 37 per cent were Hindus (Table 7). These Hindus stemmed from service elite families who had adopted Mughal court forms and thus were trained to be fluent in Persian language and ceremonials.

I break down the figures for the Persian Office by separating out the office of Munshi — sometimes designated either Persian Munshi or Mir ('Head') Munshi — into a distinct category for special discussion. Here we find nearly three quarters (74 per cent) of the Munshis were Muslim. This significantly high proportion of Muslims appointed Mir Munshi indicates that Muslims were perceived by the British as possessing, to the highest degree, the mastery of the Persianate court ritual requisite for this top position in the Persian Office.

Social standing, and not technical knowledge alone, proved important to qualify an Indian for service in the Residency system. Particularly during the formative period of the Residency system (1770s-1820s), British officials preferred to be assisted by an Indian of 'good family'. The British often focused on wealth as a measure of social standing.

British attitudes toward wealthy Indian subordinates were inconsistent. The subordinate should be of independent fortune (but not as we shall see, wealthy to a degree inappropriate to his subordinate position). Typical of such favourable recommendations are two for Iltifat Hussain Khan (who served as Mir Munshi in the Hyderabad, Delhi, and Lucknow Residencies): 'He is a native Gentleman of rank and independent fortune. . . His family is respectable and his circumstances place him above want and consequently above dishonesty.'[4] Such British presuppositions about the implicit honesty of the independently wealthy were not always well founded. Following his death, the British discovered that Iltifat Hussain, 'who came to Lucknow with the highest character [references] of personal integrity, accumulated while he held the office of Moonshee many lacs [hundreds of thousands] of rupees, in addition to the private fortune of which he was possessed...' because he 'reveal[ed] to the Durbar the secrets of the Residency.'[5] In this case and others, the British came to believe that they had been taken advantage of by a corrupt Indian subordinate.

The British gradually became so concerned about being cheated by venal subordinates that possession of disproportionate wealth became a cause for dismissal, as in the case of Mirza Ali

Akbar. During long years of reputable service to the Company, Mirza Ali Akbar earned the title (reserved for a few prominent Muslims in the nobility or the Company's service) 'Khan Bahadur,' received from a grateful British superior a brace of pistols, acquired the reputation for rooting out corruption among his subordinates, and held testimonials from Company officials including the Governor-General. In 1845, however, a banker in Bombay reported — for never fully disclosed reasons — to the Company that he had just transferred some Rs 99,902 of Mirza Ali's own money to him. Rejecting Mirza Ali's protestations that this large sum had been acquired legitimately, the Company suspended and, after four years of inconclusive litigation, eventually dismissed him. Some in the Company, including the Commissioner of Sind, voiced their support of his honesty 'in the absence of any proof to the contrary beyond the suspicion arising from the magnitude of the sum.' Nevertheless, the Company as a whole could not believe than any uncovenanted servant paid Rs 200 monthly could be in possession of such wealth (some 500 times his monthly salary) without having taken immoral advantage of his position in the Company.[6]

The Company thus judged Munshis for their wealth in a variety of ways. Some were recommended by their family wealth. Others were dismissed for being excessively wealthy. Yet others were proven honest by their lack of wealth: 'the poverty which he pleads...tends to establish the integrity of his former conduct...' as Munshi.[7]

Part of this deep concern and suspicion by the Company about the background and integrity of their subordinates stemmed from the degree to which Residents and other British officials had to depend almost blindly on their Munshis and other Indian subordinates. Since the Munshi served as the Resident's guide through a world the British only poorly understood, the Resident often felt vulnerable since he could neither personally check nor do without his Munshi.

The Duties of the Munshi in the Persian Department

The head of the Persian Department, the Mir Munshi, usually served the Resident as administrative assistant and chief of staff, both in terms of relations with the local Ruler and also in the management of the Residency itself. As such, the Munshi provided the link between the Resident and the Ruler and his court on the one hand, and between the Resident and the Residency establishment on the other. In the early years of the Residencies, the Munshis often served the Company as nearly autonomous political agents. Even at a minimum, the Munshi drafted the Resident's letters to the Ruler into Persian, presented them to the court, and supervised the various other employees of the Residency. The degree of authority held by a particular Munshi varied considerably, depending on Company policy at the time about the place of Indians in the Residency system as well as the peculiar relationship between each Resident and his Munshi. One of the key issues which the Company had to work out empirically was the degree of authority safely delegated to the Munshi.

Over time, the amount of authority and independence allowed by the Company to its Indian subordinates tended to decline throughout the Residency system. Even before formal Residencies came into being, the Company occasionally sent Indian agents on independent missions to regional courts. Sent with either a detailed set of instructions, or with only a general purpose, these early missions conformed to similar missions that had historically been sent between Indian princes. The agent, sometimes taking the title Wakil, tended to act on behalf of the Company rather than as a fully integrated member of its bureaucracy.[8] Although decreasingly frequent, these semi-independent missions occurred on occasion well into the nineteenth century, particularly beyond the frontier of British control. In 1824, for example, the Resident of Malwa and Rajputana sent a Munshi to settle a dispute between the Maharawal of Jaiselmir and that Ruler's minister. The Munshi, although trusted enough to go alone, was not to be trusted with any more information than necessary; he was given a packet of sealed supplementary instructions to be opened only should his original orders not prove

sufficient. The Munshi returned from the successful mission with, the Resident reported himself convinced, the sealed instructions unopened.[9]

The overall trend in the Residency system, however, was to subordinate the Munshi to a Briton, attempting to make the former no more than the tool of the latter. An early test of the Company's policy toward the independence of Munshis came in 1791 when the Resident at Nagpur died suddenly. Both the Mir Munshi and the young British lieutenant commanding the Residency escort — ordinarily a purely military, non-political post — sought to assume the functions of the office of Resident. Each wrote independently to the Governor-General asserting his right to replace the late Resident until a new Resident could be posted. The Governor-General immediately decided to support the British Escort Commander and ordered the Munshi to obey him. The Munshi, rather than allow himself to be demoted to the 'Character of Common News Writer', resigned the Company's service.[10] Later efforts by Indians to show initiative and conduct negotiations on behalf of the Company were put down. For instance, in 1837, a Munshi sent to simply deliver instructions to the Amirs of Sind, was charged by the Company with exceeding his instructions when he sought to negotiate an agreement with the Amirs. The apparently well-intentioned Munshi was suspended by the Company and, despite his pleas, retired without being returned to active duty.[11]

This marked constriction of the role of Indian subordinates distinguishes the political from most other branches of the Company's administration in India. In the civil administration of districts under direct British rule, Indians took an increasing part, both in subordinate and, more slowly, in superior positions. Between 1828 and 1849, the number of Indians in subordinate positions in the Company's direct administration more than doubled, from 1,197 to 2,813, and then stabilized at that level.[12] By the end of the nineteenth century, Indians started entering the Indian Civil Service, albeit in limited numbers. In the sensitive area of political service, however, the British virtually excluded Indians from 'covenanted' (commissioned status) positions until well into the

twentieth century. The British felt that Indian princes would be offended at taking advice from an Indian Resident or Political Agent.[13] Thus, the British used Indians only in subordinate positions within the political line well into the twentieth century and generally sought to decrease the discretionary authority of Indians even there.

Within this overall trend toward limiting the scope of the Indian subordinates, individual Residents differed widely, however, in the role they assigned their particular Munshis. Since the Company did not permit Indians to enter the covenanted ranks of the Residents, Assistant Residents, or Political Agents, the office of Munshi was the highest which an Indian in the Residency system could attain. Due to the shortage of trained Britons — one of the arguments for the Residency system in the first place — fairly young officials were sometimes posted as Resident. It was not uncommon for a British Resident, relatively inexperienced either in the duties of his office or in the particulars of the court to which he was dispatched, to have as his Munshi an Indian with thirty or more years service in that Residency. This disparity in age and experience, coupled with the uncertainties felt by a Resident plunged into the sophisticated and complex world of Indian court ritual conducted in Persian, often led to extremes in the relationship between the Resident and his Munshi. Some Residents responded by placing themselves trustingly in the hands of their senior Munshi; others rejected and demeaned any suggestion of guidance from their Indian subordinate. The appointment of a new Resident therefore often led to a career change for the Munshi at that Residency. In some instances, the Munshi seems to have been able to extend the influence of his position for his personal advantage; in other cases, the Munshi found himself accused of abuse of his office and summarily dismissed by the new Resident.

Despite official Company pressure to constrict the role of Munshis, some Residents had their Munshis carry out virtually all of their negotiations with the local Ruler, only providing guidance at the beginning and stepping in at the end, as heads of state might at a summit conference, to finalize the agreements reached.[14] A Resident thereby sought to avoid the elaborate formality that a

meeting between himself and the Ruler entailed. Typically, a meeting required: 'so much parade and so large a concourse of people, that a visit...is a serious and rare affair.'[15] Since the Munshi could shuttle back and forth with relatively less ceremony, he was often entrusted by the Resident with the negotiations.

Residents also occasionally delegated to their Munshis much of the intercourse with the Ruler or state administration, especially when that intercourse clashed with the formal role assumed by the Resident himself. In a number of instances, the Munshi conducted the negotiations — at least once in disguise so as to avoid being identified as an employee of the Company — which the Resident desired but felt he could not officially countenance.[16] In one admittedly unusual case, the Resident at Delhi, Sir Edward Colebrooke, entrusted his Munshi with some extremely sensitive negotiations. Colebrooke had the Residency Munshi retire on a Company pension — using forged testimonial letters to obtain the pension — and then act as the Resident's 'bag man,' to collect over Rs 150,000 in bribes from the notables with whom the Resident dealt.[17] In this way, the Resident apparently hoped to obtain these illicit funds through an intermediary rather than compromising his personal dignity. Residency Munshis, for the most part however, carried out duties of a more orthodox nature.

Recruited as most Munshis were from the traditional service elite, many of the Munshis had relatives and colleagues serving in equivalent positions in the administrations of other regional Rulers. These informal linkages were used by some Residents to gain information from or establish contacts with those courts. Often negotiations between the Company and a Ruler came through unofficial correspondence between friendly or related Munshis in the respective services. Munshis also attended weddings and other social functions where such unofficial meetings could be enacted.[18] Some regional Rulers also used these linkages to the disadvantage of the Company. As an example, in 1825, the Resident of Malwa and Rajputana discovered that his Munshi, in addition to conducting official letters to the Alwar Ruler, was also drafting suitable replies to those letters on behalf of that Court.[19]

As will be discussed further later, the Munshis thus had their own interests, as well as those of the Company, in mind.

Since the exact details of the in camera discussions between the Munshi and the Ruler which the former did not report to the Resident can rarely be recovered, one can only speculate in most instances about the backstage role actually played by the Munshi. One Munshi, Khair al-Din Muhammad Ilahabadi, records some of the behind the scenes negotiations in his 'Ibrat Nama'. As the Munshi to the Resident with Sindhia until 1786, he was party to the tripartite discussions among Sindhia, the Mughal Emperor, and the Company — the last represented simultaneously by two different Residents, one to each of these Rulers. Khair al-Din takes personal credit for some of the successes achieved by the Company. He also explained how difficult it was for him to find a common meeting time for the Muslim Emperor, the Hindu Sindhia, and the Christian Resident, without disturbing the particular schedule of meals and devotions of any of these three.[20] Thus, the Munshi provided vital intermediation between the Resident and the Rulers.

Within the ranks of the Company officials, attitudes differed as to the extent to which Indian subordinates in general, and Munshis in particular, could or should be trusted. Significantly, Company officials did not seem to blame Indian Rulers for corrupting Munshis; such behaviour seemed to them natural for an 'oriental despot'. The Company did, however, blame its Indian subordinates for such corruption since they were required to meet British standards. At the same time, British officials of the Company often expected that such British standards would prove too severe for 'mere Indians'. Thus, British expectations of the worst from their Indian underlings often seemed to be confirmed. As Lord Clive, Governor of Madras, wrote in 1802 when the Nawab of the Carnatic was found to have bribed the Company Munshi who carried messages between them:

> I was aware of the difference which prudence with respect to the General education and habits of the natives of India requires to be observed in the degree of confidence to be

> reposed in the best regulated Indian character, and in European gentlemen of approved principles.... [This] Moonshey, in the execution of these humble offices has proved unequal to resist the temptation of converting his public trust to the means of private advantage; and I state with equal regret that His Highness the Nabob has suffered his good nature so far to yield to the importunity of the Moonshey, as to gratify him by occasional aids of a pecuniary nature.... [The Munshi] has pursued this object with a degree of importunity, which has transgressed the bounds of respect to the Nabob...[21]

Lord Clive fired the Munshi and tried to protect the Nawab from further contact with Indian uncovenanted servants of the Company who, he felt, would naturally be similarly acquisitive.

Since Residents necessarily depended heavily on Munshis in order to conduct the business of the Residency, they felt particularly strongly about the place of such subordinates in the Company's service. Some influential Residents expressed their firmly held belief that Indians were incapable of loyalty and unworthy of trust. Sir Charles Theophilus Metcalfe (who served in Residencies and missions to the Arab states, Sindhia, Delhi, Lahore, and Hyderabad, and also on the Supreme Council in India and later as Governor of Jamaica and Governor-General of Canada) spoke consistently for those officials opposed to reliance on Indian subordinates:

> This duty cannot be entrusted with confidence to Natives, it requires a judgment which they do not in general possess and a security regarding the fidelity which it is not safe to feel. They might suppress most important intelligence if it suited their views to do so.[22]

Indeed, Metcalfe abolished the post of Mir Munshi in Hyderabad during his time as Resident there, thus depriving himself and his successors of the services of this position.

The attitudes of British officials toward Munshis were in a large measure reflections of their racial attitudes toward Indians in general. Some Munshis made special efforts to show their

solidarity with their British employers; a few British officials regarded these efforts with respect, particularly during the early days of the Company's expansion. In 1798, for example, the Resident at Hyderabad wrote with gratitude that two Munshis in his Residency had voluntarily donated the substantial sums of Rs 250 each 'toward the support of the War which Great Britain is engaged in against the French Republic.'[23] In another instance two years later, the Resident at the court of Sindhia called upon Munshis on his staff to testify under oath in support of his personal honesty and against charges by that court against him.[24]

More frequent was the British attitude of racial superiority that placed Munshis, and all Indians, in an inferior status. Sir William Rumbold objected strongly when the Hyderabad Residency Munshi was sent by the Resident to be a witness to his dealings with that court.[25] One Resident wrote '...it is vain to expect honesty from any Native Servant, who is not placed beyond the Reach of ordinary Temptation.'[26] The office of Munshi was regarded by the Company as particularly within the reach of temptation.

Munshis, on their part, were aware of the insults and contempt extended to them by some British. Munshis responded with diminished loyalty to such denigration. Shaikh Lutfullah (1802-74), a traditionally educated gentleman who came from a Sufi family of Malwa, served a number of British officials and Rulers during his long career. He contrasts the degrading attitude held by Andrew Ross Bell, then Officiating Political Agent in Upper Sind (1839-41), toward his Indian subordinates with the more respectful behaviour of other British officials he had served.

> Mr. Ross Bell's mode of conducting business was strangely different from what I had ever seen. He had no confidence in his subordinates, and they had no feeling of allegiance towards him in the performance of their duty. Lying up on his sofa, the great man dictated his letters to his cringing Munshi, who dared not seat himself, either on the floor or on a chair, and was obliged to take down word by word, whether sense or nonsense, standing on his legs, with his inkstand fastened to his waistband.

Despite this impolite behaviour, Bell had to entrust Persian papers to his Munshi 'to be read and explained' to him; the mutual lack of respect evident here would necessarily affect the performance of this political agency.[27]

Just as the actions of individual Residents in carrying out Company policy affected the shape of the Residency system, so too the actions of individual Munshis in carrying out the instructions of the Resident determined in some measure the shape of indirect rule in that state. Metcalfe and others argued that any intermediaries between the Resident and the object of his concern, the local Ruler, tended to distort their relationship. In general, the Calcutta government urged the Residents to carry out all the important work of the Residency personally, in preference to entrusting it to Indian subordinates.[28] In practice, despite such injunctions, Residents found they had to depend on Munshis and other subordinates in order for the Residency to function. Efforts — like Metcalfe's in Hyderabad — to eliminate the office of Munshi, often following revelations of 'corruption' in that office, ended in frustration and the restoration of the position, albeit sometimes with considerably restricted powers. In 1842, the Resident at Lucknow wrote that the abolition of the post of Mir Munshi three years earlier had made his job almost impossible:

> I am often now occupied a whole hour in making myself acquainted with all the bearings on a single case in the Persian Department and in giving the requisite decision on it, the case itself not being at all more intricate than hundreds of others, when I had an intelligent Head Mounshee, I used to settle finally and correctly, in twenty minutes.[29]

He goes on to say the work of the Residency had fallen into severe arrears as a result. The office of Munshi was subsequently restored in Lucknow and elsewhere although not always with the authority it had held earlier. On the whole, the Company sought increasingly to limit the authority of — but not the numbers of Indians employed in — the Persian Office. Despite these British efforts to constrain the official authority of the Persian Office, it

continued to serve effectively as the centre of almost every Residency.

As with the Residency system as a whole, the role of Munshi changed gradually over the period from the 1770s to 1857. These changes reflected shifts in local conditions found in each Residency over time; gradually, the position of each Ruler and the functions of each Resident altered, and with them the role of the Munshi. Further, from the early nineteenth century, the East India Company deliberately introduced policies which tended to bureaucratize all of its branches, including the Residency system. By rationalizing and routinizing its functions, the Company sought regularity and efficiency in place of the less predictable, if more flamboyant, character of its earlier days in India. This continued, if uneven, drive toward bureaucracy both reduced the scope of the Munshi for independent action and provided him with security of office.

Munshis and Bureaucratization of the Residency System

Since the office of Munshi stood at the apex within the Residency office establishment, changes in this office trace most clearly for us the shift from a personal to an impersonal organization of the system of indirect rule. Central to the process of bureaucratization is the regularizing of recruitment, promotion, and tenure in office. Originally almost a personal retainer of the Resident, subject to service at his whim, the Munshi became a civil servant, albeit an uncovenanted one, with regularized rules of service and rights of appeal and pension. This transition to a more bureaucratic form was, however, gradual and imperfect. Nevertheless, patterns of tenure and promotion slowly developed, explicitly as well as implicitly, until the system stabilized in the mid-nineteenth century.

As is characteristic of pre-bureaucratic situations, the Residency system during its first half century (1764-1820s) tended to function on the basis of personal bonds. Residents for the most part selected their own Munshis and other subordinate staff members. Many of these staff members moved from Residency to Residency

with their patron. Others were passed on by the recommendation of one outgoing Resident to the next British official taking his place. Munshis also recruited their relatives and trained them to eventually take their place. Incumbent staff members had no impersonal guarantee of security and little right of appeal against dismissal. Rather than pensions awarded according to formal rules, Munshis who had strong patrons often received an award of tax-free lands (*jagir*) of value unrelated to any consistent formula.

From the 1830s onward, however, the rules of service were gradually rationalized by the Calcutta government. As might be expected, the incumbent uncovenanted officials led in asserting their rights of tenure. Only if a Resident accused a subordinate official of some degree of malfeasance could the Resident order his dismissal. It should be noted however that the burden of proof continued to lie on the accused. Further, the members of the uncovenanted service, like its covenanted superiors, developed an ethic of solidarity by the middle of the nineteenth century.

Looking at the earlier period (1764-1820s), I find little regularity in the careers of Residency Munshis. Nevertheless, I see two types of personalistic patterns of service. In the first, a Munshi linked himself with a British patron and followed the latter during the greater part of their linked careers. In the second, after one member of a family had secured service in the Company, he recruited relatives until a number of members had joined. I will examine each of these patterns in turn, using an example of each which approached the ideal type.

The bonds between a Munshi and his British patron often proved close and enduring despite pressures on them from the outside. Ali Naqi Khan relied on his bonds with John Baillie through most of their careers in India. Ali Naqi represented the type of individual most frequently found as Mir Munshi in the early decades of the Residency system. A Muslim classically trained in Arabic and Persian, of a service elite family with a small but prestigious landholding in Awadh, Ali Naqi embodied the cultured tradition which the British wished to employ on their behalf in India. Ali Naqi served the Company, probably at first

through employment as a language instructor by British officials on a semi-official basis, from the early 1780s. Young Company recruits were often allowed a special 'munshi allowance' for the hire of such a language tutor.

The two men came together early in their careers with the Company. The young and inexperienced Baillie joined the Company's Bengal service as a military cadet in 1790. Baillie reports that Ali Naqi worked for him from this period, probably as Arabic teacher. The Munshi must have taught the Sahib well. In 1800, Governor-General Wellesley founded the College of Fort William to put language training on a more formal basis and appointed both men to the faculty.[30] Ali Naqi obtained the appointment as Head Assistant in the Arabic Department, Baillie — after just ten years in India and still only a Lieutenant — received appointment as Professor and Head of the Arabic Department. The close and enduring bonds that often develop between a language teacher and his star pupil, even when that pupil later becomes the patron, can be seen over the course of the nearly thirty years that the Munshi served his younger British master.

Both men continued to work together; they next applied their skills to the world of practical politics. In addition to his military duties and those as Arabic Professor, Baillie took on the post of Political Agent in Bundelkhund from 1803. Ali Naqi did not voluntarily choose to leave his profession as a scholar of Arabic. In 1806, the College Arabic and Persian Departments merged due to a budget cut and Ali Naqi was dismissed from the College faculty — without pension. Baillie remained as Professor of Arabic for a year longer, in addition to his duties as Political Agent. Baillie appointed Ali Naqi as his Munshi in the political service. Ali Naqi continued to serve Baillie as the latter rose through the ranks of both the military (reaching the rank of Lieutenant Colonel by 1814) and the political service: Political Agent in Bundelkhund (1803-7) and then Resident at Lucknow (1807-15). During those occasions when Baillie's own career took him back to his regiment on military duty, he apparently lent Ali Naqi for political work to his colleagues, most notably General Stewart.

Baillie's appointment as Resident at Lucknow, and Ali Naqi's as his Mir Munshi there marked the culmination of both their careers. For the latter, it was a return — in an influential position — to his homeland. The value of this position to Ali Naqi did not lie in his salary. His official income had not increased over the course of his career: he had received Rs 250 monthly from Fort William College early in his career and only Rs 200 monthly as Mir Munshi of the Lucknow Residency after some thirty years of service. Rather, its value to him lay in both the key functions of the office of Mir Munshi and the unwavering trust placed in him by the Resident, Baillie.

Ali Naqi used his relationship with the Resident for his own advantage. As did all Company employees native to Awadh, Ali Naqi held the right to petition the Ruler of Awadh through the Resident. As the Mir Munshi of the Awadh Residency, he assessed all such petitions, including his own. As the trusted chief of staff of the Resident, he drafted covering letters for the Resident's signature and then presented both the petition and letter to the Awadh Ruler for satisfaction.

As I have reconstructed from the evidence turned up in the extensive correspondence of the Awadh Ruler, Ali Naqi's alleged victims, and the Company's own inquiries into the scandal that ended his career with the Company, I can discern two strategies followed by Ali Naqi for his advantage. Both derived from his position as Mir Munshi. First, he induced Baillie to recommend to the Awadh Ruler that Ali Naqi's son be appointed Tahsildar (district revenue collector) over an area of Awadh known as Sumirpur and Hamirpur. Since the boy was apparently only 10 at the time (although Ali Naqi asserted he was all of 15), Ali Naqi had his own brother-in-law and nephew appointed deputies to carry out the duties of the office. Since most of the tahsildar's income derived from the difference between the amount actually collected in land revenues and the amount finally submitted to the Awadh treasury, their interest lay in maximizing this difference. Some of the concerned landholders accused Ali Naqi of personally coercing them into paying more than they signed for. Ali Naqi, while admitting being present in the district at the time (he

claimed for the purpose of visiting a famous courtesan there), denied these accusations that he pressurized landholders.[31]

Ali Naqi's second strategy involving acquiring rights in the district of Sandi to some fifty villages and the attached hereditary office of Chowdry (Caudhari, headman) by compelling the young putative heiress — through a highly questionable line of inheritance — to marry his son. The Awadh Ruler, in an unusual show of resistance to the will of the Resident, as represented by his Munshi, delayed complying with Ali Naqi's claims for two and a half years. This resistance only confirmed the Resident's low opinion of the 'unhappy and vicious' judiciary in Awadh. Baillie demanded in particularly strong terms that his Munshi be put in control of the disputed lands immediately, prior to any judgment from the Awadh courts. When even this failed to obtain satisfaction, the Resident requested the Governor-General write 'enducing [sic] his Excellency the Vizier to confer at once on the Moonshee without further unnecessary investigation' the claims of that 'old servant', long in the 'confidential employment' of the Company.[32]

The Awadh Ruler countered with complaints to the Governor-General about the unjust pressures on him from the Resident and his 'faithless' Munshi. At the same time, however, to obviate the difficulty, the Ruler offered Ali Naqi a large salary should he leave the Company's service and join that of Awadh.[33] This strategy of attempting to buy their way out of unpleasant situations was not uncommonly used by the Rulers of Awadh. So blatant, however, was the evidence of abuse of Company power and the refusal of the Resident to doubt his Munshi that, once brought to the attention of the Governor-General, he ordered a full inquiry. Ali Naqi was dismissed by the Company; Baillie was censured for using 'Irregular Influence' since he had already been 'fully appraised of the dissatisfaction with which His Lordship [the Governor-General] viewed the practice of our Government in exercising a Despotic authority over the Sovereign of Oude.'[34] Following his forced retirement in 1817, Baillie went on to win elections to Parliament and the Court of Directors of the East India Company. Our sources contain no further evidence of Ali Naqi Khan. While

this case ended unhappily for the Munshi and his patron, the strong bonds between them over the course of their linked careers are evident and typical of the pre-bureaucratic character of the Residency system during its first half century.[35]

The second predominant pattern characteristic of uncovenanted service during its early years consisted of a Munshi entrenching himself in the Residency system and then recruiting other members of his family. As had happened in the Mughal Empire and in the administrations of the other regional Rulers of India, an elite with traditions of service to the East India Company thus formed itself.[36] Rather than, as in the first pattern I have discussed, personal bonds between a single British official and a single Munshi, in this second pattern the Munshis themselves used their position to advance the careers of their kinsmen. In some instances, this tradition of adherence to the Company figured prominently in the identities of the uncovenanted officials, and in their appeals for favour from the Company. Petitions of appointment not uncommonly began with 'I am an hereditary servant of the [Company] Government....'[37] Looking at the example of Azizullah, we can see how family traditions of service to the Company carried weight in recruitment.

Saiyid Azizullah's career reflects many of the pre-bureaucratic characteristics of the early Residency system. As Mir Munshi in the Hyderabad Residency from 1794 to 1806, he went beyond the limitations that would later be imposed on that office in the process of bureaucratization. For instance, in 1796, Azizullah used his personal credit with the bankers of Hyderabad in order to finance the Residency since it, like other Residencies in this pre-bureaucratic period, had yet to make regular arrangements for the transfer of funds.[38] No uniform standard for salaries had yet been established for Munshis. The Resident set Azizullah's at Rs 700 monthly, far in excess of the Rs 200 or 250 that would later become the norm for the post. Further, he took a leading role in the negotiations among the Nizam, the Marathas, and the Company. Due to this service, he received a promise from the Governor-General of a full pay pension for life: the 'merits and services of Moonshi Uzeez Oolah in the course of the various negotia-

tions...entitle him to some form or mark of the appreciation of Government, His Lordship has been pleased to grant him provision for life' of his monthly Rs 700.[39] This liberality on the part of the Company to a Munshi with only six years service contrasts markedly with its later bureaucratic form (as we shall see, pension rules later imposed demanded thirty years or more of service, and a service-derived disability, before even a half-pay pension would be granted). On his retirement after only a dozen years of service, Azizullah received a khilat of shawls from the Resident as a token of the Company's gratitude. He also nominated his successor in the post of Mir Munshi. Azizullah's own son, Iltifat Husain Khan, eventually succeeded to the post. His career, therefore, reflects the personalistic nature of the early Residency system.

By 1806, however, the Court of Directors and the Calcutta government had begun to make demands for efficiency and economy. Despite the explicit promise from his predecessor to Azizullah, the current Governor-General tried at first to deny him any pension at all. Only after Azizullah's appeal to the Company's records for the promise was the full pension finally granted and continued until his death (fourteen years later).[40] An appeal by Iltifat Husain Khan and the other sons of the late Azizullah for a continuation of this pension to his family met with a firm rejection by the Company.[41] Azizullah did leave his family the legacy of service with the Company.

The members of this family in the Company's service tended to recommend their kinsmen to it for employment. After initial service in the district administration of the Company, Iltifat Husain Khan succeeded (in 1813) to his father's old post as Mir Munshi Hyderabad — although by this time the salary had been reduced to only Rs 100 monthly.[42] Iltifat Husain went on to serve the Company for twenty-six years, as Mir Munshi successively in the Hyderabad, Delhi, and Lucknow Residencies. Following his death in office in 1839, his brother Saiyid Ata Husain and his son Imtiyaz Husain both stood as candidates for the latter post, relying on the family's traditions of service to the Company to bolster their cases.

This situation raised some important issues for the Company about the nature of service by its Residency staff. On the one hand, the Resident recognized the hereditary rights of the late Munshi's family to service with the Company, and indeed over the post of Mir Munshi at Lucknow. On the other, both these relatives of the late Munshi had disabilities which weakened their cases. The Resident wrote:

> ...it was a subject of very great regret to me that the Eldest Son of the Moonshee was so young and inexperienced (he is only 19 years of age) that I could not with any propinquity place him in the office held by his Father...[before his death, the Munshi had] suggested that I might give some Minor Situation in the office to the lad, to teach him official business, and to keep him out of idleness.[43]

The pre-bureaucratic administrations of the late Mughals or of a regional Ruler would have had no difficulties with appointing the inexperienced son to the post with the aid of an trusted and knowledgeable assistant. The Company gave the son a post of Naib (a deputy) Munshi at Rs 60 monthly. Imtiyaz Husain does not appear to have remained long in the Company's service however.

The issue of hereditary rights to the post of Munshi in the Awadh Residency presented different problems in the case of the brother of the late incumbent. The brother, Saiyid Ata Husain, already held office as tahsildar (district revenue collector) in the administration of the Awadh Ruler. His appointment had raised questions for some Company officials about the propriety of brothers serving thus in the Residency and in the Awadh administration since the actions of the former very much influenced the fortunes of the latter. The Resident could find no impropriety at the time and the matter was not pursued further.[44] Ata Husain's desire to take his late brother's office raised questions in the Resident's mind as to why someone would want an 'office where nothing can be made honestly beyond 200 Rupees a month in preference to being a [tahsildar who] can with *entire honesty*

realize a clear profit *twenty times 200 Rupees per mensem* [his emphasis].' He continued, since a number of Ata Husain's 'sons and other adherents...occupy active and profitable situations' in the Awadh administration, this appeared a particularly suspicious circumstance.[45] After some further reflection, the Resident was led to 'infer that there exist unknown facilities of making large sums of money with impunity in an appointment which is so generally, and eagerly sought.'[46] The Company abolished the post of Mir Munshi only to discover that, while the Resident could not fully control the post, he could not function without it either; the office was restored three years later. The example of this family (which could be repeated for a number of others) illustrates how personalistic rather than bureaucratic criteria determined how the Residency system functioned, particularly during its early decades.

Introduction of Bureaucratic Characteristics

During the course of the nineteenth century the Residency system, like the rest of the British administration over India, gradually introduced more bureaucratic features.[47] The system continued to retain some pre-bureaucratic characteristics but the British did make conscious efforts to rationalize many of its procedures. With respect to the Munshis and other uncovenanted civil servants in the Residency, the most striking changes came in three areas: recruitment, service rules, and pensions.

Recruitment into the uncovenanted civil service was never fully regularized during the pre-1857 period. The covenanted civil service developed more clearly defined procedures for appointment and shifted more fully from patronage to examination as a means of entry.[48] In the uncovenanted service this transition was both slower and less uniform. Patronage, the sole form of recruitment during the early decades of the Residency system (1764-1820s), gave way, at least in part, to formal qualifications, particularly from the 1830s onward. Incomplete as this transition was, one can nevertheless detect the tendency to recruit new types of at least semi-Western educated Indians into the Residency ser-

vice in a few telltale examples. As we shall see below in the case of Shahamat Ali, a degree from Delhi College proved a valued qualification for recruitment into, and advancement through, the uncovenanted service. Other Residency officials held certificates as qualified wakils issued by Company courts of law. In a few instances, an official examination was administered to test a recruit's qualifications for the post of Munshi. Thus, some in the Company made efforts to institute more regular means of recruitment than simply the personalistic ties of a candidate to either a British or an Indian employee of the Company.

The second and more evident measure of the process of bureaucratization consisted of the formal rules for security of tenure in office. The first instance we have of an Indian subordinate successfully claiming rights of incumbency in the face of a Resident's order for dismissal without cause came as early as 1806. Prior to that time, Residents seem to have had virtually no checks on their authority over their subordinates. In this instance, however, a Residency servant convinced the Governor-General to reverse the Resident's order of dismissal. The facts of this particular case, however, suggest its anomalous character. The servant in question was the Residency treasurer, Muni Lal, the head of a family which had held that post for the previous thirty-five years. Since the post was unpaid and since there was no alternative means of financing the Residency, the Residency Treasurer was particularly well placed to confront the Resident. Further, the Resident in question — John Baillie whom we have seen earlier would run into difficulties for his personalistic practices — had only been in office for twenty-five days before he dismissed the Treasurer.[49] Thus, in this instance, the particular circumstances of the case rather than rules of tenure seem to have been the deciding factor. Indeed, in 1823 a new Lucknow Resident, Ricketts, finally ousted Muni Lal by accusing the Residency Treasurer of corruption prior to dismissing him. In this instance, Ricketts made a particular point of asserting the Resident's authority over the Residency servants:

> I presumed that I acted according to the discretionary authority entrusted by His Lordship [the Governor-General] in Council to the Political Residents...it has never been usual for the Residents at this Court to report the appointments or removals of their subordinate officers.

The Resident went on to assert his right to appoint 'an old and confidential Servant of my Brother's and mine for many years' to the post.[50] Reinforcing the strongly personalistic line of his patron this Treasurer was said to have sold the office to his successor on the occasion of his patron's transfer from Lucknow six years later.[51] Such a blatant practice of personal control over this office in the Residency proved too much for the Company and the unlucky purchaser of the office failed to convince the Company of his right to the post.

By the early 1830s, the issue of tenure rights to office by Indian subordinates came to a head. Residents continued to assert their power to dismiss at will. Two wrote the Calcutta government in 1830 and 1831 respectively:

> I did not doubt the discretionary Power of a Political Resident to employ those only in whose fidelity he could confide....
>
> [T]here seems to be no doubt of the intention of Government that the Agent of the Governor-General is at liberty to exercise his discretionary powers in the appointment or removal of any of the Omlah [officials] from his office.[52]

In the former case, however, the Governor-General and Court of Directors for the first time confirmed the rights of incumbent uncovenanted servants. The Governor-General's Secretariat ordered the dismissed subordinate officials reinstated with back pay and censured the Resident. The Secretariat judged that the Resident, in an

> ...act of unauthorized power, merely to make way for his own dependents, [had] dismissed this [Munshi] and other

> individuals belonging to the Resident's office who must be considered as public and not private Servants, and that [the Resident] should be called upon to make good to them the losses which they have suffered...to the great detriment of those individuals themselves as well as to the serious interruption of public business if not actual injury to the public interests.[53]

Rights of tenure, therefore, had begun to come to the Indians in the Residency bureaucracy.

On their part, the Indian officials in the Residency consistently asserted their rights of incumbency. By the 1840s, the Calcutta government consistently supported these rights:

> ...the Governor-General considers it on principle to be a prejudicial and objectionable practice for high European functionaries when removed from one office to another to admit or encourage the pretensions of their former dependents to aspire to situations in their new offices which others have an older and stronger right to fill.[54]

Uncovenanted servants thus secured the explicit right against dismissal without any charge being laid against them.

This bureaucratization of the tenure of Munshis and other Indian officials in their offices in the Residencies extended further. By 1855, the Company had begun to mandate half-yearly reports from the Residents about all dismissals of uncovenanted servants. Each Resident had to describe the circumstances of each dismissal, and submit a formal justification for that personnel decision.[55] In earlier times, Residents had dismissed such Munshis and other Indian subordinates on their own authority, without bothering to inform the Calcutta secretariat. Unless the dismissed party officially complained against his Resident, the secretariat had no record of the termination. These semi-annual reports thus brought the Indian officials of the Residencies officially into the Company's personnel records.

Effectively counteracting this regularizing of the tenure of Indian subordinates, however, stood the continuing principle of

solidarity among the British in the Company's administration. A Resident who raised the charge of corruption, incompetence, or infidelity to the Company against one of his Indian subordinates could be sure of the Governor-General's support for the dismissal of the Indian so implicated. Appeals by the Indian official concerned rarely brought about any intervention by the Governor-General.[56] Thus, once the Residents learned to appeal to bureaucratic rather than personalistic criteria, they recovered much of their practical authority over the tenure of their subordinates.

The third measure of the bureaucratization of the uncovenanted Residency service relates to the clear formalizing of pension rules. As we have already seen in the case of Azizullah, during the early decades of the Residency system, neither the pay nor the pensions of Indians were standardized. While retiring Munshis appreciated the security that these pension rules promised, they found the scale of the awards also diminished over time.

Most indicative of the personalistic nature of the early system was the grant of jagirs (the right to tax free land revenues), to some of the more prominent Munshis. Possession of a jagir conferred a distinguished status approaching that of a nobleman on the fortunate Munshi. Jagirs fit in far better with the pre-bureaucratic practices of the Mughal Empire than with those of a salaried civil service. When a particularly important British Resident requested that his Munshi be honoured by the Company, the jagir granted could be quite lavish. Up until 1806, the Governor-General granted jagirs worth amounts up to Rs 7,000 annually to some particularly favoured political Munshis. As a special mark of personal favour, the lands selected for the jagir were often located in the home district of the Munshi where his elevation into the landholding elite would be particularly apparent. Not willing to create an hereditary rentier class, however, the Company made sure that the jagir was assigned only for the life of the holder, or rarely one additional life. So valued were jagirs that Munshis continued to request them — unsuccessfully — from the Company for years after the Company had eschewed the practice.[57]

Part of the reason for the Company's efforts to diminish the status of the Residency Munshis resulted from its desire to prevent that Indian official from overshadowing, or rivalling the Resident himself, especially in the eyes of the Indian court and Ruler. Especially during the early Residencies, the Indian Rulers quite openly expressed their gratitude to the Residency Munshis for services rendered, either officially by the Residency or unofficially by the Munshi. Such gifts to the Resident's subordinate could be phrased as a token of respect for the Resident himself. Thus, the Ruler of Janjira expressed his 'inalterable gratitude to [the British] nation,' not by giving gifts to the Resident — such gifts being forbidden — but rather by bestowing a jagir of a village on the Resident's Munshi. This jagir was designed 'as a place of retreat, whenever circumstances may deprive him of the employment which he now holds under [the Resident] and which (from the wonderful revolutions that for some years past have subverted the Mohamedan Power in Hindostan, and in which his paternal property has been involved), is his only dependence for a very large family.'[58]

As part of the Company's process of introducing bureaucratic practices into the Residency system, the Company shifted the procedure for determining the pensions for Munshis. The Company switched from the arbitrary award of jagirs to monthly pensions based on specified amounts of service and a percentage of the Munshi's average pay during his last years in office. The initial shift to pensions did not immediately eliminate the personalistic factor. Munshis from particularly wealthy or socially prominent families received higher pensions than those of lower status with the same amount of service; Munshis with especially large families had their pensions enhanced.[59] Retiring Munshis also expected khilats, or dresses of honour, to be formally bestowed on them by the Resident. Munshis stated that they knew the precedent of exactly how many and what degree of khilats their predecessors had received.[60] Thus Residents found themselves bound by ceremonies and traditions specified by their subordinates as well as by the Rulers to whom they were posted.

In 1813, the Company began to institute formal rules for fixed pensions. Over the next forty years, these regulations progressively tightened. The early rules regulated such matters as gratuitous grants of pensions by Residents (1813), standardized forms to be used (1826), and the necessity for supporting medical and character certificates (1828).[61] In 1831, the Company issued the most complete regulations specifying exactly which uncovenanted offices, under what circumstances, would receive precisely how much pension, and for how long. The burden of these regulations was that only 'Superior Classes of Public Servants', of good character, with unimpeachable supporting evidence of service, incapacitated on the job, whose request was confirmed by the Court of Directors in London, would receive pensions until their death; more than twenty years service meant a one-third pay pension, more than thirty years meant half their pay as pension. Model forms were circulated.[62]

Over time, the uncovenanted officials evidently began to regard themselves increasingly as a class. In 1854, a petition endorsed by 1,220 members of the uncovenanted service of Bengal — including political Munshis as well as Indians in other branches of the Company — requested the institution of a pension fund. This fund, to be created by a 4 per cent deduction from the salaries of uncovenanted officials earning at least Rs 10 monthly, would supplement the inadequate official pension and protect retirees with fewer years of service. The Financial Department of the Company rejected this petition, citing actuarial uncertainties and (unattributed) opposition among the members of the uncovenanted service themselves. The Company did liberalize the pension rules to the extent that someone with thirty-five or more years of service no longer needed to be incapacitated before retiring on half-pay.[63] A few months later, however, the rules were tightened by putting a ceiling on the amount of pension possible and specifying that any gap in service eliminated all seniority rights.[64]

Finally, in July 1857, the Court of Directors ordered the entire system routinized. Pensions were granted by means of a printed tabular form, to be filled out by the Resident, which calculated the

exact amount to be paid to the retiring Munshi.[65] This obviated extensive correspondence with London over each case and eliminated any individual factors. Thus, the service of 'Native Public Servants attached to Political Residencies' shifted from personalistic to bureaucratic criteria, in terms of recruitment, tenure in office, and retirement provisions, over the first half of the nineteenth century.

None of the Indian officials in the Residency system which I have studied perfectly conform to the ideal bureaucratic type. Nevertheless, this rationalization of the system effected virtually all Indians in the service to some degree. The career of Shaikh Shahamat Ali demonstrates some of the ways in which this bureaucratization took place in the Residency system.

At the time of his entry into the Residency system, Shaikh Shahamat Ali embodied the characteristics of the new elite created by the interaction between the British and the traditional cultures of North India. Shahamat Ali took his education at Delhi College, as one of the first students to enter following its restoration in 1823. He wrote: 'I owe my education to the benevolence of the British Government in restoring, for the benefit of Indian youths in Delhi and the neighboring provinces, the College founded in the time of the Mogul emperors.'[66] As reorganized, the College combined traditional disciplines, such as Persian literature, with Western sciences and humanities. He joined the newly created English class in 1827, refusing to withdraw from it despite his excommunication by Delhi Maulawis (later reversed under British pressure) for doing so. His training, therefore, was more like that of his future colleagues in the Residency system who had trained as wakils in Company courts of law than that of traditionally trained scholars such as Ali Naqi Khan, discussed earlier in this chapter.[67]

Shahamat Ali and the other members of the first graduating class embodied the very attributes sought by the Company for its new model Indian subordinates. British officials, in the political line particularly, applied to the College for its graduates. The Secretary to the Delhi Resident vetted candidates and then dispatched them to their new patrons. In 1832, Shahamat Ali was sent as Persian Munshi and English translator to Captain Wade,

then political agent in the Punjab; one of his class-fellows, Mohan Lal, was sent in the same role to Lieutenant Alexander Burnes for his mission to Afghanistan.[68] Shahamat Ali later published his journals in English in England; they clearly reflect his orientation to a British audience rather than one drawn from the traditional service elite of India.[69]

Following the first type of pre-bureaucratic career pattern discussed above, Shahamat Ali remained attached to Wade in the Political Agency at Ludhiana. In 1840, Wade planned a trip to England and Shahamat Ali intended to use the chance to tour Europe, at least partially in Wade's company. Wade's unexpected appointment that year as Resident at Indore and Political Agent for Malwa meant that they postponed their European trip. Shahamat Ali accompanied Wade, who appointed him Residency Mir Munshi.

At this point, both Shahamat Ali and Wade themselves confronted the changes brought about by bureaucratization. Saiyid Amjad Ali, the incumbent Mir Munshi demoted in order to make a place for Shahamat Ali, formally complained to the Governor-General's secretariat: '[This was not] consistent with the rules of the British Government that any of its Servants should be degraded without just cause.' He threatened resignation in protest.[70] This right to petition for redress, in accordance with fixed rules of service, is an important characteristic of a bureaucracy.

Both the Governor-General and the Resident accepted the new standards for appointment. The former queried the latter as to basis of the appointment. The Resident defended his action as founded on rational criteria, not personal patronage. Wade cites Shahamat Ali's seniority in the political service and 'the injustice of depriving him, because he had served with me, of that hope of reward which he might reasonably have claimed for his acknowledged services.' The Resident denied any personal links to the Munshi, denying he was a 'personal adherent'.[71] Wade went on to criticize the complainant Amjad Ali: 'I have a high opinion of his ability, though not the same of his honesty.'[72] These innuendoes were deemed by the Company sufficient to justify Wade's

demotion of Amjad Ali, but not any reduction of pay. Since no specific charges were laid against Amjad Ali, he could not defend himself. Wade further systematically analyzed the appointment and promotion patterns in the Indore Residency going back ten years in order to find precedents for his actions. Thus, by the 1840s, most parties accepted rationalistic terms of reference even if they did not always act in accordance with them.

The remainder of Shahamat Ali's career reflects his growing incorporation into British culture. He remained in office even after the retirement of Wade, by then ennobled as a Knight Commander of the Bath, in 1844. Shahamat Ali took leave of absence for two years (1848-50) in order to tour Europe and publish his journal — and, I presume, visit Wade. Returning to India, Shahamat Ali soon shifted from the administrative position of Mir Munshi Indore to the executive position of Deputy Bhil Agent and then Junior Superintendent and Co- Regent for the small kingdom of Sellana. Further promotions were then temporarily blocked by the Company's new sense of propriety. Shahamat Ali would receive a pension for his regency from the Raja of Sellana when the latter came of age; the Company forbade someone in the pay of a Raja from service in the Residency system. Shahamat Ali therefore renounced the pension (larger than his official pay would be) in order to continue work for the British.[73] Thus, in a number of ways, Shahamat Ali's career suggests how the Residency system shifted from predominately pre-bureaucratic to bureaucratic characteristics during the first half of the nineteenth century.

By bureaucratizing the Residency system, the Company made clerks with limited official power out of men whose predecessors had been guides in the intricacies of Indian diplomacy. The British then came to value their Indian subordinates in the Residencies less as individuals and more as small parts of the apparatus of Empire. In order to complete our understanding of the value of the positions held by Indian subordinates in the Residency, we should also examine the patterns evident in the other offices of the Residencies as well.

The English Office of the Residency

Second only to the Persian Office in prominence stood the English Office of the Residency. While the Persian Office dealt primarily with diplomatic and political matters — the relationship between the Resident and the regional Ruler — the English Office managed affairs internal to the Company. This normatively included the control of the increasing volume of correspondence in English, and often the financial accounts. If a Persianate education — Islamic in orientation — helped equip a Munshi for service in the Persian Office, a clerical education, British in orientation, proved requisite for a writer in the English Office. Not surprisingly, the composition of the two departments differed markedly.

Table 7 provides a quantitative picture of the men who comprised the English Office. Hindus with a Western-style education made up the largest group (48 per cent) within this Office. Significantly, all three of the Parsis found in the Residency system held such posts (in Poona, Gwalior, and Indore), reflecting the particularly European orientation of their community. Finally, although they totalled only 5 per cent of the officials in this office, 'European-named' officials deserve particular attention here.

Most (some 86 per cent) of the uncovenanted servants who bore European names served in the English Office. When the often overlapping accounting department — sometimes in the English Office, sometimes located in the Residency Treasury — is added in, all of the European-named officials are accounted for. Demonstrating the special status of officials bearing such names, the Company uniformly attached the honorific 'Mr' exclusively to their names in the records. In fact, I discern four analytic types of people among those who bore these European names. Because few are identified other than by name and title 'Mr', it is sometimes difficult today to locate every one of these subordinates accurately within a single one of these four types.

The first type was composed of what were called 'pure-blooded' Britons, but of significantly inferior — in the Residents' eyes — social class. Trained as clerks, they rarely played a very

prominent role. Often references to them in the records consisted of appeals by a Resident on their behalf for a pay or pension increase. Even after pay and pension scales had been bureaucratized, Residents occasionally asked the Company to treat one of these European subordinates generously by awarding a slight excess of the amount to which his service entitled him, due to his indigent condition and large family. While these subordinate Europeans formed a small part of the Resident's 'official family', there was a clear social gulf between them.

This type of subordinate official presented the Company's government with moral and social difficulties, and not just within the political branch of its administration. As Misra points out for the civil branches of the Company's administration, its growing demands for trained manpower induced the Company to rely unwillingly on such uncovenanted Europeans, domiciled in India. The Court of Directors regarded these appointments as reducing their scope of patronage and found these European subordinates not amenable to discipline. Recruited in India, these Europeans fell outside of the system of nomination so valued by the Directors as a perquisite of a Directorship. As Europeans, they rejected the cavalier treatment meted out by the Company to its Indian subordinates. Despite the Court's instructions to discourage such employment, in 1798 the Calcutta administration had to admit to employing nearly 100 of them at Fort William alone.[74] Within the Political Department (which included the Residencies), the number of uncovenanted officials with European names increased by 51 per cent between 1851 and 1857, from 100 to 151.[75] Their useful, but little respected position, in the English Office of the Residencies thus reflects their place in the Company as a whole.

The second type, similarly undistinguished, was made up of non-British Europeans who found themselves in India and joined the Company's service. Like the first type, they occasionally had Indian wives and lived on the fringes of Residency society, often within the Residency compound. Likewise, I only gain glimpses into their lives when unusual circumstances compel the Resident to take official notice of them.

Representative of this second type was Mr Breganca, a Portuguese who rose during forty years of service in the Lucknow Residency to be Head Assistant Writer in the English Office and Deputy Post Master. During those years, he rose to official notice on two occasions. In 1815, the Awadh Ruler offered his son, age twelve, a position as royal pianist at Rs 200 per month, more than double the father's income. Fearing the charge of impropriety, Mr Breganca petitioned the Company for permission to accept this handsome offer. Despite its usual practice to bar employees of a Residency from receiving income — even indirectly — from the local Ruler, the Company generously gave its permission.[76]

The second occasion when Mr Breganca rose to the Company's attention came thirteen years later when he petitioned for an increase in his pension after forty years of service. The Calcutta secretariat thus came to know that Breganca had been what we would call 'double-dipping': receiving a monthly pension of Rs 80 since 1815 and yet also employed as Deputy Post Master. Shocked at this oversight, the Company reduced his income to his Rs 80 pension but forgave him from paying back the approximately Rs 18,000 which it asserted he had improperly received over the years.[77]

British officials often responded to the absence of European women by making local alliances of one sort or another: these alliances sometimes generated the third type of European-named official: one of mixed ancestry. Residents, as Company officials particularly isolated from other Europeans, were often quite open about these alliances (for example Octerlony, Resident at Delhi and for Rajasthan, 1803-25). Several Residents appointed their children to positions in the Residency, most often in the English Office. Sir Edward Colebrooke, for instance, put his son Edward in charge of the Delhi Residency financial records, later found to be extremely fraudulent. On his retirement, Sir Charles Warre Malet (a Resident for twenty-two years, including a dozen with the Peshwa, 1785-97) brought his son by an Indian woman back to England. The boy, finding life with his father's legitimate English family unsatisfactory, returned to India. The new Peshwa 'in

consequence of the intimacy and Friendship, which subsisted for a series of years' between their fathers, employed the young H.C. Malet as a Lieutenant and also provided him a generous allowance. The Peshwa's effort to bring an influential former Resident's son into his service was overshadowed by larger tensions which led to war with the Company. When forced to choose between loyalty to the Peshwa or to the British, young Malet chose the latter, but was forced to petition the Company for financial support. Characterizing him as 'a Native of India', the Governor-General refused to help him, but the Court of Directors reversed this decision and ordered the son of the Resident provided for by the Company.[78] Thus, these untoward products of the Residency system often presented moral problems for the Company's Government.

The final type bearing European names consisted of 'East Indian Christians'. Undoubtedly some of the subordinates so described in the records belong in the third type discussed above. Others, however, may have been Indians who converted to Christianity and took on European names and characteristics. Mr John George and Messers David and J.B. Luckstedt, as examples, all served in Delhi or Rajasthan Residencies in the 1830s.[79] Except in unusual situations, however, I find little about any of these four types in the records. Clearly, however, the English Office of the Residency contained many of the products of the mixing of British and Indian cultures and peoples.

The Intelligence or Newswriter's Office

The Company's network of intelligence agents was one of its most telling advantages over the various Indian regional Rulers. The Residents developed a web of newswriters who reported regularly about events and rumours of future events, from the local court, from other courts involved with that state, and from beyond the frontiers of Company and its allies. The Resident had this knowledge recorded and assessed into information in his Intelligence Office and then transmitted both to other concerned Residencies and to Calcutta for further analysis. This network

provided Residents with relatively rapid intelligence of events in neighbouring courts and regions. It also permitted the Company to assemble information from across India into a coherent picture. Thus, the Company could coordinate its efforts while dealing simultaneously with several effectively autonomous regional Rulers.

At the time of the Company's entry into Indian politics, most of the regional Rulers had a similar (if less extensive) network of newswriters, *akhbar navis*. Each court proclaimed a daily newsletter describing what it considered to be the significant events of its own court. Issued by a court about its Ruler's formal activities, these official akhbar tended to be formulaic and propagandistic, presenting to the world its explanations of its official activities. Every other court interested in affairs there would station an akhbar navis of its own, not only to collect and transmit the official akhbar, but also to send on supplementary information, acquired from unofficial sources.

In its early days of diplomacy, the Company simply imitated the pre-existing pattern. It requested respectable Indians to attend the regional and Mughal Imperial courts on its behalf, collect the official akhbar, and also report on events bearing on the interests of the Company. Over time, the Company transformed the nature of this network of newswriters, in terms of both its personnel and its procedures.

As in the other parts of the early Residency system, recognition and reward for service to the Company for its intelligence agents depended at first on personalistic rather than rational factors. In some cases, the Company made no arrangements at all for compensating these semi-official informants for their efforts; the informants apparently cooperated because of a wish to be associated with the Company.[80] In other cases, where an influential Resident brought some special service to the attention of the Governor-General, the reward could be quite handsome: one newswriter received a gratuity of Rs 1,000 for his work during the Rohilla War. The family of another newswriter killed on duty at the camp of Karim Khan received Rs 3,000.[81]

Realizing the value of information, the officials of the Company gradually began to seek more confidential knowledge and to try to monopolize intelligence of all sorts. Calcutta encouraged Residents to gain access to knowledge about virtually all aspects of the court and state to which they were posted, including the personal habits and inclinations of the Ruler, his family, and all potentially significant members of his court and administration, the papers and records of all departments of his government, and the conditions and opinions of all classes within his capital and countryside. Residents had substantial intelligence budgets, power to grant the Company's extraterritorial protection, and other perquisites to compensate their informants.

Not only did the Company seek access to a wider range of intelligence, it further sought to deny access to all others. As soon as it gained some ascendancy over a Ruler, it compelled him — often by treaty — to make all communication outside of his state only through the Company's Resident at his court. While this strategy of isolating the princes is discussed in depth in Chapters 4-6, it is important to note here that the Company rooted out efforts by Rulers to exclude the Residency intelligence system from sources at their capitals or to use it for their own purposes.

Some regional Rulers recognized the threat that the Company's new model intelligence network represented to their own access to independent information as well as to their ability to act outside the Company's supervision. The Poona court in 1795 objected to the Resident's appointment of a newswriter to that court. In the Resident's words, the proposed newswriter 'being an Intelligent person likely to give me valuable good Information...the vague objections of the Durbar seem dangerous in Precedent as liable to an unlimited Extension.'[82] If one Ruler could exclude a Company newswriter, so could they all. The Company therefore insisted on this appointment.

Once in place, a newswriter was subject to severe pressure from the Court on which he reported. In some cases, for example Sawantwadi in 1816, the Company newswriters were confined and plundered at the apparent instigation of the court.[83] The Company made special efforts to redeem the honour of its effected

servants in such cases. Nevertheless, such pressures remained. The newswriter at Jaipur recounts how before him 'none *dared* to come forward, thro' fear' to take service as newswriter at that court. He continues to describe his fate — in the third person — should he be dismissed from the Company's service and protection as proposed:

> ...the Court of Jyepoor will wreak its vengeance by imprisonment and seizure of his household, for opposing the orders and the acts *in general* of...that Government...first by entering into the service of the British Agency against the positive injunctions from that Court—and secondly, in the discharge of his duties during his servitude in that Department, where he was on several occasions made a direct instrument to oppose and cross them in the course of business, and on disputes, etc., etc.[84]

He thus felt that he had incurred the enmity of his court first by violating the ban on its citizens serving the Company and then by working for the Company's interests even when they clashed with those of the court. While perhaps self-serving, such fears at their perceived betrayal of the regional Ruler by reporting on him to the Company appear on a number occasions in the petitions of newswriters.[85]

In addition to putting pressure on newswriters, Indian courts tried to use the Company's intelligence system by putting it to work for themselves. As an example, the Wazir of Kabul proposed that the Company's newswriter in Peshawar also pass information to him. The Wazir argued that the newswriter's services would be thus shared by the Wazir and the Company. The Company immediately rejected this 'abuse' of its intelligence network.[86]

The regional Rulers were not the only ones jealous of access to intelligence; the three Company Presidencies also proved rivals for control of information. The Bombay Government objected strongly and successfully when the Resident at Delhi — who reported to the Governor-General in Calcutta — ordered the newswriter at Multan — who served the Bombay Government —

to convey copies of all reports to him as well.[87] The Calcutta Government could afford to soothe inter-Presidency rivalries by giving way in this instance but it prohibited Indian Rulers from maintaining independent intelligence networks. Since, as we have seen, the Governor-General gradually pulled virtually all the Residents out of the authority of the Governors of Madras and Bombay and took them under his own authority, these particular rivalries were eventually settled in his favour.

Under pressures of economy, the Residents were gradually forced to merge their own intelligence networks. In the early days, each Resident had his own staff of newswriters in all the courts which might be of interest to his own. This often meant that there would be several Company newswriters, each reporting to a different Resident, at the same court. Until 1809 the Lucknow Resident, for instance, maintained newswriters at Delhi, Jaipur, Amritsar, Patialah, Rampur, Kalpi, Faizabad, and Lucknow. At the same time, the Delhi Resident also maintained his own newswriters at five of those places as well as at least six more.[88] The Calcutta secretariat brought such overlaps to light and ended them as the Company rationalized the flow of information. Further, as regional Rulers were progressively isolated from each other, the Residents needed to know decreasing amounts about other regional courts. In consequence, the Company dismissed numbers of newswriters, thus reducing the cost of Residencies as well.

In place of many Indian newswriters, who had earlier functioned with little supervision, from early in the nineteenth century onward Residents began to exchange information regularly among themselves. They dispatched copies of all their information to all other concerned Residencies as well as to Calcutta on a systematic basis.

Tension arose between Calcutta and the Residents themselves as to just how centralized the system should be. To avoid the scrutiny of their superiors, Residents began to communicate with each other in 'demi-official' letters, thus avoiding the requirement that a copy be sent to the Governor-General's secretariat. The latter forbade this practice although it rarely probed into the per-

sonal correspondence of its covenanted servants.[89] By the 1850s, however, the intelligence network (though by no means infallible, as the 1857 struggle would show) had become routinized. Newswriters worked under close supervision and information flowed smoothly through the Residency system and on to Calcutta. A regional Ruler, the subject of much of this information, would be punished for having been discovered communicating with another Ruler or indeed anyone outside of his state, except through his Resident.

Treasury

Residency Treasurers, while often outside of the Residency establishment per se, managed the financial transactions so central to the entire Residency system. At the time of the creation of the first Residencies, their treasuries were extensions of the indigenous banking system that lay largely outside of Company control.[90] Given the vast sums passing through most of the important Residencies each month, these semi-autonomous treasuries played a crucial role both in the Residency system and in the states in which they were located.

When the Company sent out its first political Residents, it expected to use the existing network of Indian banking houses to transfer funds to these Residencies,outside of Company territory as they were. The Resident drew a bill on the Company, submitted it to a trusted local banker, and received payment (minus a variable commission) on the spot. The banker then sent a *hundi* or draft for payment to his correspondent bank in Calcutta or another specified Company treasury. The hundi had to be honoured a specified number days after 'sight'. As long as the Company's credit remained good, and as long as there was a reasonably balanced flow of such hundis into and out of the region where the Resident was located, all went well. Those conditions did not always pertain, however, leaving Residents on occasion embarrassingly short of cash. In one instance, the Munshi of a Residency had to arrange funding on the basis of his personal credit.[91]

Over time, the Residents made more regular arrangements for the transfer of funds. Residents often appointed a member of an Indian banking house as the official Residency Treasurer. Like the bankers themselves, the vast majority of Residency Treasurers were Hindus, from traditional banking communities. Not only did the Treasurer arrange for the regular and occasional transfer of funds, he also exchanged coinage as the Resident specified. Since each mint's coins differed in intrinsic value, often from year to year, elaborate exchange rates had to be maintained at all times by the Treasurer.

Such banking houses-by-appointment to a Residency gained not only a commission on every transaction, they gained prestige from their association with the Company. Looking at the treasury of the Delhi Residency, we see an instance of how this system worked. When General Octerlony seized Delhi in 1803, and with the city acquired control over the Mughal Emperor, he established a Residency there. Har Sukh Rai, one of Delhi's richest bankers, stood forth to serve the Residency as Treasurer. Octerlony paid Har Sukh a commission of 1.4 per cent on all transactions plus 4 per cent on the revenues from the Delhi lands paid into the Residency. These rates conformed to those Har Sukh had received from Perron, a French general in the service of the Marathas who had earlier controlled territory around Delhi. Har Sukh explained he had taken on the office of Treasurer 'from ambition, and from a desire to be placed in a confidential situation' under the Company.[92] Nominally Residency Treasurer, he assigned a *gumashta* (literally a deputy) to actually perform the work, paid on a sub-commission basis. In 1805, the Company took over more direct management of the territory around Delhi, thus eliminating the 4 per cent commission hitherto paid Har Sukh's clerk. Only after five years did the Company put the arrangement on a more regular footing when Har Sukh finally obtained a salary (Rs 200 per month) from the Company for his clerk, calculated retroactively to 1805. While Har Sukh took prestige from his service to the Company, the clerk apparently needed more tangible recompense.

Such informal arrangements persisted in some Residencies even longer. The Lucknow Treasurer did not receive a salary from the Company until 1816.[93] In the Indore Residency, the firm of Bihari Lal based in Lucknow, and not the Resident, named the clerk who acted as the Residency Treasurer even as late as 1841.[94]

While the Company did not always determine the appointment of the Treasurer, or even pay him, it did demand some security from him. This sometimes meant that the services of yet another banking house would be required to post the substantial bond.[95] Given the uncertainties of commercial life in early nineteenth-century India, the Residents must have felt glad to avoid risk in this way. Indeed, the Indore Resident evidenced smug relief when the Residency Treasurer's security, and not the Resident himself, had to make good Rs 75,000 on a dishonoured hundi.[96]

The cost to the Company of this delegation of financial responsibility to indigenous firms was a lack of strict control over the Residency Treasury Office. The office was inherited or sold on a number of occasions.[97] Further, a firm could withdraw the service at any time, leaving the Resident financially isolated on short notice and forced to arrange for caravans carrying specie through dangerous territory.[98]

The Resident found it more difficult to control the actions of an unpaid Residency Treasurer than the other Residency subordinates. Treasurers apparently used their ties with the Residency to bolster their prestige in deals that would not have been approved by the Company. One Delhi Residency Treasurer (Shagun Chand, son of Har Sukh discussed above) gave large sums of money to a pretender to the Kotah throne. Since he had been Residency Treasurer for twelve years and since he sent the money via a uniformed Residency peon, he convinced many that the Company had given its official support for the pretender's bid for the throne. This 'so ill advised a step,' added to other unauthorized actions, determined the Governor-General to finally dismiss him as Delhi Treasurer, although he continued to serve as Treasurer to the Malwa and Rajputana Residency.[99] In another incident, the Lucknow Treasurer, when dismissed, absconded with all the accounts of his office, and eight subordinate clerks as

well, thus leaving the Resident bereft of any financial records or trained personnel.[100] One Treasurer, the Resident's illegitimate son, was found by later investigators to have taken Rs 13,112 in bribes in addition to an illegal 4 per cent commission on all payments into or out of the Treasury.[101] Thus relatively unsupervised, the Treasury of the Residency occasionally proved a source of embarrassment to the Company.

As the amounts managed by each Residency grew (for example, to Rs 100,000,000 annually in Awadh and comparable amounts in other Residencies),[102] the Company gradually regularized the functions of the Treasury. The Company brought treasurers into the Residency establishment, paid them a fixed salary instead of a commission, appointed them on the basis of seniority, and offered them set pensions based on years of honest service.[103] These changes parallel the bureaucratization found in other Residency offices.

The Local Language Departments

Reflecting their particular circumstances, some Residencies used 'Hindustani' or a regional language to communicate with the local court. The pervasive efforts by the East India Company to conform to the conventions of the Mughal Empire led it to adopt Persian as the language of political intercourse as the norm through the first half of the nineteenth century. Until 1835 Persian remained the official language of the Company even for its own administration in areas of direct rule. In some Residencies, and not always consistently even in them, a local language, however, served as the medium of communication with the local court. This usually reflected both the strongly regional character of the local court and the identification of the Resident with that regional sentiment. In such instances, the Munshi of the particular regional language, and what I have called the 'local language department', played an enhanced role.

The debate over whether to conduct business in Persian, or Hindustani (in its Sanskritic, or Persianate, form), or another regional vernacular like Marathi, Kannada, or Punjabi held more

than incidental importance. The Company's decision in 1835 (under Governor-General Bentinck, a Utilitarian) to abandon Persian degraded the Mughal culture associated with it and displaced those Munshis who had mastered its sophisticated Islamic traditions. But accepting Hindustani in a Persio-Arabic script allowed this same Islamic elite to hold its own temporarily. On the other hand, by increasingly using Hindustani in a Sanskritic script over the course of the nineteenth century, the British evoked the traditions of the Hindu culture, particularly of North India, thus favoring Hindu scribal groups over Muslim ones. Further, any use of a regional language placed that region's culture in the fore in local affairs. Thus, each British decision about the use of one or another had cultural and political implications for Indians in government employ and for Indian society as a whole which would increase over the course of the nineteenth century (and continue until today). Further, by eliminating the use of Persian — a language not native to many of the Rulers or any of the British Residents — the necessity for Persian Munshis as intermediaries, on whom both sides were dependent, would be diminished. Table 7 indicates that all of the members of a 'local language department' whom I have identified were Hindu, in sharp contrast to the predominantly Muslim Persian Department.

Since the Residencies largely functioned in the traditional world of Mughal-style diplomacy, they tended to continue the use of Persian, and the prominence of the Persian Munshi. Some political officers protested, however. James Tod stood out as one of those most committed to the culture of the region in which he served. In 1832, he made perhaps the most impassioned, if futile, case before Parliament for the use of the local vernacular in place of Persian:

> ...all correspondence should be carried on in the vernacular dialects of the principalities, by which means the princes would be able to judge for themselves, instead of being at the mercy of some ignorant or unprincipled moonshee expounder of a foreign language.[104]

Nevertheless, it is a tribute to the lingering potency of Mughal political culture that Persianate conventions persisted as the norm through so much of the nineteenth century. Even in 1877, when Queen Victoria declared herself Empress of India, she took the Persianate title 'Qaisar-i Hind' (literally, Caesar of India). Nevertheless, the growing assertions of the Company and of regionality in the political world of India shifted the medium of communication away from Persian. The presence of these local language departments within some Residencies may reflect the desire of both the local Rulers and the Residents gradually to shift somewhat away from Mughal Imperial forms alien to both of them.

Residency Doctors

In addition to British surgeons occasionally attached to the Residency, the Company assigned 'native doctors' to some Residencies. Table 7 indicates that 57 per cent of them were Muslims, reinforcing my argument that a Muslim service elite played the prominent role within the Residencies. These Indian doctors did not directly participate in indirect rule over the Indian states but a brief examination of them indicates in part how the Residencies functioned.

These 'native doctors' initially appear in the Residency records from the 1830s. The provision by the Company for their formal training in Western medicine reflects the same shift of its emphasis from traditional Persianate skills to the more westernized, bureaucratic training that we have seen in the Residency Munshis. Either attached as assistants to British surgeons or appointed independently to the smaller Residencies and Political Agencies, their pay ranged from Rs 18 to 31 monthly (at par with some of the middle ranking Indian clerks of the Residency).

For the most part, these Indian doctors appear in the records primarily due to extraordinary circumstances concerning one of them. One Indian doctor was by birth classed as a Chamar, that is of a community considered 'untouchable' by orthodox Hindus. In 1831, the new Officiating Resident in Nepal dismissed him as utterly unfit for his post because 'Jetoo's caste rendered his com-

pounding medicines for the Brahmans and Kshatrees of the Escort out of the question.' The British largely respected such 'caste' distinctions in their subordinates and the Resident expressed dismay that this man had been 'very improperly thrust into the situation' of doctor in the first place.[105] In another case, an Indian doctor in the Gwalior Residency had contracted leprosy. Since this diminished his capacity to fulfill his duties, the Resident requested that he be granted sick leave for three years until he had qualified for a pension from the Company.[106] Of all the departments and offices of the Residency discussed above, however, that of Persian Munshi proved the most vital to the functioning of indirect rule.

The Role of Indian Officials in the Residencies

This examination of the Munshis and other Indian officials within the Residency system has demonstrated some of the roles played by these subordinates in indirect rule in India. By detailed analysis of the identities and functions of these Indian uncovenanted officials, we have seen the changes in the patterns of recruitment, service, and reward. Over time, these Indian subordinates, like the Residency system itself, altered in composition and function.

These Indian officials, particularly the Mir Munshis, originally sprang from the Islamic service elite which had dominated in the diplomatic and clerical ranks of the Mughal Empire. In the early days of the Residencies, they served the English East India Company with some degree of autonomy. Their service rules and their rewards reflected the ad hoc nature of the early Residency system. The mixed feelings held by the British Residents and other officials toward these indispensable but 'inscrutable' Indian subordinates led to closer official control over them.

Over time, pre-bureaucratic elements gave way as the Company rationalized the Residencies as a whole and the Indian subordinate establishment in particular. The Company gradually subordinated Munshis to British Residents. It bound these Munshis by ever-constricting rules and formulations to reduced status,

salary, and pension benefits. At the same time, it provided them with some degree of job security, as clerks. By comparing careers of several Munshis at different stages of this process, we can see the ways this bureaucratization affected their careers and service conditions.

Underneath this official reduction of status, however, the Munshis continued to pursue their own interests. By their manipulation of their British employers and also the Indian Rulers with whom they dealt, these Indian officials in a large measure determined the nature of the Residencies. These Munshis, as the technicians of the Residency, did much to shape the system of indirect rule in India.

NOTES

1. C.f. Robert Eric Frykenberg provides a pathbreaking study which presents us with significant insights into the role of Indian subordinates in an area of British direct rule. See his *Guntur District, 1788-1848: A History of Local Influence and Central Authority in South India* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965). See also Peter James Marshall, 'Indian Officials under the East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Bengal,' *Bengal Past and Present* 84 (July-December 1965):95-120 for another excellent study of Indians in the service of the British. My work extends analysis of Indian subordinates of the British over the entire Residency System for the period 1770-1857.

2. My analysis of the patterns of appointment of the different communities of Munshis suggests no correlation with the community of the local Ruler to whose court Munshis were posted. Careful examination of hundreds of discussions by British officials for or against the appointment of a particular Munshi likewise revealed no explicit concern with matching, or avoiding the matching, of the Munshi's and the local Ruler's community.

3. Resident Poona to Governor-General, 24 February 1791, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 2, ed. Govind Sakharam Sardesai (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1936), p. 198 For a similar case, see Resident (Sindhia) to Resident (Poona), 19 December 1789, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 1, ed. Jadunath Sarkar (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1936), p. 359.

4. Persian Secretary to Government to Resident Lucknow, 6 May 1831, FPC, 10 January 1834, No. 36.

5. Officiating Secretary to Government of India with the Governor-General to Officiating Resident Lucknow, 15 April 1839, FPC, 3 July 1839, No. 98. Assistant in Charge Lucknow Residency to Secretary to Government in Political Department, 26 December 1833, FPC, 10 January 1834, No. 35.

6. Secretary to Government of Sinde to Secretary to Government of India with the Governor-General, 10 September 1849, FPC, 21 September 1849, No. 2. Political Agent Sinde and Baloochistan to Secretary to Government of India, 30 April 1842, FPC, 2 November 1842. Secretary to Government Foreign Department (Secret) to Governor Sinde, 23 March 1844, FSC, 27 April 1844, No. 106.

7. Minute of Governor-General, 24 April 1800, FPC, 24 April 1800, No. 61.

8. E.g., in 1785 the Governor-General sent 'the Native Mohammed Hussen...to depute to Hyderabad' for negotiations about a deeper British involvement in that Court. Minute of Governor-General, 7 December 1785, FSC, 7 December 1785, No. 7a.

9. Political Agent and Superintendent Ajmere to Resident Malwa and Rajputana, 30 September 1824, FPC, 29 October 1824, No. 7.

10. Lt. James Davidson to Department Persian Translation, 16 August 1791, Foreign Miscellaneous, vol. 52, Nagpore Residency, 19 April 1792.

11. Syud Azamuddin Hossain to Agent Governor-General Sinde, 23 September 1837 and Agent Governor-General Sinde to Secretary to Government of India, 26 September 1837, FPC, 20 October 1837, Nos. 84, 85.

12. Parliamentary Papers, 11 (110C), *Lords*, 1852, cited in Banky Bihari Misra, *The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in Modern Times* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 178. A return of 'Natives Employed in Civil Administration' suggests that the number of Indians in the 'uncovenanted service' within the Political Department (as distinct from the General and the Judicial/Revenue Departments) more than doubled between 1851 and 1857, from 39 to 82. Although it is not clear which offices are included in this category, it does give some indication of growth in the number of Indians under this rubric. Parliamentary Papers, 42 (201VI), 1857-8, cited in Misra, p. 194.

13. See Creagh Coen, pp. 37-8.

14. E.g. Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 1 June 1809, FPC, 29 July 1809, No. 1.

15. Minute of Sir C. T. Metcalfe, 14 December 1829, FPC, 19 December 1829, No. 22.

16. E.g. Resident Poona to Governor-General, 16 March 1798, FPC, 17 April 1798, No. 44. Resident Nagpur to Governor-General, 17 October 1799, FSC, 26 June 1800, No. 16.

17. Assistant Resident Delhi to Secretary to Government, 1 September 1829, FPC, 18 September 1829, No. 25.

18. E.g. Acting Resident with Daulat Rao Scindia to Governor-General, 5 January 1798, FSC, 6 February 1798, No. 14. Assistant Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 5 August 1798, FSC, 10 September 1798, No. 30. Resident Poona to Governor-General, 10 July 1798, FSC, 10 September 1798, No. 40. Copy of letter from Scindia to his Vakeel Bugwunt Row, recd. 29 March 1786, FSC, 4 April 1786, No. 2. Resident Hyderabad to Persian Secretary to Government, 2 September 1807, FPC, 12 October 1807, No. 27.

19. Proceedings vs. Kurm Ahmud, 24 November 1825, FPC, 14 April 1826, No. 24.

20. E.g. Khair al-Din claims that he obtained Sindhia's approval for a Residency at Poona, *Ibrat Nama*, fol. 122-9. The Resident with Sindhia eventually dismissed Khair al-Din because of his suspicions about the latter's 'secret intrigues' at that court, independent of the Resident. After his dismissal, Khair al-Din was received by Sindhia 'with a more distinguished attention than ever,' much to the frustration of the Resident. Only after 'protracted correspondence' with Sindhia about this did the Resident manage to have Khair al-Din expelled from court. Resident Poona to Governor-General, 2 March 1786 in *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 1, ed. Jadunath Sarkar (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1936), pp. 47-9. Khair al-Din himself puts a different face on his dismissal by the Resident, asserting simply that he became sick and returned to his native place, *Ibrat Nama*, fol. 158. This manuscript, apparently never widely circulated, appears to be a self-justification of this Munshi, whose career had thus ended in disgrace.

21. Minute of President and Governor, Fort St. George, 18 January 1803, Madras Political Consultations, 18 January 1803.

22. Resident Delhi to Secretary to Government, 13 October 1813, FPC, 1 June 1816, No. 13. These views are repeated in Minute of Sir C. T. Metcalfe, 14 December 1829, FPC, 19 December 1829, No. 22.

23. Assistant Resident Hyderabad to Secretary to Government, 1 October 1798, FPC, 19 October 1798, No. 2.

24. Resident with Daulat Rao Scindia to Governor-General, 3 August 1800, FSC, 16 October 1800, Nos. 17, 18.

25. Resident Hyderabad to William Rumbold, 21 March 1829 and Secretary to Government to Resident Hyderabad, 18 April 1829, FPC, 18 April 1829, Nos. 34, 38. Rumbold was later proven deeply involved in the corrupt practices of William Palmer and Co. in which at least some Indians in the Residency establishment lost their investments.

26. Resident Hyderabad to Secretary to Government, 5 September 1816, FPC, 28 September 1816, No. 15.

27. Lutfullah saw this in 1839; he left Ross's service soon after. His autobiography was written in the 1840s and first published in 1857. Shaikh Lutfullah, *Autobiography of Lutfullah: An Indian's Perceptions of the West*, ed. Edward B. Eastwick, reprint, ed. S.A.I. Tirmizi (New Delhi: International Writer's Emporium, 1985), p. 335.

28. Secretary to Government to Resident Malwa and Rajputana, 14 June 1822, FPC, 14 June 1822, No. 13.

29. Resident Lucknow to Political Secretary to Government of India with Governor-General, 9 April 1842, FPC, 12 October 1844, No. 136. See also Resident Hyderabad to Secretary to Government, 28 March 1826, FPC, 22 April 1826, No. 28.

30. See Sisir Kumar Das, *Sahibs and Munshis: An Account of the College of Fort William* (New Delhi: Orion, 1978).

31. Board of Commissioners Furruckabad to Governor-General, 13 May 1817 and Secretary to Government to Acting Resident Lucknow, 28 June 1817, FPC, 28 June 1857, Nos. 56, 57.

32. Resident Lucknow to Chief Secretary to Government, 15 March 1811, FPC, 29 March 1811, No. 53. Resident Lucknow to Secretary to Government, 1 July 1815, FPC, 26 July 1815, No. 39. Arzee of Seyyud Imtiaz Allee, 23 September 1815, FPC, 20 October 1815, No. 51.

33. Resident Lucknow to Secretary to Government Political Department, 8 December 1815 and Nawab Vazier to Resident Lucknow, 6 December 1815, FPC, 23 December 1815, Nos. 7, 8.

34. Secretary to Government to Acting Resident Lucknow, 28 June 1817, FPC, 28 June 1817, No. 57.

35. At least some Munshis would seem to have felt a disinterested loyalty to their patrons. Sir John Shore writes of the 'lasting friendship' between him and his Munshi. On Shore's retirement after a career in the Company's administration culminating in a term as Governor-General, Shore's Munshi — who had become wealthy in his service — offered the

former Governor-General the handsome gift of 1,600 Pounds Sterling 'on the plea that [Shore] had saved little' during his lifetime in India. Although Shore turned down this generous offer, there is no evidence to indicate this was anything but an act of loyalty by the Indian subordinate. C. J. S. Teignmouth, *Memory of the Life of John, Lord Teignmouth*, 2 vols. (London: Hatchard, 1843) 1:32-3.

36. Frykenberg discusses the same process among the Indian officials in the Guntur Collector's office, *Guntur*, p. 83.

37. E.g. Petition of Jankee Pershaud, Head Writer Lucknow Residency, n.d., FPC, 12 October 1844, No. 135.

38. Resident Hyderabad to Secretary to Government, 10 November 1796, FPC, 25 November 1796, No. 30.

39. Secretary to Government to Resident Hyderabad, 16 November 1800, FPC, 20 November 1800, No. 38.

40. Secretary to Government to Acting Resident Hyderabad, 12 May 1806, FPC, 15 May 1806, No. 89.

41. Arzee of Meer Syyid Iltifat Khan and Syyid Uta Hoosyn Khan, etc. (Sons of late Moonshee Meer Uzeez Oolla), recd. 22 June 1821, FPC, 7 July 1821, No. 64.

42. Arazdasht of Seiyad Iltifat Hussein Khan recd. 18 December 1822, FPC, 20 December 1822, No. 113.

43. Resident Lucknow to Secretary to Government of India with the Governor-General, 12 October 1838, FPC, 16 January 1839, No. 37.

44. Assistant in Charge Lucknow Residency to Secretary to Government in the Political Department, 26 December 1833, FPC, 10 January 1834, No. 35.

45. Resident Lucknow to Secretary to Government of India with the Governor-General, 12 October 1838, FPC, 16 January 1839, No. 37.

46. Acting Resident Lucknow to Officiating Secretary to Government of India with the Governor-General, 3 April 1839, FPC, 3 July 1839, No. 96.

47. Misra traces the bureaucratization of the entire British administration in India from the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century. He credits Warren Hastings and Cornwallis with the major steps in rationalizing the Company's administration during the period 1772-93 (pp.48-57). Misra argues for three factors in creating a civil service bureaucracy: the emphasis on written examinations, the centralization of power in the office of Governor-General, and the growing strong executive authority of the British administrators in the areas of direct Company

rule (pp. 83-8). B. B. Misra, *The Bureaucracy in India: An Historical Analysis of Development up to 1947* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1977).

48. See Bernard S. Cohn, 'Recruitment and Training of British Civil Servants in India, 1600-1860' in Ralph Braibranti, ed., *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966), pp. 87-140.

49. Arzee of Munna Loll, son of Munsa Ram Gomashtah of Lahoo Burhan Doss and Dwarka Doss, recd. 24 August 1807, FPC, 12 October 1807, No. 24.

50. Acting Deputy Persian Secretary to Government in Charge to Resident Lucknow, 5 December 1823, and Arzee of Moonee Lall, n.d., FPC, 12 December 1823, Nos. 30, 31.

51. Resident Lucknow to Deputy Secretary to Government in the Political Department, 3 August 1829 and Petition of Indernaran Bapoly, n.d., FPC, 28 August 1829, Nos. 34, 35.

52. Agent of the Governor-General Moorshedabad to Chief Secretary to Government, 16 November 1831, FPC, 25 November 1831, No..56. Acting Resident Delhi to Chief Secretary to Government in the Foreign Department, 30 January 1830, FPC, 19 March 1830, No. 4. See also Acting Agent of the Governor-General Moorshedabad to Officiating Persian Secretary to Government, n.d., FPC, 11 April 1822, No. 137. Resident Lucknow to Secretary to Governor-General, 13 December 1832, FPC, 14 January 1833, No. 36.

53. Secretary to the Governor-General to Chief Secretary to Government, 27 July 1831, FPC, 9 September 1831, No. 21. Chief Secretary to Government to Acting Resident Delhi, 19 March 1830, FPC, 19 March 1830, No. 5.

54. Secretary to Government to Resident Indore, 18 January 1841, FPC, 18 January 1841, No. 101.

55. E.g. 'Half Yearly return of dismissal of Uncovenanted Servants: Lucknow Residency,' 4 January 1855, FPC, 26 January 1855, No. 73.

56. For instances where the Governor-General refused to involve himself in the case, see Petition of Moolvie Jaffer Alie, late Head Moonshee Gwalior and Syud Baker Alie, Assistant Moonshee to Governor-General, 29 September 1849, FPC, 29 December 1849, Nos. 188-90. Petition of Syud Hussein late Naeb then Moonshee Rajpootana Territory, 30 July 1855, FPC, 28 December 1855, No. 692.

57. Secretary to Government Fort William to Chief Secretary to Government Fort St. George, 1 January 1805, Fort St. George Political

Consultations, 22 January 1805. Chief Secretary to Government Fort St. George to Acting Resident Mysore, 15 June 1805, Fort St. George Political Consultations, 14 June 1805. Petition of Ramiah Brahminy, English Accountant late Residency with Daulat Rao Scindhia, 13 November 1806, Fort St. George Political Consultations, 21 November 1806. Lord Lake to Governor-General, 27 January 1806, FPC, 27 March 1806, No. 1. Arzee from Moonshee Syyud Mukhdoom Ally Khan, recd. (?) September 1807, FPC, 19 October 1807, No. 76.

58. Resident Poona to Governor-General, 24 February 1791, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 2, ed. Govind Sakharam Sardesai (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1936), p. 198 For a similar case, see Resident (Sindhia) to Resident (Poona), 19 December 1789, *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 1, ed. Jadunath Sarkar (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1936), p. 359.

59. Resident Poona to Secretary to Government, 23 August 1814, Inscription in a Gold Snuffbox submitted in evidence, 18 August 1814, and Vice President in Council to Secretary to Government in the Political Department, 18 August 1814, FPC, 18 November 1814, Nos. 21, 23, 24. Envoy Cabul to Secretary to Government, 3 January 1811, FPC, 7 January 1811, No. 44. Petition of Pearee Lall, 4 June 1811, FPC, 21 June 1811, No. 50. Arzee of Rae Roshun Lall, 9 February 1816, FPC 1 June 1816, No. 70. Resident Lucknow to Persian Secretary to Government, 15 July 1816, Statement of Roy Roshun Laul, 13 July 1816, and Deputy Foreign Secretary to Government to Resident Lucknow, 9 August 1816, FPC, 4 January 1817, Nos. 80, 81, 82.

60. First Assistant Resident in Charge Hyderabad Residency to Chief Secretary to Government, 15 January 1811, FPC, 4 February 1811, No. 17.

61. Civil Auditor to Chief Secretary Political Department, 30 April 1830, FPC, 21 May 1830, No. 14.

62. Extract Proceedings Vice President in Council, Territorial Department, 4 January 1831, FPC, 22 April 1831, No. 113.

63. Financial Department No. 18 of 1854, Court of Directors to Governor-General, 5 May 1854, FPC, 7 July 1854, No. 42.

64. Governor-General in Council, Financial Department, 11 September 1854, FPC, 29 September 1854, No. 37 and Order of President in Council, Financial Department, 19 May 1855, FPC, 8 July 1855, No. 13.

65. Extract Proceedings Governor-General in Council, Financial Department, 14 July 1857, FPC, 31 July 1857, No. 8.

66. Shahamat Ali, *The Sikhs and Afghans, in Connexion with India and Persia, Immediately Before and After the Death of Ranjeet Singh: From the*

Journal of an Expedition to Kabul through the Panjab and the Khaibar Pass (reprint of 1847 ed.) (Patiala: Languages Department, Punjab, 1970), p.v.

67. While Fort William College was established by the Company to train its British officials, primarily in Indian languages, Delhi College was originally founded by Indians wishing to provide a modern education for their children.

68. Shahamat Ali, p.x. See also Agent of the Governor-General for Central India to Secretary to Government of India, 11 June 1856, FPC, 11 July 1856, No. 37.

69. Note the very English style of the titles of his book compared with the title and overall style of Khair al-din's book *Ibrat Nama*. Shahamut Ali also tried to present Islamic values to the British public. He translated and published *Taqwiyat al-Iman* under the title *Support of the Faith*. The author, Shah Muhammad Isma'il Shahid, played an important role in the Muslim community and its efforts to define its identity in an India dominated by the British. He died in 1831 supporting a jihad against the Sikhs in the Punjab. The fact that Shahamut Ali translated this particular work suggests his own efforts to reconcile his Muslim and British ties.

70. Meer Syud Amjud Ali Head Moonshee Indore Residency to Secretary to Government, recd. 13 January 1841, FPC, 18 January 1841, No. 99.

71. Resident Indore to Secretary to Government of India, 15 June 1841, FPC, 28 June 1841, No. 108.

72. Resident Indore to Secretary to Government of India, 5 March 1841, FPC, 3 May 1841, No. 55.

73. Agent of the Governor-General for Central India, to Secretary to Government of India, 18 February 1857, FPC, 27 March 1857, No. 40. Shahamat Ali went on to take part, as officiating Superintendent for Central India, in the reconstruction of Dhar and other Central Indian states following the 1857 conflict. See John Malcolm Ludlow, *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India* (reprint of 1859 ed.) (Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1986) pp. 183-4.

74. Misra, *Indian Middle Classes*, p. 176.

75. This return does not specify which positions were classified as part of the 'uncovenanted service', nevertheless, it does give some evidence for an increase in this category. Parliamentary Papers, 42 (201VI), 1857-8, cited in Misra, *Indian Middle Classes*, p. 194

76. D. C. Braganca to Resident Lucknow, 31 March 1815, FSC, 25 April 1815, No. 61.

77. D. C. Braganca to Resident Lucknow, 5 August 1826, FPC, 6 October 1826, Nos. 98, 99.

78. Memorial of H. C. Malet to Governor-General, n.d., FPC, 20 June 1836, No. 15.

79. Secretary to Governor-General to Officiating Resident Delhi, n.d., FPC, 14 May 1832, No. 54. Head Clerk Rajpootana Agency to Agent Governor-General Ajmere, 1 September 1832, FPC, 15 October 1832, No. 24. Agent Governor-General Rajpootana to Officiating Secretary to Government of India, 27 August 1853, FPC, 18 November 1853, Nos. 85, 87.

80. Office of Persian Translator to Newswriter Hyderabad, 19 May 1790, FPC, 21 May 1790, No. 5. Petition of Fyz Ali, Newswriter, n.d., FPC, 30 December 1800, No. 64.

81. Resident Nagpore to Chief Secretary to Government, 8 May 1812, FPC, 29 May 1812, No.3. 1780.

82. Resident Poona to Governor-General, 21 February 1795, FPC, 23 March 1795, No. 11.

83. Resident Nagpore to Chief Secretary to Government, 8 May 1812, FPC, 29 May 1812, No. 3. Envoy Goa to Resident Poona, 11 April 1816, FPC, 11 May 1816, No. 41.

84. Humble Petition of Motee Loll, 4 January 1833, FPC, 12 March 1833, No. 12.

85. Resident Mysore to Secretary to Governor-General, 5 June 1834, FPC, 19 July 1834, No. 83. Mooftee Kulleem to Governor Bombay, 7 January 1843, FPC, 25 April 1845, No. 5.

86. Resident Delhi to Secretary to Government, 9 July 1815, FPC, 26 July 1815, No. 62.

87. Resident Delhi to Secretary to Government, 13 August 1813, FPC, 3 September 1813, No. 28.

88. Resident Lucknow to Chief Secretary to Government, 28 May 1809, FPC, 13 June 1809, No. 46. Resident Delhi to Chief Secretary to Government, 5 August 1809, FPC, 22 August 1809, No. 22. Envoy Cabul to Chief Secretary to Government, 18 May 1810, FPC, 9 June 1810, No. 13.

89. Secretary to Government of India with the Governor-General, circular letter to all Residents, etc., 23 July 1842, FPC, 10 August 1842, No. 1.

90. Karen Leonard, 'The "Great Firm" Theory of the Decline of the Mughal Empire,' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21, No. 2 (April 1979):151-67. This is further discussed in John F. Richards, 'Mughal State Finance and the Premodern World Economy,' and Karen Leonard, 'In-

digenous Banking Firms in Mughal Economy: A Reply,' in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23, No. 2 (April 1981):285- 313.

91. Resident Hyderabad to Secretary to Government, 10 November 1796, FPC, 25 November 1796, No. 30.

92. As quoted in Resident Delhi to Secretary to Governor-General, 3 May 1810, FPC, 5 June 1810, No. 50.

93. Acting Deputy Persian Secretary to Government in Charge to Resident Lucknow, 5 December 1823, and Arzee of Moonee Lall, n.d., FPC, 12 December 1823, Nos. 30, 31.

94. Resident Indore to Secretary to Government of India, 5 March 1841, FPC, 3 May 1841, No. 56.

95. This amounted to Rs.50,000 in the case of Nagpur, for example. Resident Nagpore to Secretary to Government of India Foreign Department with Governor-General, 16 January 1851, FPC, 21 February 1851, No. 276.

96. Resident Indore to Secretary to Government Political Department, 31 March 1824, FPC, 21 July 1826, No. 114.

97. There are numerous examples recorded in the correspondence. Examples include the following Residencies: Lucknow (1771, 1807, 1823, 1829), Hyderabad (1835), Delhi (1811), and Nagpur (1850). Arzee of Munna Loll, recd. 24 August 1807, FPC, 12 October 1807, No. 24. Arzee of Moonee Lall, n.d., FPC, 12 December 1823, No. 31. Officiating Resident Lucknow to Deputy Secretary to Government Political Department, 22 August 1829, FPC, 4 September 1829, No. 30. Resident Hyderabad to Secretary to Government of India, 18 September 1835, FPC, 12 October 1835, No. 85. Arzee of Golab Ray, 5 December 1850, FPC, 21 February 1851, No. 277.

98. Agent Governor-General Rajpootana to Resident Delhi, 21 March 1814, FPC, 15 April 1814, No. 34.

99. Secretary to Government to Resident Delhi, 6 October 1821, FPC, 6 October 1821, No. 32. Agent Governor-General Western Provinces to Secretary to Government, 13 December 1822, FPC, 15 January 1823, No. 78. Resident Malwa and Rajpootana to Secretary to Government Political Department, 9 April 1825, FPC, 22 July 1825, No. 1.

100. Political Agent Bhurtpore to Deputy Secretary to Government Political Department, 31 March 1830, FPC, 30 April 1830, No. 49.

101. Assistant Resident Delhi to Chief Secretary to Government, 29 June 1829, 30 June 1829, FPC, 17 July 1829, Nos. 19, 20. Assistant Resident Delhi to Chief Secretary to Government, 19 July 1829, FPC, 7 August

1829, No. 15. Resolution of Governor-General, 24 July 1829, FPC, 24 July 1829, No. 11.

102. Resident Nagpore to Secretary to Government of India Foreign Department with Governor-General, 16 January 1851, FPC, 21 February 1851, No. 276. Petition of Rampersaud Chatterjea to Resident Lucknow, 4 July 1810, FPC, 28 July 1810, No. 45.

103. Officiating Resident Lucknow to Officiating Secretary to Government of India Foreign Department, 4 December 1855, FPC, 4 January 1856, No. 62.

104. J. Tod to T. Hyde Villiers, 23 March 1832, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Sessionals *1831-32*, Minutes of Evidence, VI, Political or Foreign, Appendix 13, p. 819.

105. Officiating Resident Nepal to Political Secretary to Government, 6 September 1831, FPC, 9 September 1831, No. 44.

106. Resident Gwalior to Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor-General, 11 August 1842, FPC, 7 September 1842.

9. Case Studies in Indirect Rule: Awadh, Hyderabad, Mysore, and Nepal

> An invariable rule ought to be observed by all Europeans who have connexions with the Natives of India — never to practice any art or indirect method of gaining their end...when they condescend to meet the smooth-tongued Mohamedan, or the crafty Hindoo, with the weapons of flattery, dissimulation, and cunning, they will certainly be vanquished....
>
> —John Malcolm
> Resident to Persia, Sindhia, and Mysore.

Introduction

Each of the hundreds of Indian states had a unique history of relations with the Company. Heretofore, I have drawn on these histories in order to illustrate points about the larger patterns of the Residency system. While it is impractical to present the chronology of each state's relationship to the Company, it is instructive to examine briefly the history of that relationship for some key states. Following a state's interaction with its Residents diachronically underscores the importance of local factors as well as overall Company policy. Further, it reveals continuities, particularly in the strategies and tactics of Rulers, that would otherwise be obscured. I have selected four case studies on the basis of their importance for the development of the Residency system: Awadh, Hyderabad, Mysore, and Nepal.

Awadh and Hyderabad stand out as two of the most substantial states — in population, geographic size, political prominence, and resources. Both were among the first to receive Residents. Until 1856, their Residents and their Rulers remained central to the process of indirect rule. The event that marks the end of this study, the 1857 conflict, came about in a large measure due to the annexation of Awadh. In short, these two states proved to be

central to the Residency system throughout the period under study.

Mysore and Nepal represent extremes within the Residency system. Mysore state moved close to and quite distant from the ideal of indirect rule, thus demonstrating the dangers inherent in any static classificatory schema. Mysore until 1799 fought to reject any Resident or Company influence over it. After the Company had utterly defeated Mysore state, it reconstituted that state under the direction of a Resident and an imposed Minister. When the young Ruler — whom the Company had installed — came of age in 1811, he repudiated that Minister and assumed personal direction of the administration, excluding the Resident. The Company acquiesced in his demand for non-interference. After twenty years of relatively independent control by the Ruler, the Company once again stepped in and took over direct management of the state administration. The Company did not restore control to the Ruler for fifty years, until 1881 when a new Ruler came of age and renewed the request for his control over the state. Mysore state thus swung repeatedly from virtually no British control to nearly direct British rule.

Nepal, in contrast, remained within the Residency system but outside of indirect rule. It too forcibly rejected initial attempts at influence by the Company. Unlike the other three case studies, Nepal managed to continue this rejection. Only during one decade, at a time of weakness in the Nepal court and aggressiveness in the Residency, was a type of indirect rule established. The strategies of the court and the policies of the Company, however, soon combined to restore the status quo ante and the relative autonomy of the state. These four case studies thus illuminate various important features of the Residency system.

The Case of Awadh

One of first states with a Residency, Awadh continued to provide a test case for the Residency system until 1856. Awadh's geographical size and location, substantial population, valuable resources, and political significance all lent importance to the

Residency there. Briefly surveying the origins of the Residency in Awadh, the Company's military policies, the Resident's developing control over the state and extraction of its resources, and the basis for the annexation of Awadh in 1856, I will bring out the salient features of Awadh as a case study for indirect rule.

The relationship between the Awadh Ruler and the Company determined to a large measure the shape of North Indian history over the entire 1764-1857 period. As the Mughal Empire gradually fragmented over the eighteenth century, imperial governors and hereditary regional powers established *de facto* states out of its constituent parts. At the Mughal centre, the Emperor became a political object in the hands of a series of king-makers. The Awadh Rulers combined in themselves the hereditary status of Nawab (effectively Governor) of the province of Awadh as well as surrounding territories and Wazir (imperial first minister), who during several periods held control over the Emperor. After Hyderabad largely broke from military involvement in North India (c. 1713), Awadh remained the most central and valuable province engaged in the political conflict surrounding the Mughal Emperor. Awadh lay in the heart of the fertile Gangetic plain, was well populated (roughly 10 million), and remained politically active. A series of Awadh Rulers worked to reestablish Mughal imperial power across North India, albeit under their own direction. The Company came to stand as the greatest obstacle to this. In 1764, the Awadh Ruler marched the Mughal imperial armies eastward — ostensibly to restore the Nawab of Bengal and to punish the Company which had just deposed him. The Company's armies defeated those of Awadh in a series of battles up the Gangetic plain. Finally, bereft of any military force, the Ruler rode almost unattended into the English camp and threw himself on the Company's mercy. From this point, he and his successors until 1856 remained constricted in their actions by the Resident, not always fully cooperative but never able to stray far.

Awadh escaped direct rule in 1764 due to the Company's internal policies rather than any strategy of its Ruler. The Company, finding itself suddenly in military occupation of the bulk of North India, cast about for a feasible way to dispose of it. The Calcutta

Council shrank at this time from attempting to assert its own direct administration, lacking the funds or manpower to garrison, the expertise or staff to administer, and the inclination or authority from its Court of Directors to annex these vast territories. Consequently, the Company sought an Indian Ruler to entrust with the lands. First, the Council fixed on the Mughal Emperor but then reconsidered the wisdom of strengthening their nominal sovereign. They then concluded that the Company's interests would be best served by restoring the the Awadh Ruler as an effective buffer between the Company and hostile forces to the south and west — such as the Marathas and the invading Afghans. Further, he had proven administrative ability and access to resources, both of which would be useful if harnessed to the Company. To ensure his loyalty to the Company, it bound him with a treaty stipulating mutual defense (paid for by Awadh), trade for the Company free of duty, and a payment to it of Rs 5,000,000 (approximately 500,000 pounds sterling).[1] The ease with which the Awadh Ruler paid this vast sum set the tone for the Company's future extractions of cash from that province and indicated to it the advantages of indirect rule. Thus, the Awadh Ruler regained his lost position and territory through a decision by the Company and his willingness to pay loyalty and cash to it.

The suspicion and mutual misunderstanding within the Company that surrounded the creation of a Residency in Awadh reflected the Calcutta Council's early uncertainties as to its relationships with Rulers. Until 1772, the Calcutta Council did not consider establishing even a permanent line of communication to the Awadh Ruler. Although the Ruler had already exchanged wakils with the Mughal Emperor, the 'Prince of Persia', and the 'kings' of the Punjab and Kabul, the Company ordered the withdrawal of his wakil from Calcutta.[2] The Company preferred to transmit the occasional message through an officer in its army stationed near the Awadh court rather than establish permanent diplomatic links. In 1772, the Ruler wrote the Company protesting against a rumoured decision that the Calcutta Council had taken to assign an 'English gentleman to reside' at his court

without prior consultation with him. The Ruler requested that Captain Harper, the Company officer currently acting as informal liaison, be appointed formally. Unfortunately for Harper, the rumours which he had apparently passed on to the Ruler were false. Although they had had no intention to that point of appointing anyone to reside at the Awadh court, the Council now questioned their 'confidence in Capt. Harper... weakened by too unprecedented a recommendation' from the Ruler.[3] The Council ordered Harper — tainted by the Ruler's request — to withdraw from court and return to his troops. As we have seen, the Company never tolerated Rulers choosing their own Residents.

Soon after, however, Governor-General Warren Hastings personally raised the issue of a Resident with the Ruler at a private meeting:

> I took the occasion to ask him whether it would be agreeable to him that a person in whom I confide should be appointed by me to reside near his Person for the sake of perpetuating and strengthening the good understanding so happily begun, as well as for the transaction of such ordinary affairs as might not suit the formality of a correspondence by letter...[4]

The Ruler, having been consulted, accepted the offer. Hastings eventually prevailed over opposition in the Council and established the Residency.

Once established, the Residency began to intervene inconsistently in the internal affairs of Awadh. The Company took an interest in the Awadh succession of 1775. Not until 1785, however, did the conflicts within the Company allow for a relatively permanent appointment to the Residency. Only after some ten appointments (or reappointments) to the office of Resident during the first dozen years, did the Company stabilize the Residency. Edward Otto Ives, once appointed Resident, remained in office for nine years (1785-94).[5] During this time, relations between the Company and Awadh remained relatively uneventful.

Indirect Rule in Awadh

By 1798, the Ruler and the Resident both recognized that the Company held ultimate power over Awadh. The Resident had isolated Awadh, by excluding all other outside political influence over the state (with the exception of the vestiges of Mughal imperial sovereignty). The Residents were expected by the Company to build up a determining influence over the Awadh administration. Most obviously, the Resident arbitrated succession in Awadh. Early in 1798, the Resident deposed the Ruler, Wazir Ali (who had ascended the throne only months earlier), and installed the Company's candidate, Saadat Ali Khan. Thereafter, the Resident intervened in virtually all aspects of the Awadh administration — at various levels according to Company policy of the day. I do not mean to imply that Residents had a free hand in Awadh: Rulers still proved able to frustrate and manipulate the Resident's goals on occasion. Nevertheless, both the Ruler and the Resident understood from 1798 that in a direct confrontation, the latter would win.

While the Company never had any single or consistent set of policies in Awadh, I would categorize the repeated short-term goals set for the Resident into three broad rubrics: controlling Awadh's military power, extracting for the Company Awadh's resources, and manipulating Awadh for the political purposes of the Company.

The Company sought to limit the scale and potency of the Awadh army from 1764 to 1858. Following the victories of the Company over him in 1764, the Ruler had recognized the value and superiority of European arms and military science. He, like other Rulers, recruited European military advisors to reconstitute his army. Indeed, so successful was his policy that the Company grew concerned and, in a 1768 treaty, stipulated the maximum size of the army and prescribed that less than a third could be 'modernized' on a 'European model'.[6] The Company continued to force the reduction of even this limited army. The Company pressured the Ruler to dismiss all Europeans from his service and, as a prerequisite for accession, made the next Ruler sign a treaty (1775) requiring the Company's permission before employing any

European.[7] An 1801 treaty further limited the size of the army.[8] In addition, the Residents discouraged the Rulers from maintaining the remaining troops in any effective form. Writing in 1823, a Ruler explained that his dynasty had come to regard the degradation of the army as a loyalty test:

> From the time of my late Father, ...relying as he did on the Honorable Company's Government for support and against all domestic and foreign enemies, he considered that the maintenance of any troops of his own was not only unnecessary, but would have had the appearance of a separation of interests between the two states [Awadh and the Company]. As an instance of this...there remains scarcely anything of artillery but the name.

He continues that he surpassed even his father in the neglect of the army, in order to prove his fidelity to the Company.[9]

The Company largely replaced the Awadh army with its own troops controlled by the Resident. By treaty, the Company guaranteed the protection of the Ruler from external and internal enemies. To this end, the Company stationed some of its troops in Awadh and billeted others in the surrounding territories, ready for rapid deployment into Awadh should there prove need. Further, to free the Company's regular troops for service elsewhere, the Company organized a subsidiary force, the 'Oudh Auxiliary Force,' at the Ruler's expense. All these troops under his control gave the Resident military power unchallenged by anything in the region. Militarily dependent on the Company, the Ruler had to accept the Company's ultimate power over the state.

The Resident, when reduced to a direct confrontation with the Ruler, could rely on the force of these troops. In 1837, the Resident had them cannonade the throne room where a pretender was ascending his late father's throne against the Company's wishes.[10] Used at the Resident's discretion against selected defaulting landholders, these troops provided him with a base for his forays into the administration. At the same time, the soldiers themselves — mostly born in Awadh — used the Resident to provide them and their families with protection from the Awadh administra-

tion. Thus, the Resident redirected much of Awadh's military potential into the Company's hands.

The Company also used the Resident to extract a range of resources from Awadh. The Company expected the Resident to secure control for it over commerce, including minerals (especially saltpetre), manufactures, and grain.[11] The Governor- General stressed frequently to the Resident the Company's need for specie from the Ruler, in the forms of subsidies for the Company's troops, loans at low interest, or simply donations, official or unofficial. The Company — as well as its officials and friends personally — saw Awadh as a source for quick wealth. Over all between 1764 and 1856, the Company extracted at least Rs 6 million in assorted penalties (imposed on various Awadh Rulers, for example, to cover the Company's 'expenses' in installing its candidate during succession disputes), some Rs 52 million in loans made by several Rulers to the Company at low interest, and Rs 7 to 8 million annually in 'subsidy' for troops (for 25 years until 1801).[12]

Governor-General Wellesley's policies put particular pressure on Awadh. Wellesley sent his brother, Henry, to strengthen the Residency in forcing concessions from the Ruler in 1801. The Resident further sought extensive information about the revenues and economy of Awadh, as part of his deep intervention in the administration.[13] The Ruler threatened to resign in the face of these demands, rather than compromise his principles about the dignity of his position. Calling the Ruler's bluff, the Residency drafted a treaty for the annexation of Awadh. The Ruler, faced with such a threat, reluctantly agreed to the cession to the Company of his territories outside Awadh proper, with annual revenues of over Rs 13 million, to satisfy the financial burdens placed by the Company on him.

Nevertheless, the Ruler desperately clung to his own understanding of his dignity and responsibilities as Ruler. In conceding the transfer of territory, the Ruler offered what protection he could to his former Muslim subjects, particularly exhorting the Governor-General personally to issue orders '...that no one may be permitted to injure or destroy any mosques, tombs, or imaumbar-

rahs...' in the ceded territories.[14] In exchange, the Ruler received only temporary relief from intervention by the Resident in the administration of the remaining territories. Other Rulers would take the same position: unable to oppose the Resident's intervention, they nevertheless refused to relinquish their cultural values, even if it meant material loss.

The Company regarded Awadh as a prime recruiting ground for its army and administration. Since the Ruler did not share much identity with the bulk of the population he governed — there was no national or racial unity between the Ruler and the people of Awadh — he did not particularly interest himself in the Company's recruitment of his subjects, either by opposing or encouraging it. The Company offered its recruits from Awadh patronage and employment alternative to service in the decrepit Awadh army or the personal armies of the landholders of the province. In addition to salary, the Company offered protection within Awadh itself in the form of its Resident. Many in Awadh responded by joining the Company's service. Soldiers and officers from Awadh formed the core of the Company's Bengal armies until 1857. During the 1857 fighting, soldiers native to Awadh formed the greatest threat to the Company.[15] Thus, the Residency advanced the Company's trade in Awadh, provided for vast transfers of cash to the Company, and formed the link between the Company and many of its Indian employees.

In addition, the Company tried to manipulate Awadh for political and ideological purposes. As a counterpoint to British India, the Indian states stood as the 'other' for Company officials; Awadh, due to its geographical and political prominence, stood out particularly among the states. Perceived disorder and misgovernment in Awadh were potentially dangerous (lest they spread to Company territories), but they also apparently confirmed the relative superiority of Company administration. The Awadh administration was thus used by the Company as a negative example of alternatives to British rule. Conversely, for Indian notables and people disgruntled with British administration, Awadh provided a political alternative and thus a safety valve. Rather than revolt against the Company, they could emigrate to

Awadh. Further, the Company used the Ruler to try to break up the political structure of the Mughal Empire. By isolating Awadh and then controlling it indirectly, the Company dealt with North India piecemeal rather than as a political unit. In 1819, the Company's Resident gave impetus to the Awadh Ruler's repudiation of Mughal sovereignty and the assertion of his own.[16]

As one of the first and most important arenas for Company experimentation with indirect rule, Awadh continued to play a major part in the Residency system. Over time, the Resident developed a constituency of people within the capital and province of Awadh as the basis for much of his influence and as a means for the accomplishment of these goals. In return for their support, the Resident offered the members of this constituency extraterritorial protection as well as his influence in the Awadh court for appointments or promotions. As Chapters 5 and 6 have shown, this constituency expanded to include Europeans, Indian employees of the Company, prominent people at the Awadh court, anyone who sought the protection of the Resident, and finally, the 'people' as a whole.

The Resident's all embracing responsibility to protect the people legitimated the Resident's involvement in all areas, including the morals and behaviour of all officials, even those of the Ruler and his personal companions. From the 1840s, the Resident intervened in any aspect of the administration at his own discretion. Residents even specified who was worthy of attending on the Ruler as a courtier.[17] Rulers came to accept the power of the Resident and tended to give way or give gifts in order placate the Company and thus to avoid confrontation. Several Rulers became notorious for their devotion to poetry, religion, and/or sensual pleasure rather than the affairs of state. Some scholars have seen this as an effort to find refuge from the frustrations inherent in their condition of indirect rule.[18] Nevertheless, I argue that the Rulers preserved their own sense of their position in the world, as defined by their cultural values.

Over the years from 1764 to 1856, the Company had on several occasions proposed the annexation of Awadh. In each instance, the Company's policies or its financial, military, or general situa-

tion at the time precluded its doing so. Finally, the Directors authorized the Governor-General to annex Awadh on the grounds of misgovernment. There is no evidence that conditions in Awadh had particularly changed for the worse at that point. Rather, the balance of factors internal to the Company had decided the issue. In fact, the Governor-General admitted that he was unable to 'find a pretext' for the ultimatum since the Ruler 'will take any amount of kicking without being rebellious.'[19] Indeed, at the time of annexation, the Ruler had just weathered a communal crisis, despite British desires that he fail and thus justify Company intervention.[20]

Governor-General Dalhousie had the Resident convey to the Ruler the Company's unwillingness to tolerate any further maladministration. Although the legal right of the Company to so intervene was mute, Dalhousie overrode such considerations and justified his act on the grounds that the Company had to protect the people of Awadh from abuse by the Ruler. Rather than direct annexation, the Governor-General proposed the Company's administration of Awadh in the name of the Ruler. The Ruler would keep his main palace, titles, and would receive an annual pension of up to Rs 1,800,000 if he would sign the authorization for this act. To put further pressure on the Ruler, the Resident was to offer the Queen Mother an additional Rs 100,000 annually if she would induce him to sign.

Despite these inducements, the Ruler refused to compromise his honour, as he conceived it, by collaborating in this way with the Company. He, as had his predecessors, accepted their status as Rulers within the system of indirect rule and would not sell this for personal gain. In the face of this intransigence, the Company annexed Awadh into its direct rule rather than merely administer it in the name of the Ruler as they were doing in Mysore and other states at the time. In his virtually final act, the Awadh Ruler paid off his army and ordered all his officials and officers to cooperate with the Company, 'on no pretence to revolt or mutiny' while he 'proceeds to Calcutta, to bring his case to the notice of the Governor-General and [then to England] to intercede with Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen'.[21] Thus, the Awadh Ruler apparent-

ly accepted his place as a sovereign within the Company's system of indirect rule but not as a mere symbol legitimizing British administration.

I have highlighted some of the features of this case of indirect rule. Awadh came early under indirect control by the Resident. By controlling military forces within the state and building a constituency of courtiers, administrators, landholders, and members of the general populace, the Resident was able to accomplish many of the purposes of the Company. The Resident reduced the military power of Awadh and directed some of its career soldiers to the Company's armies. He extracted many resources, most notably specie through gifts, penalties, or loans from the Ruler to the Company. The Resident further used the political position of Awadh to advance the Company's cause. At the same time, the Ruler proved able to block or distort some of the Resident's policies. Residents never satisfied the Company's ideals for the reform of the administration. At key points, the disparate cultural values and goals of Ruler and Resident brought them into direct conflict. Although the Resident could ultimately win such direct confrontations, the Rulers retained, even long after annexation in 1856, their own understanding of their status as Ruler.

The linkages between the Awadh annexation and the 1857 conflict are clear: the disgruntled Indian soldiers native to Awadh in the Company's armies, the landholders disturbed by the new British land settlement, and the nobility of the former court all comprised central elements in the anti-British forces. Following 1857, the British altered the direction of their policy from annexation to stable indirect rule for most of the period until 1947. Awadh, one of the first to come under the Residency system, was thus also the last major state annexed into direct rule.

The Case of Hyderabad

As with the founder of the Awadh dynasty, the first Nizam of Hyderabad, Asaf Jah, initially focused his energies on controlling the person of the Emperor and thereby the Mughal Empire as a whole. In 1713, however, he relinquished his direct involvement

with the Mughal centre and carved an effectively autonomous state out of central India. Despite this *de facto* autonomy, however, the Nizam continued to retain a *de jure* subordinate relationship to the Mughal Emperor. After Tipu Sultan of Mysore proclaimed himself a sovereign independent of the Mughal Emperor, the Ruler and Chief Minister of Hyderabad indicated their disgust and insulted feelings of propriety at this act of disloyalty.[22] In 1819, when the Awadh Ruler — supported by the Company — also repudiated the sovereignty of the Mughal Emperor, the Hyderabad Ruler rejected the Company's suggestions that he do likewise.[23] Despite this continuing — albeit nominal — loyalty, however, the Ruler of Hyderabad engaged in independent political manoeuvring outside the scope of the Mughal Empire through the bulk of the eighteenth century.

Located further than Awadh from the Delhi court, Hyderabad largely turned its back on the Mughal Empire and involved itself militarily and politically in affairs in peninsular India. The disputed successions to the offices of Nizam (1748), and also of his subordinate, the Nawab of the Carnatic (1749), provided the entrees for the French and English East India Companies into involvement with the Indian Rulers as each Company backed a different side in the successions. Indeed, European influence in these two courts formed some of the central objects in the series of Carnatic Wars between these two European powers (1746-8, 1751-4, 1756-63). The court of the Nizam of Hyderabad continued to play the English off against the French, retaining a French military contingent in Hyderabad until 1798. The ultimate victory of the English over the French left the court of the Nawab of the Carnatic largely under the sway of the English.

Despite fundamental differences between the situations of Hyderabad and Awadh, broad parallels also developed in their respective relationships with the Company. During the eighteenth century, the Awadh Residency proved an object of contention between the factions of the Calcutta Council; even into the nineteenth century, the Governor-General and the Madras Council contended over the Hyderabad Residency. The Company even used the more established Awadh Residency as an

explicit model for the politically less advanced Residency in Hyderabad.[24] The Company expected both Residents to extract the states' resources and to manipulate the Rulers for the Company's political and military purposes. In both instances, despite various tactics deployed by the Resident, the Company remained largely dissatisfied with his relations with the Ruler and reforms in his administration.[25] As a result, both Rulers received repeated threats from their respective Residents that continued failure to meet Company expectations would lead to their deposition and/or the annexation of their states into direct Company administration.

Highlighting the contrasts between these two cases, however, allows us to examine some of the dynamics of indirect rule. One of the most striking differences arises from the contrasting financial relationships which developed between the Company and each state. Related to this, each of the two dynasties pursued a different set of strategies with respect to the Residency; the Residents in each state likewise followed different tactics. Finally, while the Company annexed Awadh and then had to crush it militarily during the 1857 fighting, the Company did not take Hyderabad which remained loyal to the British in 1857. Following 1858, Hyderabad stood out as the premier princely state in the Residency system. The Nizam proudly included within his titles and embellished on his coins 'Faithful Ally' of the British.

Indirect Rule in Hyderabad

The Company regarded Hyderabad, as it did Awadh, as a source of resources. It extracted much specie from both states in the form of subsidies for Company troops. In 1801, the Company forced the Awadh Ruler to cede half his territory to satisfy these subsidy payments in perpetuity. The Hyderabad Ruler perforce ceded the 'Northern Circars' in exchange for military services, first to the French (1750-3) and then to the English (1766). In 1853, the Company took over the rich cotton lands of Berar, among other territories, from the Nizam in lieu of his debts to it, debts largely resulting from the subsidies due for the protection by the Company of the state.

The flow of monies in the two states tended to go in opposite directions. In Awadh, the Company as a body contracted for massive loans from the Ruler. In contrast, in Hyderabad the Nizam (like the Nawab of the Carnatic) borrowed vast sums for his state from private British firms and individuals. Hyderabad's chronic shortage of cash stemmed primarily from the considerable ongoing payments to the Company for subsidiary forces, required by treaty. Many Britons and Indians who loaned money to Hyderabad worked for the Company, although they advanced these funds personally, quite apart from their official duties. Hyderabad's substantial debt to these individuals in their private capacity undoubtedly gave the Ruler influence over them as Company officials.

A joint stock corporation, William Palmer and Company, popularly known as 'The Firm', formed the channel for many loans, at some 25 per cent per annum.[26] The Firm had some 5,000 stockholders, mostly Europeans in the Company's or Her Majesty's service. Included among them was Henry Russell, the Resident in Hyderabad (1811-20), and William Rumbold (a protege of Governor-General Lord Hastings and husband of Hastings' ward). Also among the stockholders were Indian employees of the Company, including Residency Munshis. Many nobles and administrators of Hyderabad also took substantial loans from the Firm.[27] These loans flew directly in the face of both British laws and the Company's regulations, frequently repeated by the Court of Directors, against any financial transactions between the servants of the Company and Rulers.[28] Although the Firm operated in Hyderabad from 1801, the Resident did not request special sanction for it to do so legally until 1814.

From the perspective of Hyderabad, there was a quite reasonable identification of the Firm with the Company. The Firm operated for a dozen years from an office within the Residency grounds, with the blessings of the Resident and the Governor-General.[29] Indeed, the term regularly used by the Nizam and his Chief Minister for both the Company and the Firm was identical: *kothi*.[30] The costs of obtaining cash for expenses and the good will

of so many highly placed people — both within the Company and without — was apparently not regarded as excessive by the Ruler.

From 1808 to 1820, and perhaps thereafter, the Firm extracted vast wealth from Hyderabad, often taking over directly land revenue collection for specified districts in lieu of cash. These monies kept the stockholders personally satisfied but clearly conflicted with their duties as officials of the Company. In Awadh, the Company drew off much wealth through official loans from the Ruler at interest far below market rates. In Hyderabad, the Company also extracted capital through the subsidy to the Company for its troops. A substantial part of the Hyderabad payments, however, came from the principal of loans made by Company officials as private stockholders of the Firm. On one hand, the interest to the Firm drew off much capital that the Company might have otherwise been able to tap. On the other hand, the private gain of the Company's officials compromised to some extent their relations with the Nizam in an official capacity.

Even after the Firm's activities were finally forbidden by the Court of Directors in 1821, William Palmer and his more powerful associates continued to be influential in Hyderabad, London, and Calcutta.[31] In contrast, some of the smaller stockholders lost their entire investment. For over twenty years after the Directors' ban, the more prominent associates of the Firm continued their activities: functioning through intermediaries, laying charges of corruption against uncooperative Residents and their staff members via the judicial courts or newspapers, and extracting monies from the Hyderabad administration. As late as 1842, despite dire threats from a later Resident against such activity, the Chief Minister continued to consult with William Palmer about the affairs of state.[32] All these activities undercut the prestige and effectiveness of the Resident in Hyderabad for most of the period under study. The European community in Hyderabad, therefore, never became the source of strength for the Resident as part of his constituency, as was occurring in Awadh at the time.

The Hyderabad Resident's relations with the courtiers and people of Hyderabad also differed markedly from those of the Awadh Resident in his state. Unlike the Awadh example, the

Hyderabad Resident never could build strong links to elements from the general population. Further, the Hyderabad Ruler made explicit efforts to isolate his courtiers and administrators from the Resident. Thus, the Hyderabad Resident, already compromised by the Firm and its ongoing interference, proved unable to assemble the same potent Indian constituency, drawn from a range of interests, as did his Awadh counterpart.

Perhaps, in part due to the Ruler's efforts, Hyderabad was not as productive a recruiting area for Company servants as was Awadh. Some Hyderabadis did join the Company's service, holding positions within both Residencies and other branches of its administration. In the Company's armies, however (particularly in the largest of them, the army of the Bengal Presidency, prior to 1857), far more soldiers came from Awadh. In part this stemmed from the relative proximity of Awadh to the Company's main capital of Calcutta, in part it reflected the prejudices and practices of the Company's recruiters. The result, however, was that the Hyderabad Resident did not stand as spokesman, protector, and paymaster for large numbers of Company employees indigenous to that state as did the Awadh Resident. In 1848, for example, two-thirds of the soldiers in the Hyderabad contingent came from Awadh and transmitted remittances totalling some Rs 4,000,000 annually to their families through the Awadh Resident.[33] As a constituency, they therefore buttressed the Awadh rather than the Hyderabad Resident.

With respect to the elite of the capital, the Hyderabad case also varied from that of Awadh. As in Awadh, high officials of Hyderabad quickly perceived that the Company might offer shelter to them, their families, and their wealth. During the negotiations that led up to the 1798 Treaty — which established Hyderabad as a subordinate ally of the Company — the Nizam's ministers sought to insert guarantees for themselves into its provisions. Specifically, the Chief Minister sought to amend 'the fifth article so as it entitle him and his heirs' to the guaranteed protection of the Company.[34] The status he sought was in fact secured by some Awadh ministers through guaranteed pensions. This proposal by the Hyderabad minister, and a secret letter of

commitment by the Resident, were rejected by the Governor-General. The two highest ministers of Hyderabad had to settle for handsome pensions from the Company for their role in the negotiations. Later, when the Chief Minister died and his colleague had fallen from office, the Resident did intervene to protect their families and dependents from too violent a depredation by the next Chief Minister and the Ruler.[35]

The Governor-General's initial hesitation to bind itself to support any single faction in Hyderabad seems to stem from the delicate situation in South India at the time. The threat of Tipu Sultan, coupled with the looming French presence, and the uncertainties of the Company's relations with the various Maratha powers, all led the Governor-General to extreme caution in involvement in the factional manoeuvring in Hyderabad. The Company wished to avoid antagonizing the Nizam. The Resident even refused an appeal for protection by one of the Ruler's younger sons, fearing hostility from the heir apparent when he acceded.[36] The 1800 Treaty even had a provision, Article 15, which pledged that the Company had 'no manner of concern with His Highness's children, relations, subjects, or servants with respect to whom His Highness is absolute.'[37] Once the South was considered secure by the Company, it reversed its policy of non-interference. The Governor-General, recognizing that it would violate this provision of the Treaty, nevertheless bestowed an annual pension of Rs 100,000, retroactively, on the Chief Minister from the date of the 1800 Treaty; at least two of his subordinates received Rs 24,000 pensions from the same date.[38]

In 1805 the Chief Minister, Mir Alam, tried to ensure future security for himself by proposing to invest at least Rs 300,000 in Company securities and thus 'enjoy, to its full Extent, the protection of the British Government.'[39] The Resident, urging the Governor-General's acceptance of the minister's proposition, suggested this would lead to

> ...an increased Dependence on the part of the Proposer on the British Government, and the probable realization of considerable sums, for the public use in the event of the Benefits

> of the plan being extended to the Monied men at Hyderabad, many of whom I have little doubt, would be happy — especially if permitted to do so without an open avowal of their names — to follow the Minister's example.[40]

The minister's offer, if accepted, would have placed him in the Resident's constituency, which might expand through the inclusion of other notables. The Governor-General declined the offer, at least in some measure because of the Ruler's open hostility to such connections.

A prime distinction between Hyderabad and Awadh centred on the divergent attitudes of the respective Rulers toward links between the Company and notables in their states. In Awadh, the Ruler provided loans to the Company — albeit reluctantly — and nominated courtiers to receive the interest and protection of the Company. In Hyderabad, the Ruler consistently evidenced hostility toward any links between the Resident and his officials. In light of the Ruler's objections, the Governor-General forbade the issuance of any secret guarantees, although he added that the minister was free to purchase Company bonds and other commercial paper openly, should he choose.[41] Therefore, while the Awadh Resident disbursed some Rs 5,000,000 annually in pensions and remittances to local inhabitants in 1821, the Hyderabad Resident paid out only Rs 4,500.[42]

The Nizams largely distanced themselves from the values and pressures that the Residents tried to force on them. In 1814, the Resident recounted an exchange with the Hyderabad Ruler that typified the obstacles the British encountered in trying to 'reform' the Ruler and his state. When the Resident chided the Ruler for acting — by British standards — despotically, the Ruler replied: '...the Country is mine, and the Troops are mine, and I have the right to do what I choose with them both.' The Resident next tried to limit the Ruler's actions by appealing to '...those fixed principles which were recognized and adopted by all established Governments.' In response, the Ruler denied any need for him to conform to Western values:

> 'You must remember,' said the Nizam, 'you are speaking to a person who is not a Native of your own Country. You cannot expect me to be acquainted with the Principles which obtain in Europe, any more than with the languages which are spoken there.'[43]

This attitude of distancing himself from the Resident enabled him to block extensive shifts of loyalty by his administrators from him to the Company.

Over the years, the Nizam maintained his policy of isolating the Resident by cutting him off from the influential people of Hyderabad. Residents repeatedly complained of the Ruler's 'characteristic jealousy' of any meetings between him and a local notable.[44] The consequence was a frustrated isolation on the part of the Resident. One Resident wrote in 1839:

> It is well known that I should have been happy to receive the visits of any respectable person; and there can, I think, be no doubt that the noblemen and gentlemen of the city would have been glad to avail themselves of the privilege of frequenting the Residency. But this was forbidden...[45]

The Ruler punished those who broke the ban. When the Ruler's own step-brother, Mir Badshah, appealed in person to the Resident to prevent the attachment of his mother's property by the Ruler, the latter sent a military party 'to persuade Mir Badshah to see the matter in its correct perspective and return home, without taking any rash step.'[46] In this and in other ways, the apparent opposition of the Ruler choked off the 'free and social intercourse between the upper orders of Society...and the British Residency.'[47]

The Ruler's efforts to prevent the Resident from building any constituency in the capital extended to noblemen from outside of Hyderabad who sought to live there as pensioners or dependents of the Company. The Ruler either expelled or excluded from Hyderabad close relatives of the Mughal Emperor and other exiled nobles (although certain gratuities were sometimes given to maintain appearances). The Ruler expressly voiced the fear that

they would be used against him by the Resident should they be allowed to stay.[48]

So consistent and strenuous was the Ruler's opposition to such links between his subjects and the Resident that it became established Company policy not even to entertain requests for its protection. Only a few rare and minor exceptions to this policy can be found.[49] Only those individuals who lived within the confines of the Residency or the Cantonment, or in the bazaars attached to them, regularly enjoyed the protection of the Company, and even this was jealously limited by the Ruler. While civil and minor criminal matters in these areas were under the jurisdiction of the Resident, anyone guilty of a serious crime was legally bound over to the Ruler's courts for trial. The Ruler virulently rebuffed any suggestion that the Company's jurisdiction be extended; any over-zealous transgression by the Resident in individual cases led to his rebuke by the Governor-General.[50] In the face of the Ruler's strategy of isolating the Resident as much as possible, there was little the latter could do to build a constituency among the local nobility that would allow him to rival the Ruler for prominence in the capital.

The only major figure whom the Resident succeeded in linking closely to the Company was the minister in charge of the administration. In Awadh, the Company generally refrained from nominating ministers so as to be able to avoid responsibility for their policies. In Hyderabad, and in other states including Mysore, the Company nominated and then maintained ministers in office, thus finding itself liable for their policies. The Nizam's strategy extended itself to try to isolate this minister as well as the Resident, leaving them removed from almost all sources of power except each other. Neither the Resident nor the minister could freely broaden his base of support. The Resident's isolation, imposed by the Ruler, was further reinforced by the minister. Out of jealousy for his position, the minister also sought to prevent any rival from approaching the Resident.[51]

Following 1800, the Company decided that 'any advantage to be derived by the British from an alliance with Hyderabad state depended on placing its resources under the control of a minister

who should owe his elevation exclusively to their influence.'[52] Consequently, the Resident insisted, over the Ruler's objections, on the appointment of its supporter and pensioner, Mir Alam, as Chief Minister. The Ruler attempted to nullify this encroachment on his administration by appointing men hostile to the minister as his subordinates. In order to ensure that the minister would be able to carry out the duties of his position, the Resident secured a *wajib al arz* ('record of rights'), for Mir Alam. When the Ruler's threats took on a physical form, the minister retreated to the Residency for two weeks of 'discussion' in that refuge.[53]

On this client's death, the Resident tried once again to induce the Ruler to appoint a man favourable to the Company to the post. After prolonged wrangling, the Ruler finally appointed his own nominee as minister and, to try to guarantee the new minister's distance from the Company, he further forbade any 'personal intercourse' between the minister and the Resident.[54] Unable to veto the Ruler's appointment, the Resident bypassed the official Chief Minister and compelled the Ruler to empower a second minister, Chandu Lal, to actually conduct the affairs of state. For the next 34 years (until 1843 when the incumbent Resident finally abandoned him), Chandu Lal became ever more fully the client of the Company.

Whenever denied authority by the Ruler, Chandu Lal appealed to the Resident for support. The Company responded with harsh and repeated warnings, delivered in person and by letter, designed to induce 'a state of uncertainty and alarm' both in the Ruler and in Chandu Lal's rivals for power.[55] One harsh letter was never actually delivered by the Resident but its contents were 'leaked'.[56] When his personal safety was threatened, Chandu Lal relied on a detachment of Company troops or a sojourn in the Residency to see him through the troubles.[57] Demonstrating its support for him, the Company sent frequent gifts to Chandu Lal, the members of his family, and his 'confidential servants'. These presents ranged as high as Rs 25,000 in value.[58] All of this was in addition to the regular and reciprocal social as well as official visits between the Resident and this minister; each visit was carefully noted in the Hyderabad Court Diary. On his part, Chandu

Lal remained uniformly 'subservient' to successive Residents, never failing to promise to carry out their policies; in a number of instances, he allegedly kept some Residents personally satisfied financially as well with bribes.[59] Although Residents regularly wrote of the 'implicit and devoted attention which [Chandu Lal] is disposed to pay our Wishes,' they also found that few of these 'wishes' were ever implemented to the Residents' satisfaction.[60]

The Rulers countered the Residents' control over the minister by withdrawing themselves and their influence from the administration, leaving the problems of — and responsibility for — collecting the revenues and paying off the state's perpetual deficits to the minister. Both Sikandar Jah (1803-29) and Nasir al-Daula (1829-57) made vigorous attempts in the early years of their respective reigns to manage the affairs of state themselves. Both were, however, frustrated and insulted by the interference of the Resident and the minister, and both withdrew from active involvement in the administration for the rest of their reigns.[61] As recognized by the Resident, the Ruler's 'policy with regard to us seems to be to maintain the little independence he has left and it is I think with this view that he studiously keeps aloof from us, entrenching himself in formality and ceremony he resists all approach to intimacy or familiarity.'[62] This strategy had the advantage to the Ruler of avoiding both moral responsibility for the policies of the minister and the financial difficulties of his administration. Unlike in Awadh where the Ruler was continually being warned to 'reform' the condition of the administration and province or face penalties from the Company, in Hyderabad the Resident had to admit that the many deficiencies and abuses found in the administration and revenue collection system were, for the most part, the responsibility of the Company since it had set the policies carried out by the minister, however imperfectly.[63]

Residents made their most extensive efforts at the penetration of the Hyderabad administration between 1820 and 1829. During this period, the Resident used the Company's willingness to allow deep intervention to establish an administration under his guidance. The Resident also began accepting petitions from disaffected landholders and peasants; such petitions arrived at the rate

of 1,560 annually. In order to carry out the administration, the Resident appointed British officers, already in the Ruler's pay, to supervise land revenue settlement in certain districts.[64] Chandu Lal, to whom such measures were threatening, seems to have done what he could to surreptitiously frustrate British efforts. Even while the programme was fully underway, the Resident admitted that it had not gone as anticipated.

The vexation of the Resident and the shift of Company policy against intervention associated with Governor-General Bentinck (1828-33) led the Company to admit the problems of such deep involvement. When a new Nizam ascended the throne in 1829, he requested that the Resident withdraw from control over the administration. The Company quickly assented, asking only that it not be blamed for any drop in revenues to the state, calculated by the minister to have been some Rs 3,000,000 annually.[65] After a few years of effort at administration on the part of the new Ruler, effort apparently frustrated by a jealous Chandu Lal, the situation returned to the status quo ante: the Ruler withdrew from affairs of state and the minister frantically worked to raise funds to pay off the moneylenders, the Company, and the Ruler, while at the same time obsequiously acquiescing to the Resident's suggestions for 'reform' of the administration.[66]

Further limiting the Resident's exercise of indirect rule over Hyderabad was the Ruler's unwillingness to treat the state's debts as his own. Since the Ruler maintained a personal treasury distinct from that of the state, the debts to moneylenders, the Company, the troops, and even to the Ruler himself, apparently did not overly perturb him. Compared to his private funds, the debts of the state were never out of hand. While the Ruler never disclosed the amount in his personal treasury, he indicated to the Resident that he had at least Rs 20,000,000 available for emergencies; the Ruler frequently referred to the state debt as an amount he could pay.[67] The minister, however, continually scrambled to keep up with the interest payments through yet more borrowing.

By 1843, Chandu Lal's age and physical infirmities had raised doubts in the minds of both Company officials and moneylenders in Hyderabad about his ability to pay them both off. In a final

effort to salvage his position, Chandu Lal proposed a massive Rs 7,500,000 loan from the Company to be paid off through the transfer of territories from Hyderabad to the Company, similar to what Awadh had done in 1801. The Ruler, however, refused to countenance such an offer. When the Governor-General began to push for significant concessions in exchange for financial aid, the Ruler asserted that he would concede nothing.[68] Chandu Lal, however, had lost the confidence of the Resident and felt compelled to resign.[69]

In the following decade, there were eight appointments to the office of Chief Minister. The Resident took an active part in them; in 1846, for example, the Resident nominated its candidate for minister in open court and then secured his appointment.[70] Caught among the jealousy of the Ruler, the lack of consistent support from the Resident, and the chaotic financial condition of the administration, no minister could survive long in office. Only following the assignment in 1853 of certain districts (notably Berar) to the Company to settle the debt owed it, would the Resident resume his close cooperation with the incumbent minister, Salar Jang. Once resumed, the close relationship between Residents and this minister persisted unbroken for thirty years (1853-83). Together, Salar Jang and the Resident avoided severe changes in the relationship between the Company and Hyderabad. In spite of Dalhousie's expressed wish, the Company did not annex Hyderabad. During the 1857 conflict, despite a few local risings, Hyderabad remained loyal to the British and out of the fighting. Over the post-1857 period, Residents turned aside all threats to the minister. Indeed, so pleased were the British with Salar Jang's loyalty, they kept the post of Chief Minister within his family, even through the minority of his son.

Awadh and Hyderabad provide useful contrasts in indirect rule. Despite their comparable size and wealth, Hyderabad and Awadh came under indirect rule at different times, when the political situation and the Company's policies had changed. The subsequent history of their relations with the Company also differed significantly. Awadh came earlier into the exclusive influence of the Company and its Ruler from the late eighteenth

century perforce depended on military power under the direction of the Resident. Compared to Awadh, Hyderabad maintained longer an independent foreign and military policy, since the presence and then the threat of the French in South India and the Mysore and Maratha Wars restrained the Company. The Nizams furthered their independence from the Resident by consistently pursuing a policy of isolating the Resident. Further, the activities of the Firm compromised the effectiveness of some of the Residents. In part as a result of this policy, the Hyderabad Resident never formed an extensive constituency as did his counterpart in Awadh.

One crude contrast between Awadh and Hyderabad is the velocity of personnel change. In Awadh, tactics on both sides tended to be less consistent. A contributing cause for this was the fact that there were nine Awadh Rulers during the period from the founding of the Residency until 1856 while in Hyderabad there were only three Rulers over this time. During this same period, there were some thirty Awadh Residents, with a mean average tenure of two and a half years; only five Residents remained in office for five years or more. In Hyderabad, this period saw only some eighteen Residents; Residents served an average of four and a half years, eight Residents served five years or more. As a result, Hyderabad shows more consistency of policies on both sides.

The contrasting fiscal transactions between Awadh and Hyderabad tended to make the latter more independent of the Resident as well. The Awadh Ruler, by loaning money to the Company, and placing prominent members of his family, court, and administration under the Resident's protection, compromised their loyalty to his dynasty. The Nizam, by allowing his state to owe money to the Resident and prominent officials of the Company personally, compromised them. Further, by separating his personal treasury from that of the state, the Hyderabad Ruler redirected the pressures of the Company's fiscal demands onto the minister through whom the Resident tried to control the state.

The pattern of the Resident's relationship to the minister also varied between these cases. For much of the period under study,

the Hyderabad Resident supported a minister in the face of the Ruler's opposition. This placed on the Resident a greater responsibility for the condition of the administration without providing him with an effective means of reforming it. The Hyderabad Resident's problem was not lack of staff or military support (one Resident claimed to have had 15,000 men under his command, mostly Company-officered troops).[71] Rather, local conditions and the shape of the developing relationship among the Resident, the Ruler, and the minister led to a role of the Residency in the state distinctly different from that in Awadh.

In hindsight, the most striking distinction between the Awadh and Hyderabad cases was the annexation of the former but not the latter by the Company. At several times, however, the official Company policy in favour of annexation presented threats to the Hyderabad Ruler, just as it did to the Ruler of Awadh. In 1843, for example, the Company simultaneously pushed for 'reforms' in both states. The Company even prepared the draft of a treaty in which the Nizam received financial relief from his obligations to the Company but would in exchange turn over the administration of Hyderabad to the Resident. According to this proposal, the Ruler would

> ...delegate to the British Resident as Dewan, or to such other person as the British Government may from time to time select, the whole administration of His Highness' dominions until such time as the sums so advanced shall be repaid with compound interest at 2% per annum, and until the British Government shall be satisfied that His Highness, his Heirs and successors can conduct the Government of His Highness' dominions in such manner as to avoid the recurrence of embarassments similar to those which now prevail, and to preserve order and peace.[72]

As in Awadh, the Ruler rejected such a proposal as the equivalent of selling his authority, and selling out his responsibility, in exchange for financial gain. In 1848, Governor-General Dalhousie threatened the Hyderabad Ruler that, unless the Ruler reformed his administration, the Company would displace him

from control over it. Dalhousie used the same justification as had been used in the past in other states including Mysore, and as he would in Awadh in 1856: the Company legitimated its displacement of the Ruler on the grounds of '...its own security and [the] further peace of its borders and the interests of its own subjects' as well as of the Company's obligations to the people of the state.[73] Because of the particulars of his situation, the Nizam managed to fend off annexation threats against him. The Awadh Ruler succumbed to them in 1856. Thus, while Awadh came under direct British rule, Hyderabad remained under indirect rule until 1947. Mysore illustrates the issue of direct and indirect rule in yet a third way.

The Case of Mysore: Direct or Indirect Rule

An examination of British policies toward Mysore illustrates the radical shifts in Company policy toward and away from indirect rule. With each shift of policy came justifications for the new principles to be employed. An examination of these justifications demonstrates some of both the explicit and the unexpressed reasons which lay behind these policies.

Until 1799, the Company perceived the Muslim dynasty of Mysore as the greatest threat to its position in South India. The Ruler of Hyderabad and the various Maratha Rulers also posed potential problems for the Company but these lacked the aggressive immediacy of the Mysore Rulers: Haydar Ali Khan (c.1760-82) and his son Tipu Sultan (1782-99). The Company worked through its Residents to create a Triple Alliance against Mysore, consisting of itself, Hyderabad, and the Marathas. Adding piquancy to the situation were the French agents seen by the British to be lurking in all these states. This French influence appeared very real to the British officials of the day although we now understand the improbability of any Napoleonic thrust from Egypt, particularly after Nelson crushed the French fleet at Abukir (1798).

Under Governor-General Wellesley, the Company determined to end the threat of Mysore. Wellesley's moves against Mysore set

the tone for the Company's continued military advances through peninsular India; after the conquest of Mysore (1799), it brought Hyderabad under indirect influence and then defeated the Marathas militarily (by 1818). Of first concern here is how the Company proceeded to contain Mysore, and then to harness its resources in the Company's interests through indirect rule.

The Mysore Sultans had also used policies of indirect control. Haydar Ali, a Muslim, had begun as a military officer in the service of the Hindu Rajas of Mysore. In securing power over the state in about 1760, Haydar Ali ruled in the imprisoned Raja's name. To demonstrate his nominal subservience to his *de jure* Ruler, Haydar Ali continued to carry out the ritual coronation ceremonies of successive Rulers of the incarcerated Hindu dynasty. Only in 1795 did his son, Tipu Sultan, finally break with this tradition of acting under the nominal authority of this old dynasty. For only his last four years did Tipu Sultan rule directly as sovereign.

The Company had also determined to make use of the residual authority of the imprisoned Hindu dynasty. In 1767, the Madras Government resolved '...to root out Hyder Ally and to establish the ancient Family of the Rajahs in the Mysore Government; and in this Service will require all the Force we can possibly spare...'[74] The Company thus intended to use this 'ancient family' as a legitimation for the Company's own political purposes. Since the leading members of this 'ancient family' lay in Haydar Ali's prisons at the time, the Company's decision clearly put them in some danger. Rather than risk provoking Haydar Ali into removing its legitimation (by executing the entire 'ancient family'), the Company kept its resolve in camera. Indeed, the Company went on to fight a series of wars with Haydar Ali and his son Tipu Sultan, punctuated by a series of treaties with them, without any overt reference to the 'ancient family' which the Company had secretly decided to use. Although Haydar Ali and Tipu Sultan agreed through these treaties to surrender hostages and large amounts of land and specie, they adamantly rejected the presence of a British Resident at their court. In so doing, they avoided the

gradual slide into indirect control experienced by other Rulers; instead their end came suddenly.

As the final war with Mysore appeared ever more certain, the Company made Tipu Sultan's rejection of a Resident the *casus belli*. Governor-General Wellesley, who had come to South India in 1799 to personally direct the final confrontation, unilaterally set a deadline for the acceptance of a Resident. As he had earlier confided in a Secret Department minute: 'The residence of an Ambassador at his Court, would not only restrain the execution of any hostile designs which he [Tipu] might hereafter form, but would provide an authentic source of intelligence.'[75] Finally, ignoring Tipu Sultan's belated and qualified acceptance of such an envoy, Wellesley ordered the poised armies of the Company loosed into Mysore.[76] These armies smashed their way into the Mysore capital. By May 1799, Tipu Sultan lay among the piles of dead defenders of that capital.

Indirect Rule in Mysore

Even after his martial plans had been fulfilled, Wellesley had yet to determine how to dispose of the conquered state. At this point, the Company did not feel ready to simply abolish Mysore state by annexation into direct rule; rather it tended to favour a form of indirect rule. The Governor-General's initial inclination to restore Tipu Sultan as Ruler, under the careful guidance of a Resident, had necessarily died with Tipu Sultan. Since the Company's armies occupied Mysore state and since the situation lent itself to a range of options, the principles underlying Company policy were particularly evident in the discussion of what course to follow.

Writing to Henry Dundas (President of the Board of Control), Wellesley laid out three options available to the Company, analyzing the advantages and weaknesses he saw in each. The first option called for the total annexation of Mysore into the direct rule of the Company. This he rejected as unfeasible. Providing the trained manpower to administer such a large acquisition would be 'difficult to manage, in the present state of the Company's service in this [Madras] Presidency.' Further, it would raise the jealousy of the Nizam and the Marathas to a dangerous level.[77]

The second option meant division of Mysore state into three sections allotted respectively to the members of the Triple Alliance: the Company, the Nizam, and the Marathas. Wellesley discarded a division of the spoils into relatively equal shares on 'moral' grounds: the Maratha armies had refused to participate in the attack on Mysore and therefore deserved little of the prize. An alternative, assigning the vast bulk of Mysore state to the Company and the Nizam with only a token amount to the Marathas, he felt would have the defects of the first option. Further, it would unwisely increase the power of the Nizam. By dismissing options one and two on practical and moral grounds, Wellesley turns from direct to indirect rule for his solution.

The third option, that which he determined as the only one feasible, called for the restoration of Mysore state to a hereditary Ruler, with a British Resident to guide him. The ease with which Wellesley came to this conclusion suggests its primacy in his mind from the beginning. Only two questions remained: how much territory to assign to Mysore state and whom to install on its throne. Wellesley answered the first by selecting for annexation sufficient territory to reward the Company without straining its administration, allotting roughly the same amount to the Nizam, and providing a token amount to the Marathas. In fact, the Marathas refused their share of the spoils and it too was subsequently split evenly between the Nizam and the Company. What remained to the Mysore Ruler was, to Wellesley's mind, an appropriate sized state for a subordinate ally.

The question of whom to make Ruler had two obvious answers: a relative of Tipu Sultan or a member of the 'ancient family' of Hindu Rulers whom the Company had recently liberated from prison. In his discussion of each answer, Wellesley reveals his presuppositions about the nature of Indian Rulers. Although it 'certainly would have been desirable' to restore one of Tipu Sultan's sons, this possibility he ultimately rejected on the grounds of their Muslim 'racial' characteristics and family traditions of hostility to the British and Francophilia:

> ...the aspiring ambition, independent pride, and deadly revenge, congenial to the Mohammedan character, precluded the possibility of restoring any branch of the family of the late Sultaun to the throne, without exposing us to the constant hazard of internal commotion and even foreign war.[78]

He thus turns away from Tipu Sultan's family and toward the Hindu dynasty.

Wellesley found both 'moral' and 'rational' factors arguing for the restoration of the Hindu Rulers of Mysore, who had been deposed for some forty years by this time. Further, he assumed the Raja, restored by Wellesley's grace, would remain loyal to the Company:

> ...if I were to look to moral considerations alone, I should certainly, on every principle of justice and humanity, as well as of attention to the welfare of the people...restore the heir of the ancient Rajah of Mysore.... [E]very motive must concur to attach the heir of the Mysore family if placed on the throne to our interests, through which alone he can hope to maintain himself against the family of Tippoo. Something, perhaps, may also be expected from his gratitude, although that quality is not often found among States in any part of the world, and seldom, if ever, among the native States of India.[79]

He goes on to assert — projecting British assumptions of communal solidarity — that the Marathas would be pleased that the Company had installed a fellow Hindu on the Mysore throne. He assumed that the Nizam would have a Muslim partisanship, disappointed by such action. Nevertheless, Wellesley felt that this could be handled tactfully by the Resident in Hyderabad.

Wellesley's commitment to indirect rule and his selection of the 'ancient family' for the Mysore throne had critics within the Company. Officials such as Thomas Munro (in 1799 appointed joint secretary of the Commissioners for the Settlement of Mysore) discounted the possibility of any popular appeal of the 'long

despised and forgotten' Hindu dynasty and suggested that the people of Mysore, 'long accustomed to the government of strangers,' would prefer a strong direct rule by the Company.[80]

The Governor-General's will, however, prevailed with the Court of Directors. The Company crowned a three-year-old boy, representing the Hindu dynasty, as Maharaja and appointed a Resident to advise him.[81] Having learned from its experience of disorder in other states under its supervision, the Company carefully drafted the Mysore Treaty of 1799 to stipulate both that the Company was giving Mysore state to the Ruler and that the Company reserved the right to interfere in the administration should the annual subsidy owed the Company be threatened by maladministration. This counteracted the Governor-General's assertion of the hereditary right of the 'ancient family' since they could not logically both be traditional sovereigns and also the beneficiaries of a gratuitous gift of sovereignty by the Company.

The Governor-General and his staff tended to regard Indian Rulers in terms of religious stereotypes. In installing a Hindu Ruler, they held certain expectations about what they were getting. As they explained to the Resident who was to guide the Ruler:

> But though Hindoo Princes are for the most part sufficiently frugal in their immediate personal Expenses, and though the same spirit of Parsimony usually pervaded all Departments of their Governments, there is one kind of profusion which they are apt to practice to an extent that does not infrequently involve their affairs in great Embarassment; Namely the alienation of land in favor of Individuals (most commonly Brahmins) and of Pagodas [Hindu temples].[82]

This stereotype was to prove misleading when the Ruler finally came to power.

The Company's treatment of the family of the late Tipu Sultan highlights its recognition of the legitimacy of hereditary Indian nobility. Even though the British regarded this family as their implacable enemy, who could not be trusted with the government of Mysore, the British also unquestioningly recognized this

family's right to a hereditary income worthy of their noble status. The Company allotted some Rs 700,000 annually to the members of the family.[83] In part, this money might be seen as 'hush money' to purchase the quiescence and dependence on the Company of the late Sultan's family and its supporters in Mysore. If so, it was successful because the family went quietly off to exile, rather than turn to lead an uprising against the Company or its nominated Maharaja in Mysore. At the same time, this stipend and others suggest that the officers of the Company seem to have believed in the institution of nobility and the duty of society to support nobles in an appropriate style. This obligation, motivated by the Company's cultural values rather than stipulated by treaty, does much to explain the British tendency for indirect rather than direct rule.

Even before the Governor-General had formally announced his policy for the installation of the Hindu dynasty, he had already all but decided on the man to be appointed as Diwan in effective charge of the administration. He ordered Purniah, whom the British had decided was the most competent of the late Tipu Sultan's former ministers, brought in chains before the local British commander and offered a choice between the post of Diwan or continued imprisonment.[84] Purniah selected the former option and from that point on devoted himself to fulfilling British expectations for a good Indian administration. He held prompt payment of the subsidy due to the Company as his primary goal. He carefully accumulated a visible surplus of revenues over expenditures. For a dozen years he exhibited behaviour that won him encomia from his British superiors. Long after his death, Purniah had risen in the minds of the British to the ideal of a Diwan, sought for but unequalled among the mere mortals on whom the British were forced to rely thereafter: 'unless the highly improbable event should occur of a Second Poorneah of Mysore making his appearance.'[85] Purniah's devotion and commitment to the Company, however, eventually proved his undoing.

More telling about British values than the installation of a three-year-old Maharaja as 'sovereign' of Mysore in 1799 was their turning over the actual power of administration to that Ruler

on his reaching the age of sixteen. The Company had installed the Ruler as a minor, to legitimate acts done by Purniah and the Resident in his name but obviously without his understanding. Over the years, the Company retreated from the aggressive policies of Wellesley. By the time the Maharaja demanded his full rights as a Ruler in 1811, the Company had entered a period when it committed itself to a policy of extreme non-intervention within the Indian states. As a result, the Company did not question the Ruler's demands. Purniah, who did question them, was degraded and pushed into retirement.

Purniah apparently believed that as long as he pleased the British he would continue in power over the administration, *de facto* if not *de jure*. After the Ruler came of age and demanded control over the administration, Purniah blatantly refused the request. Purniah explicitly disobeyed his Ruler's demand for the vast surplus that Purniah's long years of thrifty administration had accumulated and that symbolized Purniah's devotion to the Company. Purniah told the Resident in open court

> ...that he could not with propriety deliver into the orders of the Rajah the public money which had been collected from the surplus Revenue of the Country because the English Government might make a demand for that treasure to satisfy their public exigencies and He alone was accountable to them for the amount.[86]

Purniah also asked that the office of Diwan be made hereditary to his own family. Apparently never believing that the Company would give power to the puppet Ruler, Purniah had made no effort to train the boy in administration.

When faced with a conflict between the model Minister and the demanding but untrained sixteen-year-old Ruler, the Company never wavered in its support of the latter. The Resident accused Purniah of flagrant disrespect to his Ruler but excused Purniah's behaviour as senility and allowed him to retire gracefully, once he had paid back the money the Ruler claimed Purniah personally owed the administration.[87] Further, as the Ruler requested, the

Resident withdrew from any significant involvement in the administration of the state, leaving it all in the Ruler's hands.

Within a few years the Resident reported disquieting consequences of the combination of the Ruler's personal direction of the administration and British non-interference. Dismissed Ministers came to the Resident complaining that the Ruler had made the conduct of their office unconscionable. The huge surplus accumulated by Purniah disappeared and the state went into debt. Tactful hints by the Resident failed to change the Ruler's ways. When chided by the Resident, the Ruler replied that Purniah had ruined the state in a selfish quest to squeeze a surplus from the people; the costs of such a quest now had fallen on the Ruler to bear. He also defended his large expenses for the paraphernalia and rituals of court as one time expenditures required by the restoration of royal power in Mysore.[88]

In Mysore, the Company encountered the conflict over cultural values that it ran up against in so many other states. The Company expected Indian Rulers to both be the 'natural leaders' of the people and also to understand, or at least conform to, British standards of decorum and administration. Indian Rulers, even when installed on the throne by the British, sought to live up to their own notions of royal behaviour. The British, while they partly expected and occasionally appreciated the pomp and ceremony of a court, also derided what they considered to be empty pageant and clucked at the vast cost. The Rulers, while they accepted British military and political power, bridled at any degradation of their dignity or participation in the rituals which placed them in the appropriate ranks of the Kings of the Earth. Out of these differences and clashes of culture came much of the misunderstanding and conflict that pervades the history of the relations between Rulers and Residents.

By 1831, the Company had shifted its policies toward intervention once again. Under Governor-General Bentinck, the Company entered a period when it approved decisive intervention, wherever justified. Thus, when the Governor-General decided that conditions in Mysore had deteriorated to an unacceptable point, he ordered British direction of the Mysore administration,

although only temporarily and in the name of the Ruler. In doing so, the Governor-General invoked the Treaty of 1799. This proved embarrassing since the Treaty did not permit such action in these circumstances.[89] Even more than the Treaty, however, the Governor-General based his decision on the principle of the Company's overriding moral obligation to the people of Mysore:

> It is clear that the Territory of Mysore was made over to the Raja, in trust, to be managed as a dependency of the British Empire in India, and under the responsibility of the British Nation to the people of the tract so assigned, that it should be well managed.[90]

In this instance, as frequently in other states, the self-perceived moral authority of the British served to justify displacing the Ruler, even in the absence of a strict legal right to do so. This attitude would become particularly prevalent from about this time through the mid-nineteenth century.

In Mysore, the Governor-General established a Commission in 1831 to administer the state by means of British officers appointed by the Company. The displaced Ruler received a handsome annual income of some Rs 350,000 plus 20 per cent of the net revenues of the state. Despite repeated protests from the Ruler and heated debate among the officials of the Company, this form of virtually direct British administration continued for fifty years until 1881 (at the time the offending Ruler's adopted son came of age).

In ratifying the Governor-General's decision to impose British administration on Mysore in 1831, the Court of Directors blamed the Mysore Resident for inadequate supervision over the Ruler. The Resident had been optimistically assuring his superiors that the Ruler was coming around to institute reforms until the end — indeed, due to the lag in communications, for some time after the Governor-General had already decided that no improvement was possible under the Ruler's administration. Since the Resident, James Casamajor, had been in the Mysore Residency since 1817, he felt that he had to defend his policy of non-interference. He wrote a 'vindication' of his actions against the 'censure' of the

Directors. In this he argued that he had only been following the orders given him, blamed the Ruler for 'pusillanimity and timidity', and tried to prove the Directors' criticism had 'been formed from a partial and imperfect understanding of the general subject.'[91] In this, the Madras Government supported the Resident and his career does not seem to have suffered.

It is evidence of the solidarity of the Company's career officials in India that few Residents were ever punished for an apparent failure of the Residency system. Annexation of a state they had been assigned to control indirectly more often led to promotion than to degradation for the Resident. Even in cases where the Company army had to be called in or even where the Residency was sacked and looted, the Resident received no blame. The few Residents who were censured or demoted had usually been found guilty of either corruption or of working on behalf of a Ruler rather than the Company.

The Maharaja of Mysore, acting as did several other Rulers deprived of control over their administrations, showed a far greater concern about any threat to his royal dignity than to financial or administrative losses. He pleaded in vain to be allowed at least one district under his direct control, as had been allowed the Mughal Emperor and the Raja of Tanjore. This would have been a token of his continuing sovereignty.[92]

In the drive for efficiency and consolidation characteristic of the time, the Company decided to abolish the Mysore Residency in 1843. Up to this point, the Resident had continued to attend the Maharaja but the administration of the state had been carried out separately by a British Commission. Conflict between the Resident and the Commissioner, and the Company's desire to reduce its expenses, made the elimination of the Resident appear rational to the Governor-General. The Maharaja objected more strenuously to this proposal than he had to the end of his administration of the state a dozen years earlier. The Residency had become the symbol of his status as Ruler. The Maharaja offered to foot the entire cost of the Residency if only it was retained.[93] The Governor-General rejected this plea and confirmed the termination of the Residency in Mysore. During this period, as we have seen, the

Company accorded far less respect for the position of the Indian Rulers than it had earlier.

The case of Mysore illustrates three points about the place of the states in the system of indirect rule. First, the Company's attitude toward the states shifted over the years. Until the 1790s, the Company hesitated to use its growing military force to crush its perceived enemies decisively. This ended dramatically as Wellesley began the Company's most dynamic period of expansion across India by conquering Mysore. The Company's virtual creation of a new Mysore state following that destruction suggests that the Company still preferred indirect to direct rule where feasible. Further, the generous stipend to the family of the late Sultan indicated the continued respect for the hereditary aristocracy that persisted within the Company's officials. The assumption of the administration of the state showed one of the deeper interventions that punctuated the early nineteenth century. This respect for Rulers, however, tended to decline, particularly from the 1840s to 1858. In Mysore, the Company kept the Ruler out of the state administration and proved willing to degrade him by the abolition of the Residency. Only in 1881, during British efforts to reconstitute a feudal order and an empire built around the Indian Rulers, was the Mysore dynasty restored to control. Thereafter, Mysore became a 'model state' in the eyes of the British.

Second, the Resident's relationship to Purniah shows the limitations expected of such an imposed Minister. Purniah apparently regarded his duty as fulfilling the Resident's expectations for a good administration. This centred on establishing peace and particularly on generating a large and visible surplus of revenues over expenditures. Purniah accomplished both. When the Ruler asserted his rights as sovereign, however, the Minister fell before the very means of his long success. He chose to demonstrate his loyalty to the Resident instead of his Ruler. The Resident frequently only remained supportive of a Minister until this support clashed with the larger relationship with the Ruler. Purniah, therefore, proved a model 'imposed Minister' but fell due to the limitations of this model.

Finally, in Mysore, the contradictions inherent in the British policies of indirect rule resulted in a mixed situation. On the one hand, the British retained a tendency toward indirect rule, with all the respect for hereditary Rulers and low British investment of money and manpower implied therein. On the other, the British felt their obligation to provide a 'moral' and efficient administration for the people of India. In Mysore, more blatantly than in most other states, the conflict between these two resulted in a condition between indirect and direct rule. The hereditary Ruler remained nominally on the throne and absorbed significant amounts of the state revenue. At the same time, the British carried out the administration of the state directly. Significantly, British efforts during the late nineteenth century to restore a permanent, feudal order in India led to its restoration of the Ruler of Mysore to power.

The Case of Nepal

The Company's extension of indirect or direct rule over almost all of India needs to be kept in perspective by means of at least one instance where it did not proceed to establish indirect rule. The case of Nepal demonstrates how, despite somewhat similar origins, the Residency did not become a means for Company control. I examine this case for differences in process (by both the Company and the indigenous state) and outcome.

As with most other states, the Company's initial contacts with Nepal were military and commercial. The Company extended futile assistance in 1767 to the then Raja of Katmandu, who was being overrun by the invading Gurkas. Accepting the Gurka conquest of Nepal, the Company concluded a commercial treaty in 1792 with the new Gurka Ruler.[94] In 1800, the reigning Raja lost in a factional dispute at the Nepal court and abdicated in favour of his young son, taking refuge in British territory at Banaras. As the Company had in other states, it sought to use its protection over one side in a factional dispute to gain influence within that state. Governor-General Wellesley sent a mission to negotiate a treaty providing for a Resident in Nepal. This resulted in a treaty con-

cluded in 1801 establishing such a Resident and guaranteeing an annual income of Rs 82,000 (including Rs 10,000 worth of elephants) from Nepal to the former Raja.

Up the point of the 1801 treaty, the case of Nepal appeared superficially similar to the many Indian states which came into contact with the Company about the same time. Unlike Nepal, however, these other states would eventually come under indirect rule by the Company. Instead of heading for indirect rule by the Company, Nepal moved — albeit unevenly — toward status as a friendly, but independent, neighbour of the British Empire in India. Through highlighting the particular historical developments of Nepal's relations with the Company, I can suggest some of the factors which would direct Nepal onto a different track from that of other states in South Asia.

Some of Nepal's distinctions seem obvious to us now. One major factor that distinguished Nepal was geography, physical and cultural. Nepal lay in the mountains and on the edge of the cultural region traditionally considered Indian. Burma, Assam, and Afghanistan, however, shared many of these features and were subjected to extensive efforts by the Company to impose indirect rule upon them.

Especially significant in distinguishing Nepal from the other states, therefore, were the strategies followed by the Nepal court. Two of the most striking and consistent strategies of the Nepal court remained its continued communications with other states and its insistence on isolating Nepal — both the court and the country — from the influence of the Company's Resident. The effects of these two policies were to preclude the Company from establishing either exclusive or effective control, two of the prime features of indirect rule.

Nepal consistently pursued the strategy of developing and sustaining its links to several Asian powers. The Nepal court continued to dispatch extensive overt and covert missions to most of the states in South Asia not yet isolated by the Company, thus maintaining an independent foreign policy. Later it waged war in Tibet in 1855, quite outside of British control. The Nepal Ruler continued to retain regular relations with China — sending a

periodic mission bearing tribute to the Chinese Emperor — until 1912. This continued communication with much of the rest of Asia distinguished Nepal from the Indian states which gradually lost their ability to maintain such balancing foreign relations.

One major effect of this strategy was to provide the Nepal court with an overview of events across Asia. Unlike many of the Indian states, they could compare their condition with that of states conquered or fallen into the indirect rule of the Company. Further, they gained an understanding of the times that the Company was weakest due to military engagements elsewhere.

The Nepal administration simultaneously sought to keep the Company at arm's length. The 1792 commercial treaty did not spark substantially increased trade with India. This treaty had been observed more in the breach by the Nepal administration, especially with respect to provisions lowering the import tariffs on goods coming from India. The 1801 treaty did little more to bring Nepal into the Company's orbit.

This 1801 treaty did specify the exchange of wakils to smooth relations over borders, arrange reciprocal extradition of fugitives, and negotiate other points of friction between the two states. It went on, however, to isolate the respective wakils from contact with any person in the state except the court. This severely limited the Resident's scope:

> It is incumbent upon the vakeels of both States that they should hold no intercourse whatever with any of the subjects or inhabitants of the country, excepting with the officers of Government, without the permission of those officers; neither should they carry on any correspondence with any of them; and if they should receive any letter or writing from any such people, they should not answer it, without the knowledge of the head of the State, and acquainting him of the particulars, which will dispel all apprehension or doubt between us, and manifest the sincerity of our friendship.[95]

This unique provision isolating the Resident clearly resulted from the policies of the Nepal court. No comparable provision is

found in any other treaty concluded by the Company in South Asia. Further, the Nepal court strictly enforced it, posting guards to constrict even the movement of the Resident and his contact with the both nobles and ordinary people.

Such was the frustration of this first Resident, due to his isolation and the perceived hostility of the Nepal court, that he withdrew the Residency with Wellesley's approval in 1803. The exiled former Raja left British protection and returned to Nepal in 1804. His return and subsequent assassination in the continuing factional conflicts at court deprived the Company of any part in the succession struggle of the dynasty. Thus, while many other states came under the Resident's indirect control, Nepal remained isolated from the Company, except as minor border skirmishes erupted periodically.

At length, the Company responded to these border fights by escalating into a full-scale invasion of Nepal (1814-16). The battles went poorly for the Company, its final victory proving unacceptably expensive in terms of Company casualties, both British and Indian. Although Nepal lost the war, it demonstrated to the Company the cost in blood, money, and prestige of such a hard-fought invasion of such rugged terrain and people. Once conquered, Nepal further proved to have few resources for the Company to exploit.

The peace treaty that followed this war shared two provisions with many other treaties between the Company and Indian states: it called for an exchange of wakils (i.e. it established a Residency) and it prohibited the employment by Nepal of British, other European, or American subjects without the permission of the Company.[96] The treaty significantly omitted to provide for any of the other means of access for interference by the Resident characteristic of other states: Nepal continued its diplomatic communications free from Company control; Nepal had no obligation to seek the advice of the Resident; Nepal relinquished no judicial rights over British subjects or their clients; Nepal clearly had no need for a subsidiary force and accepted no limitations on its still formidable army; Nepal paid no tribute or subsidy to, and contracted no loans from, the Company. Further, Nepal continued its

twin policies of informing itself fully about events in the states of India while at the same time isolating the Resident.

The Nepal Minister who retained control throughout this period, Bhima Sen Thapa, proved able to sustain this policy. The Nepal court quickly made apparent the strength of its determination to exclude the Resident from the affairs of state. The incumbent Raja died soon after the Resident's arrival in 1816 but the court deliberately and pointedly excluded the Resident from the infant successor's coronation ceremony.[97] This contrasts starkly with the situation in other states at this time, where the Resident had gradually come to arbitrate the succession. Further, the Nepal court continued to strictly limit the Resident's physical movements out of the Residency.

The Company and its first two Residents, Edward Gardiner (1816-29) and T. Herbert Maddock (1831-33), largely accepted this isolation and refrained from virtually all intervention. A later Resident instructed his successor to follow 'Mr. Gardiner's system: two visits [to the Nepal court] a year, and half a dozen letters to [the British] Government.'[98] The Company, engaged deeply in extending indirect rule in the rest of South Asia during this time, did not force its influence on Nepal, wary as it was of the proven Nepal army and aware as it was of the limited resources that could be extracted.

Efforts by the Resident for Indirect Rule

For about a decade following 1833, the Company did attempt to move toward bringing Nepal into indirect rule. This change largely resulted from internal and external factors which reinforced each other. The Nepal administration and state underwent significant alterations. The Resident took advantage of these changes to intervene, thus resulting in further instabilities at court.

Internally, the political and social situation in Nepal went through a transition during this decade. The period of dominance of the Minister Bhima Sen gradually ended as the court factions opposed to him and the social changes in the army and society of Nepal combined first to weaken and then to depose him. During

the period following his final fall in 1837 and eventual apparent suicide in prison, the Nepal court followed less coherent policies as one faction or another arose. Concurrently, the army and landholding systems also underwent fundamental changes.[99]

The Company's Resident at the time also began to push for deeper involvement following 1833. This Resident, Brian H. Hodgson, proved less willing to accept isolation than had his predecessors. Because his personal health problems restricted him to the salubrious hills, this active young official had been compelled to limit his ambitions to a career serving almost exclusively in Nepal, as member of the Residency staff (1820-2, 1824-33) and then as Resident (1833-43). Hodgson clearly chaffed under the severe restrictions placed on the Resident by the Nepal court. He combined his extensive research into the zoology, ethnography, and culture of Nepal with forays into the factional politics of the court.[100] Because of the Nepal court's instability at the time of Hodgson's appointment as Resident, it proved particularly vulnerable to intrusions from the Residency.

Despite his efforts, however, Hodgson lacked the usual means of access to power available to Residents in other states. His offer in 1833 to the Nepal court that he negotiate extraterritorial status for British subjects in Nepal received only a rebuff. Further, he proved powerless over the years to prohibit the Nepal court from sending overt and covert emissaries to many of the opponents of the Company at the time including Gwalior, Sind, Nagpur, Lahore, Sikkim, Bhutan, Ava, China, and several of the states of Rajputana.[101] Some of these emissaries the Company managed to intercept, others it could not block. Some of these missions came to the Company's attention only when Residents at those courts anxiously reported their presence.

Nevertheless, for a few years after the fall of Bhima Sen in 1837, the Nepal court became so riven by hostile factions of nobles that the Resident managed to established a powerful if not fully determining influence. Factions allegedly pro-British received his support, although it is not clear to what effect. His pressure on the court extracted an official pledge in 1839, endorsed with the Ruler's seal, that:

> All secret intrigues whatever, by messengers or letters shall totally cease.... The Nipal Government engages to have no further intercourse with the dependent allies of the Company beyond the Ganges, who are by Treaty precluded from such intercourse, except with the Resident's sanction and under his passports.[102]

Despite this pledge and the Resident's influence, such diplomatic missions from Nepal to the Indian states continued. In 1841, the Resident induced 94 leading nobles of Nepal to sign a vow of friendship with the Company promising 'that the Resident should ever and always be treated in an honourable and friendly manner...'[103] This pledge proved no more adequate than the 1839 agreement in securing the court's support for the Resident. In spite of Hodgson's repeated efforts, the Residency apparently lacked sufficient means or favourable circumstances for building a constituency in the Nepal court. Nepal's avoidance of financial entanglements, subsidiary forces, or other obligations to the Company left the Resident with little to build upon.

Hodgson's initiatives for Residency intervention in Nepal also lacked the full support of the Company. At this time, the Company was already over-committed militarily, particularly in Afghanistan leading up to the First Afghan War (1838-42). The prospect of a further military entanglement in Nepal at the time proved unpalatable to the Company. In a conflict over how much intervention in Nepal the Company should pursue, the Governor-General recalled Hodgson in 1843; he resigned on principle rather than accept reappointment elsewhere. The Company then instructed his successor to return to the earlier policy of extremely limited intervention. These instructions stressed that the Resident should limit himself primarily to intelligence gathering and offering criticism of the court's actions:

> Your duties at Nepaul will be twofold, viz.: to watch any movements on their part, which may be injurious to us, and to offer counsel to them in all State matters in which we may be concerned, whenever counsel is sought, or likely to be

> acceptable and useful... [You should] leave the Nepaulese entirely to govern themselves, and the only cases in which it is incumbent upon us to advise, remonstrate, or dictate, are when our own interests require such interposition. But the [British] Government would be ill represented if every valuable opportunity were not used to prompt to that which is good, and to deter from that which is evil; to express abhorrence of acts of cruelty, perfidy, injustice; to give full approbation of all that is benevolent, honest, high-minded, and just.... Your communications to Government should be few, and only when necessary.[104]

This return to a limited role by the Resident, ordered by the Company, helped permit a return to stability at the Nepal court.

In 1846 Jang Bahadur Rana ruthlessly established the dominance of his faction in Nepal; he maintained his dominance until his death in 1877 and his faction retained control until the 1950s. Under this strong and consistent leadership, Nepal reinstituted a stable internal administration and a balancing foreign policy that satisfied the British without becoming dependent on them. Nepal offered military support to the Company during its continuing difficulties in Afghanistan. Jang Bahadur impressed the Company with his understanding of British culture, not the least by a trip to England in 1850. He confirmed his place in British hearts by providing effective military aid during the 1857 conflict when the British desperately needed it. Thus, he secured Nepal's place as an independent state with respectful relations with the British.

This examination has highlighted the factors which distinguished the case of Nepal from the other states of South Asia. Part of the reason Nepal avoided indirect rule by the Company lay in the isolated geography and relatively poor resources of that state. Beyond this, however, the policies of Nepal's strong ministers did much to prevent intervention by the Resident. Sustaining a policy of isolating the Resident from the court and the state, Nepal prevented the Residents from gaining sufficient knowledge or influence in the state. By at the same time holding open its com-

munications with other powers, Nepal obtained a knowledge of events across South Asia that enabled it to better judge the Company's weaknesses and potential strategies. When the Company did intervene militarily, Nepal made the cost disproportionately high for the results. Conversely, the Resident in Nepal lacked most of the means for gaining access to power over the court available to his colleagues in other courts. The Resident's brief period of intervention — at a time when the court was unusually susceptible — failed to generate support in Nepal or from the Company. As a result, Nepal largely retained its independence on the edge of, rather than incorporated into, the Residency system of indirect rule.

Conclusion

Each of these four case studies has suggested different features of the Residency system. Together, they point out some of the variety in the origins of the connections between the states and the Company. They indicate the diverse factors which shaped the relationship between the court and the Residency. They disclose the effects on that relationship of both the local situation and also the Company's internal policy decisions, often taken with little regard for that local situation.

From the very origin of their relationship to the Company, each of these states began along a different path. The Awadh Ruler largely welcomed a Resident as a liaison between himself and the Governor-General personally. Hyderabad sought to balance the French presence at its court against the British Resident. Mysore and Nepal initially fought bitterly to repel any British influence over their states; Nepal rarely stopped contesting it. Each of these states varied in geographical location, internal resources, and political stance, affecting not only the position of its Ruler but also the attitude of the Company toward it. Further, the origins of each of these Residencies came at a different point in the history of the Company. The very concept of indirect rule evolved within the Company over time, and changed as a result of its accumulating empirical experience in these Residencies, among others. As a

result, the Company held quite different expectations for the Residency in each state.

As each Residency established itself, a number of independent and related factors determined the patterns each would follow. Much of this book has examined the Company's policies as they shifted for the Indian states overall. We have also seen that local instances occasionally went against these official policy shifts. In the discussion of both official policy and the individual cases, we have seen the deciding factors that led to the Company's decision to push for more or less intervention by the Resident in each state. At different points, the Company made a number of conscious — and at times contradictory — policy decisions about establishing direct or indirect rule, for both Awadh and Mysore.

Local factors also affected the direction the Residencies would take. The position and policies of a Ruler shaped the place of the Resident at his court. The local policy of isolation of the Resident, in Nepal and Hyderabad, for example, undoubtedly constrained the Resident from certain levels of intervention. The efforts by several Rulers to hold on to their own understanding of the nature of their position, despite personal cost to themselves, occasionally brought about a clash of cultures with the Resident. In both Hyderabad and Mysore, the very coming of age of the Ruler led to a dramatic shift in the level of intervention in the administration by the Resident. The disparate fiscal policies of the Rulers of Awadh, Hyderabad, and Mysore all had a marked impact on the shape of indirect rule in their states. Further, the personalities and policies of the officials like Purniah, Mir Alam, Chandu Lal, and Salar Jang, as well as others in the state likewise had effects. The very class composition and natural resources of the state — although largely beyond the scope of this book — proved significant.

While the goals and the means of the Residents varied, we can see some overall patterns. The Residents largely sought to extract resources from the state for the Company's purposes. In Awadh, these resources included the military potential of the population. As a commercial body that had to satisfy its stockholders in Britain as well as the often costly military and political ambitions

of its officials in India, the Company particularly sought specie. Both the Awadh and the Hyderabad Residents in particular, focused their attention on acquiring that specie for the Company (as well as personally for themselves at times).

The Residency system over the period 1764 to 1857 developed as a result of a complex interaction of a great variety of factors. I have analyzed some of the more important of these factors using these four case studies and, earlier in the book, using analysis of the component parts of the Residency system. The events of 1857 brought on an immediate trauma that altered the Residency system fundamentally. After this trauma had lessened, the British shifted their policies and sought stability in India, particularly through closer and more harmonious bonds with the Indian Rulers. My final chapter examines the developments of the Residency system in India from 1858 to 1947 and the conscious importation of this Indian system of indirect rule by British administrators in Africa and elsewhere in Asia.

NOTES

1. Seid Gholam Hossein Khan, *Seir Mutaqherin*, trans. M. Raymond alias Haji Mustafa, 4 vols. (Calcutta: T.D. Chatterjee, 1902), 2:579, 584. BSC, 6 December 1764, 2:739-43, 749. Carnac to Select Committee, 26 May 1765, Bengal Select Committee Proceedings, 11 June 1765, 1765:53-4. Aitchison, 2:67-9.

2. Resident to Secretary to Government, 25 July 1822, BPC, 9 August 1822, No.27.

3. Letter from Shuja uddaula and Minute of President, BSC, 30 September 1772.

4. Extract of Governor Hastings' report of transactions in Benaras, Extract, BSC, 4 October 1773, HMS 345:329.

5. The mean average term of office for a Resident in Awadh, however, was 2.2 years for the entire period to 1856, only 5 Residents serving for 5 years or more in that state.

6. Bengal Select Committee Proceedings, 3 August 1768, pp. 621 ff. Aitchison, 2:70.

7. Resident to Governor-General in Council, 17 May 1775, FSP, 13 December 1775. Aitchison, 2:75.

8. To four battalions of infantry, one of irregulars, two thousand cavalry, and three hundred grenadiers. Aitchison, 2:101.

9. King of Oudh to Resident Lucknow, 2 July 1823, BPC, 3 October 1823, No. 12.

10. Munshi Sital Parshad, 'Mirat al-Auza,' Persian MS 2149, fol. 363, 367-9, Raza Library, Rampur. Resident to Political Secretary to Government of India, 24 July 1837, FSC, 7 August 1837, No. 10.

11. For an excellent study of the changing economy of the Gangetic plain, see C[hristopher] A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

12. See Michael H. Fisher, *A Clash of Cultures: Awadh, the British and the Mughals* (Riverdale, Md.: Riverdale Company, 1987).

13. Resident to Governor-General, 19 December 1799, Consultation 12 June 1800, No. 102, HMS 579:339.

14. Treaty 10 November 1801 and Memorandum of the final results of the discussions between His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General and the Nabob Vizier of Oudh, 1802, Aitchison, 2:130-42.

15. See Rudrangshu Mukherjee, *Awadh in Revolt 1857-1858: A Study of Popular Resistance* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984).

16. See Fisher, *A Clash of Cultures*, Chapter IV.

17. For example, in 1848 the Resident compelled the Awadh Ruler to sign an agreement to expel all 'enuchs [*sic*], singers and other improper persons' from his court and administration. Written Agreement Made with His Majesty, n.d., IPFC, 8 July 1848, No. 64.

18. See Hermann Goetz, *The Crisis of Indian Civilization in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1938).

19. J.G.A. Baird, ed., *Private Papers of the Marquis of Dalhousie* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1911), p. 344.

20. This crisis stemmed from a confrontation between Hindu and Muslim partisans over a disputed temple or mosque in Ayodhya, in eastern Awadh. See Fisher, *A Clash of Cultures*, Chapter VI.

21. Proclamation of King of Oudh, 5 February 1856, IPFC, 6 June 1856, No. 203.

22. John Malcolm to Gerald Wellesley, private, n.d., quoted in John William Kaye, *The Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir John Malcolm...*, 2 vols. (London: Smith, Elder, 1854), 2:379.

23. Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 22 January 1820, BSC, 22 January 1820, No. 13.

24. Governor-General to Secret Committee, 1 August 1789 and to Lord Hobart, 26 June 1796 in Charles Ross, ed., *Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis*, 3 vols. 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1854) 1:426, 2:308.

25. E.g. note by Secretary to Governor-General, 10 January 1834, FPC, 5 June 1837, No. 68.

26. See for details Peter Wood, S. Regani, Z. Yazdani.

27. Secretary to Government to Resident, 6 June 1823, FPC, 6 June 1823, No. 23.

28. Most notably Statute 37 Geo. III cap. cxlii s.28 (1797). Resident to Secretary to Government, 10 April 1814, FPC, 22 April 1814, No. 17. Regani, p. 225. Yazdani, p. 65.

29. Resident to Secretary to Government, 8 March 1823, FPC, 29 March 1823, No. 60. Hyderabad Minister to Resident, n.d., FPC, 20 December 1822, No. 15.

30. 'Tuhfa-i Dakkan,' Salar Jang Persian MS 135, fol. 157.

31. Secretary to Government to Resident, 7 June 1822, FPC, 7 June 1822, No. 1, quotes the Court of Directors' letter of 28 November 1821. [Secretary to Government] to Resident, 18 April 1829, FPC, 18 April 1829, No. 35. Regani, pp. 227, 232-3. Andhra Pradesh State Archives, MS 38/1/23. Minutes of the Governor-General, 14 December 1828 and 17 February 1830, quoted in C.H. Philips, ed., *The Correspondence of Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, Governor-General of India 1828-1835*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 1:118-19, 397.

32. Resident to Minister, 2 August 1842, FPC, 30 August 1842, No. 134. Resident to Minister, 23 November 1842, FPC, 1 February 1843, No. 49. Resident to Secretary to Government of India, 14 December 1842, FPC, 1 February 1843, No. 45.

33. Officiating Resident to Secretary to Government of India, 20 July 1848, FPC (Secret), 5 August 1848, No. 47.

34. Assistant Resident to Governor-General, 15 August 1798 and 20 August 1798, FSC, 18 September 1798, Nos. 1, 7.

35. Arzees asking for protection are included in Resident to Governor-General, 14 October 1805, FSC, 2 May 1805, Nos. 224-37. Acting Resident to Governor-General, 8 September 1805, FSC, 4 October 1805, No. 87.

36. Assistant Resident to Governor-General, 22 August 1798, FSC, 18 September 1798, No. 8.

37. Aitchison, 9:66.

38. Secretary to Government to Resident, 2 January 1801, Hyderabad Residency Records 23:1-4.

39. Minister to Resident, 9 February 1805, FSC, 16 May 1805, Nos. 69-72.

40. Resident to Governor-General, 11 February 1805, FPC, 16 May 1805, Nos. 69-72.

41. [Secretary to Government] to Resident, 14 May 1805, FSC, 16 May 1805, No. 73.

42. Hyderabad Resident to [Secretary Secret and Political Department], 20 March 1821, FPC, 7 April 1821, No. 88.

43. Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 5 December 1814, FPC, 10 January 1815, No. 26.

44. E.g. Resident to Governor-General, 16 June 1809, FPC, 29 July 1809, No. 5.

45. Private letter from the Resident to the Governor-General, quoted in Hastings Fraser, ed., *Memoirs and Correspondence of General James Stuart Fraser of the Madras Army* (London: Whitney and Company, 1885), pp. 41, 316-17.

46. Hyderabad court diary of 4 June 1853, quoted in Central Records Office, *The Chronology of Modern Hyderabad, 1720-1890* (Hyderabad: Central Records Office, 1954), p. 269.

47. Resident to Governor-General, 4 May 1805, FSC, 16 May 1805, Nos. 119-20. Resident to Acting Deputy Persian Secretary to Government, 24 January 1824, FPC, 27 February 1824, No. 39.

48. Resident to Persian Secretary to Government, 9 September 1812, FPC, 23 October 1812, No. 65. Letter of Mirza Solieman Shokoh to the Nizam, received 25 July 1828, FPC, 16 August 1828, No. 40.

49. A statement of the Company's policy is found in Secretary to Government of India to Chief Secretary to Government of Bombay, 12 October 1835, FPC, 12 October 1835. For exceptions to the policy, see Acting Resident to Secretary to Government, 5 June 1819, FPC, 3 July 1819, No. 52; Acting Persian Secretary to Government to Resident, 7 April 1813, FPC, 8 May 1818, No. 60.

50. Some people moved to these areas of Company jurisdiction to secure their persons or wealth. Superintendent of Police to Commander Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, 17 July 1838, FPC, 29 August 1838, No. 68. Extracts from the *Spectator* of 30 June 1846, 9 July 1846 and *The Englishman*, 19 June 1848, 4 March 1852, 6 March 1852 in Moulvie Syed Mahdi Ali, *Hyderabad Affairs* 6 (1883), pp. 12-13, 33, 84. Extract Court of Directors, letter 4 November 1835, No. 49, Hyderabad Residency Records, 72:189-90. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 24 July 1812, FPC, 14 August 1812, No. 4. Resident to Officiating Secretary to Government of

India in the Military Department, 22 January 1840, FPC, 8 June 1840, No. 177a. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 28 February 1831, FPC, 18 March 1831. [Chief Secretary] to Resident, 1 December 1833, FPC, 27 December 1833, No. 71.

51. Resident to Acting Deputy Persian Secretary to Government, 24 January 1824, FPC, 27 February 1824, No. 39.

52. Henry George Briggs, *The Nizam: His History and Relations with the British Government*, 2 vols. (London: Bernard Quartitch, 1861), 1:88.

53. Hyderabad court diaries of 20 November and 5 December 1806, quoted in Central Records Office, *The Chronology*, pp. 106-7.

54. Resident to Governor-General, 16 June 1809, FPC, 29 July 1809, No. 5.

55. E.g. Governor-General to Nizam and Governor-General to Moonir ool Moolk, 20 September 1810, FPC, 25 September 1810, No. 46.

56. Resident to First Assistant in Charge, 12 October 1810, FPC, 25 September 1810, No. 57. Resident to Vice President in Council, 20 June 1811, FPC, 12 July 1811, No. 19. Resident to Governor-General, 5 December 1814, FPC, 10 January 1815, No. 26. Governor-General to Nizam, 8 April 1815, FPC, 2 May 1815, No. 14.

57. Yazdani asserts that Chandu Lal fled to the Residency during the November 1812 mutiny, pp. 37-8. He told the Resident that he would only do so in an emergency. Resident to Governor-General [?], April 1814, FPC, 22 April 1814, No. 14.

58. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 1 June 1811, FPC, 28 June 1811, No. 47. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 5 October 1811, FPC, 25 October 1811, No. 43. Secretary to Government to Resident, 15 January 1813, FPC, 15 January 1813, No. 18. Resident to Acting Chief Secretary to Government, n.d. FPC, 10 October 1817, No. 19. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 31 December 1818, FPC, 30 January 1819, No. 122. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 22 January 1819, FPC, 27 February 1819, No. 69.

59. E.g. Resident to Officiating Chief Secretary, 16 September 1824, Ootacamund Proceedings, 24 September 1834, No. 42. Minister to Resident (private note), n.d., FPC, 29 December 1849, Nos. 116-17.

60. Resident to Acting Secretary in the Secret and Political Department, 2 February 1821, FPC, 24 February 1821, No. 57.

61. Resident to Governor-General, 6 April 1814, FPC, 22 April 1814, No. 15. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 28 October 1829, FPC, 13 November 1829, No. 40. Resident to Secretary to Government, n.d., FPC, 2 December 1831, Nos. 80-4.

62. Memorandum by the Resident, 12 April 1837, FPC, 5 June 1837, No. 84.

63. Secretary to Government to Resident, 21 August 1829, Hyderabad Residency Records, 67:379-86.

64. Resident to Governor-General, 1 September 1820, FSC, 30 September 1820, Nos. 8-11. Resident to Secretary to Government, 30 June 1825, FPC, 21 October 1825, No. 84.

65. Minister to Resident, 15 April 1843, FPC, 18 November 1843, No. 74. Secretary to Government to Resident, 4 May 1827, FPC, 1 June 1827, No. 34. Chief Secretary to Government to Resident, 21 August 1829, Hyderabad Residency Records, 67:379-86.

66. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 5 July 1829, FPC, 24 July 1829, No. 31.

67. Resident to Secretary to Government of India, 14 August 1843, FPC, 18 November 1843. Resident to Minister, 9 October 1846, Hyderabad Residency Records, 83:162-6. Resident to Secretary to Government of India, 31 July 1849, FPC, 8 September 1849, No. 100. Resident to Secretary to Government of India, 11 September 1849, FPC, 20 October 1849, No. 161.

68. Secretary to Government of India to Resident, 26 July 1843, FPC, 18 September 1843, No. 80. Resident to Secretary to Government of India, 14 August 1843, FPC, 18 November 1843.

69. Resident to Governor-General, 7 September 1843, quoted in Fraser, p. 191.

70. Resident to Secretary to Government of India with Governor-General, 2 November 1846, Hyderabad Residency Records, 83:158-9.

71. Hastings Fraser, *Memoirs and Correspondence of General James Stuart Fraser of the Madras Army* (London: Whiting, 1885), p.128.

72. Secretary to Government of India to Resident, 26 July 1843, FPC, 18 September 1843, No. 80.

73. Minute of Governor-General, 7 October 1848, FPC, 7 October 1848, No. 236.

74. Secret Department, Fort St. George to Secret Department, Fort William, Foreign Department Select Committee, 3 October 1767, pp. 321 ff.

75. Wellesley, *Dispatches*, 12 August 1798, 1:206.

76. Ibid., 1:326-8, 433-4.

77. Ibid., 2:35.

78. Ibid., 2:35-44.

79. Ibid., 2:35-44.

80. Letter of Thomas Munro, quoted in Acting Chief Secretary to Fort St. George in the Secret Department, 16 May 1831, Foreign Miscellaneous, vol. 274, part 1.

81. Technically, at first the Governor-General entitled this office 'Mysore Commissioner' but soon renamed it Mysore Resident.

82. Military Secretary to Resident Mysore, 4 September 1799, FSC, 22 October 1799, No. 1.

83. See Table 4 above. Governor-General to Commissioners Mysore, 19 June 1799, Madras Secret Consultations, 23 July 1799.

84. Governor-General to Commissioners Mysore, 8 June 1799, Madras Secret Consultations, 23 July 1799.

85. Acting Political Agent Jeypore to Agent of the Governor- General, Rajputana, 20 February 1825, FPC, 17 February 1826, No. 26.

86. Acting Resident Mysore to Chief Secretary to Government Fort St. George, 12 May 1811, FPC, 7 June 1811.

87. Resident Mysore to Chief Secretary to Government Fort St. George, 18 September 1811, FPC, 1 November 1811, No. 9.

88. Rajah Mysore to Governor-General, 5 November 1831, FSC 6 February 1832, No. 5.

89. The Madras Government pointed this out to the Governor-General. The Treaty allowed such action only if the Company's subsidy was endangered. The subsidy was only in arrears. Further, the Treaty only justified taking over the administration of a few districts, not the entire state. Governor in Council Fort St. George to Governor-General, 4 October 1831, FSC, 16 December 1831, No. 10.

90. Secretary to Government to Chief Secretary to Governor Fort St. George, 8 June 1831, FSC, 8 July 1831, No. 6.

91. Resident Mysore to Chief Secretary to Government Fort St. George, 11 September 1832, FPC, 4 February 1833, No. 12.

92. Rajah Mysore to Governor-General, 5 November 1831, FSC, 6 February 1832, No. 5.

93. Resident Mysore to Secretary to Government of India with Governor-General, 12 December 1842 and Rajah Mysore to Governor- General, 13 December 1842, FPC, 25 January 1843, Nos. 118, 122.

94. Aitchison, 14:56-7.

95. Ibid., 14:59-61.

96. For the instructions of the Governor-General to the negotiators, see Minute of Governor-General, 16 March 1816, FPC, 16 March 1816, No.1. For the text of the treaty see Aitchison, 14:62-7.

97. Resident Catmandoo to Secretary to Government Political Department, 9 December 1816, FPC, 28 December 1816, No. 50.

98. Resident Nepal to John Russell Colvin, circa 1845, quoted in Auckland Colvin, *John Russell Colvin, The Last Lieutenant- Governor of the North-West under the Company* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895), p. 148.

99. See Ludwig F. Stiller, *The Silent Cry: The People of Nepal: 1816-39* (Katmandu: Sahayogi Prakashan, 1976).

100. William Wilson Hunter, *Life of Brian Houghton Hodgson, British Resident at the Court of Nepal* (London: John Murray, 1896) and Anon, 'Notes on the Services of B.H. Hodgson, Esq., Late British Minister at the Court of Nepal' (printed for private circulation).

101. For a detailed discussion, see Kanchanmoy Mojumdar, *Anglo-Nepalese Relations in the Nineteenth Century* (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1973), pp. 4-69.

102. Aitchison, 14:68.

103. Ibid., 14:68-9.

104. Lt. Gov. North-West Frontier to Resident Nepal, 18 November 1843, quoted in Herbert Benjamin Edwardes and Herman Merivale, *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence* (London: Smith, Elder, 1872), pp. 459-60.

Directors. In this he argued that he had only been following the orders given him, blamed the Ruler for 'pusillanimity and timidity', and tried to prove the Directors' criticism had 'been formed from a partial and imperfect understanding of the general subject.'[91] In this, the Madras Government supported the Resident and his career does not seem to have suffered.

It is evidence of the solidarity of the Company's career officials in India that few Residents were ever punished for an apparent failure of the Residency system. Annexation of a state they had been assigned to control indirectly more often led to promotion than to degradation for the Resident. Even in cases where the Company army had to be called in or even where the Residency was sacked and looted, the Resident received no blame. The few Residents who were censured or demoted had usually been found guilty of either corruption or of working on behalf of a Ruler rather than the Company.

The Maharaja of Mysore, acting as did several other Rulers deprived of control over their administrations, showed a far greater concern about any threat to his royal dignity than to financial or administrative losses. He pleaded in vain to be allowed at least one district under his direct control, as had been allowed the Mughal Emperor and the Raja of Tanjore. This would have been a token of his continuing sovereignty.[92]

In the drive for efficiency and consolidation characteristic of the time, the Company decided to abolish the Mysore Residency in 1843. Up to this point, the Resident had continued to attend the Maharaja but the administration of the state had been carried out separately by a British Commission. Conflict between the Resident and the Commissioner, and the Company's desire to reduce its expenses, made the elimination of the Resident appear rational to the Governor-General. The Maharaja objected more strenuously to this proposal than he had to the end of his administration of the state a dozen years earlier. The Residency had become the symbol of his status as Ruler. The Maharaja offered to foot the entire cost of the Residency if only it was retained.[93] The Governor-General rejected this plea and confirmed the termination of the Residency in Mysore. During this period, as we have seen, the

Company accorded far less respect for the position of the Indian Rulers than it had earlier.

The case of Mysore illustrates three points about the place of the states in the system of indirect rule. First, the Company's attitude toward the states shifted over the years. Until the 1790s, the Company hesitated to use its growing military force to crush its perceived enemies decisively. This ended dramatically as Wellesley began the Company's most dynamic period of expansion across India by conquering Mysore. The Company's virtual creation of a new Mysore state following that destruction suggests that the Company still preferred indirect to direct rule where feasible. Further, the generous stipend to the family of the late Sultan indicated the continued respect for the hereditary aristocracy that persisted within the Company's officials. The assumption of the administration of the state showed one of the deeper interventions that punctuated the early nineteenth century. This respect for Rulers, however, tended to decline, particularly from the 1840s to 1858. In Mysore, the Company kept the Ruler out of the state administration and proved willing to degrade him by the abolition of the Residency. Only in 1881, during British efforts to reconstitute a feudal order and an empire built around the Indian Rulers, was the Mysore dynasty restored to control. Thereafter, Mysore became a 'model state' in the eyes of the British.

Second, the Resident's relationship to Purniah shows the limitations expected of such an imposed Minister. Purniah apparently regarded his duty as fulfilling the Resident's expectations for a good administration. This centred on establishing peace and particularly on generating a large and visible surplus of revenues over expenditures. Purniah accomplished both. When the Ruler asserted his rights as sovereign, however, the Minister fell before the very means of his long success. He chose to demonstrate his loyalty to the Resident instead of his Ruler. The Resident frequently only remained supportive of a Minister until this support clashed with the larger relationship with the Ruler. Purniah, therefore, proved a model 'imposed Minister' but fell due to the limitations of this model.

Finally, in Mysore, the contradictions inherent in the British policies of indirect rule resulted in a mixed situation. On the one hand, the British retained a tendency toward indirect rule, with all the respect for hereditary Rulers and low British investment of money and manpower implied therein. On the other, the British felt their obligation to provide a 'moral' and efficient administration for the people of India. In Mysore, more blatantly than in most other states, the conflict between these two resulted in a condition between indirect and direct rule. The hereditary Ruler remained nominally on the throne and absorbed significant amounts of the state revenue. At the same time, the British carried out the administration of the state directly. Significantly, British efforts during the late nineteenth century to restore a permanent, feudal order in India led to its restoration of the Ruler of Mysore to power.

The Case of Nepal

The Company's extension of indirect or direct rule over almost all of India needs to be kept in perspective by means of at least one instance where it did not proceed to establish indirect rule. The case of Nepal demonstrates how, despite somewhat similar origins, the Residency did not become a means for Company control. I examine this case for differences in process (by both the Company and the indigenous state) and outcome.

As with most other states, the Company's initial contacts with Nepal were military and commercial. The Company extended futile assistance in 1767 to the then Raja of Katmandu, who was being overrun by the invading Gurkas. Accepting the Gurka conquest of Nepal, the Company concluded a commercial treaty in 1792 with the new Gurka Ruler.[94] In 1800, the reigning Raja lost in a factional dispute at the Nepal court and abdicated in favour of his young son, taking refuge in British territory at Banaras. As the Company had in other states, it sought to use its protection over one side in a factional dispute to gain influence within that state. Governor-General Wellesley sent a mission to negotiate a treaty providing for a Resident in Nepal. This resulted in a treaty con-

cluded in 1801 establishing such a Resident and guaranteeing an annual income of Rs 82,000 (including Rs 10,000 worth of elephants) from Nepal to the former Raja.

Up the point of the 1801 treaty, the case of Nepal appeared superficially similar to the many Indian states which came into contact with the Company about the same time. Unlike Nepal, however, these other states would eventually come under indirect rule by the Company. Instead of heading for indirect rule by the Company, Nepal moved — albeit unevenly — toward status as a friendly, but independent, neighbour of the British Empire in India. Through highlighting the particular historical developments of Nepal's relations with the Company, I can suggest some of the factors which would direct Nepal onto a different track from that of other states in South Asia.

Some of Nepal's distinctions seem obvious to us now. One major factor that distinguished Nepal was geography, physical and cultural. Nepal lay in the mountains and on the edge of the cultural region traditionally considered Indian. Burma, Assam, and Afghanistan, however, shared many of these features and were subjected to extensive efforts by the Company to impose indirect rule upon them.

Especially significant in distinguishing Nepal from the other states, therefore, were the strategies followed by the Nepal court. Two of the most striking and consistent strategies of the Nepal court remained its continued communications with other states and its insistence on isolating Nepal — both the court and the country — from the influence of the Company's Resident. The effects of these two policies were to preclude the Company from establishing either exclusive or effective control, two of the prime features of indirect rule.

Nepal consistently pursued the strategy of developing and sustaining its links to several Asian powers. The Nepal court continued to dispatch extensive overt and covert missions to most of the states in South Asia not yet isolated by the Company, thus maintaining an independent foreign policy. Later it waged war in Tibet in 1855, quite outside of British control. The Nepal Ruler continued to retain regular relations with China — sending a

periodic mission bearing tribute to the Chinese Emperor — until 1912. This continued communication with much of the rest of Asia distinguished Nepal from the Indian states which gradually lost their ability to maintain such balancing foreign relations.

One major effect of this strategy was to provide the Nepal court with an overview of events across Asia. Unlike many of the Indian states, they could compare their condition with that of states conquered or fallen into the indirect rule of the Company. Further, they gained an understanding of the times that the Company was weakest due to military engagements elsewhere.

The Nepal administration simultaneously sought to keep the Company at arm's length. The 1792 commercial treaty did not spark substantially increased trade with India. This treaty had been observed more in the breach by the Nepal administration, especially with respect to provisions lowering the import tariffs on goods coming from India. The 1801 treaty did little more to bring Nepal into the Company's orbit.

This 1801 treaty did specify the exchange of wakils to smooth relations over borders, arrange reciprocal extradition of fugitives, and negotiate other points of friction between the two states. It went on, however, to isolate the respective wakils from contact with any person in the state except the court. This severely limited the Resident's scope:

> It is incumbent upon the vakeels of both States that they should hold no intercourse whatever with any of the subjects or inhabitants of the country, excepting with the officers of Government, without the permission of those officers; neither should they carry on any correspondence with any of them; and if they should receive any letter or writing from any such people, they should not answer it, without the knowledge of the head of the State, and acquainting him of the particulars, which will dispel all apprehension or doubt between us, and manifest the sincerity of our friendship.[95]

This unique provision isolating the Resident clearly resulted from the policies of the Nepal court. No comparable provision is

found in any other treaty concluded by the Company in South Asia. Further, the Nepal court strictly enforced it, posting guards to constrict even the movement of the Resident and his contact with the both nobles and ordinary people.

Such was the frustration of this first Resident, due to his isolation and the perceived hostility of the Nepal court, that he withdrew the Residency with Wellesley's approval in 1803. The exiled former Raja left British protection and returned to Nepal in 1804. His return and subsequent assassination in the continuing factional conflicts at court deprived the Company of any part in the succession struggle of the dynasty. Thus, while many other states came under the Resident's indirect control, Nepal remained isolated from the Company, except as minor border skirmishes erupted periodically.

At length, the Company responded to these border fights by escalating into a full-scale invasion of Nepal (1814-16). The battles went poorly for the Company, its final victory proving unacceptably expensive in terms of Company casualties, both British and Indian. Although Nepal lost the war, it demonstrated to the Company the cost in blood, money, and prestige of such a hard-fought invasion of such rugged terrain and people. Once conquered, Nepal further proved to have few resources for the Company to exploit.

The peace treaty that followed this war shared two provisions with many other treaties between the Company and Indian states: it called for an exchange of wakils (i.e. it established a Residency) and it prohibited the employment by Nepal of British, other European, or American subjects without the permission of the Company.[96] The treaty significantly omitted to provide for any of the other means of access for interference by the Resident characteristic of other states: Nepal continued its diplomatic communications free from Company control; Nepal had no obligation to seek the advice of the Resident; Nepal relinquished no judicial rights over British subjects or their clients; Nepal clearly had no need for a subsidiary force and accepted no limitations on its still formidable army; Nepal paid no tribute or subsidy to, and contracted no loans from, the Company. Further, Nepal continued its

twin policies of informing itself fully about events in the states of India while at the same time isolating the Resident.

The Nepal Minister who retained control throughout this period, Bhima Sen Thapa, proved able to sustain this policy. The Nepal court quickly made apparent the strength of its determination to exclude the Resident from the affairs of state. The incumbent Raja died soon after the Resident's arrival in 1816 but the court deliberately and pointedly excluded the Resident from the infant successor's coronation ceremony.[97] This contrasts starkly with the situation in other states at this time, where the Resident had gradually come to arbitrate the succession. Further, the Nepal court continued to strictly limit the Resident's physical movements out of the Residency.

The Company and its first two Residents, Edward Gardiner (1816-29) and T. Herbert Maddock (1831-33), largely accepted this isolation and refrained from virtually all intervention. A later Resident instructed his successor to follow 'Mr. Gardiner's system: two visits [to the Nepal court] a year, and half a dozen letters to [the British] Government.'[98] The Company, engaged deeply in extending indirect rule in the rest of South Asia during this time, did not force its influence on Nepal, wary as it was of the proven Nepal army and aware as it was of the limited resources that could be extracted.

Efforts by the Resident for Indirect Rule

For about a decade following 1833, the Company did attempt to move toward bringing Nepal into indirect rule. This change largely resulted from internal and external factors which reinforced each other. The Nepal administration and state underwent significant alterations. The Resident took advantage of these changes to intervene, thus resulting in further instabilities at court.

Internally, the political and social situation in Nepal went through a transition during this decade. The period of dominance of the Minister Bhima Sen gradually ended as the court factions opposed to him and the social changes in the army and society of Nepal combined first to weaken and then to depose him. During

the period following his final fall in 1837 and eventual apparent suicide in prison, the Nepal court followed less coherent policies as one faction or another arose. Concurrently, the army and landholding systems also underwent fundamental changes.[99]

The Company's Resident at the time also began to push for deeper involvement following 1833. This Resident, Brian H. Hodgson, proved less willing to accept isolation than had his predecessors. Because his personal health problems restricted him to the salubrious hills, this active young official had been compelled to limit his ambitions to a career serving almost exclusively in Nepal, as member of the Residency staff (1820-2, 1824-33) and then as Resident (1833-43). Hodgson clearly chaffed under the severe restrictions placed on the Resident by the Nepal court. He combined his extensive research into the zoology, ethnography, and culture of Nepal with forays into the factional politics of the court.[100] Because of the Nepal court's instability at the time of Hodgson's appointment as Resident, it proved particularly vulnerable to intrusions from the Residency.

Despite his efforts, however, Hodgson lacked the usual means of access to power available to Residents in other states. His offer in 1833 to the Nepal court that he negotiate extraterritorial status for British subjects in Nepal received only a rebuff. Further, he proved powerless over the years to prohibit the Nepal court from sending overt and covert emissaries to many of the opponents of the Company at the time including Gwalior, Sind, Nagpur, Lahore, Sikkim, Bhutan, Ava, China, and several of the states of Rajputana.[101] Some of these emissaries the Company managed to intercept, others it could not block. Some of these missions came to the Company's attention only when Residents at those courts anxiously reported their presence.

Nevertheless, for a few years after the fall of Bhima Sen in 1837, the Nepal court became so riven by hostile factions of nobles that the Resident managed to established a powerful if not fully determining influence. Factions allegedly pro-British received his support, although it is not clear to what effect. His pressure on the court extracted an official pledge in 1839, endorsed with the Ruler's seal, that:

> All secret intrigues whatever, by messengers or letters shall totally cease.... The Nipal Government engages to have no further intercourse with the dependent allies of the Company beyond the Ganges, who are by Treaty precluded from such intercourse, except with the Resident's sanction and under his passports.[102]

Despite this pledge and the Resident's influence, such diplomatic missions from Nepal to the Indian states continued. In 1841, the Resident induced 94 leading nobles of Nepal to sign a vow of friendship with the Company promising 'that the Resident should ever and always be treated in an honourable and friendly manner...'[103] This pledge proved no more adequate than the 1839 agreement in securing the court's support for the Resident. In spite of Hodgson's repeated efforts, the Residency apparently lacked sufficient means or favourable circumstances for building a constituency in the Nepal court. Nepal's avoidance of financial entanglements, subsidiary forces, or other obligations to the Company left the Resident with little to build upon.

Hodgson's initiatives for Residency intervention in Nepal also lacked the full support of the Company. At this time, the Company was already over-committed militarily, particularly in Afghanistan leading up to the First Afghan War (1838-42). The prospect of a further military entanglement in Nepal at the time proved unpalatable to the Company. In a conflict over how much intervention in Nepal the Company should pursue, the Governor-General recalled Hodgson in 1843; he resigned on principle rather than accept reappointment elsewhere. The Company then instructed his successor to return to the earlier policy of extremely limited intervention. These instructions stressed that the Resident should limit himself primarily to intelligence gathering and offering criticism of the court's actions:

> Your duties at Nepaul will be twofold, viz.: to watch any movements on their part, which may be injurious to us, and to offer counsel to them in all State matters in which we may be concerned, whenever counsel is sought, or likely to be

> acceptable and useful... [You should] leave the Nepaulese entirely to govern themselves, and the only cases in which it is incumbent upon us to advise, remonstrate, or dictate, are when our own interests require such interposition. But the [British] Government would be ill represented if every valuable opportunity were not used to prompt to that which is good, and to deter from that which is evil; to express abhorrence of acts of cruelty, perfidy, injustice; to give full approbation of all that is benevolent, honest, high-minded, and just.... Your communications to Government should be few, and only when necessary.[104]

This return to a limited role by the Resident, ordered by the Company, helped permit a return to stability at the Nepal court.

In 1846 Jang Bahadur Rana ruthlessly established the dominance of his faction in Nepal; he maintained his dominance until his death in 1877 and his faction retained control until the 1950s. Under this strong and consistent leadership, Nepal reinstituted a stable internal administration and a balancing foreign policy that satisfied the British without becoming dependent on them. Nepal offered military support to the Company during its continuing difficulties in Afghanistan. Jang Bahadur impressed the Company with his understanding of British culture, not the least by a trip to England in 1850. He confirmed his place in British hearts by providing effective military aid during the 1857 conflict when the British desperately needed it. Thus, he secured Nepal's place as an independent state with respectful relations with the British.

This examination has highlighted the factors which distinguished the case of Nepal from the other states of South Asia. Part of the reason Nepal avoided indirect rule by the Company lay in the isolated geography and relatively poor resources of that state. Beyond this, however, the policies of Nepal's strong ministers did much to prevent intervention by the Resident. Sustaining a policy of isolating the Resident from the court and the state, Nepal prevented the Residents from gaining sufficient knowledge or influence in the state. By at the same time holding open its com-

munications with other powers, Nepal obtained a knowledge of events across South Asia that enabled it to better judge the Company's weaknesses and potential strategies. When the Company did intervene militarily, Nepal made the cost disproportionately high for the results. Conversely, the Resident in Nepal lacked most of the means for gaining access to power over the court available to his colleagues in other courts. The Resident's brief period of intervention — at a time when the court was unusually susceptible — failed to generate support in Nepal or from the Company. As a result, Nepal largely retained its independence on the edge of, rather than incorporated into, the Residency system of indirect rule.

Conclusion

Each of these four case studies has suggested different features of the Residency system. Together, they point out some of the variety in the origins of the connections between the states and the Company. They indicate the diverse factors which shaped the relationship between the court and the Residency. They disclose the effects on that relationship of both the local situation and also the Company's internal policy decisions, often taken with little regard for that local situation.

From the very origin of their relationship to the Company, each of these states began along a different path. The Awadh Ruler largely welcomed a Resident as a liaison between himself and the Governor-General personally. Hyderabad sought to balance the French presence at its court against the British Resident. Mysore and Nepal initially fought bitterly to repel any British influence over their states; Nepal rarely stopped contesting it. Each of these states varied in geographical location, internal resources, and political stance, affecting not only the position of its Ruler but also the attitude of the Company toward it. Further, the origins of each of these Residencies came at a different point in the history of the Company. The very concept of indirect rule evolved within the Company over time, and changed as a result of its accumulating empirical experience in these Residencies, among others. As a

result, the Company held quite different expectations for the Residency in each state.

As each Residency established itself, a number of independent and related factors determined the patterns each would follow. Much of this book has examined the Company's policies as they shifted for the Indian states overall. We have also seen that local instances occasionally went against these official policy shifts. In the discussion of both official policy and the individual cases, we have seen the deciding factors that led to the Company's decision to push for more or less intervention by the Resident in each state. At different points, the Company made a number of conscious — and at times contradictory — policy decisions about establishing direct or indirect rule, for both Awadh and Mysore.

Local factors also affected the direction the Residencies would take. The position and policies of a Ruler shaped the place of the Resident at his court. The local policy of isolation of the Resident, in Nepal and Hyderabad, for example, undoubtedly constrained the Resident from certain levels of intervention. The efforts by several Rulers to hold on to their own understanding of the nature of their position, despite personal cost to themselves, occasionally brought about a clash of cultures with the Resident. In both Hyderabad and Mysore, the very coming of age of the Ruler led to a dramatic shift in the level of intervention in the administration by the Resident. The disparate fiscal policies of the Rulers of Awadh, Hyderabad, and Mysore all had a marked impact on the shape of indirect rule in their states. Further, the personalities and policies of the officials like Purniah, Mir Alam, Chandu Lal, and Salar Jang, as well as others in the state likewise had effects. The very class composition and natural resources of the state — although largely beyond the scope of this book — proved significant.

While the goals and the means of the Residents varied, we can see some overall patterns. The Residents largely sought to extract resources from the state for the Company's purposes. In Awadh, these resources included the military potential of the population. As a commercial body that had to satisfy its stockholders in Britain as well as the often costly military and political ambitions

of its officials in India, the Company particularly sought specie. Both the Awadh and the Hyderabad Residents in particular, focused their attention on acquiring that specie for the Company (as well as personally for themselves at times).

The Residency system over the period 1764 to 1857 developed as a result of a complex interaction of a great variety of factors. I have analyzed some of the more important of these factors using these four case studies and, earlier in the book, using analysis of the component parts of the Residency system. The events of 1857 brought on an immediate trauma that altered the Residency system fundamentally. After this trauma had lessened, the British shifted their policies and sought stability in India, particularly through closer and more harmonious bonds with the Indian Rulers. My final chapter examines the developments of the Residency system in India from 1858 to 1947 and the conscious importation of this Indian system of indirect rule by British administrators in Africa and elsewhere in Asia.

NOTES

1. Seid Gholam Hossein Khan, *Seir Mutaqherin*, trans. M. Raymond alias Haji Mustafa, 4 vols. (Calcutta: T.D. Chatterjee, 1902), 2:579, 584. BSC, 6 December 1764, 2:739-43, 749. Carnac to Select Committee, 26 May 1765, Bengal Select Committee Proceedings, 11 June 1765, 1765:53-4. Aitchison, 2:67-9.

2. Resident to Secretary to Government, 25 July 1822, BPC, 9 August 1822, No.27.

3. Letter from Shuja uddaula and Minute of President, BSC, 30 September 1772.

4. Extract of Governor Hastings' report of transactions in Benaras, Extract, BSC, 4 October 1773, HMS 345:329.

5. The mean average term of office for a Resident in Awadh, however, was 2.2 years for the entire period to 1856, only 5 Residents serving for 5 years or more in that state.

6. Bengal Select Committee Proceedings, 3 August 1768, pp. 621 ff. Aitchison, 2:70.

7. Resident to Governor-General in Council, 17 May 1775, FSP, 13 December 1775. Aitchison, 2:75.

8. To four battalions of infantry, one of irregulars, two thousand cavalry, and three hundred grenadiers. Aitchison, 2:101.

9. King of Oudh to Resident Lucknow, 2 July 1823, BPC, 3 October 1823, No. 12.

10. Munshi Sital Parshad, 'Mirat al-Auza,' Persian MS 2149, fol. 363, 367-9, Raza Library, Rampur. Resident to Political Secretary to Government of India, 24 July 1837, FSC, 7 August 1837, No. 10.

11. For an excellent study of the changing economy of the Gangetic plain, see C[hristopher] A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

12. See Michael H. Fisher, *A Clash of Cultures: Awadh, the British and the Mughals* (Riverdale, Md.: Riverdale Company, 1987).

13. Resident to Governor-General, 19 December 1799, Consultation 12 June 1800, No. 102, HMS 579:339.

14. Treaty 10 November 1801 and Memorandum of the final results of the discussions between His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General and the Nabob Vizier of Oudh, 1802, Aitchison, 2:130-42.

15. See Rudrangshu Mukherjee, *Awadh in Revolt 1857-1858: A Study of Popular Resistance* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984).

16. See Fisher, *A Clash of Cultures*, Chapter IV.

17. For example, in 1848 the Resident compelled the Awadh Ruler to sign an agreement to expel all 'enuchs [*sic*], singers and other improper persons' from his court and administration. Written Agreement Made with His Majesty, n.d., IPFC, 8 July 1848, No. 64.

18. See Hermann Goetz, *The Crisis of Indian Civilization in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1938).

19. J.G.A. Baird, ed., *Private Papers of the Marquis of Dalhousie* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1911), p. 344.

20. This crisis stemmed from a confrontation between Hindu and Muslim partisans over a disputed temple or mosque in Ayodhya, in eastern Awadh. See Fisher, *A Clash of Cultures*, Chapter VI.

21. Proclamation of King of Oudh, 5 February 1856, IPFC, 6 June 1856, No. 203.

22. John Malcolm to Gerald Wellesley, private, n.d., quoted in John William Kaye, *The Life and Correspondence of Major-General Sir John Malcolm...*, 2 vols. (London: Smith, Elder, 1854), 2:379.

23. Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 22 January 1820, BSC, 22 January 1820, No. 13.

24. Governor-General to Secret Committee, 1 August 1789 and to Lord Hobart, 26 June 1796 in Charles Ross, ed., *Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis*, 3 vols. 2nd ed. (London: John Murray, 1854) 1:426, 2:308.

25. E.g. note by Secretary to Governor-General, 10 January 1834, FPC, 5 June 1837, No. 68.

26. See for details Peter Wood, S. Regani, Z. Yazdani.

27. Secretary to Government to Resident, 6 June 1823, FPC, 6 June 1823, No. 23.

28. Most notably Statute 37 Geo. III cap. cxlii s.28 (1797). Resident to Secretary to Government, 10 April 1814, FPC, 22 April 1814, No. 17. Regani, p. 225. Yazdani, p. 65.

29. Resident to Secretary to Government, 8 March 1823, FPC, 29 March 1823, No. 60. Hyderabad Minister to Resident, n.d., FPC, 20 December 1822, No. 15.

30. 'Tuhfa-i Dakkan,' Salar Jang Persian MS 135, fol. 157.

31. Secretary to Government to Resident, 7 June 1822, FPC, 7 June 1822, No. 1, quotes the Court of Directors' letter of 28 November 1821. [Secretary to Government] to Resident, 18 April 1829, FPC, 18 April 1829, No. 35. Regani, pp. 227, 232-3. Andhra Pradesh State Archives, MS 38/1/23. Minutes of the Governor-General, 14 December 1828 and 17 February 1830, quoted in C.H. Philips, ed., *The Correspondence of Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, Governor-General of India 1828-1835*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 1:118-19, 397.

32. Resident to Minister, 2 August 1842, FPC, 30 August 1842, No. 134. Resident to Minister, 23 November 1842, FPC, 1 February 1843, No. 49. Resident to Secretary to Government of India, 14 December 1842, FPC, 1 February 1843, No. 45.

33. Officiating Resident to Secretary to Government of India, 20 July 1848, FPC (Secret), 5 August 1848, No. 47.

34. Assistant Resident to Governor-General, 15 August 1798 and 20 August 1798, FSC, 18 September 1798, Nos. 1, 7.

35. Arzees asking for protection are included in Resident to Governor-General, 14 October 1805, FSC, 2 May 1805, Nos. 224-37. Acting Resident to Governor-General, 8 September 1805, FSC, 4 October 1805, No. 87.

36. Assistant Resident to Governor-General, 22 August 1798, FSC, 18 September 1798, No. 8.

37. Aitchison, 9:66.

38. Secretary to Government to Resident, 2 January 1801, Hyderabad Residency Records 23:1-4.

39. Minister to Resident, 9 February 1805, FSC, 16 May 1805, Nos. 69-72.

40. Resident to Governor-General, 11 February 1805, FPC, 16 May 1805, Nos. 69-72.

41. [Secretary to Government] to Resident, 14 May 1805, FSC, 16 May 1805, No. 73.

42. Hyderabad Resident to [Secretary Secret and Political Department], 20 March 1821, FPC, 7 April 1821, No. 88.

43. Resident Hyderabad to Governor-General, 5 December 1814, FPC, 10 January 1815, No. 26.

44. E.g. Resident to Governor-General, 16 June 1809, FPC, 29 July 1809, No. 5.

45. Private letter from the Resident to the Governor-General, quoted in Hastings Fraser, ed., *Memoirs and Correspondence of General James Stuart Fraser of the Madras Army* (London: Whitney and Company, 1885), pp. 41, 316-17.

46. Hyderabad court diary of 4 June 1853, quoted in Central Records Office, *The Chronology of Modern Hyderabad, 1720-1890* (Hyderabad: Central Records Office, 1954), p. 269.

47. Resident to Governor-General, 4 May 1805, FSC, 16 May 1805, Nos. 119-20. Resident to Acting Deputy Persian Secretary to Government, 24 January 1824, FPC, 27 February 1824, No. 39.

48. Resident to Persian Secretary to Government, 9 September 1812, FPC, 23 October 1812, No. 65. Letter of Mirza Solieman Shokoh to the Nizam, received 25 July 1828, FPC, 16 August 1828, No. 40.

49. A statement of the Company's policy is found in Secretary to Government of India to Chief Secretary to Government of Bombay, 12 October 1835, FPC, 12 October 1835. For exceptions to the policy, see Acting Resident to Secretary to Government, 5 June 1819, FPC, 3 July 1819, No. 52; Acting Persian Secretary to Government to Resident, 7 April 1813, FPC, 8 May 1818, No. 60.

50. Some people moved to these areas of Company jurisdiction to secure their persons or wealth. Superintendent of Police to Commander Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, 17 July 1838, FPC, 29 August 1838, No. 68. Extracts from the *Spectator* of 30 June 1846, 9 July 1846 and *The Englishman*, 19 June 1848, 4 March 1852, 6 March 1852 in Moulvie Syed Mahdi Ali, *Hyderabad Affairs* 6 (1883), pp. 12-13, 33, 84. Extract Court of Directors, letter 4 November 1835, No. 49, Hyderabad Residency Records, 72:189-90. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 24 July 1812, FPC, 14 August 1812, No. 4. Resident to Officiating Secretary to Government of

India in the Military Department, 22 January 1840, FPC, 8 June 1840, No. 177a. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 28 February 1831, FPC, 18 March 1831. [Chief Secretary] to Resident, 1 December 1833, FPC, 27 December 1833, No. 71.

51. Resident to Acting Deputy Persian Secretary to Government, 24 January 1824, FPC, 27 February 1824, No. 39.

52. Henry George Briggs, *The Nizam: His History and Relations with the British Government*, 2 vols. (London: Bernard Quartitch, 1861), 1:88.

53. Hyderabad court diaries of 20 November and 5 December 1806, quoted in Central Records Office, *The Chronology*, pp. 106-7.

54. Resident to Governor-General, 16 June 1809, FPC, 29 July 1809, No. 5.

55. E.g. Governor-General to Nizam and Governor-General to Moonir ool Moolk, 20 September 1810, FPC, 25 September 1810, No. 46.

56. Resident to First Assistant in Charge, 12 October 1810, FPC, 25 September 1810, No. 57. Resident to Vice President in Council, 20 June 1811, FPC, 12 July 1811, No. 19. Resident to Governor-General, 5 December 1814, FPC, 10 January 1815, No. 26. Governor-General to Nizam, 8 April 1815, FPC, 2 May 1815, No. 14.

57. Yazdani asserts that Chandu Lal fled to the Residency during the November 1812 mutiny, pp. 37-8. He told the Resident that he would only do so in an emergency. Resident to Governor-General [?], April 1814, FPC, 22 April 1814, No. 14.

58. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 1 June 1811, FPC, 28 June 1811, No. 47. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 5 October 1811, FPC, 25 October 1811, No. 43. Secretary to Government to Resident, 15 January 1813, FPC, 15 January 1813, No. 18. Resident to Acting Chief Secretary to Government, n.d. FPC, 10 October 1817, No. 19. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 31 December 1818, FPC, 30 January 1819, No. 122. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 22 January 1819, FPC, 27 February 1819, No. 69.

59. E.g. Resident to Officiating Chief Secretary, 16 September 1824, Ootacamund Proceedings, 24 September 1834, No. 42. Minister to Resident (private note), n.d., FPC, 29 December 1849, Nos. 116-17.

60. Resident to Acting Secretary in the Secret and Political Department, 2 February 1821, FPC, 24 February 1821, No. 57.

61. Resident to Governor-General, 6 April 1814, FPC, 22 April 1814, No. 15. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 28 October 1829, FPC, 13 November 1829, No. 40. Resident to Secretary to Government, n.d., FPC, 2 December 1831, Nos. 80-4.

62. Memorandum by the Resident, 12 April 1837, FPC, 5 June 1837, No. 84.

63. Secretary to Government to Resident, 21 August 1829, Hyderabad Residency Records, 67:379-86.

64. Resident to Governor-General, 1 September 1820, FSC, 30 September 1820, Nos. 8-11. Resident to Secretary to Government, 30 June 1825, FPC, 21 October 1825, No. 84.

65. Minister to Resident, 15 April 1843, FPC, 18 November 1843, No. 74. Secretary to Government to Resident, 4 May 1827, FPC, 1 June 1827, No. 34. Chief Secretary to Government to Resident, 21 August 1829, Hyderabad Residency Records, 67:379-86.

66. Resident to Chief Secretary to Government, 5 July 1829, FPC, 24 July 1829, No. 31.

67. Resident to Secretary to Government of India, 14 August 1843, FPC, 18 November 1843. Resident to Minister, 9 October 1846, Hyderabad Residency Records, 83:162-6. Resident to Secretary to Government of India, 31 July 1849, FPC, 8 September 1849, No. 100. Resident to Secretary to Government of India, 11 September 1849, FPC, 20 October 1849, No. 161.

68. Secretary to Government of India to Resident, 26 July 1843, FPC, 18 September 1843, No. 80. Resident to Secretary to Government of India, 14 August 1843, FPC, 18 November 1843.

69. Resident to Governor-General, 7 September 1843, quoted in Fraser, p. 191.

70. Resident to Secretary to Government of India with Governor-General, 2 November 1846, Hyderabad Residency Records, 83:158-9.

71. Hastings Fraser, *Memoirs and Correspondence of General James Stuart Fraser of the Madras Army* (London: Whiting, 1885), p.128.

72. Secretary to Government of India to Resident, 26 July 1843, FPC, 18 September 1843, No. 80.

73. Minute of Governor-General, 7 October 1848, FPC, 7 October 1848, No. 236.

74. Secret Department, Fort St. George to Secret Department, Fort William, Foreign Department Select Committee, 3 October 1767, pp. 321 ff.

75. Wellesley, *Dispatches*, 12 August 1798, 1:206.

76. Ibid., 1:326-8, 433-4.

77. Ibid., 2:35.

78. Ibid., 2:35-44.

79. Ibid., 2:35-44.

80. Letter of Thomas Munro, quoted in Acting Chief Secretary to Fort St. George in the Secret Department, 16 May 1831, Foreign Miscellaneous, vol. 274, part 1.

81. Technically, at first the Governor-General entitled this office 'Mysore Commissioner' but soon renamed it Mysore Resident.

82. Military Secretary to Resident Mysore, 4 September 1799, FSC, 22 October 1799, No. 1.

83. See Table 4 above. Governor-General to Commissioners Mysore, 19 June 1799, Madras Secret Consultations, 23 July 1799.

84. Governor-General to Commissioners Mysore, 8 June 1799, Madras Secret Consultations, 23 July 1799.

85. Acting Political Agent Jeypore to Agent of the Governor- General, Rajputana, 20 February 1825, FPC, 17 February 1826, No. 26.

86. Acting Resident Mysore to Chief Secretary to Government Fort St. George, 12 May 1811, FPC, 7 June 1811.

87. Resident Mysore to Chief Secretary to Government Fort St. George, 18 September 1811, FPC, 1 November 1811, No. 9.

88. Rajah Mysore to Governor-General, 5 November 1831, FSC 6 February 1832, No. 5.

89. The Madras Government pointed this out to the Governor-General. The Treaty allowed such action only if the Company's subsidy was endangered. The subsidy was only in arrears. Further, the Treaty only justified taking over the administration of a few districts, not the entire state. Governor in Council Fort St. George to Governor-General, 4 October 1831, FSC, 16 December 1831, No. 10.

90. Secretary to Government to Chief Secretary to Governor Fort St. George, 8 June 1831, FSC, 8 July 1831, No. 6.

91. Resident Mysore to Chief Secretary to Government Fort St. George, 11 September 1832, FPC, 4 February 1833, No. 12.

92. Rajah Mysore to Governor-General, 5 November 1831, FSC, 6 February 1832, No. 5.

93. Resident Mysore to Secretary to Government of India with Governor-General, 12 December 1842 and Rajah Mysore to Governor- General, 13 December 1842, FPC, 25 January 1843, Nos. 118, 122.

94. Aitchison, 14:56-7.

95. Ibid., 14:59-61.

96. For the instructions of the Governor-General to the negotiators, see Minute of Governor-General, 16 March 1816, FPC, 16 March 1816, No.1. For the text of the treaty see Aitchison, 14:62-7.

97. Resident Catmandoo to Secretary to Government Political Department, 9 December 1816, FPC, 28 December 1816, No. 50.

98. Resident Nepal to John Russell Colvin, circa 1845, quoted in Auckland Colvin, *John Russell Colvin, The Last Lieutenant- Governor of the North-West under the Company* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895), p. 148.

99. See Ludwig F. Stiller, *The Silent Cry: The People of Nepal: 1816-39* (Katmandu: Sahayogi Prakashan, 1976).

100. William Wilson Hunter, *Life of Brian Houghton Hodgson, British Resident at the Court of Nepal* (London: John Murray, 1896) and Anon, 'Notes on the Services of B.H. Hodgson, Esq., Late British Minister at the Court of Nepal' (printed for private circulation).

101. For a detailed discussion, see Kanchanmoy Mojumdar, *Anglo-Nepalese Relations in the Nineteenth Century* (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1973), pp. 4-69.

102. Aitchison, 14:68.

103. Ibid., 14:68-9.

104. Lt. Gov. North-West Frontier to Resident Nepal, 18 November 1843, quoted in Herbert Benjamin Edwardes and Herman Merivale, *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence* (London: Smith, Elder, 1872), pp. 459-60.

10. Indirect Rule in India, Pre- and Post-1858, the Model for the Rest of the Empire

Every real advantage to the people which can be expected from our rule can be secured through a Native ruler, with the aid of an English Political Agent of average ability, more surely, easily, and cheaply than by any form of direct administration with which I am acquainted.

—Lord Canning,
Governor-General (1856-62)

The Residency System: 1764-1858

The body of British military officers and civilian officials who comprised the political line changed considerably in composition and function over the century following the foundation of the first political Residencies. In the beginning, the Company appointed political Residents unsystematically, giving little thought to their roles. Gradually a body of understanding developed within the Company's political line as a composite of the Residents' empirically derived knowledge about indirect control over various aspects of the Indian states. The Company haltingly introduced bureaucratic elements in an effort to make the Residency system more efficient and consolidate its control over the states. Following 1857, the Company's policies shifted so as to stress stability in response to the shock of the conflict of that year.

During the eighteenth century, the Company gave little forethought to the nature of its first Residencies. In consequence, these earliest political Residencies had little internal stability or direction. Some Residents received their appointments from one or another Governor on the basis of convenience: e.g. they were the military officers whose troops happened to be nearest an Indian Ruler. Such Residents often served merely as liaison, transmitting messages. Other would-be Residents asserted their right

to the post on the basis of seniority in the Company's hierarchy or due to some connection to a powerful patron. Few of the early Residents were qualified by any particular skill or training for the office.

As the three Presidencies expanded their contacts with Indian Rulers — at different rates and under disparate circumstances — the Company's several decision-makers came to perceive the need for a more reliable means of both communication with those Rulers and information about local conditions within the states. While this elevated the role of the Resident, the various governing bodies remained in conflict about the precise direction and extent of the Residencies. As a result, Residents attained or lost their posts, followed inconsistent policies, and as yet formed no fully coherent system.

For the most part, London favoured only the least expensive and limited use of Residencies. From the beginning, policy-makers in the metropolis stressed the benefits of primarily commercial links to the Indian states. In particular, the Court of Directors envisioned only a limited political role for the Residencies. Until the French threat to India had been convincingly eliminated, the Directors emphasized the quasi-diplomatic functions of the Residencies, especially as an early warning system against 'foreign' (i.e. non-British) machinations at the Indian courts. London generally saw in deeper Company involvement with the Indian states only expensive trouble. Nevertheless, the Directors personally regarded the power of appointment to the office of Resident as their own patronage.

During the eighteenth century, the Governor of Bengal (after 1773 retitled the Governor-General) conceived of the Resident primarily as his personal representative to an Indian Ruler. Likewise, the Calcutta Council and the Governors of Madras and Bombay each saw the Resident as their man at the Indian court. Only gradually did the Governor-General assert his own lines of authority over each of the Residencies and begin to build a Residency system.

Gradually, the Company formulated strategies for the Residents to implement, strategies which would ultimately form the

basis for indirect rule. The Company came to expect Residents to establish and control means of access to a broad range of knowledge and information about the state and its administration. The Company also used the Resident to enforce its monopoly over political communication into and out of the state. The Company further desired the Resident to extract wealth from the Ruler in order to fund the Company's own operations in that state and elsewhere across India. Only in special cases, however, did Residents have a clear and consistent policy to follow about more specific tactics or actions. Such as yet unresolved issues included the Resident's intervention in the succession of an Indian Ruler, interference in his jurisdiction, and/or involvement in his administration. For the most part, the Ruler remained secure while the Residents contended with the Chief Minister over reforms in the state administration which they expected to foster the Company's goals.

Not until the nineteenth century did the Governor-General fully assert his own control over the Residencies and begin to build them into a system of indirect rule. During the Company's dramatic expansion over India, it used the Residencies as the medium of its relatively inexpensive and effective control over those substantial parts of India not directly under its authority. The Residents secured the Company's monopoly over official communication between the state and any other Ruler. This exclusivity proved vital for the functioning of indirect rule. Over this period, the Residents experimented with the effects of different levels and means of intervention in the states. While Rulers could develop countermeasures to deflect, manipulate, or block some parts of the Resident's activities, both sides came to recognize the ultimate power of the Company to intervene in any area of the state it chose. At the same time, the Company continued to recognize the sovereignty, albeit in a limited form, of the Indian Rulers.

Many developments by the Company led to the capacity of the Resident to exercise indirect rule over the Indian states. The substitution of the Ruler's armies with Company subsidiary troops — Indian soldiers under the direction of the Resident but on the

payroll of the Ruler — provided the Resident with important means to enforce his authority. The subsidiary system meant that the Resident controlled the most effective body of troops in the state, giving him the trump card in any direct confrontation with the Ruler. These troops enabled the Resident effectively to arbitrate succession to the throne, thus gaining influence over the incumbent Ruler and his heirs. Further, these troops often proved essential for enforcement of the state's land revenue demand, thus giving the Resident a powerful hold over the state administration should he choose to exert it. In addition, the Company often gained access to the wealth or valuable territories of the state through payments to it of the subsidy for the troops. These payments, in addition to forced loans and reparations, meant that the revenues extracted by the Ruler's administration from the state often ended up in the Company's treasury.

Within the Ruler's capital, the Resident built a constituency of prominent members of the court and administration. Through extraterritoriality, the Resident could alienate anyone he chose from the Ruler's jurisdiction. Through the Resident's manipulation of symbols of authority and his selective intervention in the state's affairs, he made the Residency an alternative to the Ruler's court for honour, protection, and advancement. Residents, when authorized by the Company, extended their control deep into the state administration. All parties came to recognize the indirect rule exerted by the Resident. Nevertheless, the Company did not always regard the Resident's role in the state as satisfactory.

Rulers also learned, as their relationships with the Resident developed. Some Rulers proved more able than others to retain their authority within the Residency system. Those Rulers who — from the beginning of their contacts with the Company — maintained an independent military base sometimes proved able to fend off the intrusion of a Resident into their states. States on the periphery of India, Nepal, and Afghanistan in particular managed to repel or isolate the Residency and its attendant indirect control. These and other Rulers who were able to deny the Resident a monopoly over their external communications could counterbalance his influence. Even after the establishment of a Residency,

many Rulers tried to maintain means of communication to the Company or to London alternate to the Resident. The Rulers in these cases thus sought to prevent the Resident from isolating them politically from sources of power from outside the state, exclusivity being an essential criteria for indirect rule.

Even after the Company's armies had forced their way into their capitals, some Rulers managed to retain a degree of autonomy from the Resident. At certain points, states like Nepal or — more within the Company's orbit — like Hyderabad, sought consistently to isolate the Resident to some degree from the sources of information, wealth, and influence he needed to effectively control the state indirectly. Some Rulers who could not block or get around the Resident tried to use the Resident for their own purposes, or to incorporate him personally into the values of their courts, either through monetary or cultural means. Other Rulers sought to neutralize the Residency by discrediting the Resident personally in the eyes of his superiors. Ultimately, however, under indirect rule the Rulers had to give way when directly confronted by the Resident. Deprived of much of the power of their position, the Rulers nevertheless clung to the symbols of their authority. Rulers, including one in Mysore and several in Awadh, endured great personal losses of power rather than relinquish their own cultural valuation of their place in the universe. Nevertheless, such was the authority of the Company that the Resident himself often became a major symbol of the Ruler's prestige.

By the 1840-57 period, the Company had begun to consolidate its relations with the Indian states. The Company decreed an official policy of non-intervention except where justified. This meant that unless a Ruler stood between the Company and some territory it coveted, or committed some act which the Company regarded as validating intervention, the Ruler was largely left to rule under the critical advice of his Resident.

By this time, the Company had extended its system of indirect rule across India. The Resident had effectively excluded any official influence on the state from any external power other than the Company. The Resident could determine to intervene in virtually

any aspect of the state, as the Ruler had to recognize. Residents arbitrated successions whenever they decided to, they intervened in the state administration wherever they felt justified (with or without specific directions from the Governor-General), and they involved themselves in the jurisdiction and court life of the Ruler whenever they felt appropriate. By and large, the Company had given up the respect it had hitherto extended to the Indian Rulers, although it continued to formally acknowledge their limited sovereignty and to rely on indirect rule as a policy.

The Political Line: 1764-1858

Despite the vital place of the Residency system in the Company's rule over India, the Company established no bureaucratically distinct political service during the pre-1857 period. Nevertheless, over time a recognizable body of specialists in indirect rule emerged, largely self-selected, from the ranks of the Company's British civilian and, especially, military employees. The Company officials, even during the eighteenth century, had come to recognize a 'political line' as a distinguished branch or track within the Company's service. Nevertheless, this line shared personnel with the other branches of the service. A member of the Company's civil service might be a district collector or even a judge one day and a Resident the next, with no prior training in diplomacy or experience with political involvement in an Indian state. Entry into a Residency by a military officer usually proved more of a commitment within one's career.

Military officers as a whole who served in Residencies tended more than civilians to specialize in political service. During the period of greatest expansion, the Company filled the manpower needs of the vastly increased numbers of Residencies by drawing off officers from its armies; these officers being both cheaper for the Company and more numerous than its civilian officials. The duties of a military officer on regular regimental duty tended to be more routine and more removed from those of political service than for a civilian. As a result, military officers who entered the political line tended more frequently to make a career of that kind

of service. The tendency for military officers to remain in the political line, and for the Governor-General to employ them there as less expensive than a civilian, conflicted with the Directors' injunctions against the practice. As a result, civilians appeared disproportionately in the higher posts in the political line.

Within the Company's service, some individual officers or officials did tend to specialize their careers in the Residencies. The members of the military and civil cadres of each of the three Presidencies jealously vied for preference in appointment to the Residencies located in the various regions of India. Although the Company slowly regularized rules of recruitment and promotion in the political line, such issues as patronage, seniority, and distribution of offices among the separate cadres remained contentious until 1857.

Despite this lack of a separate cadre of political officers, the Residency system as a body did develop techniques of indirect rule through experimentation. While Residents rarely received any formal training in their duties, they did build upon a body of understanding about indirect rule, passed down by word of mouth, example, or through the accumulation of records in Calcutta or the Residency itself. Gradually, a core of career-long political officers emerged over the course of the nineteenth century.

Indian Subordinate Officials in the Residency Offices

The Indians who served in the offices of the Residencies did much to shape indirect rule in India. The Company, during the early years of its relations with the Indian states, relied heavily on the same Islamic service elite that had traditionally served the Mughal Empire and the regional Rulers of India. Even before its creation of political Residencies, the Company had dispatched Indian agents to convey messages and negotiate with the Rulers. During the early years of the Residencies, members of this same service elite accepted positions, most notably as Munshis who advised the Resident in the art of Mughal-style diplomacy, translated the intentions of the British into the Persian formulas of the Indian court, explained the meanings of court ceremonies, and thus

enabled the Resident to function in a world otherwise alien to him in language and values. Beneath the Munshis was the entire Indian staff of the Residencies, composed of clerks, intelligence writers, bankers, translators, doctors, and other servants.

The British steadily subordinated the Indian members of the Residency establishment to their British superiors. While the British wished to be served by members of 'good families', they did not wish to be rivalled by these servants in wealth or influence. The British ideal seemed to be a Munshi of an impoverished but honourable family, who served his British master selflessly all his productive life, and then gratefully accepted a small but well-earned pension for his few remaining years after entrusting his son to a lifetime of service to the British. Any hint by a Munshi of independence, either in fortune or ambition, could lead a Resident to dismiss him.

During the nineteenth century, the normative pattern for the career of a Munshi shifted. In the earlier pattern, the Munshi served as a personal aide to a British Resident throughout their linked careers. As the Briton rose through the ranks of the political line, so too did his Munshi. The salary and pension bestowed on the Munshi by his master were sometimes generous but inconsistent overall. These rewards for personal loyalty varied considerably and, on occasion, consisted of a grant of tax-free land. Over time, however, the Residency system adopted bureaucratic features. This meant both the reduction of the place of the Munshi and also an increasing degree of stability in his career. The salaries and pensions paid to Munshis declined. All similar posts, anywhere in the Residency system, received roughly the same pay. Further, the Company introduced rationalistic criteria, calculated solely on the basis of length of continuous service, to determine pensions. At the same time, Munshis received assurances from the Company that they would be secure in the tenure of their positions. Despite these assurances, however, a Resident merely had to imply some malfeasance on the part of the Munshi to have him dismissed. In place of the traditional training in Persian and Mughal diplomatic arts, the Company began to expect education in Western law or office practices in its recruits.

This does not mean that Munshis entirely lost personalistic bonds to their masters or influence outside of the bureaucratic procedures. Munshis still swayed their British masters. Indeed, the Viceroy himself complained that Queen Victoria listened more to her Indian Munshi than to him concerning the attitude held by Indian Rulers toward Residents:

> **My own private opinion is that her Indian Munshi tells her that there is in India the greatest devotion to herself and all her family, but at the same time distrust and dislike of the Government, and that the native chiefs think that the Residents are rude and overbearing. I have done my best to disabuse her of this feeling...[to little avail].[1]**

The influence of the Indian establishment of the Residency offices could be subtle but should nonetheless be considered seriously in our understanding of indirect rule in India.

The Residency System in India: 1858-1947

Following 1858, the British made the stability of the system of indirect rule a central pillar of the Empire. In so doing, the official policy that had hitherto directed the Residencies necessarily changed. The decades leading up to 1857 had been dominated by a spirit of consolidation of British power. The Company had laid out an official policy of non-interference in the states, unless the Ruler's intolerable actions warranted a dramatic intervention such as annexation. At the same time, the Residents had interfered in any aspect of the state administration or court that they had judged justified by local circumstances. The Company decided whether it wished the Resident to determine a succession of the Ruler, alter his court ritual, force the dismissal of his chief minister, or permit one of his subjects to receive the extraterritorial protection of the Residency. The high-handed treatment of some Indian Rulers (and landholders, and the maltreatment of the Indian soldiers of the Company's Bengal army) had led to the traumatic events of 1857. Thereafter, among other reforms, the British officially determined to seek stability and support from the remaining Indian Rulers, incorporating them into the British Raj.

Despite this shift of official policy, a number of the trends current within the Residency system prior to 1857 continued. The composition of the body of Britons who staffed the Residencies changed only slowly. As Copland demonstrates, British intervention in the internal affairs of the states in fact persisted at a higher rate than official policy would suggest.[2] Since the Residency system in India has been studied far more extensively for the period following 1858 than that before it,[3] I therefore survey this later period by concentrating on only three central issues. First, since the entire concept of indirect rule revolves around the issue of sovereignty, I discuss the continuities and changes in official policy toward the sovereignty of the Indian states. Second, I look briefly at the administrative changes of the political line, for both British and Indian covenanted officials. Third, I conclude with a survey of the influence of the model of India's Residency system on the rest of the British Empire.

Indirect Rule in India: The Sovereignty of the Indian Rulers

As I have laid out the ideal type, indirect rule requires that the imperial power recognize, at least some degree of sovereign authority in the local state. None the less, the issue of sovereignty remained unresolved throughout the entire history of the relations between Indian Rulers and the East India Company and then the British crown. On the one hand, a series of formal treaties with each major Indian state specified the respective rights of that Ruler and the British. On the other, rapidly shifting conditions prevalent on the ground, as the Resident and the Ruler jostled for power in the Indian states, often led to ad hoc procedures, not always in accord with the formal treaties. Indeed, the British official on the spot often acted with little regard for precedents or treaties, responding rather to political expediency or some 'overarching' British moral principle. As the Governor-General wrote in 1831, 'I consider it unmanly to look for minor facts in justification of this measure.'[4]

While each successive treaty revised the legal status of the Ruler (bringing it more into accord with extant conditions), lags

between the changes in practice and the treaty in force were inevitable. In addition, while early in its history the Company assumed that many of the Indian Rulers held status as sovereigns, the British gradually backed away from this assumption during the early nineteenth century. By the time of the Indian nationalist movements from the late nineteenth century onward, however, the British gradually returned to the view that the princes held sovereignty of a sort.

Further, historical accident had left some Rulers of relatively tiny 'states', consisting of only a few square miles, with treaties acknowledging their sovereignty. In other cases, landholders with vastly more territory lacked such a treaty and thus, technically, sovereign status. In the case of Banaras (Varanasi), the Ruler moved back and forth between these statuses in response to British policy. Clearly, the British definition of sovereignty, as held by Indian Rulers, changed fundamentally from the 1760s to 1947.

As the Company began its political intercourse with the Indian Rulers in the late eighteenth century, it presumed that not only the Mughal Emperor but also many of the Indian regional Rulers with whom it dealt held sovereignty. In their correspondence with each other, the Company's high officials of the eighteenth century refer as a matter of course to the 'sovereignty' of a number of Indian Rulers, including those of Hyderabad (1779) and Awadh (1783).[5]

The British not only assumed among themselves that these Rulers had sovereignty, they further made overt declarations of that fact to the Rulers. We have seen that the Mughal Emperor retained the title and *de jure* status of sovereign until 1858; the Emperor even received the formal obeisance of the Company until 1843. Even lesser Indian Rulers, however, including many who themselves only claimed status as a subordinate of the Mughal, obtained assurances of sovereignty from the Company. Early British assurances to these Rulers of recognition of their sovereignty occasionally became embarrassing to the British in later days.

The Nawab of Arcot [the Carnatic], for one, carefully retained and proudly proffered in 1775 his collected correspondence with the King of England, the Court of Directors, and the Governor of Madras, each assuring him of his sovereignty.[6] Specifically, in 1760 the Governor of Madras had promised in writing that 'the sovereignty of the whole Carnatic is vested in the Nabob Omdut ul Mulk Serajah Dowlah Bahadur and his Posterity....' Letters from the King and his plenipotentiary dated 21 February 1760, 6 February 1768, and 19 August 1770 had addressed him as an independent sovereign declaring '...you are established in the full possession of the Government of the Carnatic.' Indeed in 1770, the King had requested the Nawab 'to represent our person' in investing two Company officials with the order of the Bath. As late as 1783, the Nawab received correspondence from the Governor-General referring to the former's 'sovereignty'.[7] In receiving, and relying on, such declarations from the Company, the Nawab of Arcot was not alone.

The issue of the sovereignty of various Indian Rulers also received extensive attention within the Company and the British Government. In 1775, the Governor-General queried the Supreme Court of Bengal about the sovereignty of the Nawab of Bengal. The Court's vague judgment, that '...there may remain to him a shadow of Majesty...,'[8] set the tone for the Company's inability to apply any exact definition of the term 'sovereignty' to the Indian Rulers. Nevertheless, as the Company's political awareness and political involvement began to increase, it started to develop general distinctions among different strata of Indian Rulers. As the British needs shifted, so too did their classifications of the Indian Rulers.

During the early nineteenth century, the Company had already begun to reconsider its assumptions about the sovereignty of the Indian Rulers. In 1815, Governor-General Lord Hastings explained to the Awadh Resident the ambivalent sovereignty of that Ruler:

> The Nawaub is consequently to be treated in all public observances, as an independent Prince. Essentially he must be

> **subservient to the British Government; but in proportion as that point is secure, personal attentions to him involve no inconvenience, and on the other hand they cannot be productive of advantage. In all intercourse, the Resident should consider himself as the Ambassador from the British Government to an acknowledged Sovereign....[9]**

The Governor-General went on to encourage this Ruler to perform a coronation of himself as sovereign.[10] This exchange thus displays the ambivalence of the Company that came to characterize the Residency system. The Resident was at once to publicly acknowledge the sovereignty of the Indian Ruler whenever convenient for the British, while simultaneously making the Ruler subservient to the Company.

As the Company gained military ascendancy over successive regions in India, its views on the sovereignty of the Indian Rulers changed. Treaties with the Indian rulers transferred from them to the Company various rights normally held by a sovereign. While no treaty explicitly revoked the sovereignty of any Indian Ruler, a growing number did specify that the Ruler was subordinate to the British. Despite these treaties, however, the issue of sovereignty remained moot. Many of the Indian Rulers sought to assert the continuity of their sovereign status.

The Company and then the British continued to use the term 'sovereignty' for a number of the Indian Rulers late into the nineteenth century. Examination of various formal treaties reveals British use of the following language to describe the position of several of the Indian princes: 'full and perpetual sovereignty' (Awadh, 1816), 'independent sovereignty' (Satara, 1818), 'full sovereignty' (Hyderabad, 1860 and Gwalior, 1871), and 'sovereignty' (Baroda, 1875).[11] Nevertheless, British practice often reduced some of these very 'sovereigns' to the *de facto* status of puppets or virtually confined them within their own palaces.[12]

Under Governor-General Dalhousie, as we have seen, the Company's assertions of its rights over the Indian states reached its peak with the 'doctrine of lapse'. Under this doctrine, the Company asserted its right to assume the authority of any Indian

prince, annexing that state into directly ruled British territory, should that prince fail to have a direct, natural, and legal heir, as decided by the Company. Under Dalhousie and other Governors-General, parts of or entire Indian states were annexed should the British decide the Ruler was misgoverning.

The events of 1857, when Indian Rulers or former Rulers led many of the forces aligned against the British — and when the loyalty of other Rulers to the British proved vital to British survival — led to a reversal of British policy. The Proclamation of 1858 by Queen Victoria guaranteed the tenure of the Indian dynasties, excepting only those who had egregiously opposed the British. Thereafter, the British relied on Indian Rulers, and the system of indirect rule, as one of the cornerstones of British rule in India.

In 1858, the British Crown assumed the Company's relationship with the Rulers. Queen Victoria issued a Proclamation, 1 November 1858, promising: 'We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own....'[13] This transfer reduced but did not resolve the problem of the sovereignty of the Indian Rulers. Unlike the Company, which in and of itself had no sovereign status, the British Crown clearly did. The incongruity of Indian — at least nominal — sovereigns as subordinate to a body like the East India Company lessened somewhat as they were now directly subordinate to a sovereign power. Nevertheless, despite much debate, no consensus ever emerged as to the precise legal status of the Indian Rulers. The British Government of India preferred to refer to 'the Indian princes', thus reducing their status in English from the earlier custom of calling them 'kings'. British commentators and legal scholars, both official and non-official, sought on several occasions to reconcile the conditions extant in India with the theory of international law of the day through the use of such concepts as 'paramountcy', 'suzerainty', and 'supreme sovereign'.

During the late nineteenth century, British officials and legal scholars also tried to work out the legal basis by which the British had obtained parts of the sovereignty of the various princes. In analytic terms, Lee-Warner saw British jurisdiction in princely

states as stemming from three sources. First, the prince had delegated certain specified rights to the British through treaties and other engagements. Second, the British had inherited (most notably in succession to the Mughal Empire) certain residuary rights historically exercised by a superior power in a princely state. Third, the British had simply substituted their authority for that of the prince by their will as the stronger power.[14]

Efforts to bring all the Indian states into one theoretical system met with fundamental problems, due to their array. The range of the princely states, from tiny to vast, in geographical extent and political authority, led to an unquantifiable variety of rights and powers. The British never officially agreed on even the number of states, that is, where the princes ended and the mere landholders began. Simple size did not determine the matter since a number of the landholders (e.g. among the Taaluqdars of the United Provinces) held vastly more territory than some of the acknowledged princes (e.g. among the Rulers in Kathiawar). Any single definition arrived at by theoreticians met with a plethora of exceptions in the field. The answer for some officials was a vagueness that encompassed a wider range of conditions. One Chief Commissioner proposed in 1864 that the twenty-three Kathiawar princes be defined as having powers 'resembling *quasi*-sovereignty' — hardly a precise label.[15]

In one such attempt to formulate a theoretical definition of sovereignty that would suit British practice in India, Sir Henry Maine laid out in 1864 what would become the most widely accepted official interpretation of the concept of sovereignty. He envisioned sovereignty as a divisible bundle of rights:

> Sovereignty...indicates a well-ascertained assemblage of separate powers or privileges. The rights which form part of the aggregate are specifically named...as the right to make war and peace, the right to administer civil and criminal justice, the right to legislate, and so forth. A sovereign who possesses the whole of this aggregate of rights is called an *independent* sovereign; but there is not, nor has there ever been, anything in international law to prevent some of those

> rights being lodged with one possessor, and some with another. Sovereignty has always been regarded as divisible.[16]

Maine therefore argued that the Indian princes were limited sovereigns who had transferred some of their sovereign rights to the British but continued to retain others.

Since over the years, each state negotiated its own series of treaties with the British, legal scholars could find no strict uniformity of principle with respect to the princely states as a whole. Even for the same state, sequential treaties varied its legal rights according to the circumstances of the time. As a result, British political practice usually responded to the exigencies of the moment. Further, many issues concerning a prince's rights remained unspecified in any of the treaties. As Maine himself admitted:

> The mode or degree in which sovereignty is distributed between the British Government and any given Native State is always a question of fact, which has to be separately decided in each case, and to which no general rules apply. In the more considerable instances, there is always some treaty, engagement, or *sanad* to guide us to a conclusion, and then the only question which remains is — What has become of the sovereign rights which are *not* mentioned in the Convention?[17]

That is, the treaties are only an incomplete and inconsistent record of some of the sovereign rights transferred from the princes to the British. Whether the residual rights remained with the Indian states or with the British Crown remained the problematic.

Even among the British, not all agreed with Maine's interpretation. Other prominent officials and legal scholars disagreed about both the nature of sovereignty and the status of the princely states. Further, the British needs continued to shift. Indeed, as late as 1867-70, the British concluded nearly identical treaties with no less than eighteen Rulers which specified:

> That any person, being a subject of [the Ruler], committing a heinous offense within the limits of [that] State and seeking

> asylum in British territory, will be apprehended and delivered up by the latter Government to the former on requisition in the usual manner.[18]

Within twenty years (1887-8), however, each of these eighteen treaties was modified to apply only in the British favour. The modified treaties excluded extradition by the Indian state of accused found in British India while continuing extradition from the state into British hands.[19] Thus, while the British at times formally recognized the sovereign authority of some Rulers, they were not above reversing policy and unilaterally reducing that authority as well.

The grand policy of the British Raj, however, was to use the Indian princes, as the 'natural' Rulers of India, to cement the people of their states to the British. In 1877, Victoria took an Indian imperial title and thereby elevated herself from merely Queen of the United Kingdom to Empress of India as well. The internal British reasons for this elevation are outside of our concerns here. British officials in India, however, used this occasion to stage a grand, imperial assemblage of all the major Indian princes that would symbolize and affect their personal loyalty to the new Empress.[20] The Viceroy at the time, Lord Lytton, wrote to Disraeli, the architect of the imperial elevation.

> Nothing has struck me more in my intercourse thus far with Indian Rajas and Maharajas than the importance they attach to their family pedigrees and ancestral records. Here is a great feudal aristocracy which we cannot get rid of, which we are avowedly anxious to conciliate and command, but which we have as yet done next to nothing to rally round the British Crown as its *feudal* head.[21]

Lytton later wrote Salisbury explaining how to separate the Indian people from the Indian nationalists by means of the traditional Rulers, the Indian princes:

> Politically speaking, the Indian peasantry is an inert mass. If it ever moves at all, it will move in obedience, not to its

> **British benefactors, but to its native chiefs and princes, however tyrannical they may be. The only political representatives of native opinion are the Baboos, whom we have educated to write semi-seditious articles in the native Press, and who really represent nothing but the social anomaly of their own position.... To secure completely, and efficiently utilize, the Indian aristocracy is, I am convinced, the most important problem now before us.[22]**

The Viceroy further explained his purpose for holding the assemblage of the Indian princes and the display of their new relationship to their suzerain:

> **In the first place, the relative positions in which the Imperial Government and the Feudatory States have been placed by the proclamation of the Imperial title, and the measures connected therewith, are not precisely the same as those previously occupied by the parties concerned. The object contemplated by me in organizing with so much elaboration the great Assemblage recently held at Delhi was not merely scenic display or theatrical pomp. In proclaiming, with special ceremony, the recognition and assertion of the British Empire in India, I also desired to prepare the way for its more complete consolidation. It seemed to me that, by all means not involving any infraction of the recognised rights of the Native princes, the subordinate position of their States should be more distinctly defined than hithertofore, and that the resources of those States should, if possible, be gradually brought into closer and more systematic co-operation with the Supreme Government of the Empire to which they belong.[23]**

The thrust of the 1877 imperial assembly was therefore to create a more unified structure of Empire in India. The princes and the resources of their states were to be harnessed to the larger purposes of the British Raj. They would then lead the masses of India's population away from the Indian nationalists and toward loyalty to the British Raj.

By the turn of the century, British policy-makers saw the need to strengthen the position of the Indian princes as a bulwark of the British Raj. The issue became particularly acute for the British as Indian nationalism started to become a problem for the directly ruled parts of India — but, significantly not in the vast majority of the indirectly ruled States. Moving toward a recognition of the independence and sovereignty of the Indian Rulers, Lee-Warner wrote in 1899, 'In a Native State, large or small, the Queen's writ does not run; that is the main point: it is foreign territory in the midst of the Queen's dominions.'[24]

Viceroy Curzon also wrote of the need to strengthen the princes, whom he regarded in 1900 as a weak reed:

> ...about the Native princes...we act as their schoolmasters.... For what are they, for the most part, but a set of unruly and ignorant and rather undisciplined school-boys? What they want more than anything else is to be schooled by a firm, but not unkindly, hand; to be passed through just the sort of discipline that a boy goes through at a public school in England, but which they have never had out here; and to be weaned, even by a grandmotherly interference, from the frivolity and dissipations of their normal life.... We have embarked since the Mutiny upon the policy of sustaining the Native States and princes. We do so, not so much in the interests of the princes themselves, who are often quite undeserving of the compliment, as in the interests of the people, who are supposed to like the old traditions and dynasties and rule.... I hope...to do something towards raising the whole tone and standard of the life of Native princes in my time, and thereby to place their own future existence upon more durable foundations.[25]

While they differed in approach, Lytton, Lee-Warner, and Curzon argued for the strengthening of the Indian princes.

In their rear guard action against the growing strength of the Indian nationalist movement, the British continued to use the Indian princes. By stressing the special relationship between the British Crown and the princes, and concomitant British obligation

to protect the princes, the British found one more justification for their rejection of Indian independence. Nevertheless, despite British reliance on the issue of the Indian princes, by the end of World War II, India achieved independence.

Over the entire period of the Company and then Crown rule, the British altered their attitudes toward the Indian Rulers and their definition of the sovereignty of those Rulers, in response to the needs of the day. A brief survey of the status of the Raja of Banaras, one of the more inconsistent examples, will illustrate some of these changing British attitudes. Although a relatively subordinate office holder in the Mughal imperial hierarchy, in the mid-seventeenth century the Ruler of Banaras had acquired large territories just prior to the arrival of the British on the scene.[26] In Mughal legal terms, the Mughal Emperor had delegated his own supreme authority over territories including Banaras to the Nawab of Awadh. On his part, the Nawab of Awadh had delegated his authority over the Banaras area to the Raja. By means of the treaty of 1775, the Awadh Nawab transferred his own rights over Banaras to the East India Company.[27] Having acquired authority over the Raja of Banaras, the Company then had to decide how to treat him in legal terms. By this time, the Company had already begun to proclaim publicly its sovereignty over the territories of many of the landlords (zamindars) in Bengal and its other territories. Even such large landholders as the Raja of Banaras received such treatment. In 1775, the Resident at Banaras received orders from the Calcutta government to

> ...deliver to Raja Cheyt Sing [Raja of Banaras] his Sunnads of Investiture from this Government of the Zemindarry lately ceded...to the Company...having first notified to him the Sovereignty of the Company over all the Territories of His Zemindarry and received from him on account of the Company and in their name a nuzzerana or acknowledgement of his vassalage which we fix at 10,000 Rupees.
>
> You will then require him to publish this act by proclamation thro' his Country and Invest him with a khelaut in this

> **place with all the usual formalities...[including] an oath of Fealty or allegiance to the Company upon his being invested with the Grant of the Zemindarry.[28]**

The Company clearly was drawing here on a medieval European model of a feudal order complete with oaths and vassalage. This assertion of Company overlordship, however, did not necessarily entail direct Company administration of the estate; the Company went on to assure the Raja of his continued '...free and uncontrolled management of the Internal Government of his Country.'

The Company continued its conception of its feudal relationship with the Raja, based on European medieval patterns. In 1778, the Company found itself in need of troops and money to fight its wars in South India. Consequently, the Company tried to extract its feudal rights of tribute from the Banaras Raja in excess of the payments stipulated by treaty. When he delayed yielding the requested funds, the Governor-General travelled in person to remind him of his obligation to his overlord. Instead of paying, the Raja attacked the Governor-General. Clearly, the Raja did not share the Company's European model of a feudal relationship.

Next, the Company deployed a different model, that of a figurehead Ruler with a virtually independent executive. Defeating the Raja militarily, the Company displaced him in favour of his nephew. Further, the Company appointed one of its Indian officials, Chief Magistrate Ali Ibrahim Khan, manager of the estate of Banaras. The Company decided '...to deprive the new Rajah of every Prerogative, which denoted either Sovereignty or Independence of the Company.'[29] It removed his mint (the right to coin being a symbol of sovereignty in Mughal terms). The Raja remained thereafter merely one of the larger landholders under direct British administration. To complete the Banaras story, however, in 1911, the British, faced with growing Indian nationalism, restored the Raja to the status of sovereign, albeit under British suzerainty.[30] This was seen by some as a test case, to determine if it was feasible to turn all of British India back over to the Indian Rulers and therefore run India through indirect rule, free from the

Nationalist threat. Indeed, in 1919, the British Raj expanded the territories of the Banaras Raja still further.[31]

Just prior to Indian independence, both the princes and the British came to the position that those specific aspects of sovereignty which the princes had delegated to the British Crown could not be transferred to anyone else by the Crown and therefore lapsed with the end of colonial rule.[32] In 1947, the British used this argument to justify the return to the princes those transferred rights. The Cabinet Mission to the Indian princes in 1946 took the following position:

> When a new fully self-governing or independent Government or Governments come into being in British India, His Majesty's Government's influence with these Governments will not be such as to enable them to carry out the obligations of paramountcy. Moreover, they cannot contemplate that British troops would be retained in India for this purpose. Thus, as a logical sequence, and in view of the desires expressed to them on behalf of the Indian states, His Majesty's Government will cease to exercise the powers of paramountcy. This means that the rights of the States which flow from their relationship to the Crown will no longer exist and that all the rights surrendered by the States to the paramount power will return to the States. Political arrangements between the States on the one side and the British Crown and British India on the other will thus be brought to an end. The void will have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments in British India, or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them.[33]

In short, the full sovereignty of the princes was restored by the British to them. Their future lay in their own arrangements with free India or Pakistan.

On their part, the Indian National Congress opposed the British doctrine that the Indian princes would regain full sovereignty at

Indian Independence. A resolution of the All-India Congress Committee stated the Congress

> **...does not agree with the theory of paramountcy as enunciated and interpreted by the British Government; but even if that is accepted, the consequences that flow from the lapse of that paramountcy are limited in extent.... The lapse does not lead to the independence of the State.[34]**

Nevertheless, as passed by the British Parliament, the Indian Independence Act specified:

> **...the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of the Indian States...**

At the same time, the Act ordered that the '...effect shall, as nearly as may be, continue to be given to the provisions of any such agreement...' until a new relationship could be worked out with the new Indian and Pakistani Governments.[35] That is, the status quo would continue for the nonce.

Following 1947, most of the princes did integrate their states with India or Pakistan.[36] The largest of the states, Hyderabad, however, had to be forcefully invaded by India in a 'police action' in 1948. Not until the derecognition and termination of the privy purses of the princes by Indira Gandhi through the 26th Amendment to the Indian Constitution (28 December 1971) were the last of the sovereign rights removed from the princes. As long as Kashmir remains an issue, the story of the sovereignty of the Indian states will remain not fully resolved.

The Indian Political Line: 1858-1947

While the Company's official policies toward the Indian states shifted dramatically following 1858, the body of Residents and Political Agents who carried out those policies largely continued in the same patterns.[37] Their duties remained similar to the earlier period, although with far greater restraints on their autonomy and

initiative. As a result, the opportunities for distinction declined in the political line, with consequent deleterious effects on the quality of the men who entered this service.

Since stability became the spirit of the system of indirect rule, political officers found themselves working toward routine. The isolation and repetitious nature of their work meant that few creative or adventurous Britons selected the political line. Residents and Political Agents spent most of their time watching local conditions in the court and countryside, advising the Ruler and his high officials, and waiting in case the Ruler should do anything egregiously untoward. Even in those instances when the Resident or Political Agent assumed direct management of a state — during the minority or incapacity of a Ruler — his duties only came to resemble those regularly performed by an administrator in British India.

Despite the routine nature of much of the work of the political line, the Government of India presented life in the Residencies to potential recruits as diverse and exciting service. As Viceroy Curzon wrote in 1905:

> The public at large hardly realizes what the Political may be called upon to do. At one moment he may be grinding in the Foreign Office, at another he may be required to stiffen the administration of a backward Native State, at a third he may be presiding over a *jirga* [assembly] of unruly tribesmen on the frontier, at a fourth he may be demarcating a boundary amid the wilds of Tibet or the sands of Sistan. There is no more varied or responsible service in the world than the Political Department of the Government of India. I commend the Political Department of the Government of India to all who like to know the splendid work of which Englishmen are capable.[38]

Those few British civilians who selected the political line over the regular administration because of the hope of such excitement or the glamour of the diplomatic life usually found themselves disappointed in their expectations.

Even more than during the pre-1858 period, military officers now outnumbered civilians in the political line. The life of a military officer on regimental duty following 1858 often tended toward the dull routine. As a result, service in a Residency or Political Agency proved relatively exciting. Further, military officers in the political line cost the Government of India less than civilians, indeed officers so employed often cost the Government of India less than if they had remained on regimental duty. As we have seen earlier, however, civilians continued to obtain more than their proportion of the highest positions in the political line.

During the twentieth century, the patterns of bureaucratization increased significantly. Although the formal training of the Residents remained minimal, recruits did receive *A Manual of Instructions to Officers of the Political Department of the Government of India.*[39] Further, the 1935 Government of India Act, among other changes, reorganized the political line. The Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India had hitherto been the agency controlling the Indian states. The 1935 Act removed all matters relating to the Indian states from the Government of India and transferred them to the Crown Representative, who was directly responsible for these matters to the British Government. In fact, the Viceroy also held the office of Crown Representative so no major changes occurred. Nevertheless, the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India could no longer be the body controlling the states. As a result, in 1937, the Indian Political Service came into 'demi-official' existence.[40]

As part of this bureaucratization the Crown institutionalized the existing recruitment patterns. The Indian Political Service recruited from both the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Army according to a precise formula. Any military officer, who had passed his promotion examination, was unmarried and was under 26 years of age, could apply to be permanently seconded to the Political Service; any Indian Civil Servant, who had passed his examination, was unmarried and had less than five years service, could also apply. The Indian Political Service accepted four military officers every other year, five every alternate year, plus two members of the Indian Civil Service per year, except only one

in the fifth year.[41] This complex formula only meant that there was an intake of 6.3 officials per year at a ratio of 70 per cent military and 30 per cent civilian. By 1947, however, the shortage of qualified Britons (and the virtual exclusion of Indians) left the Political Service at less than three quarters of its sanctioned strength of 170.

Indian Covenanted Members of the Political Service

The special place which the British Raj accorded to princely India after 1858 largely limited the scope of indigenous officials within the Residencies. With regard to its bureaucracy as a whole, the British Government of India felt the effects of two reinforcing pressures for enhanced Indian participation. Pushing from below were the increasing number of highly qualified, Western-educated Indian professionals who sought places in the administration of India. The pressure from above consisted of demands by London for reduced costs in money and British manpower. British career members of the Indian Civil Service held deep resistance to both these pressures. Nevertheless, around the turn of the century, and particularly during the inter-war period, the Indian Civil Service perforce began to allow a few Indians into its ranks. During the early years of Indian entry, the Civil Service tried to confine them to judicial positions, where they would be judging other Indians but not commanding the executive authority of the British Raj.[42] Even by 1947, the Indian Civil Service remained about 50 per cent British; that proportion was itself anomalously low due to the war service of eligible British men. One of the last bastions entered by Indians was the Residency system.

With a few exceptions, covenanted positions within the Political branch of the Indian Civil Service remained exclusively British. The world of the princely states stood for many British policy-makers and members of the Indian Civil Service as a powerful bastion of oriental feudalism. The idea of placing Westernized, middle-class professional Indians in positions of authority over parts of this world proved particularly troublesome to such Britons. Many of the Indian princes as well found the idea abhorrent.

Not until the 1920s, with the Montague-Chelmsford reforms, did the British administration even seriously discuss the prospect of permitting Indians into the Political Department. Creagh Coen reports that the princes who had been consulted about allowing Indian officials in the Residencies were uniformly opposed, with the exception of the Ruler of Gwalior (who had nationalist sentiments). Despite the strong record of the few Indians permitted to serve in covenanted posts within the Political Department, the Secretary of State in 1928 put himself on record as regretting any Indianization of this Department.[43] By 1938, only seven Indians had ever been admitted to the Indian Political Service, only two of whom went on to take charge of a political agency.[44] Only because of the severe shortage of British manpower did the number of Indians begin to rise by 1947. At the time of Indian and Pakistani Independence, of the 170 sanctioned officers in the political department, only 17 (10 per cent) were indigenous to South Asia: 12 Muslims, four Hindus, one Sikh.[45] Thus, the Political Service remained one of the most conservative of the branches of the British Government of India.

Indirect Rule in India: The Model for Empire

On the whole during the period after 1858, the system of indirect rule achieved the goals set for it by the British Government. In its more stable form after the 'Mutiny', the Residency system became a model for much of the rest of the Empire. John Malcolm's prescription for the efficacy of the Residencies (c. 1820) thus proved remarkably acute as a prophesy:

> ...[a] new and different species of rule is to be tried which is to control clusters of states and communities, and to preserve them in temper and in peace without interfering with their internal administration or arrangements.... [Y]ou have the choice betwixt this and an indent upon Hertford College [Haileybury, the Company's civilian training center] and Addiscombe [military seminary] for one thousand writers and five thousand cadets, and Feringy Raj ['foreign, i.e. British, rule'] all over India!... [T]he consequence of the

> establishment of our direct authority — that our empire should last fifty years; but if we can continue to keep up a number of Native States without political power, but as royal instruments, we shall, I believe, exist in India as long as we maintain our naval superiority in Europe.[46]

This use of 'royal instruments' developed over time in India indeed held the Empire together until the close of World War II.

India stood as the foundation for the British Empire, the base upon which British imperialism built elsewhere in Asia and in Africa. Expansion in India occurred during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; in contrast Southeast Asia and East and West Africa came under British control from the late nineteenth century onwards. Ideologically, as well as chronologically and economically, India served as the basis for further British advances. As the proving ground for British use of indirect rule, India was believed by the British to have produced the models that were later consciously adopted elsewhere in the Empire. Further, India served as the training ground for many of the officials — both in London and in the field — who directed or carried out later British expansion. India often proved to be the arena in which they received their first, formative experience with shaping or governing non-European cultures and political systems. Colonial administrators often seem to have clung to the memory of their first Indian accomplishments throughout the rest of their careers. India provided the guidelines and precedents, although the process of adaptation to local environments in Africa and Southeast Asia later shifted some of the terms and forms of imperialism there. Despite this adaptation, both the models and the experience gained in India proved to be vital for virtually all subsequent British expansion and colonial administration.

In my examination of the development of the Residency system of indirect rule outside of India, I will demonstrate the ideological links between the system in India and its later forms in the rest of the British Empire. Although, as I have already shown, the practice of indirect rule in India's states often varied considerably, the British image of these loyal Rulers and their paternalistic Resi-

dents proved persuasive for Britons throughout the Empire. When officials in the field wished to justify to their superiors in London a sub-imperialism already enacted, they often drew upon the model of India's Residency system to do so. When politicians or civil servants in Britain wished to explain to a subordinate in the field about the limited British expansion they were authorizing, they too often drew upon the model of India's Residents. Almost by convention, the term 'Residency system' implied limited British involvement and fewer potentially embarrassing entanglements, an approving home constituency and press, and a subordinate, loyal, traditional, and therefore 'natural' rule, undisturbed by upstart nationalists with a British-style education. Thus, throughout the British Empire, the model of the Indian Residency system was generally understood by the British to mean inexpensive, effective, and legitimate interference in a hitherto independent indigenous political system.

Implementation of this image was, of course, more difficult. Circumstances in the field usually conformed neither to the official policy nor to the bureaucratic image of indirect rule. Nevertheless, that the expected result frequently failed to materialize in the African or Asian instance at hand does not seem to have diminished the power of the Indian example in British eyes. As we have seen, in India itself, the practice often varied significantly from official policy and among states as well as within the same state at different times. Despite this variety well into the twentieth century, the Indian example maintained its force for British administrators.

India, in addition to providing the model for a Residency system, also generated the experience with indirect rule that proved so influential for British officials throughout the Empire in their attempts to manipulate non-European political systems. Few British officials in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or Africa lacked some experience of India, either directly through personal service, or indirectly through family traditions or simply through the British imperial tradition perpetuated in literature, biography, or news reports. In these ways, as well as through the more formal administrative links I will discuss, the systems of indirect

rule through Residents established in the rest of the British Empire have significant ties to the Indian prototype.

Tracing the spread of indirect rule from India to much of the rest of the Empire presents few difficulties. By examining each of the major examples of indirect rule in the Empire, we can see each of the multitude of links discussed above. I will briefly discuss the expansion of indirect rule from India to the other British colonies, organized in a rough chronological order.

The Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and South Pacific Littoral

In the first examples of indirect Residency rule which I shall examine — the Persian Gulf, Zanzibar, Malaya, and the South Pacific — the administrative and personal connections to India are directly demonstrable. Although each of these regions was later administered independent of India, the early British presence there came under the auspices of the English East India Company. For a time, each of these regions was administered by the British Government of India. Because of the continuity in personnel and the administrative heritage that each shared with India, the systems of indirect rule established in the Persian Gulf, Zanzibar, Malaya, and the South Pacific clearly had roots in Indian experience. Only later did each of these areas develop forms of indirect rule, although still called a Residency system, that differed considerably from the Indian model.

The Persian Gulf's location, beyond Europe but on the route to India, largely determined its role in British policy. As such, its relations with Britain remained under the authority of the East India Company, although with a strong Foreign Office influence, from the early British presence until 1858 when the Company's government was taken over by the British crown. While at times Persia and the Arabian peninsula rose to prominence in the defensive and foreign policy concerns of both the Company and the British Foreign Office, for the most part these regions and their Residents remained peripheral to the Company's interests in India and the Foreign Office's in Europe. Persia itself at times took on a larger role in defense strategy of India and in the Russian

strategy of the British Cabinet. As such, it remains a subject for diplomatic historians and never approached any form of indirect rule.[47] Of more interest here were the Residents posted at various times to Basra, Bushire, and Baghdad. Residents in those cities, rather than having any strong political function, retained a largely commercial and consular role particularly during the eighteenth century but throughout the nineteenth as well. Nevertheless, in order to stabilize its relationships with the several small states on the Arabian side of the Gulf littoral, the Company developed a distinctive system during the early part of the nineteenth century which approached the model of indirect rule.

The foundation for the distinctive form of indirect rule found in the Persian Gulf was a 'General Treaty of Peace with the Arab Tribes', concluded by the Company with most of the small states along the Persian Gulf coast of the Arabian peninsula. It stated, in part, that 'the pacified tribes shall all of them continue in their former relations with the exception that they shall be at peace with the British Government and shall not fight with each other.'[48] The Company's aim was limited to terminating their practice of preying on its commercial shipping in the Gulf. As this policy proved successful from the perspective of both the Company and the Arabian signatories, these provisions were gradually extended into a stable 'trucial system', primarily through the work of the local Resident, Samuel Hennell of the Bombay service (Resident 1826-54). In their internal affairs, these small states were left relatively autonomous by the Company and later by the British Crown as long as the provisions of the treaty protecting British maritime trade were respected. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the British took the precaution of securing 'Exclusive Agreements' with these trucial states, Bahrain, and Kuwait: agreements excluding any other foreign power from any connection with them except with the approval of the British.[49] As oil emerged as a more strategic resource during the twentieth century, British and world interest in the region picked up considerably, a subject beyond the scope of this book. Nevertheless, until that point, the Residents of the Gulf exercised a relatively marginal degree of internal interference in the affairs of these

states. Although approaching a system of indirect rule, and clearly developing out of the Indian administrative tradition, the Persian Gulf represents a limited form of Residency control.

A related example of indirect rule, Zanzibar, also derived its significance for the British from its location on the way to India, this time on the sea route around South Africa. In its earlier period of relations with Britain, Zanzibar was a possession of the Sultan of Muscat, on the Arabian peninsula, and had been useful to that Ruler in the slave and other trades. As a result, Zanzibar also originally related to Britain through the English East India Company. Over time, however, the form of indirect rule the British established over Zanzibar came to differ significantly from the Persian Gulf example discussed above.[50]

Unlike the states of the Gulf, Zanzibar island came under British indirect rule after having been subject to the rivalry of several European states. Due to its strategic location on the pre-Suez Canal sea route to India and the Far East, Zanzibar was the object of the colonial ambitions of each of the European nations with possessions in those lands. From 1822, the British entered into the first of a series of treaties designed to stop the slave trade around the Cape. Hennell, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, extended the British presence there in 1839 and a British representative was posted to both Zanzibar and its overlord, Muscat. After a succession dispute in 1856, Zanzibar broke off from Muscat with the Company's support and, by 1890, British control had extended to the point that the Sultan of Zanzibar requested that the British establish a protectorate over his island, thus excluding pressures on him from other European powers. Unlike the Persian Gulf where indirect rule was relatively limited, the case of Zanzibar is one in which the British supplied not only a British first minister (from 1891, significantly entitled 'Resident' from 1913) but also many of the district officers in the Sultan's service (from 1914). This case thus differs considerably from that of the Persian Gulf. Not only did other European powers play a role for many years in the area, but the form of indirect rule proved much more extensive. Zanzibar thus came to resemble Mysore, or one of the other Indian states, during periods when they were ad-

ministered by the Resident and subordinate British officials as a 'court of wards'.

Turning to Southeast Asia, we find strong evidence of a system of indirect rule derived from India in the example of Malaya. Although local conditions and a different function within the imperial system made the practice of indirect rule in Malaya eventually vary from the contemporary Indian form, there are indisputable links from the former to the latter. From their acquisition by Britain, the settlements of Penang (1786), Singapore (1819), and Malacca (1824) came under the control of the East India Company's Indian administration. Despite abortive efforts to build a distinct Straits Civil Service (1805-30), the British officials who administered these colonies were drawn directly from the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay services, both civil and military. As late as 1860, six of the nineteen members of the local administration were British officials from the Indian services (all, in fact, officers of the Madras army).[51] Thus, awareness of Indian practice was widespread through these colonies.

These Straits settlements, although at various times designated Residencies, did not really extend indirect rule over the neighbouring Malay states until 1874. Instead, their administrations largely adhered to a strict non-interventionist policy. Nevertheless, on three distinct occasions when indirect rule over the Malay states was proposed, the Indian example was explicitly referred to as the model to be followed. While Acting Governor of Penang in 1871, Colonel Archibald Anson, RA — who had served as Chief of Police in Mauritius — made a strong move to set up a system of indirect rule over the Malay states. In April he extended extraterritorial jurisdiction over all British subjects anywhere on the peninsula; as we have seen, extraterritoriality is one of the features that often accompanied the establishment of Residencies. He further appointed a Committee on Native States to examine the issue of British intervention.

This Committee, which included Major Macnair, late of the Madras Artillery, raised the possibility of the appointment of Residents to the Malay courts. Macnair, however, referring to his experience in India, suggested that since a Resident might be an

irritant to the Malay Rulers, the slightly less formal office of Political Agent would be more appropriate.[52] This refinement of the specific degree of indirect rule, based explicitly on experience in India, stands as evidence for the conscious adoption of Indian models elsewhere in the Empire. Although this Committee's report was not immediately acted upon, Major Macnair was later sent in 1874 as part of the advance party to Perak to negotiate the appointment of the first Resident in the Malay states.

The second proposal for indirect rule in Malaya came from G.W.R. Campbell, Lieutenant-Governor Penang, in September and repeated in October 1872. A former Commissioner of Police in Ceylon, Campbell urged the Colonial Office to make the appointment of a Resident or Political Agent in each of the west coast states. Once again, the Indian example was explicitly drawn upon in support of his argument.[53]

The third proposal for indirect rule over Malaya which drew upon the Indian case for its justification came the next year in a Minute of the Secretary of State for the Colonial Office, the Earl of Kimberley.[54] Having served in the India Office, Kimberley would be well acquainted with Indian practice. Acting on his instructions, the first Residents were posted in 1874; by the end of that year, each of the west Malay states had its Resident. Thus, in each of these three separate suggestions for establishing indirect rule in Malaya, India stood as the justification and model.

The text of the first treaty establishing a Residency, that of Pangkor (20 January 1874), reflects awareness of the Indian experience. Explicitly stated in the treaty were guarantees that the Resident's advice '...must be asked and acted upon in all questions other than those touching on Malay religion and custom.' Further, '...the collection and control of all revenues and the general administration of the Country must be regulated under the advice of those Residents.'[55] As learned empirically in India, while interference in the indigenous religion could have violent consequences, provisions asserting the requirement that the local Ruler request and follow the advice of the Resident were vital to an effective Residency. These key phrases thus left the Resident with the justification for as much interference as he would wish to exercise.

When establishing the Malayan Residencies, the British administration of the Straits Settlements tried to draw upon the practice and experience of India. That administration wrote to the Government of India in November 1874, at the very time the Residencies were being founded in the Malay states, to request 'copies of any rules or regulations or printed code' issued to the Residents in India. As we have seen, the Government of India had only a few of the most general exhortations as standing orders for its own Residents but it sent them along for the edification of the Residents of Malaya.[56]

At about the same time, the Colonial Office also sent instructions on the form of indirect rule to be followed in Malaya. The Colonial Office presumed Residents in Malaya already to have knowledge of Indian practice to the extent that its instructions specified obedience to a role 'well understood in the East' of giving 'influential advice to the native ruler.'[57] As Swettenham colourfully puts it,

> ...it is very certain that no 'system' had ever been conceived. There was an idea and that was all. The idea was that a British officer, or two, should be sent into a country where white men were unknown; where everything that could be wrong was wrong; where every man was a law to himself; where there was hardly any trade, no development of any kind, no roads, no police, or other means of maintaining order; and where two or three individuals claimed to be supreme. It was apparently supposed that, under these circumstances, the single white man would reduce everything to order by the exercise of tactful advice.[58]

In addition to the Residency system, the models for direct district administration and for the legal codes were also modelled on those of India.[59] The officials in Britain and many of the officials in the Malay states thus tried to draw heavily on the experience accumulated in India about the efficacy of a Residency system for the Empire.

Despite these intentions to follow the Indian example, circumstances in Malaya differed from those in India's princely

states. In November 1875, the newly posted Resident to Perak (Captain J.W.W. Birch) was assassinated.[60] The British asserted that the Perak Sultan must have given at least tacit approval for the murder and British troops were dispatched to restore order. From this point, the level of the Residents' intervention in the Malay states increased steadily despite continued insistence from London that the Residents were exceeding their authority in so doing. Departing from the officially directed model, each Resident in Malaya took on the functions of executive officer of the state to which he was posted. State councils, apparently uniformly under the domination of the Resident, assumed the authority of the Sultan. In 1895, the four Malay states federated their administrations under a 'Resident-General'. Thus, the Residency system in Malaya, which owed its initial inspiration and intended model to India, diverged from the ideal type of indirect rule. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Residency system in Malaya was indirect in name only and emerged as a parallel to the pattern developed in Zanzibar slightly later.

Proposals for the establishment of a Residency system on the Indian model were also made at various times for areas of the South Pacific under British influence. Looking at Fiji and Samoa, we can see that a pattern explicitly based on the princely states of India was proposed from several quarters as the debate over their future was raised. As in the case of Malaya and Zanzibar, however, neither ended up following the Indian pattern.

Proposals for an Indian style Residency system for these South Pacific islands came from both private and public sources. As early as 11 December 1869, a Melbourne newspaper, *The Age*, suggested that Fiji should be governed through an officer like a British Resident in an Indian state.[61] A few years later, in 1873, the Governor of New Zealand requested that Samoa should be taken and controlled by officials like 'Residents at Native Courts in India.'[62] In neither case, however, were these proposals followed by the cabinet, largely due to both British domestic political concerns and possible negative implications for British relations with the European powers and the United States.

Continental Africa

British imperialism in Africa came, for the most part, a century or more after it had begun in India. While in both instances, indirect rule through Residents was extended by the British over a large number of indigenous states and regions, in the African case no systematic and unifying pattern emerged. Unlike India where almost all Residents were instructed and controlled by the Governor-General, in Africa each colony was relatively more autonomous. Further, there was no single British African Company equivalent to the English East India Company; control of the African colonies by the Colonial Office in London could not equal even the degree of control exercised by Calcutta over the Indian Residencies. As a result, a greater discontinuity in the practice of indirect rule emerged in Africa as compared with India.

Looking at the African colonies we can, at the risk of oversimplifying, lay out a typology of administrative forms. One type of limited indirect rule would be represented by southern Nigeria and parts of South Africa where Africans recognized little traditional authority. Here the British created 'warrant chiefs' in order to carry out British policies. Lugard's much discussed system in northern Nigeria, in which substantial Muslim Rulers and Residents shared rule through indirect rule, compares closely to some of the middle range of Indian cases we have already seen. Still other forms of indirect administration were developed in Uganda and Egypt where local political structures maintained a degree of autonomy comparable to some of the larger Indian states. Thus, the African examples vary among themselves and differ — at times considerably — from the ideal type. Nevertheless, the Indian model was explicitly drawn upon as the justification and /or as the practical prototype for almost every instance of indirect rule found in Africa.

The earliest British effort at a form of indirect rule in Africa, that of Theophilus Shepstone's abortive 'native policy', was apparently also the least explicitly indebted to India. From 1836 (but especially from 1845) until 1875, Shepstone developed a policy which kept African tribesmen under a distinct administration and in

separate regions from Whites. During this time, a number of administrative forms were attempted but none proved stable or effective in the long run, particularly as pressure on the reserved areas from White settlers increased.

One of the first attempts at a form of indirect rule under Shepstone's direction came in 1836 in a treaty with the Gaika tribe. Indigenous chiefs who accepted British sovereignty were allowed to rule on a token payment of one ox per year with the provision that 'where necessary, English magistrates or residents will be duly appointed within the above locations.' Within three months, this treaty was modified somewhat, it being made specific that the British '...agents shall act solely in a diplomatic capacity.'[63] By 1840, however, this system broke down under the influx of Whites and direct British rule took its place in the region.

In Natal, Shepstone again tried to institute a form of indirect rule. Here tribal political structures had apparently been so disordered that Shepstone himself took on the role of the superior chief. To the extent that, as he claimed, he employed traditional chiefs as his subordinates and strove to '...govern them according to the principles of their own laws, customs, and usages...', to the extent he made use of a form of indirect rule.[64] In this case as well, pressure from immigrating Whites eventually terminated Shepstone's form of indirect rule.

Significantly for our argument that the-Indian experience proved influential in later forms of indirect rule, Sir Harry Smith, who served as Governor of the Cape of Good Hope and High Commissioner of Kaffir Tribes during the formative years (1847-52) of Shepstone's system, was very familiar with indigeneous states on the British frontier in India. Smith has just regarded his '...position as analogous to that of every Governor-General who has proceeded to India'. Like them, he bought lands on the frontier under the British control but sought to use the indigeneous authorities to rule the people there, under British indirect administration.[65]

Later, in 1884, High Commissioner Hercules Robinson tried to reconstitute the authority of chiefs in Lesotho (Basutoland) but by

this point they had lost virtually all of their indigenous authority. What power they had apparently came from the British Government.[66] Out of these efforts at indirect rule, begun by Shepstone and his successors, however, came the present-day policies of 'Bantustans' practiced by the South African government as a variation on the conceppt of indirect rule.

Underlying much of the twentieth century understanding of indirect rule is the idea that European and non-European cultures hold fundamentally different political and social values. Some, such as the South African Government, assert that non-Europeans must only be governed by their 'natural leaders' (under European supervision, of course) according to their own customs and forms. As stated in the official justification of this policy published in Johannesburg:

> The political systems of the White nation have throughout been Western.... The total attitude of Black people to government is different.... The evidence is overwhelmingly against the possibility of accommodating harmoniously in the same political system the Whites and Blacks of South Africa.[67]

Along the same lines, Vorwoerd stated, 'the Bantu [have] a system which is engraved in their souls and which is incorporated in their own Native laws.'[68] The solution arrived at by the South African Government was to recreate an 'indigenous' political system.

With the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, the South African Government, in Roger Southall's words, 'gave notice of its intention to erect a new structure of indirect rule based upon the revitalized authority of the chiefs.'[69] Ten 'homelands' were created, each to serve as the new state for a group of Blacks then living in the Republic of South Africa. Four of these 'self-governing national states' (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Liskei) were given their 'independence' between 1976 and 1981.

In these policies, the South African Government apparently sought to establish a system of indirect rule over states which it had itself created. Much in the political manoeuvring between Black political figures and the South African Government which

preceded the creation of these 'independent states' (not recognized by the international community) is reminiscent of the negotiations between British Residents and the indigenous Rulers of India. One can only speculate as to the role of the South African ambassador posted to one of them. The strategies followed on either side would presumably prove similar in many respects to those found in the princely states of India.

Turning to East and then West Africa within the British Empire of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we find a variety of colonial administrative forms, both direct and indirect. In areas with relatively heavy White settlement, for example Kenya or Southern Rhodesia, direct British rule generally developed. In areas where indigenous political systems were less disrupted by a substantial White presence, such as Uganda, Tanganika or northern Nigeria, forms of indirect rule were established by the British.

Both in East and later in West Africa, the initial application of the principle of indirect rule was largely the work of Frederick Lugard (1858-1945). Lugard knew India well, having been born, raised, and posted there during his military career which ended abortively with a adultery scandal. From his first confrontation with a well-developed indigenous political structure in Uganda to his extensive use of indirect rule in northern Nigeria, Lugard appealed to the Indian model.

In 1890, presenting his draft of a treaty to the King of Buganda on behalf of the East Africa Company, Lugard proposed the establishment of a Resident in the court with extraterritorial powers over all 'white men' in the 'same position as the Residents at the Courts of Indian princes.'[70] Indeed, so pervasive was awareness of India as the model that the King of Buganda, in a letter to Queen Victoria — presumably with some coaching from Lugard — wrote:

> I and my chiefs are under the English Flag as the people of India are under your flag. We desire very much that the English should arrange this country. Should you recall these agents of the Company, my friend, my country is sure to be ruined, war is sure to come.[71]

In this early discussion, therefore, India provided the conscious model used to describe the kind of administration Lugard wished to employ. Although Lugard admitted that his memory of the technical details of indirect rule in India was a bit fuzzy, it was the idea of the Indian Residencies that appealed to him and to his British audiences.[72]

Over time in Uganda and Tanganika the administrative systems changed from those that Lugard had apparently envisioned. In Uganda, the British established a formal protectorate over the local chiefs. Nevertheless, the level of intervention there often proved less than in some Indian states under a Residency system. In Tanganika, the British used the chiefs as merely 'mouthpieces for the orders of the European administrative officers — although, as already pointed out, their orders would be described as advice and not instructions,' to quote such an European administrative officer. He continues:

> It was this lack of initiative and intelligence in many chiefs that proved a serious weakness in the first days of Indirect Rule. Yet these backward and often illiterate potentates enjoyed the absolute loyalty of their peoples, so that with a chief who would accept the advice of the administrative officer in charge of the district, and assuming this advice to be sound, Indirect Rule worked for the benefit of the ordinary husbandman.[73]

Thus here too, indirect rule took a different direction than that intended by Lugard or expected in the ideal type.

In analyzing indirect rule in Tanganika, Austen has commented that it proved ultimately to be a failure because of the bureaucracy established to institute it. This bureaucracy in fact negated the advantages of indirect rule by centralizing authority in its own hands rather than permitting authority to remain with indigenous political institutions. When we compare them to India, local chiefs in East Africa held, at most, the degree of authority exercised by some of the larger landholders of India, such as the taaluqdars of Awadh. They thus retained only limited

authority on the basis of their traditional status. Most of their authority came rather from their links to the British administration. In India, this was called direct rule; in Africa it was classed as a form of indirect rule. Thus, nowhere in East Africa did a form of indirect rule develop which approached the original Indian model.

In West Africa, British officials seeking to establish a system of indirect rule had drawn upon Indian models even before the arrival of Lugard in 1900. Kimberley as Colonial Secretary had proposed such a system as early as 1873, a proposal aborted by the Ashanti invasion. More than two decades later, the Governor of the Gold Coast, W.E. Maxwell, had sent an ultimatum dated 23 September 1895, to the Ruler of Kumasi demanding that

> ...[you] refrain from attacking your neighbors, and, in order that these objects may be effectively secured, it is necessary that you should consent to the establishment of a British Resident at Kumasi who will exercise control over you in these respects, but will not otherwise interfere with the administration or institutions of the country.[74]

Just three years later, the Niger Committee Report proposed not only the dispatch of Residents to the local states but also the establishment of a 'Simla' or hill-station governmental headquarters, both on the Indian pattern.[75] The Indian model of indirect rule thus predated Lugard in West Africa.

Nevertheless, in northern Nigeria, under Lugard's direction, indirect rule came closest to the Indian form. After his shift from East to West Africa, Lugard again drew upon the Indian example both to support his advocacy for a system of indirect rule and to provide a body of experience for his policies. In 1900 he referred to northern Nigeria as 'a little India'.[76] Although the specific methods he followed were shaped by local conditions, he used the Indian example to justify himself to his employers, in this case the Royal Niger Company. In his annual report of 1902 Lugard wrote:

> [Indirect rule] has been our policy in India; and Northern Nigeria, though but a third in size, and many centuries be-

> hind the great Eastern dependency, still presents to my imagination many strangely parallel conditions.[77]

In his effort to understand and deal with the states of Africa, Lugard thus saw them as he had experienced the indigenous states of India.

Not only did Lugard himself look to the Indian case, he urged other imperial administrators to do so systematically as well. In his analysis of the British imperial administration he wrote:

> It is one of the defects of our system of State departments that the invaluable lessons of Indian administration and economic progress — the result of much costly experience and research — and the history of its successes and failures, is not more readily accessible to other tropical dependencies, which are emerging from the stage in which India was many years ago.[78]

Lugard explicitly learned from the Indian model, as evidenced in his determination to avoid the difficulties the British had created for themselves through their recognition of some degree of sovereignty in the Indian princes.[79] To Lugard then, establishing a British Empire in Africa in the early twentieth century paralleled the process of its establishment in India during the early nineteenth century.

British efforts to make use of the 'costly experience and research' of decades of indirect rule in India was not confined to Lugard alone. His colleague George Goldie, Governor of the Niger Coast Protectorate, also referred to the policies he sought to apply as based on the Indian case. Goldie explained to his employers that 'The [Royal Niger] Company, following the example of the East India Company and the Government of India, desires, as far as practicable, to rule indirectly through the native feudatory princes.'[80] Indeed, efforts were made, with less success, to establish Residency systems on the Nigerian pattern in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Gambia.[81]

As in the other Southeast Asian and African examples we have examined, over time the British administration in Nigeria

gradually shifted from the Indian pattern and eventually developed its own forms of indirect rule. Unlike the Indian model, the Residents of northern Nigeria were not accredited to a particular court. Instead, as with some political agents in India, they ruled parallel to the indigenous Rulers. The Residents of northern Nigeria held their own courts, assessed and collected taxes and generally administered without necessarily referring to the local Ruler. At the same time, the Resident sought to maintain the dignity of the local Ruler by means of ceremonies and observances. Further, the local Ruler also performed each of these administrative roles, retaining a degree ot autonomy.[82]

Despite these differences, northern Nigeria more than perhaps any other of these African examples remained relatively close to the model of Residency rule developed in India. In scale, several of the indigenous states matched some of those of India. British policies set similar limited goals for the British presence in both. Despite Lugard's determination, similar conflicts over local sovereignty emerged within the British administration. Further, as nationalist movements emerged in West Africa under the direction of Western-educated Africans, the British relied ever more solidly on the 'traditional' Rulers, just as it did in India after 1857. The West African Congress led by Western-educated officials and professionals of a class created by the British modelled itself on the Indian National Congress led by the same class. Both Congresses threatened the stability of British colonial rule while the paternalistic Residents and their loyal chiefs seemed to stand for stability. In order to support the authority of the local chiefs, Residents practising indirect rule in northern Nigeria under Lugard's successors intervened less in local affairs. Just as had occurred in India, the Residents came to be charged with maintaining continuity, not with fundamental social engineering. Again, once precedents had been empirically established, conformity, not innovation, came to be the Residents' guide. As a 1928 circular to the Residents stated,

> ...a state of progress has been reached at which there is no room for what may be termed amateur or experimenting

> **administrative officers content to work in the light of nature and to deal with each problem as it arises without taking advantage of the accumulated body of precedents and experience which now exists.[83]**

Much in the West African cases, therefore, followed the patterns found earlier in the princely states of India.

British relations with Egypt from the end of the nineteenth century also depended heavily on their experience of indirect rule in India. Although Egypt was nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, it had long acted independently. Thus, as in India, the local Ruler, entitled in Egypt the Khedive, stood as a *de facto* although not a *de jure* sovereign. As a result of his budgetary policies, and with the acquiescence of European bankers, the Khedive accumulated an insupportable debt, to both the British and the other European nations. European efforts to protect this investment in Egypt led to increasing outside interference in his administration, culminating in the British invasion of 1881-2.

In 1893, the British Government appointed Cromer as its Consul-General in Egypt — effectively its agent for indirect rule. From the time of his appointment until his departure in 1907, Cromer, as well as many of his superiors and subordinates, apparently modelled indirect rule in Egypt on their experience with India's princely states. Indeed, Owen argues that Cromer based virtually his entire understanding of Egypt on his perception of India taken from his earlier service there.[84] Cromer's successors gradually changed the pattern of indirect rule practised in Egypt and eventually extended a 'protectorate' over that state (1915-22). Nevertheless, the explicit and implicit influence of Indian experience can be clearly seen in British indirect rule over Egypt.

In order to protect its Egyptian base from disorder up the Nile, the British also extended their influence to the south, over the Sudan. After bloody military campaigns which established the economic inutility of the Sudan to the British, they instituted a loose system of indirect rule from 1898 to 1924. The British supported a series of local elites in a vain effort to establish a stable system of indirect control. Once again, as in the Indian and

several other of the examples cited above, the British tried to rely on traditional elites in order to suppress nationalist feeling generated by the new, Western-educated classes. Although the British were temporarily able to stabilize the Sudan sufficiently to prevent any threat to British indirect control over Egypt, they were ultimately no more successful in the Sudan than in their other colonies in preventing independence.

In Africa and Southeast Asia, as in India, the British Empire proved impermanent. The systems of Residents that were instituted could not hold the indigenous states forever within British control. Nevertheless, as the formal colonial rule ended and Residents gave way to nationalist governments, new forms of indirect influence often replaced the old forms of indirect rule. Much in the relations between today's independent Asian and Africans states and the European, American, and Asian powers can be compared with the older forms of indirect colonial rule.

For much of the establishment of the British Empire, the example of India's Residency system proved highly persuasive. The image of India's princely states after 1858 as loyal bastions of inexpensive British rule proved extremely attractive to Britons. The century of empirical evidence about the means and possibilities of indirect rule which had been accumulated in India influenced later British policy, both in the field and in London. Thus, the British Imperial administrators in Africa and Southeast Asia owed much to the experience of the East India Company.

NOTES

1. The case at hand concerned British policy with respect to an attack by a Ruler in Manipur against the British. Lord Cross to Lord Lansdowne, 15 October 1891 in Lord Newton, *Lord Lansdowne; a biography* (London: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 90-1, quoted in Sever, 1:337.

2. Copland's evidence comes from Western India where the level of British intervention tended to be higher than elsewhere. Nevertheless, his point is well taken. Copland, *British Raj*.

3. Among the collections or monographs on the Indian states and the Residency system after 1857, the following are particularly notable:

Bjorne Hettne, *The Political Economy of Indirect Rule: Mysore 1881-1947* (London: Curzon Press, 1978); Jeffrey, ed., *People, Princes and Paramount Power;* Ajit K. Neogy, *The Paramount Power and the Princely States of India, 1858-1881* (Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi, 1979); K[avalam] M[adhava] Panikkar, *An Introduction to the Study of the Relations of the Indian States with the Government of India* (London: Hopkinson, 1927); Barbara Ramusack, *The Princes of India in the Twilight of Empire: Dissolution of the Patron-Client System, 1914-1939* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1978) and *The Indian Princes and their States,* in *The New Cambridge History of India,* vol. 3, no. 9 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); Lloyd I. and Susanne H. Rudolph, 'Rajputana under British Paramountcy: the Failure of Indirect Rule,' *Journal of Modern History* 38 (1966): 138-60; Howard Spodek, 'Urban politics in the local kingdoms of India: A View from the Princely Capitals of Saurashtra under British Rule,' *Modern Asian Studies* 7, 2 (1973):253-75.

4. The issue at hand was intervention in Awadh contrary to a treaty provision. Minute of the Governor-General, 30 July 1831, FPC, 30 September 1831, No. 2.

5. Governor-General to Resident Hyderabad, 30 November 1779, Eur MS Addl 29115, BM; Governor-General to Resident Lucknow, 5 June 1783, Eur MS Addl 29115, BM.

6. Nabob of Arcot to Governor-General, received 29 August 1775, FSC, 5 October 1775, No. 8.

7. Governor-General to Nabob of Carnatic, 15 August 1783, Eur MS Addl 29006, BM.

8. Resolution of the Supreme Court, FSC, 10 July 1775, No. 19.

9. Political Letter from Governor-General to Court of Directors, 15 August 1815, *Papers respecting a Reform in the administration of the ...Nawaub Vizier...1st January 1808 to 31 December 1815* (London: EI Co. 1824), 853.

10. See Fisher, 'The Imperial Coronation of 1819: Awadh, the British and the Mughals,' *Modern Asian Studies,* 19, 2 (1985):239-77 for details.

11. Aitchison, 2:160-1, 9:80-1, 95-7, 5:430-4, 3:66-7.

12. E.g. Governor-General Dalhousie accepted the sovereignty of Indian Rulers even as he annexed their states in violation of explicit treaty rights. Governor-General's Minute of 18 June 1855, FPC, 28 December 1855, No. 319.

13. Sever, 1:232-4.

14. Lee-Warner, *The Native States,* p. 340. Tupper discusses another tripartite analytic system, *Indian Political Practice,* 3:32-60.

15. Foreign Department, 21 May 1864, No. 77, cited in Tupper, 1:221.

16. Minute No. 22 of 22 March 1864, p.36 of Legislative Department Collection, Proceedings, Political A, April 1864, No. 17 cited in Tupper, *Indian Political Practice*, 1:44.

17. Minute of 22 March 1864, cited in Tupper, *Indian Political Practice*, 1:45.

18. Aitchison, *passim*.

19. Ibid.

20. See Bernard S. Cohn, 'Representing Authority in Victorian India,' in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 165-209.

21. 30 April 1877, quoted in Sever, 1:286.

22. 11 May 1877, quoted in Sever, 1:287.

23. Minute of the Viceroy 25 July 1877, cited in C.H. Philips et al., ed., *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858 to 1947, Select Documents* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 417.

24. Lee-Warner, 'The Native States of India,' *British Empire Series, Volume 1: India, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, British Northern Borneo, Hong-Kong* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1899), p. 271. Lee-Warner summarizes the diverse positions of other legal scholars in *The Native States of India*, pp. ix-x.

25. Curzon to Lord Hamilton, 29 August 1900, cited in Philips, ed., *Evolution of India*, pp. 425-6.

26. Bernard S. Cohn, 'Political Systems in Eighteenth Century India: the Banaras Region,' *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 82, 3 (1962), 313-20.

27. Aitchison, 2:109-10.

28. Political Consultations, 24 August 1775, Eur MS Addl 28977, BM.

29. Governor-General to Resident Banaras, 24 March 1783, BSC, 24 March 1783.

30. Aitchison, 2:89-95.

31. Ibid., 2:96-97.

32. Cabinet Mission Memorandum on States' Treaties and Paramountcy of 12 May 1946.

33. Cabinet Mission to the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, 12 May 1946, cited in Philips, ed., *Evolution of India*, p. 435.

34. Resolution of the All India Congress Committee, 15 June 1947, quoted in Sever, 2:626-7.

35. Indian Independence Act, 18 July 1947, quoted in Sever, 2:641-2.

36. Menon, *Integration*, p. 46.

37. The two most valuable studies of the political service after 1858 are Copland, 'The Other Guardians,' and Creagh Coen, *The Indian Political Service.* I largely draw my material from these sources in the section below.

38. Quoted in L.S.S. O'Malley, *The Indian Civil Service: 1600-1930* (London: Frank Cass, 1965), p. 160.

39. The earliest version of this *Manual* was created for Harcourt Butler as Foreign Secretary (1907-10). Creagh Coen discusses this limited training of recruits, pp. 44-6, as does Copland, 'The Other Guardians.'

40. Creagh Coen, p. 54.

41. Ibid., p. 35.

42. See Bradford Spangenberg, *British Bureaucracy in India: Status, Policy and the I.C.S., in the Late 19th Century* (Delhi: Manohar, 1976), esp. pp. 264-335.

43. Creagh Coen, pp. 37-9.

44. Copland, 'The Other Guardians,' p. 289.

45. Since the Indian Political Service could not recruit enough Britons, it left 46 (some 27 per cent) of its sanctioned places empty. Indians thus made up less than 14 per cent of the actual strength of the Service. Creagh Coen, p. 4.

46. Private letter to Stewart, n.d., quoted in Kaye, *Malcolm,* 2:371.

47. See M[alcolm] E. Yapp, *Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798-1850* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

48. Article 4, quoted in J[ohn] B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 156.

49. See Aitchison, *.passim,* p. 835.

50. See John Middleton and Nane Campbell, *Zanzibar: Its Society and Politics* (London: Institute of Race Relations, 1965), and John Gray, *History of Zanzibar from the Middle Ages to 1856* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

51. Indeed, the officers of the Madras army comprized the largest group within the political line in India as well, as we have seen. L.A. Mills, *British Malaya, 1824-1867,* (Singapore: Methodist Publishing House, 1925), p. 95.

52. CO 273/47, Report of the Committee on Native States, 19 May 1871 cited in C.D. Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control,* London Oriental Series, vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 81-4.

53. Lt. Gov. Penang to Colonial Secretary, Singapore, 6 September and 24 October 1872 in CO 273/61 and 'Perak and Larut Disturbances,' Archive Room, Raffles Museum, cited in Cowan, p. 126, n. 58.

54. Minute of Kimberley, 31 August 1873, in CO 273/67 cited in Cowan, p. 166. Lugard himself was aware of Kimberley's suggestion for Residents 'on the analogy of the Residents of the Courts of independent Rajas in India,' Frederick Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, 5th ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1965), pp. 129-30.

55. Pankgor Treaty, clauses vi and x, cited in Frank Swettenham, *British Malaya*, pp. 176-7.

56. Proceedings, Political B, February 1875, Nos. 95-6 and Proceedings, Secret I, June 1888, Nos. 74-6, cited in Tupper, *Indian Political Practice*, 3:158.

57. Secretary of State dispatch c.1512, pp. 98-100, 1 June 1876, cited in Cowan, p. 243.

58. Swettenham, *British Malaya*, pp. 213-14.

59. Sadka, *The Protected Malay States*, pp. 214, 255.

60. See *The Journals of J.W.W. Brich, First Resident to Perak, 1874-1875*, ed. and introduction by P.L. Burns (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976).

61. Enclosure in Canterbury to Granville, 2 Januaty 1870, CO 309/93, cited in MacIntyre, p. 227.

62. Fergusson to Kimberley, 22 October 1873, CO 209/230, cited in MacIntyre, p. 363.

63. Treaty of Peace with the Gaika Tribe, 17 September 1836, PP 1836, 39, encl. #5 in #9 and Treaty with the Gaika Tribe, 5 December 1836, PP 1851, 38, cited in Kenneth N. Bell and W.P. Morrell, eds, *Select Documents in British Colonial Policy, 1830-1860* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), pp. 460-85.

64. Report of T. Shepstone, Diplomatic Agent, 14 August, 1848, PP 1850, 37 cited in Bell and Morrell, pp. 515-18.

65. Smith to Lord Grey, 3 February 1848 and enclosures in PP 1847-48, 43 (Command 969), cited in Bell and Morrell, pp. 506-10.

66. Richard P. Stevens, *Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland: The Former High Commission Territories in Southern Africa* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967).

67. Introduction to Anonymous, *The Republic of Transkei* (Johannesburg: Chris van Reisburg Publications, 1976), n.p.

68. Quoted in Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane, *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), p. 242.

69. Robert Southall, *South Africa's Transkei: The Political Economy of an 'Independent' Bantustan* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983), p. 45.

70. Lugard to Mgr. Hirth, 17 December 1890, cited in Margery Perham, *Lugard: The Years of Adventure, 1858-1898* (London: Collins, 1956), p. 229.

71. Letter received by Lugard, 20 June 1892, Frederick Lugard, *The Diaries of Lord Lugard*, ed. Margery Perham, 3 vols. (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), 3:313-14.

72. Cited in Margery Perham, *Lugard: The Years of Authority, 1898-1945*, (Hamden, Ct.: Archon Press, 1968), p. 147.

73. E. K. Lumley, *The Forgotten Mandate: A British District Officer in Tanganika* (London: C. Hurst, 1976), p. 33.

74. Governor W.E. Maxwell to Prempeh: Ultimatum 23 September 1895, CO 879/43, No. 490, cited in C. W. Newbury, *British Policy Towards West Africa, Select Documents 1875-1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 86.

75. Report of the Niger Committee, 4 August 1898, CO 879/52, No. 550, cited in Newbury, *British Policy*, pp. 309-11.

76. Lugard to Colonial Office, September 22 1900, cited in Kanya-Forstner, 'Military Expansion', p. 435.

77. Cited in Perham, *Lugard: The Years of Authority*, p. 148.

78. Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, p. 47.

79. See Perham, *Lugard: The Years of Authority*, p. 148.

80. Report on the Niger-Sudan Campaign to the Earl of Scarbrough, Deputy Governor, Royal Niger Company, 1897, cited in Perham, *Lugard: The Years of Adventure*, p. 625.

81. Afigbo, p. 464.

82. See Anton Bertram, *The Colonial Service* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), esp. pp. 70-2.

83. Circular to Residents, 1 July 1928, cited in Crowder, 'The Relationship of the British Political Officer to His Chief in Northern Nigeria' in *West African Chiefs*, ed. Michael Crowder, p. 16.

84. No less than seven major figures who shaped Britain's indirect administration of Egypt had significant Indian experience. Roger Owen, 'The Influence of Lord Cromer's Indian Experience on British Policy in Egypt 1883-1907,' *Middle Eastern Affairs*, 4, ed. Albert Hourani, *St. Anthony's Papers*, 17 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 109-39.

See also Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid, *Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969).

Select Bibliography

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Persian and Urdu Manuscripts

'Dār al-Inshā'' Collection. Persian MS. Andhra Pradesh State Archives, Hyderabad.

Khair al-Dīn, Muḥammad, Ilāhābādī, 'Ibrat Nāma.' Partial transcription by Faiẓ al-Ḥaq. Persian MS, 2210. National Archives of India, New Delhi.

Parshād, Munshī Sītal. 'Mir'āt al-Auẓa'.' Persian MS, 2149. Raza Library, Rampur, U.P.

'Tuhfa-i Dakkan.' Persian MS, 135. Salar Jang Museum, Hyderabad.

Wājid 'Alī Shāh. 'Jawābāt-i Shukūk Mundarija Awadh Blū Būk.' Library of the Mahārājā of Mahmudabad, Mahmudabad, U.P.

Other: Persian MSS, 235, 808, 1356. Regional Archives, Allahabad; Persian MS, 38. Andhra Pradesh State Archives, Hyderabad .

English Manuscripts

East India Company Records Series (India Office Library, London; National Archives of India, New Delhi):

Bengal Secret and Military Consultations
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations [BSPC]
Bengal Secret Consultations [BSC]
Bengal Select Committee Proceedings
Bombay Service Army List
Foreign Department Select Committee
Foreign Miscellaneous Series [FMS]
Foreign Political Consultations [FPC]
Foreign Secret Consultations [FSC]
Foreign Secret Proceedings [FSP]
Fort St. George Military and Political Consultations
Fort St. George Political Consultations
Fort William Secret Department
Home Miscellaneous Series [HMS]
Hyderabad Residency Records

India Political and Foreign Consultations [IPFC]
India Political Procedings [IPP]
Madras Service Army Lists
Madras Political Consultations [MPC]
Madras Secret Consultations
Mysore Residency Records
Ootacamund Proceedings
Personal Records [PR]

Collected Correspondence of East India Company Officials:
Clerk, Claud: Eur. MS, D.538. IOL.
Frere, Henry Bartle Edward: Eur. MS, F.81. IOL.
Gardiner, William Linneaus: Eur. MS, C.304. IOL.
Hastings, Warren: Eur. MSS Addl., 28973-29116. BM.
Jenkins, Richard: Eur. MS, D.473. IOL.
Macaulay, Colin: Eur. MS Addl., 13692. BM.
Malet, Charles Warre: Eur. MS, F.149. IOL.
Munro, Thomas: Eur. MS, F.151. IOL.
Palmer, William: Eur. MS. Addl., 15596. IOL.
Roberts, Henry Gee: Eur. MS, E.265. IOL.
Seton, Archibald: Eur. MSS Addl., 13576-7. BM.
Strachey, Richard: Eur. MSS, D.514, D.585. IOL.
Walker, Alexander: Eur. MS, C.198. IOL.

Collections of Correspondence, Residents or political agents at:
Awadh (Oude, Oudh): Eur. MSS Addl., 13522-3, 13526-7, 29093. BM; Oude MS English Surplus, S1 2796. Uttar Pradesh Regional Archives, Allahabad.
Baroda: Eur. MS Addl., 13607. BM.
Benaras: Eur. MS Addl., 13581. BM.
Bundelkhund: Eur. MS Addl., 13591. BM.
Delhi: Eur. MS Addl., 13578. BM.
Hyderabad, Eur. MSS Addl., 13583-6. BM.
Mysore: Eur. MSS Addl., 13670, 15669 . BM.
Nagpore: Eur. MS Addl., 13590. BM.; Eur. MS, E.111. IOL.
Poona: Eur. MSS Addl., 13587, 13597-99. BM.
Sindiah (Scindhia): Eur. MSS Addl., 13600-3. B.M.
Tanjore: Eur. MSS Addl., 13684-90. BM.
Several states: Eur. MS Addl., 13612. B.M.; Eur. MSS, C.204, D.556, E.293 E. 304, E.357, F.66. IOL.

Dissertation:
Wood, Peter. 'A Vassal State in the Shadow of Empire: William Palmer's

Bank in Hyderabad, 1810-1824.' Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1981.

PRINTED WORKS

Ackerley, J. R. *Hindoo Holiday: An Indian Journal*. 1932. Reprint. New York: Penguin, 1960.

Afigbo, A. E. 'The Establishment of Colonial Rule, 1900-1918' in *The History of West Africa*, edited by J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder. 2 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.

———. 'The Warrant Chief System in Eastern Nigeria: Direct or Indirect Rule?' *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 4, 3 (1968):421-38.

Ahmad, Safi. *British Residents at the Court of Avadh (1764-1856)*. Lucknow: Avadh History Research Centre, 1968.

Aitchison, C[harles] U. *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring Countries*. 5th ed. 14 vols. Calcutta: Government of India, Central Publication Branch, 1929.

Ali, Shahamat. *History of Bahawalpur*. London: J. Murray, 1848.

———. *The Sikhs and Afghans, in Connexion with India and Persia, Immediately Before and After the Death of Ranjeet Singh: from the Journal of an Expedition to Kabul through the Panjab and the Khaibar Pass*. 1847. Reprint. Patiala: Languages Department, Punjab, 1970.

Ali, Moulvie Syed Mahdi, compiler. *Hyderabad Affairs*. Hyderabad: Printed for private circulation, 1883.

Andhra Pradesh. Central Records Office. *The Chronology of Modern Hyderabad, 1720-1890*. Hyderabad: Central Records Office, 1954.

Anstey, Roger. *King Leopold's Legacy: The Congo under Belgian Rule, 1908-1960*. London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Ashton, S[tephen] R. *British Policy Towards the Indian States, 1905-1939*. London: Curzon Press, 1982.

Aṣiwaju, A. I. 'The Alaketu of Ketu and the Onimeko of Meko: The Changing Status of Two Yoruba Rulers under French and British Rule' in *West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status under Colonial Rule and Independence*, edited by Michael Crowder and Obaro Ikime. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1970.

———. *Western Yorubaland Under European Rule 1889-1945*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976.

Baird, J. G. A., ed. *Private Papers of the Marquis of Dalhousie*. Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1911.

Banerjee, Anil Chandra. *The Rajput States and British Paramountcy*. New Delhi: Rajesh Publications, 1980.

Barnett, Richard B. *North India between Empires: Awadh, the Mughals, and the British 1720-1801*. Berkeley: University of California Press,

1980.

Basu, Purnendu. *Oudh and the East India Company: 1785-1801*. Lucknow: Maxwell, 1943.

Bayly, C[hristopher] A. *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Bell, Evans. *Memoirs of Gen'l John Briggs of the Madras Army with comments on some of his Words and Work*. London: Chatto and Windus, 1885.

———. *The Mysore Reversion, 'An Exceptional Case'*. 2nd. ed. London: Trübner, 1866.

Bell, Kenneth N. and W. P. Morrell, eds. *Select Documents in British Colonial Policy, 1830-1860*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928.

Bertram, Anton. *The Colonial Service*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930.

Bhargava, Krishna Dayal, ed. *Browne Correspondence*. Indian Records Series. Delhi: National Archives of India, 1960.

Bhattacharyya, Pranjal Kumar. *British Residents at Poona, 1786- 1818*. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1984.

Bhattacharyya, Sukumar. *The Rajput States and the East India Com- pany from the Close of the 18th Century to 1820*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1972.

Bingle, R. J. 'Changing Attitudes to the Indian States, 1820-1850: A Study of Oudh, Hyderabad and Jaipur' in *Indian Society and the Beginnings of Modernization, c. 1830-1850*, edited by C. H. Philips and M. Doreen Wainwright. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1976.

Briggs, Henry George. *The Nizam: His History and Relations with the British Government*. 2 vols. London: Bernard Quartitch, 1861.

Broadfoot, W. *The Career of Major George Broadfoot, C.B. (Governor-General's Agent North West Frontier, 1844-1845) in Afghanistan and the Punjab Compiled from His Papers and those of Lords Ellenborough and Hardinge*. London: John Murray, 1888.

Bruton, William. *Newes from the East-Indies*. London: J. Okes, 1638.

Burns, P. L., ed. *The Journals of J. W. W. Birch, First Resident to Perak, 1874-1875*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Choksey, R. D. *A History of British Diplomacy at the Court of the Peshwas, 1786-1818*. Poona: R. D. Choksey, 1951.

[Clunes, John]. *An Historical Sketch of the Princes of India, Stipendiary, Subsidiary, Protected, Tributary, and Feudatory: With a Sketch of the Origin and Progress of British Power in India by an Officer in the Service of the Honourable East India Company*. Edinburgh: Smith, Elder, 1833.

Cohn, Bernard S. 'The Command of Language and the Language of Command' in *Subaltern Studies IV: Writings on South Asian History and Society*, edited by Ranajit Guha. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985.

———. 'Political Systems in Eighteenth Century India: the Banaras Region.' *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 82, 3 (1962):313-20.

———. 'Recruitment and Training of British Civil Servants in India, 1600-1860' in *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*, edited by Ralph Braibanti. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, 1966.

———. 'Representing Authority in Victorian India' in *The Invention of Tradition*, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Colebrooke, T. E. *Life of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone*. 2 vols. London: John Murray, 1884.

Colvin, Auckland. *John Russell Colvin, The Last Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West under the Company*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895.

Conroy, F. Hilary. *The Japanese Seizure of Korea*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960.

Copland, Ian. *The British Raj and the Indian Princes: Paramountcy in Western India, 1857-1930*. Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1982.

———. 'The Other Guardians: Ideology and Performance in the Indian Political Service' in *People, Princes and Paramount Power: Society and Politics in the Indian Princely States*, edited by Robin Jeffrey. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Cowan, C. D. *Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control*. vol. 2. London Oriental Series. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Creagh Coen, Terence. *The Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect Rule*. London: Chatto, Windus, 1971.

Crowder, Michael. 'Indirect Rule—French and British Style.' *Africa*, 34 (1964):197-205.

———. 'The Relationship of the British Political Officer to His Chief in Northern Nigeria' in *West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status under Colonial Rule and Independence*, edited by Michael Crowder and Obaro Ikime. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1970.

———. *West Africa under Colonial Rule*. London: Hutchinson, 1968.

——— and Obaro Ikime, eds. *West African Chiefs: Their Changing Status under Colonial Rule and Independence*. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1970.

Das, Sisir Kumar. *Sahibs and Munshis: An Account of the College of Fort William*. New Delhi: Orion, 1978.

Day, Clive. *The Dutch in Java*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Diskalar, D. B. 'Foundation of an Observatory at Lucknow.' *Journal of the U.P. Historical Society* 10, 1 (July 1937):7- 32.

Dodwell, Henry Herbert. *Dupleix and Clive: The Beginning of Empire*. Reprint. Gorakpur: V. Prakashan, 1952.

Durand, H. M. *Life of Major-General Sir Henry Marion Durand*. 2 vols. London: W. H. Allen, 1883.

East India Company. *The East-India Register and Directory*. Annual.

———. *Papers Respecting a Reform in the Administration of the Government of His Excellency the Nawaub Vizier. . . 1st January 1808 to the 31 December 1815. . . .* London: East India Company, 1824.

Edwardes, Herbert Benjamin and Herman Merivale. *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence*. 2 vols. London: Smith, Elder, 1872.

Edwardes, William. *Reminscences of a Bengal Civilian*. London: Smith, Elder, 1866.

Farooqi, Mian Bashir Ahmed. *British Relations with the Cis-Sutlej States, 1809-1823*. Lahore: Punjab Government Records Office, Language Department, 1971.

Firminger, Walter Kelly. *Historical Introduction to the Bengal Portion of 'the Fifth Report'*. 2 vols. Reprint. Delhi: Neeraj Publishing House, 1984.

Fisher, Michael H. 'British Expansion in North India: The Role of the Resident in Awadh.' *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 18, 1 (January-March 1980):69-82.

———. *A Clash of Cultures: Awadh, the British and the Mughals*. Riverdale, Md.: Riverdale Company, 1987.

———.' Extraterritoriality: Concept and Practice in Princely India.' *Indo-British Review* 15, 2 (December 1988):103-122.

———. 'The Imperial Coronation of 1819: Awadh, the British and the Mughals.' *Modern Asian Studies* 19, 2 (1985):239-77.

Flint, John E. 'Frederick Lugard: The Making of an Autocrat (1858-1943)' in *African Proconsuls: European Governors in Africa*, edited by L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan. New York: The Free Press, 1978.

Forster, E. M. *The Hill of Devi*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953.

Fraser, Hastings. *Memoirs and Correspondence of Gen'l James Stuart Fraser of the Madras Army*. London: Whiting and Co., 1885.

Frykenberg, Robert Eric. *Guntur District, 1788-1848: A History of Local Influence and Central Authority in South India*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.

Furnival, J. S. *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of British Burma and Netherlands India*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1948.

Gifford, Prosser. 'Indirect Rule: Touchstone or Tombstone for Colonial Policy' in *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, edited by Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.

Glieg, George Robert. *The Life of Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, Bart. and K.C.B., etc., Late Governor of Madras with Extracts from his Correspondence and Private Papers*. 2 [*sic*, 3] vols. London: Henry Colburn and Richard Bentley, 1830.

———. *Memoirs of the Life of the Right Hon. Warren Hastings*. 3 vols. London: Richard Bentley, 1841.

Glieg, John William. *The Life and Correspondence of Major-General John Malcolm, G.C.B., Late Envoy to Persia, and Governor of Bombay*. 2 vols. London: Smith, Elder, 1854.

Goetz, Hermann. *The Crisis of Indian Civilization in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1938.

Goldsmid, F.J. *James Outram: A Biography*. 2 vols. London: Smith, Elder, 1880.

Gray, John. *History of Zanzibar from the Middle Ages to 1856*. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Hailey, Lord. *An African Survey*. Revised edition. London: Oxford University Press, 1957.

———. *A General Survey of the System of Native Administration*. Administration in the British African Territories, pt. 4. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1951.

Hastings, Francis Rawdon-. *The Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings*. Edited by Marchioness of Bute. Reprint. Allahabad: The Panini Office, 1907.

Hettne, Bjørne. *The Political Economy of Indirect Rule: Mysore 1881-1947*. London: Curzon Press, 1978.

Hodson, C. P. *List of the Officers of the Bengal Army 1758-1834*. 4 vols. London: Constable, 1927-1928.

Hogben, W. Murray. 'An Imperial Dilemma: The Reluctant Indianization of the Indian Political Service.' *Modern Asian Studies* 15, 4 (1981): 751-69.

Hume, James, ed. *A Selection from the Writings, Prose and Poetical, of the late Henry W. Torrens, Esq., B.A., Bengal Civil Service, and of the Inner Temple*. Calcutta: R. C. Lepage, 1854.

Hunter, William Wilson. *Life of Brian Houghton Hodgson, British Resident at the Court of Nepal*. London: John Murray, 1896.

Hurd, John. 'The Economic Consequences of Indirect Rule in India.' *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 12, 2 (April-June 1976):169-81.

Hutton, James. 'The Subsidiary System in India.' *Contemporary Review* 6 (September-December 1867):172-85.

Huttenback, Robert A. *British Relations with Sind, 1799-1843*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.

India. Imperial Record Department. *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*. 12 vols. Calcutta: Imperial Record Department, 1911-.

———. National Archives of India. *Fort William-India House Correspondence*. 21 vols. to date. Indian Records Series. Delhi: Manager of Publications, Government of India, 1949-.

Ingram, Edward, ed. *Two Views of British India: The Private Correspondence of Dundas and Lord Wellesley: 1798-1801*. Great Britain: Adams and Dart, 1970.

Ismā'il, Shāh Muḥammad, Shahīd. *Support of the Faith (Taqwiyat al-Imān)*. Translated by Shahamut Ali. 1243 Hijri (1826-27). Edited and revised by M. Ashraf Darr. Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1969.

Jahāngīr. *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri*. Translated by Alexander Rogers. Edited by Henry Beveridge. Reprint. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1968

Jeffrey, Robin, ed. *People, Princes and Paramount Power: Society and Politics in the Indian Princely States*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

———. 'The Politics of "Indirect Rule": Types of Relationship among Rulers, Ministers and Residents in a "Native State".' *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 13, 3 (November 1975):261-81.

Kamerkar, Mani. *British Paramountcy: British-Baroda Relations, 1818-1848*. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1980.

Kanya-Forstner, A. S. 'Military Expansion in the Western Sudan — French and British Style' in *France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, edited by Prosser Gifford and William Rogers Louis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

Kawakami, K. K. *Manchoukuo, Child of Conflict*. New York: A. M. S. Press, 1933.

Kaye, John William. *The Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Metcalfe*. 2 vols. London: Richard Bentley, 1854.

———. *The Life and Correspondence of Major General Sir John Malcolm*. 2 vols. London: Smith, Elder, 1834.

———, ed. *Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe*. London: Smith, Elder, 1855.

Kelly, J[ohn] B. *Britain and the Persian Gulf*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.

Khalidi, Omar. *The British Residents at the Court of the Nizams of Haydarabad*. Wichita, Kansas: Haydarabad Historical Society, n.d.

Khan, Seid Gholam Hossein. *Seir Mutaqherin*. Translated by M. Raymond alias Haji Mutafa. 4 vols. Reprint. Calcutta: T. D. Chatterjee, 1902.

Lee, Ki-Bak. *A New History of Korea*. Translated and edited by W. Wagner with E. J. Shultz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.

Lee-Warner, William. *The Native States of India*. British Empire Series, vol. 1: *India, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, British Norther Borneo, Hong-Kong*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1899.

———. *The Native States of India*. Revised edition. London: Macmillan, 1910.

———. *The Protected Princes of India*. London: Macmillan, 1894.

Leonard, Karen. 'The "Great Firm" Theory of the Decline of the Mughal Empire.' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21, 2 (April 1979):151-67.

———. 'Indigenous Banking Firms in Mughal Economy: A Reply.' *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 23, 2 (April 1981):309-13.

Lewis, W. S., et al., eds. *Horace Walpole's Correspondence with Sir Horace Mann*. 48 vols. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937-1983.

Llewellyn-Jones, Rosie. *A Fatal Friendship: The Nawabs, the British, and the City of Lucknow*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Louis, William Roger. *Ruanda-Urundi*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.

Low, D[onald] A[nthony]. *Lion Rampant: Essays in the Study of British Imperialism*. London: Frank Cass, 1973.

——— and R. Cranford Pratt. *Buganda and the British Overrule: 1900-1955, Two Studies*. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.

Ludlow, John Malcolm. *Thoughts on the Policy of the Crown towards India*. 1859. Reprint. Delhi: Gian Publishing House, 1986.

Lugard, Frederick D. *The Diaries of Lord Lugard*. Edited by Margery Perham. 3 vols. London: Faber and Faber, 1959.

———. *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*. 3rd ed. Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1926.

Lumley, E. K. *The Forgotten Mandate: A British District Officer in Tanganika*. London: C. Hurst, 1976.

Lutfi Al-Sayyid, Afaf. *Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

Lutfullah, Shaikh. *Autobiography of Lutfullah: An Indian's Perceptions of the West*. Edited by Edward B. Eastwick. Reprint edition. Edited by S. A. I. Tirmizi. New Delhi: International Writer's Emporium, 1985.

Macauley, Colin. *Desultory Notes on a Cursory View of Some Papers Extracted from the Records of the East India House*. Printed for the use of the Committee of the House of Commons on the Travancore Petition. n.p., n.d.

McIntyre, W. David. *The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, 1865- 1875: A Study in British Colonial Policy in West Africa, Malaya and the South Pacific in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli*. London: Macmillan, 1967.

Mackenzie, Mrs Colin. *Six Years in India: Delhi: The City of the Great Mogul*. London: Richard Bentley, 1857.

Magubane, Bernard Makhosezwe. *The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979.

Mair, Lucy P. 'Indirect Rule in Ibo Land.' *West Africa* 2335 (3 July 1962):238.

———. *Native Policy in Africa*. London: George Routledge and Sons, 1936.

Majumdar, R. C. 'Ellenborough and Sindhia,' in *The History and Culture of the Indian People*. vol. 9. *British Paramountcy and Indian Renaissance, Part 1*, edited by R. C. Majumdar. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1963.

Malcolm, John. *A Memoir of Central India*. 2 vols. London: Kingsbury, Parbury, and Allen, 1823.

Marshall, P[eter] J[ames]. 'Indian Officials under the East India Company in Eighteenth-Century Bengal.' *Bengal Past and Present* 84 (July-December 1965):95-120.

Mathur, R. M. *Rajput States and the East India Company*. Delhi: Sundeep, 1979.

Mehta, Mohan Sinha. *Lord Hastings and the Indian States; Being a Study of the Relations of the British Government of India with the Indian States, 1813-1823*. Bombay: Taraporevala and Sons, 1930.

Menon, V. P. *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*. Bom- bay: Orient Longmans, 1956.

Metcalf, Thomas. *The Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857-1870*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.

Middleton, John and Nane Campbell. *Zanzibar: Its Society and Politics*. London: Institute of Race Relations, 1965.

Mills, L. A. *British Malaya, 1824-1867*. Singapore: Methodist Publishing House, 1925.

Misra, Banky Bihari. *The Bureaucracy in India: An Historical Analysis of Development up to 1947*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1977.

———. *The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in Modern Times*. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Mojumdar, Kanchanmoy. *Anglo-Nepalese Relations in the Nineteenth Century*. Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1973.

Mukherjee, Rudrangshu. *Awadh in Revolt 1857-1858: A Study of Popular Resistance*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Mukhopadhyay, S. C. *British Residents at the Darbar of Bengal Nawabs of Murshidabad, 1757-1772*. Calcutta: Gian, 1988.

Neogy, Ajit K. *The Paramount Power and the Princely States of India, 1858-1881*. Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi, 1979.

Newbury, C. W., ed. *British Policy Towards West Africa, Select Documents 1875-1914*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.

Newton, Lord. *Lord Lansdowne; A Biography*. London: Macmillan, 1929.

Nicholson, A. P. *Scraps of Paper: India's Broken Treaties, Her Princes, and the Problem*. London: Ernest Burn, 1930.

Notes on the Services of B.H. Hodgson, Esq., Late British Minister at the Court of Nepal. Printed for private circulation, n.p., n.d.

Nkrumah, Kwame. *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. New York: International Publishers, 1966.

O'Malley, L. S. S. *The Indian Civil Service: 1600-1930*. London: Frank Cass, 1965.

The Origin, Rise and Consolidation of the Indian States. 1932. Reprint. Delhi: B.R. Publishing, 1975.

Owen, Roger. 'The Influence of Lord Cromer's Indian Experience on British Policy in Egypt 1883-1907.' *Middle Eastern Affairs*, vol. 4. Edited by Albert Hourani. St. Anthony's Papers, 17. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Panikkar, K[avalam] M[adhava]. *The Evolution of British Policy towards Indian States 1774-1858*. Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1929.

———. *An Introduction to the Study of the Relations of the Indian States with the Government of India*. London: Hopkinson, 1927.

Panikkar, K. N. *British Diplomacy in North India: A Study of the Delhi Residency 1803-1857*. New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1968.

Paton, John. *An Abstract of Political Intercourse between the British Government and the Kingdom of Oudh*. Reprint. Edited by Bisheshwar Prasad. Allahabad: Allahabad University Press, 1944.

Perham, Margery. *Lugard: The Years of Adventure, 1858-1898*. London: Collins, 1956.

———. *Lugard: The Years of Authority, 1898-1945*. Hamden, Ct.: Archon Press, 1968.

Philips, C. H., ed. *The Correspondence of Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, Governor General of India 1828-1835*. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

———. *The East India Company, 1784-1834*. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1961.

——— et al., eds. *The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858 to 1947, Select Documents*. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Prasad, Bisheshwar. *Paramountcy under Dalhousie*. Delhi: Ranjit Printers, 1964.

Prinsep, Henry T. *History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the administration of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813-1823.* London: Kingsbury, Parbury and Allen, 1825.

Prinsep, Charles C. *Record of Services of the Honourable East India Company's Civil Servants in the Madras Presidency from 1741 to 1858.* London: Trubner, 1885.

Qanungo, Bhupen. 'A Study of British Relations with the Native States of India, 1858-1862.' *Journal of Asian Studies* 26, 2 (February 1967):251-66.

Raj, Sheela. *Medievalism to Modernism: Socio-economic and Cultural History of Hyderabad 1869-1911.* Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1987.

The Rajah and Principality of Mysore with a Letter to the Right Hon. Lord Stanley, M.P.. London: Thomas Richards, 1865.

Ramusack, Barbara. *The Indian Princes and their States. The New Cambridge History of India,* vol. 3, no. 9. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

———. *The Princes of India in the Twilight of Empire: Dissolution of the Patron-Client System, 1914-1939.* Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1978.

Ray, Mihir Kumar. *Princely States and the Paramount Power, 1858- 1876: A Study of the Nature of Political Relations between the British Government and the Indian State.* New Delhi: Rajesh, 1981.

Reeves, Peter, ed. *Sleeman in Oudh: An Abridgement of W. H. Sleeman's 'A Journey through the Kingdom of Oude, 1849-1850'.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Regani, Sarojini. *Nizam-British Relations, 1724-1857.* Hyderabad: Booklovers Private Ltd., 1963.

A Reply to Lt. Gen. Macauley's Desultory Notes on the Travancore Petition. London: George Taylor, 1832.

The Republic of Transkei. Johannesburg: Chris van Reisburg Publications, 1976.

Richards, John F. 'Mughal State Finance and the Premodern World Economy.' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23, 2 (April 1981):285-308.

Robinson, Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher. *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism.* London: Macmillan, 1961.

Ross, Charles, ed. *Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis.* 3 vols. 2nd ed. London: John Murray, 1854.

Roussac, A. G., compiler. *The New Calcutta Directory for the Town of Calcutta, Bengal, the North-West Provinces, Punjab, Arracan, Assam, Pegu, Tenasserim, etc. for 1856.* Calcutta: Frank Carbery, 1856.

Rudin, Harry. *Germans in the Cameroons 1884-1914: A Case Study in Modern Imperialism.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938.

Rudolph, Lloyd I. and Susanne H. 'Rajputana under British Paramountcy: the Failure of Indirect Rule.' *Journal of Modern History* 38 (1966):138-60.

Sadka, Emily. *The Protected Malay States, 1874-1895*. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1968.

Sarkar, Jadunath and Govind Sakharam Sardesai, eds. *English Records of Maratha History: Poona Residency Correspondence*. 14 vols. Bombay: Government Central Press, 1936-58.

Satow, Ernest. *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. 4th ed. Edited by Nevile Bland. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1961.

Sever, Adrian, ed. *Documents and Speeches on the Indian Princely States*. 2 vols. Delhi: B. R. Publishing, 1985.

Simmons, C. P. and B. R. Satyanarayana. 'The Economic Consequences of Indirect Rule in India: A Reappraisal.' *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 16, 2 (April-June 1979): 185-206.

Sinha, Narendra Krishna and Arun Kumar Dasgupta, eds. *Selections from Ochterlony Papers (1818-1825) in the National Archives of India*. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1964.

Sleeman, William Henry. *A Journey Through the Kingdom of Oude*. 2 vols. London: Richard Bentley, 1858.

Smith, Woodruff D. *The German Colonial Empire*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978.

South Africa's Transkei: The Political Economy of an "Independent" Bantustan. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983.

Spangenberg, Bradford. *British Bureaucracy in India: Status, Policy and the I.C.S., in the Late 19th Century*. Delhi: Manohar, 1976.

Spodek, Howard. 'Urban politics in the local kingdoms of India: A View from the Princely Capitals of Saurashtra under British Rule.' *Modern Asian Studies* 7, 2 (1973):253-75.

Srinivasachari, C.S. *The Inwardness of British Annexations in India*. Madras: University of Madras, 1951.

Stengers, Jean. 'The Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo before 1914' in *Colonialism in Africa: 1870-1960*, edited by C. H. Gann and Peter Duignan. 4 vols. London: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

Stevens, Richard P. *Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland: The Former High Commission Territories in Southern Africa*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.

Stiller, Ludwig F. *The Silent Cry: The People of Nepal: 1816-39*. Katmandu: Sahayogi Prakashan, 1976.

Stocqueler, J. H., ed. *Memoirs and Correspondence of Major-General Sir William Nott, GCB*. 2 vols. London: Hurst and Blackett, 1854.

Sulivan, Richard Joseph. *An Analysis of the Political History of India. In*

Which is Considered, the Present Situation of the East, and the Connection of Its Several Powers with the Empire of Great Britain. 2nd., enlarged edition. London: T. Becket, 1784.

Sullivan, J. *Speech of J. Sullivan, Esq., on the Case of the Ameers of Sinde*. London: James Ridgway, 1844.

Sutherland, J[ohn]. *Sketches of the the Relations subsisting between the British Government in India and the Different Native States*. Calcutta: G. H. Huttmann, 1837.

Swettenham, Frank. *British Malaya: An Account of the Origin and Progress of British Influence in Malaya*. Revised edition. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955.

Teignmouth, C. J. S. *Memory of the Life of John, Lord Teignmouth*. 2 vols. London: Hatchard, 1843.

Thompson, Edward. *The Making of the Indian Princes*. Reprint. London: Curzon Press, 1978.

——— and G. T. Garratt. *The Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India*. Reprint. Allahabad: Central Book Depot, 1966.

Tod, James. *Annals and Antiquities of Rajast'han*. 2 vols. Reprint. New Delhi: K. M. N. Publishers, 1971.

Tupper, Charles Lewis, compiler. *Indian Political Practice: A Collection of the Decisions of the Government of India in Political Cases*. 4 vols. Reprint. Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corporation, 1974.

———. *Our Indian Protectorate: An Introduction to the Study of the Relations between the British Government and Its Indian Feudatories*. London: Longmans, Green, 1893.

United Kingdom. Parliament. *Sessionals (Commons) 1812-13*. 8: 279-82.

———. *Sessionals 1831-32*. Minutes of Evidence. 6. Political or Foreign, Appendix 3.

———. *Sessionals 1849*. 39:224-8.

Uttar Pradesh. *Union Political Pensioners in Uttar Pradesh*. Allahabad: Superintendent of Printing and Stationery, 1964.

Vashishta, Vijay Kumar. *Rajputana Agency, 1832-1858: A Study of British Relations with the States of Rajputana during the period with special emphasis on the role of Rajputana Agency*. Jaipur: Aalekh, 1978.

Vlekke, Bernard H. M. *Nusantara: A History of Indonesia*. The Hague: W. Van Hoeue, 1959.

Walia, Urmila. *Changing British Attitudes Towards the Indian States, 1823-1835*. New Delhi: Capital Publishers, 1985.

Wellesley, Richard Colley. *The Dispatches, Minutes, and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley*. Edited by Montgomery Martin. 5 vols. London: W. H. Allen, 1836-40.

Willoughby, Westel W. *The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1935.

Woodruff, Philip. *The Men Who Ruled India*. 2 vols. Reprint. Norwich: Jarrold and Sons, 1965.

Yapp, Malcolm. *Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran, and Afghanistan, 1758-1850*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.

Yazdani, Zubaida. *Hyderabad During the Residency of Henry Russell, 1811-1820: A Case Study in the Subsidiary Alliance System*. Oxford: The Author, 1976.

Young, M. Crawford. 'Background to Independence' in *Perspectives on the African Past*, edited by Martin A. Klein and G. Wesley Johnson. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972.

Index

Abukir, naval battle of, 402
Ackerley, J.R., 242
Addiscombe military seminary, 458
Aden, 171
Adowlut ('adālat, judicial court), 190
Afghan War
  First (1838-1842), 58, 81, 188, 231, 245, 420-1
Afghanistan
  British influence over, 30, 33, 167, 171-2, 347
  Failure of indirect rule in, 58, 242, 271, 415, 420-1, 435
  Invasion of India from, 378
  Modern, 3
  Wazīr of Kabul, 355
Afigbo, A.E., 5
Africa, see also South Africa
  European colonies in, 459-60, 468-77
  Direct versus Indirect rule in, 1, 3, 6-15, 18-19, 22-9, 33, 424
Akhbār ("newsletters"), 130, 272, 353
Age, The (Melbourne newspaper, see also Newspapers), 467
Aitchison, C.U., 431
Ajmere, 224
Alexander "the Great" of Macedon, 2
'Alī Ibrāhīm Khān, 452
'Alī Naqī Khān, 332-6, 346
Alwar, 326
Ambassador, 3, 46-9, 212, 280, 284, 404, 444, 471
  from Nepal, 419
America, 1, 19, 147, 417, 477
Amherst, William, Lord (Governor-General 1823-1828), 213
Amīrs of Sind, see Sind, Amīrs of
Amjad 'Alī, 347-8
Amritsar, 356
Anderson, David, 132
Annexation, see also Doctrine of Lapse
  by Japan, 28, see also Japan
  Company annexation in India, 30, 32, 44, 77-9, 149, 207-10, 244-8, 258-64
  from Hyderabad, 399-402, see also Hyderabad
  of Awadh, 9-10, 51, 59, 77, 158, 196, 209, 222, 245, 261-4, 375-8, 382-8, 399-402, 478, see also Awadh
  of Coorg, 208, see also Coorg
  of Mysore, 404-5, 412, see also Mysore
  of Peshwā's state, 189-90, see also Marathas, Peshwā
  of Sind, 283, see also, Sind
  pensions to Rulers of annexed states, 192-93, see also Pensions
  versus Indirect Rule, 13, 16-18, 58-9, 63, 67, 186, 218, 445

Anson, Archibald, 464
Arabian Peninsula, 171, 328, 461-3
Arabic language, 332-3
Architects, British Society of, 307
Arcot, see Carnatic
Āṣaf al-Daula, 142-3, 186-7, 304, see also Awadh
Āṣaf Jāh, 386, see also Hyderabad
Ashanti, 473
Asiwaju, A.I., 15
Assam, 170, 231, 415
Auckland, George, Lord (Governor-General 1836-42) 431
Austen, Ralph, 472
Ava, 38, 321, 419
Avadh, see Awadh
Awadh, 201-9, 277-286, 375-402, 422-4, 442-4, 478
  annexation of (see Annexation, of Awadh)
  Company relations with, 50-1, 142-3, 147-8, 150-4, 177, 185-7, 221-2, 271, 277-9
Indirect rule in, 8-10, 56, 124-5, 148, 151, 154-5, 167, 213, 294
Queen Mother of, 385
Residency, 33, 81, 104-5, 131, 134-6, 154, 158, 161, 298, 300, 313, 332-9, 351, 360, 424, 443
Ruler of (Nawāb Wazīr then Pādshāh), 50-1, 142, 185, 188, 196-7, 272, 282, 291, 304-5, 307, 313, 436, 443-4, 451
  Ta'aluqdārs of, 446, 472, see also Landholders
Ayodhya (temple or mosque), 425
Baghdad, 462
Bahādur Shāh II (Mughal Emperor 1837-1857), 259
Bahawalpur, 245, 255, 259, 263, 312
Bahrain, 462
Baksar, see Buxar
Baillie, John, 313, 332-5, 340
Banaras, 37, 125, 143, 148, 159, 167, 192, 222, 277, 283, 414, 442, 451-3
  Rājā of, 37, 451, 453
Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, 470, see also South Africa
Barbeyrac, Jean, 92
Barlow, George, 1, 57
Barnett, Richard, 161, 294
Baroda, 41, 80-1, 109-10, 114, 209-10, 223, 225, 251, 263, 273, 305, 444
  Gāikwād of, 127, 188, 196, 209
  Resident, 210, 217
Basra, 462
Basutoland, 469-70, see also South Africa
Batta, see Bhattā
Bax, John, 86
Belgian Congo, see Congo
Belgium, 8-9, 24-7, 40
Bell, Andrew Ross, 329-30
  Evans, 114
Benaras, see Banaras
Bengal, 50, 54, 104, 141, 143, 147-8, 150, 284, 333, 345, 383, 451
  Army, 383, 391, 440
  Dīwān, East India Company as, 49, 141
Nawāb of, 46, 50-1, 99, 123-5, 141, 145, 147, 150, 191-2, 196, 211, 222, 272-3, 284, 377, 443, 464
Presidency, 21, 44, 50, 54, 85-7, 96, 123, 125, 128, 137, 139,

167, 180, 333, 345, 377-8, 387, 433, 443, 464
Renaissance, 280
Bentinck, William, Lord (Governor-General 1828-1835), 166, 182, 200, 220-2, 226, 246, 361, 398, 410
Berar, 55, 176, 195, 245, 264, 277, 282, 388, 399
Rājā of, 312
Bharatpur, 186, 188, 263
Bhattā, (extra allowance paid soldiers while posted away from home), 79
Bhattacharyya, Pranjal Kumar, 33
Bhil, 348
Bhīma Sen Thapa, 418-9
Bhonsle, see Nagpur, Bhonsle Rājā of
Bhopal, 196, 263
Bhutan, 419
Bihar, 125, 148
Bihārī Lāl, 359
Bikaneer, 172
Birch, Captain J.W.W., 467
Bismarck, Otto von (see also Germany), 12, 25
Black Hole of Calcutta, 145
Bombay, 20, 38, 44-5, 51, 55, 70, 80-2, 109-10, 137-9, 180, 207, 272, 274, 322, 355-6, 462
Governor, 266, 274, 433
Presidency, 85-89, 123, 125, 127, 129, 137, 139, 167, 464
Bophuthatswana, 470 (See also South Africa)
Box-wallas, 10
Brahmin, 143, 363, 407
Brigança, 351
Bristow, John, 134
British Army commissions, purchase of, 298
British Crown, 445
Broadfoot, George, 86
Browne, James, 133-4
Bruton, William, 43
Buganda, 6, 37, 471
Bundelkhund, 333
Burdwan, 103
Bureaucratization of Residencies, 71, 76, 101, 243, 295, 316, 331-50, 356, 360, 363, 456
Burlamaqui, Jean Jacques, 92
Burma, 21, 30, 167, 231-2, 242, 253, 268, 415
First War (1824-1826), 169, 231
Second War (1852-1853), 245
Burnes, Alexander, 347
Bushire, 462
Butler, Harcourt, 480
Buxar (battle of), 30, 50, 142, see also Awadh, Bengal

Cabinet, British, 19, 244, 462, 468
Cabinet Mission to the Indian Princes (1946), 453
Cabul, see Afghanistan
Calcutta Council, see Bengal, Presidency
Cameroons, 8-9, 26, 40
Campbell, G.W.R., 465
Canada, 39, 328
Canning, Charles, Lord (Governor-General 1856-1862), 70, 432
Cape of Good Hope (see also South Africa), 469
Carcoon, Indian commercial representative, 282
Carnatic, 21, 124, 147-8, 150, 158, 167, 197, 201, 222, 277, 284-5, 287, 300, 306, 327, 387, 389, 443

Nawāb of the, 38, 122, 127, 141, 161, 169, 188, 192, 196-7, 245, 287-8, 328, 387, 389, 443-4
Wars (1746-1748, 1751-1754, 1756-1763), 387
Carnac, James Rivett, 80-1
Cartwright, Richard, 43
Casamajor, James, 411
Caste, 362
Catholic, 19, 26, see also Christians
Caudharī, headman, 335
Caulfield, James, 99
Cavendish, Richard, 224
Cawnpur, 281
Ceylon, 465
Chamar, 362
Chamber of Princes, 277
Chamier, John, 96
Chandu Lāl, 211, 396-99, 423, 428
Cheyt Sing, see Banaras, Rājā of
Chhatarpur, Mahārājā of, 242
China, 2, 28-9, 415-6, 419
Chittagong, 231
Chobdārs (court officers, bear a silver or gold mace), 252
Chowdry see Caudharī
Christians, 19, 26, 327, 352
Cis-Sutlej (see also Punjab), 245
Clive, Archibald Campbell, Lord, (Governor of Madras 1786-1789), 327-8
Robert, 21, 297
Close, Barry, 176
Robert, 79
Cochin, 196, 226, 263, 277
Colebrooke, Sir Edward, 326, 351
College, see Delhi College, Fort William College
Collins, John, 303
Colonial Office, 468
Colonialism, 3, 25
Commercial line, 31
Company's Directors, see Court of Directors
Concubines, 140
Congo, 8-9, 26-7, 40
Congress, see Indian National Congress or West African Congress
Constituency, 384, 386, 390, 391, 394, 395, 400, 420, 435, 460
Resident builds, 164, 393
Coorg, 208
Coote, Eyre, 316
Copland, Ian, 23, 35-6, 441
Cornwallis, Marquis Charles, (Governor-General 1786-1793, 1805), 55-57, 151-52, 368
Cossimbazar, 50
Cotton lands, ceded to Company, 388
Court of Directors
Policies of, 20, 55-7, 67, 70, 80-2, 103-5, 133-7, 140, 165-6, 244-5, 337, 345, 378, 385, 407
Role of, 44-6, 88-9, 94-8, 108-12, 148, 151-3, 173-5, 209, 216-7, 250, 284-7, 298-301, 336-7, 341, 350-2, 389-90, 411-2, 433, 438, 443
Court of Wards, 464
Court of St. James, 285
Court Ritual, see Ritual, Court
Covenanted Civil Service, 324-5, 332, 339, 356, 441, 457, 458
Indian Covenanted Officials, 457-8
Cowpox vaccination, 207
Crawfurd, John, 16, 38
Creagh Coen, Terence, 35, 42, 458
Cromer, Evelyn Baring, First Earl, 23, 476

Crowder, Michael, 19
Crown Representative, 456
Cubbon, Mark, 83
Cullen, William, 83
Cunningham, Joseph D., 86
Curzon, George, Lord (Viceroy 1899-1905), 450, 455
Cutch, 188, 196, 263

Ḍāk (postal relays of runners, later simply mail service), 133, 173, 281
Dalhousie, George, Lord (Governor-General 1848-1856), 82, 100, 158, 245, 249, 255, 257-9, 385, 399, 401, 444-5, 478
Darbār (periodic levee), 135, 174, 191, 205, 225, 275, 278-80, 306, 321, 354
Daulat Rā'o Sindhia, see Sindhia
Debt, see Loan
Deccan, 171
Definition of Indirect Rule, 4-5
Dehli, see Delhi
Dehly, see Delhi
Delhi, 33, 39, 41-2, 55-6, 100, 104-5, 119, 133-4, 136, 171, 183-4, 191-2, 224, 252-3, 259, 275, 283, 288, 291, 295-6, 300, 303, 305, 321, 326, 328, 337, 346, 351-2, 355-6, 358-9, 449
College, 340, 346, 370
Resident, 170-2, 180, 182-4, 186, 213, 232, 252,
Delhy, see Delhi
Deposition of Ruler, see Annexation
Derecognition of Pensioned Ruler, 244-5, 454
Dewan, see Dīwān
Dhar, 371
Dholpore Barie, see Dholpur Bari
Dholpur Bari, 55, 196, 172, 272
Dilāwar Jang, "Bold in War" see Kennaway, John
Direct rule, discussed, 1-29
Directors, East India Company, see Court of Directors
Disraeli, Benjamin, 448
Dividends, East India Company, 103, see also Court of Directors
Dīwān, office of, 49-50, 150, 152, 211, 214-5, 401, 408-9
Dīwānī of Bengal, see Bengal, Dīwān, East India Company
Doab, 172
Doctor, Residency, 88, 108, 307, 318, 362-3, 439
Doctrine of Lapse, 245, 257-60, 266, 444-5, 454
Dominant Resident pattern, 215, 239
D'Oyley, Sir John, 285
Dual mandate, 482, see Bengal
Dubash, 96
Dundas, Charles, 37
Henry, 404
Durand, Henry Marion, 115
Duff, Grant, 191
Dupleix, Joseph (French Governor of Chandernagore 1731-1741, French Governor-General of India 1741-1754), 21
Durbār, see Darbār
Dutch East India Company, 3, 21, 24-5

East Africa, 459
East Africa Company, 471
Edmonstone, N.B., 198,.236
Egypt, 2, 23, 402, 468, 476-7, 482

1857 Conflict, 10, 30, 32, 59, 61, 76-7, 80, 95, 235, 244, 250, 253, 260, 262, 264, 266, 283, 308, 357, 371, 375, 383, 385-6, 388, 399, 421, 442, 440, 445, 450, 458
Elchei, see Ilchī
Elchey, see Ilchī
Ellenborough, Edward, Lord (Governor-General 1842-1844), 81-2, 115, 245-6, 248, 250
Elphinstone, Mountstuart, 92, 174, 176
Elizabeth I, 46
Emperor, Mughal, see Mughal Emperor
Empire, Mughal, see Mughal Empire
Empress of India, see Victoria, Queen
England, King of, 443
  Queen of, see Victoria, Queen
Englishman, The (newspaper, see also Newpapers), 254
English Office of the Residency, 318, 349-51
Establishment, see by specific Presidency
Extradition (see also Jurisdiction), 145, 161, 254, 416, 448
Extraterritoriality (see also Jurisdiction), 14, 27, 144-47, 157, 161, 199-206, 230, 265, 354, 384, 419, 427, 435, 440, 448, 464, 471

Faizabad, 356
Farmān (Persian for "royal letter, order, decree"), 46, 48
Farmed offices, 298
Farrukhabad, 105, 124-5, 147, 192
  Nawāb of, 152, 172, 192
Fiji, 467
Firm, The (William Palmer and Company), 367, 389-91, 400, 450
Fitch, Ralph, 46
Fort St. George, Presidency see Madras Presidency
Fort William, 350, see also Bengal Presidency
Fort William College, 333-4, 370
France, 8-9, 15, 19, 21-2, 24-5, 46, 135-6, 141, 147, 156, 169, 171, 329, 358, 387-8, 392, 400, 402, 405, 422
Fraser, James Stuart, 226, 293
  William, 100
French East India Company, 3, 21, 124, 141, 155-6, 387
French Invasion of India threatened, 214, 433
French Revolution, 19, 21
French West Africa, 8-9
Frontier, East India Company's, 323, 352, 455, 469
Funding of Residencies, 101-112
Furnival, J.S., 21
Furruckabad, see Farrukhabad

Gaika tribe, 469
Gāikwāḍ, see Baroda, Gāikwāḍ of
Gambia, 474
Gandhi, Indira, 454
Ganges plain, 377, 420
Gardiner, Edward, 100, 418
  William L., 100
Gazette, Government, 280
George, John, 352
Germany, 12, 24-7, 40
Ghana, 474
Gifford, Prosser, 20, 22
Gladstone, W.E., 244

Goa, 105, 109, 136
Gohad/Gohud see Dholpur Bari
Gold Coast, 473
Goldie, George, 474
Government of India Act (1935), 456
Gumāshta (literally a deputy), 358
Gordon, Alexander, 98
Governor-General, see by specific person
Grotius, Hugo 92
Guaranteed Pensioners, 206-7, 391-2, see also Pensions
Guddee (throne), 256
Gulf, see Persian Gulf
Gurkas (see also Nepal), 169, 414
Gwalior, 42, 55, 114, 136, 180-2, 224-5, 245, 257, 263, 266, 272, 277, 349, 363, 419, 444
Rājā of, 169, 458

Hailey, Sir William Malcolm, Lord, 5, 8, 37
Haileybury, 458
Halhed, Nathaniel B., 285
Hamilton, Robert, 256
Hamirpur, 334
Haraoti, see Kotah
Hardinge, Henry, Lord (Governor-General 1844-1848), 82, 245
Harowtee, see Kotah
Harper, Captain, 379
Har Sukh Rāi, 358-9
Ḥashamat Jang, Farzand-i Maḥabbat Paiwand, "Magnificence in War, Beloved Son", see Kirkpatrick, James Achilles
Hastings, Warren, 54-5, 67, 123, 125, 128-36, 142, 150-1, 154, 161, 297, 368, 379
Hastings, Francis Rawdon, Lord (Governor-General 1813-1823), 166, 178, 187-8, 212-4, 216, 301, 305, 389, 443
Hawkins, Francis, 183-4, 234
Hawkins, William, 46
Ḥaydar ʿAlī , see Mysore, Sulṭāns of
Hennell, Samuel, 462-3
Hertford College see Haileybury
Hill States, 172
Hindustani/Hindi (see also Urdu), 98, 360-1
Hindu, 47, 143, 258, 317-8, 320, 327, 349, 358, 361-2, 375, 403, 406-7, 458
Hindustan, 91, 132, 316, 320, 344
Hitler, Adolph, 2
Hobhouse, John, 82
Hodgson, Brian Houghton, 419-20, 431
Holkar, 256, 275
Hollond, John, 104, 138
Huṇḍī (draft for payment), 357, 359
Hurd, John, 15
Hyderabad, 8, 51, 56-7, 59, 78, 137-8, 143-4, 171, 195-7, 211, 213, 219, 221, 223-4, 245, 261, 263, 271, 273, 277, 279, 293-4 296, 300-303, 321, 328-30, 336-7, 375, 377, 386-403, 422-4, 436, 442, 454
1798 Treaty, 57, 197, 391
1800 Treaty, 392
contingent, 391, see also Subsidiary Force
Niẓām of, 17, 21, 33, 5i, 105-6, 144, 185, 188, 196, 203, 211, 218, 221, 226, 240, 273-4, 277, 293-4, 305, 316, 336, 377, 386-

404, 423, 442, 444
Resident, 38-9, 41, 51, 89, 104-6, 108, 119, 127, 136-8, 144, 158-9, 167, 171, 177, 180, 185-6, 189, 195, 201, 207, 211, 218-19, 221, 224, 226, 261, 293, 299, 303, 328-30, 336-7, 373, 387-402, 406, 423-4

Iboland, 37
"'Ibrat Nāma," 327, 366, 371
Ife, University of (see also Nigeria), 5
Ilchī (a Turkic word for Ambassador or Plenipotentiary), 47-49
Iltifāt Ḥusain Khān, 321, 337
Imaumbarrahs (Imāmbārā, shrine where Shī'ī martyrs are commemorated), 382
Imtiyāz Ḥusain, 337-8
Imperialism, 4, 6, 11-2, 27, 459, 468
Imposed Minister pattern, 239, 413
India, Republic of, Independence, 451, 454
Constitution, 454
India Act (1784), 55
Indian Civil Service, 31, 324, 456-7
Indian nationalism, 2, 450-3, see also Indian National Congress
Indian National Congress, 453-4, 475, see also Indian Nationalism
Indian Ocean, 461
Indian Political Service, 8, 35, 456-8, 480
Indianization, 457-8
Indigenous Service Elite, see Residency, Indian Subordinate Officials
Indirect rule, discussed, 1-29
Ideal type, 4
Model for Empire, 458-77
Indonesia, 21
Indore, 86, 99-100, 196, 256, 263, 273, 347-9, 359
Indus River (see also Sind), 283
Infanticide, female, 210
Intelligence or Newswriter's Department, 132, 278, 316, 318, 352-7, 404, 420, 439, 472
Intervention Policy, 4-7, 123, 166, 186, 195, 212, 213, 219, 223, 224, 229, 246, 260, 410, 422, 434-7, 440-1, see also Jurisdiction or Non-Intervention Policy
in administration, 147-166, 196-99, 208-32, 242-50, 260-2, 380-6, 388-402, 404-414
in succession of rulers, 139-144, 186-193, 255-60, 265
rejected by Rulers, 287, 289-308, 414-23
Iran, 33
Islamic, see Muslim
Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909) (see also Japan), 27
Ives, Edward Otto, 379

Jahangir, (Mughal Emperor 1605-1627), 68
Jageer see Jagīr
Jagīr, 172, 206, 320, 343-4
Jaghire, see Jagīr
Jaipur, 108, 220, 283, 300, 355-6
Jaiselmir, 323
Jamaica, 39, 328
James I, 46
Jang Bahādur Rāna, 421
Janjira, 320, 344

Jankojī Rā'o, see Sindḥia
Japan, 24, 27-9, 40
Java, 24-5, 40, 171
Jaynagar, 275
Jeffrey, Robin, 33, 215, 239-40
Jenkins, Richard, 79, 92-3, 97-8, 117, 176, 193, 213, 215-6
Jenner, Edward, 207
Jetoo, 362
Jhansi, 59, 77, 245, 258-9, 263
  Rāṇī of, 264
Jirga (tribal assembly of elders), 455
Jodhpur, 293
Johannesburg (see also South Africa), 470
Judicial, 31, 71, 145, 192, 199-201, 230, 254
Jurisdiction (see also Extradition or Extraterritoriality), 144-8, 155, 157, 164, 199-208, 230, 242, 254-5, 265, 395, 434-5, 437, 446, 464

Kabul, see Afghanistan
Kaffir Tribes High Commissioner of (see also South Africa), 469
Kalpi, 192, 356
Kannada language, 360
Kanya-Forstner, A.S., 22
Karīm Khān, pindari, 353
Kashmir, 279, 454
Kathiawar, 210, 217, 263, 446
Katmandu (see also Nepal), 100, 414, 431
Kattywar, see Kathiawar
Kennaway, John, 104, 302
Kenya, 8-9, 471
Khaffe Khan, 98
Khair al-Dīn Muḥammad Ilāhābādī, 327
Khān Bahādūr (title), 322
Khasgui-wallah see Khāṣagī wālā
Khāṣagī wālā, "King's favoured one" or, sometimes Treasurer, 210
Khedive, see Egypt
Khil'at (Arabic, a robe of honor bestowed by a superior on an inferior), 187, 253, 337, 344, 451-2
Kimberley, Earl of, 465, 473, 481
Kirkpatrick, James Achilles, 302
Knowledge and information, see Residency, Information gathered by
Kolhapur, 147, 263
Korea (see also Japan), 27-8, 40
Kotah (Haraoti), 99, 108, 299, 359
Kshatriya, 363
Kumasi, 473
Kutcherry, 191
Kuwait, 462

Lahore, see Punjab
Landholders, 78, 131, 198, 202, 254-5, 264, 307, 332-5, 343, 381-3, 386, 397, 440-2, 446, 451-2, see also Awadh, Ta'aluqdārs of
Language, see by specific language
Lapse, Doctrine of, see Doctrine of Lapse
Lawrence, George, 100
  Henry, 83, 431
Leaden Hall Street, the headquarters of the English East India Company, 175
League of Nations, 28
Lee-Warner, William, 1, 35, 42, 268, 445-6, 450

Leopold, King (see also Belgium, Congo), 40
Leprosy, 363
Lesotho (see also South Africa), 469-70
Library, Residency, see Residency, Library
Liskei, 470 (see also South Africa)
Loan, from Rulers to East India Company 149, 161, 206, 209-10, 294-5, 382, 386, 389, 393, 435
to Rulers, 294, 300, 389-90, 393, 399, 417
Local Language Department, Residency, 318, 360-2
Local Language Office, see Local Language Department, Residency
London, 1-2, 9, 20, 33, 44, 46, 55-7, 70, 80, 105, 108, 122, 132, 140, 165-6, 172, 175, 216, 227, 284, 345-6, 390, 431, 433, 436, 457, 459, 460, 467-8, 477
Loodianah, see Punjab
Low, Donald A., 22-4
Lucknow, 51, 55, 81-2, 99-100, 104, 106, 119, 170, 177, 257, 278-279, 283, 294, 303, 308, 313, 321, 330, 333-334, 337-8, 340-1, 350, 356, 359 see also Awadh or Awadh, Ruler of
Luckstedt, David, 352
J.B., 352
Lucknow, see Lucknow
Ludhiana, see Punjab
Lugard, Frederick D., Lord, 2, 6, 23, 37, 468, 471-5, 481
Lytton, Edward, Lord, (Viceroy 1876-1880), 448, 450
MacCulloch, William, 175
Macleod, Dr. B., 301
Macnair, Major, 464-5
Macpherson, John, (Governor-General 1785-1786), 55, 136, 284
Maddock, Thomas Herbert, 100, 285, 300, 418
Madras, 20, 44, 45, 51, 55, 70, 97, 105, 110, 137-9, 153-4, 272, 280, 284, 287-8, 356, 412, 443, 464-5
Madras Presidency, 85-69, 123, 125, 127, 137, 139, 143, 167, 260-1, 280, 350, 387, 403-4, 430, 433, 464-5, 480
Mahādjī Sindhia, see Sindhia
Mahomedan, see Muslim
Mahratta, see Maratha
Maine, Sir Henry, 446-7
Mair, Lucy, 19
Malabar Commission, 210
Malacca, 171, 464
Malaya, 2, 22-3, 461, 464-7
Malaysia, 38
Malcolm, Duncan, 101
John, 16-7, 38, 83-4, 89, 91, 99, 204, 250, 375, 458
Malet, Sir Charles Warre, 85-6, 104, 132, 351
H.C., 351-2
Malwa, 323, 326, 329, 347, 359
Manchukuo, see Manchuria
Manchuria, 27-9, (see also Japan)
Manipur, 477
Manual of instruction for Residents, 94-5, 456
Maratha (see also Nagpur, Indore, Tanjore, Poona), 17, 91, 127, 136-37, 140, 145, 156, 161, 167, 171, 174-5, 177, 187-90, 192, 196, 206, 212, 215,

245, 256, 272, 274-6, 319, 336, 358, 378, 392, 402-6
Maratha Wars, 174, 400
Second (1803-1805), 169, 206
Third (1817-1819), 64, 169, 171, 190, 194, 206, 212, 216
Marathi language, 319, 360
Marten, 92
Masilipaṭam, 192
Maulawī (a Muslim learned in law), 304, 346
Mauritius, 464
War (1809-1810), 171
Mawlavee, see Maulawī
Maxwell, W.E., 473
Mecklenburg, Duke of, 26
Mehmānī ("guest money"), 299
Mehta, Mohan Sinha, 305
Melville, Peter, 82
Menon, V.P., 268
Metcalfe, Charles Theophilus, 18, 39, 91, 213, 218-9, 223-4, 293, 302, 328, 330
Meywar, 249
Middle East, see by specific region
Middleton, Henry, 100
Nathanial, 134-5
Mildenhall, John, 46
Mill, James, 16, 38, 163
Minister, Chief, discussed, 18-9, 24, 33-4, 143, 147-57, 165, 189, 197, 203, 208, 210-12, 214-8, 221-30, 242-3, 249, 279, 291, 295-6, 305, 376-7, 387, 389-401, 408-10, 413, 418-9, 421, 434, 463
Mīr Ālam, 392, 396, 423
Mīr Bādshāh, 394
Mīr, Jafar, 141
Mīr Kasim, 141
Mīr ("Head") Munshī, see Munshī
Mīrza ʿAlī Akbar, 321-2
Misra, Bankey Bihari, 108, 350
Mitchell, Philip, 37
Mohamedan, see Muslim
Mohammed Hussen, see Muḥammad Ḥusain
Mogul, see Mughal Emperor or Mughal Empire
Mohan Lāl, 347
Molucca, see Malacca
Montague-Chelmsford reforms, 458
Moonshee/Moonshey/Moonshi, see Munshī
Morrison, John, 284
Mosque, 253, 382
Mughal Emperor, 20, 46-51, 56, 141, 171, 179, 183, 184, 187, 190-2, 204, 234, 252, 253, 259, 260, 264, 275, 280, 284-5, 288, 291, 296, 305, 307, 312, 327, 346, 353, 358, 377-8, 386-7, 394, 412, 442, 451
Mughal Empress, 183
Mughal Empire, 30, 43, 45-51, 66, 103, 125, 130, 302, 319-20, 336, 338, 343, 360-3, 377, 380, 384, 386-7, 438-40, 446, 352
Muḥammad Ḥusain, 365
Muḥarram, the Shīʿī period of fasting and lament, 303
Mujtahid al-ʿAṣr ("highest Shīʿī religious authority of the Age"), 185
Multan, 355
Munī Lāl, 340
Munro, John, 18, 39
Thomas, 83, 236, 269, 406
Munshī, 317-49, 357, 360-4, 389, 438-40, see also Mīr Munshī
Murshidabad, 41, 46, 50, 72, 116,

see also Bengal or Bengal, Nawāb of
Muscat, 463
Muslim, 47, 172, 258, 294, 317-8, 320-2, 327, 332, 360-3, 344, 375, 382, 402-3, 405-6, 438, 458, 468
Musnud, 188, see also Guddee
Mutiny, see 1857 conflict
Muttsuddy, 132
Mysore, 23-4, 56, 78, 127, 136-8, 167, 169, 171, 186, 214-5, 263-4, 276-7, 282, 296, 375-6, 385, 387, 395, 400, 402-14, 422-3, 436, 464
Mysore
  Annexation, 404-5, 412
  Fourth War (1799), 64, 87, 137, 169, 194, 214, 233, 282, 376, 404
  Mahārājā of, 17, 24, 114, 169, 186, 188-9, 196, 288, 305-6, 403, 405-14
  Treaty (1799) 407, 411
  Wars, 400
Mysore Commission, 214, 251, 288, 406, 411-2
Mysore Resident, 38, 90, 99, 114, 136-8, 214, 226, 288, 375
Mysore, Sulṭāns of, 87, 99, 167, 171, 192-4, 276, 282, 387, 392, 402-8, 413

Nabob, see Nawāb
Nagpore, see Nagpur
Nagpur (see also Marathas), 59, 77, 79, 89, 91-3, 97-9, 119, 132, 176, 194, 196, 216, 224, 245, 257, 259, 263, 272-5, 277, 283, 286, 324, 419
  Bhonsle Rājā of, 91, 127, 188, 272, 275
  Resident, 213, 215
Nā'ib, ("deputy, assistant"), 150
Napoleon, 2, 402, see also France
Narbada, 100
Nāṣir al-Daula, 397, see also Hyderabad, Niẓām of
Naṣir al-Dīn Ḥaidar, 307, see also Awadh, Ruler of
Natal (see also South Africa), 469
Nationalism, 2, 10-1, 442, 450-1, 458, 460, 475, 477, see also Indian Nationalism
Native administration, 2
Native Doctor, see Doctor, Residency
Nawāb ("Governor"), 302, see also by regional state
Naẓr (symbolic presentation of a gift or offering usually of gold coins, from an inferior to a superior), 183, 187, 205, 253, 256, 451
Nelson, Horatio, 402
Neo-colonialism, 3-4, 37
Nepal, 36, 100, 242, 250, 273, 285, 362, 375-6, 414-23, 431, 435-6
  War (1813-1816), 169, 417
Newberry, John, 46
Newspapers (see also The Age, The Englishman, Press), 390
Newswriters, see Intelligence or Newswriters Department
New Zealand, 467
Nigeria, 2, 5-6, 8-9, 22-3, 26, 37, 468, 471, 473-5
Niger Coast Protectorate, 473-4
Nile, see Egypt
Niẓām, see Hyderabad, Niẓām of
Nkrumah, Kwame, 3, 37
Non-Intervention Policy, 153, 166, 182, 185, 195, 200, 209, 212-4, 220-7, 230, 246, 376,

392, 409-11, 436, 440, 464, see also Intervention Policy
Northeast Asia, 27, 28
Northeast India, see Assam
Northern Circars, 195, 388
Northwest Asia, 33
Northwest India, see Afghanistan
Northwestern Provinces, 250
Nott, William, 81-2, 170
Nuzzers/Nuzzurs see Nazr

Octerlony, David, 83, 100, 186, 303, 351, 358
Oil, 462
Omdut ul Mulk see Carnatic, Nawāb of the
Orissa, 43
Ottoman Empire, 476
Oude, see Awadh
Oudh, see Awadh
Oudh Auxiliary Force, 381, see also Subsidiary Force
Outram, James, 83
Overlordship, 452, 463
Owen, Roger, 476

Pacific Ocean, 461, 467
Pādshāh, see Mughal Emperor or Awadh, Ruler of
Pagodas [Hindu temples], 407
Paishwa, see Peshwā
Pakistan, 453-4, 458
Palmer, William (see also The Firm), 41, 389-90, 400
Pangkor, 465
Panikkar, K.M., 33, 57
Panikkar, K.N., 234
Panjab, see Punjab
Paramountcy policy, 4, 13, 56, 103, 154, 166, 178, 187-8, 191, 214, 216-20, 226, 260, 306, 445, 453-4
Parda (cloth screen, signifying seclusion of females), 183, 303
Parliament, British, 16, 19, 81, 98, 108, 123, 246, 277, 287, 298, 300, 336, 361
Parsi, 317-8, 349, 454
Patialah, see Punjab
Patna, 108, see also Bihar
Peasants, 397, 449
Peel, Robert, 244
Pegu, 245
Penang, 464-5
Pensions to ex-Rulers, 169, 172, 190-3, 244-5, 280, 385
to Indian Courtiers, 172, 203-7, 392-6, see also Guaranteed Pensioners
to Indian Officials of East India Company, 317, 326, 331-3, 337, 339, 343-6, 348, 350-1, 439
Peon (uniformed messenger), 317, 359
Perak, 465, 467
Perron, Pierre Cuillier, 358
Persia, 38, 375, 378, 461-2
missions to (1799 and 1810), 171
Persian Gulf, 22, 461-3
Persian Language, 36, 49, 98, 302, 319-21, 346, 349, 360-3, 438-9, 461-3
Persian Department, Residency, 318-49, see also Munshī or Mīr Munshī
Persian Secretary, East India Company, 34
Peshawar, 355
Peshwā (see also Marathas, Poona), 17, 91-2, 106, 127, 177, 188-92, 196, 212, 245, 272-6, 282, 293, 301, 312, 351-2

Pigot, George, 284
Plassey, 30, 141
Poligar, 306
Political line, 31, 60, 70-113, 437-8, 454-57, see also Indian Political Service or Residents
  Indianization, 457-8
Poona (see also Peshwā), 17, 33, 38, 41, 55, 85, 91-2, 104, 108, 119, 129, 131-2, 136-7, 159, 176, 188, 194, 196, 207, 273, 275-6, 278, 282-3, 299, 312, 316, 349, 354, 366
  Resident, 207
Poorneah, see Purniah
Population under indirect rule, 8-10, 14-18, 34, 51-2, 262-4
Portuguese, 1, 19, 24, 46, 350
Post-master, Residency, 108, 351
Pottinger, Henry, 83
Prasad, Bisheshwar, 254
Press (see also Newspapers), 286-7, 431, 449, 460
Princesses, 205
Prinsep, Henry, 34, 41
Privy purses, 454
Promotion, see Resident, Promotion
Protectorate, 2, 23, 27, 463, 472, 476
Pudukkotai, 306
Puffendorf, 92
Punjab, 59, 64, 167, 171-2, 196, 245, 263, 271, 328, 347, 356, 378, 419
  Mahārājā of the, 188
Punjabi language, 360
Purniah, 408-10, 413, 423
Pu-Yi, (Chinese Emperor then Manchukuo ruler), 28-9

Qaiṣar-i Hind (literally Caesar of India), see Victoria, Queen

Raj, (British Rule over India), 59-60, 440-1, 445-59
Rajasthan, 33, 42, 52, 59, 170-2, 224, 277, 303, 323, 326, 351-2, 359, 419
Rajasthani language, 319
Rajput, 47, 303
Rajputana Agency, 41
Rām Mohan Roy, 280-1
Rāma, 47
Rampore, see Rampur
Rampur, 172, 356
Reeves, Peter, 33
Regani, Sarojini, 33
Regency, 25, 50, 66, 78, 186, 214, 224, 245, 257, 348
Regulating Act of 1773, 123
Residency, see also by specific Department or Policy or State
  British personnel, 70-113, 441
  Civilian versus Military, 77-85
  Bureaucratization, 101-112, 339-348, 440
  European diplomatic practice, 48
  Functions, 60-66
  Information gathered by, 163, 170-186, 229, 270, 272, 278, 279, 293, 294, 295, 301, 307, 316-7, 319, 320, 323, 326, 328, 352-7
  Indian Subordinate Officials, 14, 316-64, 391, 438-40
  Recruitment, 318, 326, 331-3, 336, 339-40, 346, 350, 363
  Salary, 334-7, 358, 360, 439
  Indigenous Origins, 45-50, 270-7
  Library, 92, 113
  Phases of growth, 43-66, 432-7

Post-1857 patterns, 59-60, 440-1, 445-54
Rulers' Alternatives to, 277-84
Rulers' Strategies with respect to, 269-308
Residency surgeon, see Doctor, Residency
Resident
Accused, 295-7, 411-2
Builds constituency, 164, 393
Promotion, 95-101, 112
Recruitment, 31-2, 71, 77-89
Salary, 79-80, 96-7, 101-12, 114, 135, 298-9
Training, 89-95
Residentur, 26
Resident-General, 27, 467
Richmond, Archibald, 81-2
Ring Fence Policies, British, 166
Ritual, court, 19-20, 48, 66, 164, 178-86, 229, 250-3, 266, 292, 303, 306, 319, 321, 325, 403, 410, 440
Robinson, Hercules, 469-70
Roe, Thomas, 46
Rohilkund, 172
Rohilla War (1774), 196, 353
Roman Empire, 2
Ross, Mr, 285
Rotten boroughs, British Parliamentary, 298
Roy, Rām Mohan see Rām Mohan Roy
Royal Niger Company (see also Niger Coast Protectorate, Nigeria), 474
Ruanda, 26, 40
Rumbold, Sir William, 329, 366, 389
Russell, Henry, 17, 38, 41, 195, 302, 389
Russell Contingent, 195, see also Subsidiary Force or Hyderabad Contingent
Russia, 156, 461-2
Russian Empire, 27
Russo-Japanese war, (1904-1905), 27

Sa'ādat 'Alī Khān, 142-3, 187, 304, 380, see also, Awadh, Ruler of
Ṣābit Jang, "Proved in War," see Russell, Henry
Ṣadr ("Chief") Board of Revenue, Delhi, 183
Safīr (Envoy or Ambassador, "peace-maker"), 47
Sagur, 192
Saiyid Amjad 'Alī, 347
Saiyid Atā Ḥusain, 337-9
Saiyid 'Azīzullah, 336, 337, 343
Salar Jang, 399, 423
Salary, see Residents, Salary or Residency, Indian Subordinate Officials, Salary
Salisbury, Robert, Lord, 448
Saltpetre, 105, 382
Samoa, 467
Sanad, 265, 447, 451
Sandi district, 335
Satara, 245, 258-9, 263, 444
Rājā of, 189-91
Satyanarayana, B.R., 15
Saugar, 100
Saugor, see Saugar
Sawantwadi, 147, 223, 354
Secret Department, East India Company, 175
Secretariat, Calcutta, 71, 93-4, 105-10, 131-3, 138, 173-5, 255, 317, 341-2, 347, 351, 356, see also Persian Secretary or Bengal Presidency

Sellana, 348
Serajah Dowlah Bahadur, see Carnatic, Nawāb of
Settler colony, 12, see also Direct Rule
Seven Years War (1756-1763), 46
Shagun Chānd, 359
Shāh Muḥammad Ismā'īl Shahīd, 371
Shaikh Luṭfullah, 329, 367
Shaikh Shahāmat 'Alī, 340, 346-8, 371
Shan States, see Burma
Shareholders, East India Company, 19, 103-4, 108, 423
Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, see Persian Gulf
Shepstone, Theophilus, 469-70
Shī'īsm, 303, see also Imāmbārā
Shore, John (Governor-General 1793-1798), 136, 154, 155, 367-8
Shukūh, see Sulaymān Shukūh
Shuqqa (a royal order), 184
Siam, 38
Sierra Leone, 474
Sikandar Jāh, 144, 397
Sikh, 253, 458, 469
Sikh States, 172
Sikh War
  First (1845-46), 245
  Second, (1849), 64, 245
Sikkim, 419
Simla, 473
Simmons, C.P., 15
Sind, 82, 167, 244-5, 263, 273, 283, 288, 419
  Amīrs of, 196, 283, 288, 312, 324
  Commissioner of, 322
  Upper Political Agent, 329
Sindh, see Sind
Sindhia, dynasty, 127, 140, 196, 257
  Daulat Rā'o, 38-9, 91, 93, 187, 196, 206, 224
  Jankokjī Rā'o, 224, 257
  Mahādjī, 187, 274-6, 288, 327
Sindhia Resident with, 38-9, 91, 93, 105-6, 108, 119, 132, 137, 140, 173, 175, 180, 215, 224, 257, 275, 283-5, 303, 327-9, 366, 375
Sindiah, see Sindhia
Singapore, 464
Sirāj al-Daula, 141
Sistan, 455
Slave trade, 463
Sleeman, William, 158, 257
Smallpox, see Cowpox vaccination
Smith, Sir Harry, 469
Soucar (sāhūkār, a moneylender or merchant), 294
South Africa, 463, 468-71
Southall. Roger, 470
Southeast Asia (see also Burma, Malaya, Straits), 3, 22, 27, 33, 59, 459-60, 464, 475, 477
Southern Rhodesia, 471
Sovereignty, 1, 3, 6-7, 13-4, 18-20, 25, 35, 49, 51, 190-3, 197, 212, 218, 252-3, 335, 387, 403, 407, 412-3, 441-54, 474-8
Soviet Union, 3, 29
Spain, 1, 19, 24
Spiers, Alexander, 257
Stewart, General, 333
Stipend, from Company to former Rulers, 50, 191-2, 408, 413
Stockholder, see Shareholders, East India Company
Straits (see also Southeast Asia, Malaya), 464, 466
Ṣūbadār (Governor), 47

Subsidiary alliance policy, British, 57, 166, 209
Subsidiary Force, 99, 164, 189-90, 193-9, 209, 214, 221, 230, 269, 378, 381-2, 388-90, 420, 430, 434, see also Subsidy
Subsidy, 142-43, 149, 164, 194-7, 214, 245, 294, 407-8, 417, 435, see also Subsidiary Force
Sub-imperialism, 44, 57, 245, 460
Succession of Rulers, 21, 62, 64-6, 139-144, 155-7, 164, 185-193, 214, 216, 255-60, 265, 380-2, 387
Sudan, 22, 476-7
Suez Canal, 463
Sufi, 329
Sulaymān Shukūh, Mīrza, 204-5
Sulivan, Richard Joseph, 122, 158
Sumirpur, 334
Sunnad, see Sanad
Supreme Court of Bengal, 443
Surat, 192
Surgeon, see Doctor, Residency
Sutherland, John, 35, 42, 93-4, 117, 180-2, 224-6
Suzerainty, 1, 4, 13, 51, 445, 449, 452, 454, see also Sovereignty
Swettenham, Frank, 466
Sydenham, Thomas, 293

Ta'alụqdārs, see Awadh, Ta'aluqdārs of
Taḥsīldār (district revenue collector), 334, 338-9
Tanganika, 471-2
Tanjore, 55, 124, 127, 143, 147-8, 150, 152-4, 167, 184, 222, 234, 260, 272, 277, 284, 300, 306, 412
Rājā of, 143, 153-4, 161, 185, 188, 191-2, 196, 245
Tariffs, 416
Taxes, 439, 475
Telegraph, electric, 281
Tenasserim, 115
Thapa, Bhīma Sen, see Bhīma Sen Thapa
Thompson, E.P., 174
Thug, highwayman, 257
Tibet, 415, 455
Ṭīkā (annointment by a sovereign of a ruler), 48
Timur (Tamerlane), 98
Tipu Sulṭān, see Mysore, Sulṭāns of
Tod, James, 38, 303, 361
Tō-kan, 27-28
Tonk,169
Tordesillas, Treaty of (1494), 19
Torrens, Henry, 116
Transkei, 470 (see also South Africa)
Translators, see Munshī or Persian Department or Local Language Department
Trans-national corporations, 3
Trans-Sutlej, see Punjab
Travancore, 33, 110, 127, 138, 147, 180, 196, 200-1, 213-5, 239, 261, 263, 277, 280, 282-3, 288
Travancore Resident, 214, 226, 239
Treasury Department, 316, 318, 340-1, 349, 357-60
Treaties, discussed 19-20, 48, 65, 142-7, 166, 172, 187-90, 193-7, 206-8, 211-2, 215, 222-3, 227-9, 248, 254-7, 260-2, 273, 276-7, 291-2, 307, 354, 380-2, 411, 414-7, 441-2, 444, 446-8, 462-5, 469-71
Tribal Areas, 170, 455, 462, 469
Trucial system, 462, see also Persian Gulf

Trusteeship, 2
Tupper, Charles Lewis, 35, 42

Uganda, 23, 468, 471-2
Ujjain, see, Sindhia
Uncovenanted Indian Officials, Residency, 317-364, 438-40
Uncovenanted Servants, 316
United Provinces (see also Awadh), 446
Untouchable, 362
Urdu, see also Hindustani/Hindi, 360
Urundi, 26, 40
Utilitarianism, 361
Uzeez Oolah, see Saiyid ʿAzīzullah, 336, 337, 343

Vakeel, see Wakīl
Varanasi, see Bạnaras
Vattel, Emer de, 92
Venda, 470, (see also South Africa)
Vernacular languages, 360-1, see also languages by name or Local Language Department, Residency
Victoria, Queen-Empress, 265, 362, 385, 440, 448-9, 471
Victoria, Queen's proclamation of 1858, 23, 59, 265
Viet Nam, 3
Vishnu, 47
Vizier, see Wazīr
Vorwoerd, H.F., 470

Wade, Claude, 346-8
Wājib al ʿarẓ ("record of rights"), 396
Wakīl (Agent, "one entrusted"), 47-9, 55, 67, 130, 137, 177, 179, 205-6, 274, 279, 282, 269-70, 272-81, 290-1, 305, 323, 340, 346, 378, 416-7
Walia, Urmila, 305
Walker, Alexander, 80, 109, 114, 210
Walpole, Horace, 21
War for Independence, First Indian, see 1857 Conflict
War of Austrian Succession (1740-1748), 46
Ward, 92
Warrant chiefs, 26, 37, 468
Warsaw Pact, 3
Wazīr (Chief Minister), 50, 136, 150, 154-5, 335, 355
Wazīr ʿAlī, 186-7, 380
Webbe, Josiah, 96, 116
Wellesley, Gerard, 100
Henry, 209, 382
Richard, (Governor-General 1798-1805), 56-7, 90-1, 116, 166, 173, 175, 209, 213, 282, 333, 382, 402-6, 409, 413-4, 417
West Africa, 37, 459
West African Congress, 475
William Palmer and Company, see Firm, The
Wood, Peter, 33
Woodruff, Philip, 31, 40
World War II, 451, 459

Yapp, Malcolm, 33
Yazdani, Zubaida, 33
Yorubaland, 15, 38

Zamīndār, see Landholder or Awadh, Taʿaluqdārs of
Zanānah (separate women's quarters), 303
Zanzibar, 23, 461, 463-4, 467
Zemindars, see Landholder or Awadh, Taʿaluqdārs of

OXFORD INDIA PAPERBACKS

INDIRECT RULE IN INDIA
Residents and the Residency System
1764–1858

MICHAEL H. FISHER

More than any other imperial power, the British in India developed techniques of indirect rule. They used Residents who were posted to each major Indian state. This book concentrates on the origins, growth and functioning of the Residency system on a pan-Indian scale between 1764 and 1858. Based on their experience in India, the British later deliberately deployed indirect rule in South East Asia and Africa.

This volume delves into the actual working of the Residency system and provides a comprehensive view of this crucial element in the creation of the British empire in India.

Excerpts from reviews

'This book is a valuable study of the process of imperial expansion.'
P. J. Marshall in the *English Historical Review*

'...Fisher...has been able to discern behind treaties and agreements, how the British used the Residency system to their total advantage.'
Mani Karmerkar in *IESHR*

'...he casts fresh light on the role that the resistance and complicity of Indian rulers and officials played in the establishment of British supremacy. ...this book will be essential to students of both imperialism and the history of modern India.'
John McLeod in *Journal of Asian Studies*

Michael H. Fisher is Professor and Chairman of the History Department at Oberlin College, Ohio, USA.

Cover picture: 'The cavalcade of the King of Awadh', by an unknown artist, *c.* 1820. Reprinted by permission of the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford.

Oxford India Paperbacks
Oxford University Press

ISBN 0195644419-0

9 780195 644197

OUP
₹325.00